EXTERNALIZATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL IN TRANSIT STATES: THE CASES OF MOROCCO AND MEXICO

Abstract

In the modern context of global and domestic politics, with the increase in both international human rights regime and domestic constraints, migrant receiving states are limited in their ability to pursue restrictive measures. In this context, externalization, which refers to set of actions aimed at shifting the responsibility of dealing with migration to third parties outside of one’s border, allows states to diffuse political costs associated with migration control without facing potential backlash. This research project aims at identifying what factors determine successful implementation of externalization of migration management in transit states. The existing literature on the subject focuses its attention on the powerful destination states and attempts to explain externalization from the perspective of an asymmetrical relationship, where a more powerful actor determines the implementation of remote control practices. However, such an approach to the matter of externalization fails to account for the success of certain remote control practices and not others. I remedy this by shifting focus to the perspective of transit states with regards to the implementation of remote control practices. I propose an incentive-based approach as an explanation of successful implementation of externalization. In this sense, I argue that the consideration of potential incentives that come with the adoption of externalization play a more decisive role in determining the implementation of remote control practices than merely the wishes of a dominant state in an asymmetrical power relationship. These incentives include financial support, cooperation in a broader political and economic domain, and increasing legitimacy. In this research I rely on the cases of Morocco and its relationship with the European Union, and Mexico and its relationship with the United States.