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EXTERNALIZATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL IN TRANSIT STATES:
THE CASES OF MOROCCO AND MEXICO

КӨШІ-ҚОН БАҚЫЛАУЫНЫҢ ТРАНЗИТТІК МЕМЛЕКЕТТЕРДЕГІ
ЭКСТЕРНАЛИЗАЦИЯСЫ:
МОРОККО МЕН МЕКСИКА КЕЙСТЕРІ

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ГОСУДАРСТВАХ:
КЕЙСЫ МОРОККО И МЕКСИКИ

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Abstract

In the modern context of global and domestic politics, with the increase in both international human rights regime and domestic constraints, migrant receiving states are limited in their ability to pursue restrictive measures. In this context, externalization, which refers to set of actions aimed at shifting the responsibility of dealing with migration to third parties outside of one's border, allows states to diffuse political costs associated with migration control without facing potential backlash.

This research project aims at identifying what factors determine successful implementation of externalization of migration management in transit states. The existing literature on the subject focuses its attention on the powerful destination states and attempts to explain externalization from the perspective of an asymmetrical relationship, where a more powerful actor determines the implementation of remote control practices. However, such an approach to the matter of externalization fails to account for the success of certain remote control practices and not others. I remedy this by shifting focus to the perspective of transit states with regards to the implementation of remote control practices. I propose an incentive-based approach as an explanation of successful implementation of externalization. In this sense, I argue that the consideration of potential incentives that come with the adoption of externalization play a more decisive role in determining the implementation of remote control practices than merely the wishes of a dominant state in an asymmetrical power relationship. These incentives include financial support, cooperation in a broader political and economic domain, and increasing legitimacy. In this research I rely on the cases of Morocco and its relationship with the European Union, and Mexico and its relationship with the United States.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

This research focuses on the externalization of migration management to transit states. Externalization refers to a process and set of practices whereby actors extend existing policies aimed at controlling migration outside of their borders through third parties (Lemberg-Pedersen 2019, 2). Previous studies on this subject predominantly explained this phenomenon from the standpoint of powerful destination states, such as the EU and its member states (Betts 2008; Collyer 2016; Geddes 2005; Guiraudon 2000; Lavenex 2007; Papagianni 2013). This kind of power based approach fails to explain how and why third parties, i.e. actors that accept remote control policies, engage in externalization. I remedy this puzzle by focusing on the incentivization strategies that destination states utilize in order to push for acceptance of the externalization management in transit states. By viewing outsourcing of migration control from the perspective of transit states the mutually beneficial character of these agreements becomes central to the successful implementation of remote control practices. Such approach to the phenomenon of externalization is novel because it points to a more balanced cooperation between destination and transit states.

Exploring the implementation of remote control practices is a significant and worthy endeavor, especially in the context of increasing attempts by governments to discourage unwanted migrants from coming to their borders. One of the main debates within migration studies discusses how states control migration and the restrictive measures that they employ in order to manage migration (Colleen 2009; Gest et al. 2014; Lahav 1998; Schuck 2007). Immigration policies in this context become the essential element that determine the scope and pattern of immigration. The literature on migration control has various explanations as to why states pursue restrictive politics and what determines openness. Particularly, disparity between state intentions and on-the-ground situation of the migrants is one of the prevailing questions that scholars try to address (Hollifield 2004; Rosenblum and Cornelius 2012). As a

part of the larger discussion of state strategies to control migration, externalization of migration management is in line with the restrictive measures that the destination states pursue. This is because externalization decreases political costs of dealing with irregular migration for destination states.

Scholars who study externalization predominantly focus their attention on powerful actors (Geddes 2005; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006; Lavenex 2007; Papagianni 2013), neglecting the role and perspective of the third parties to where the nexus of immigration control is being directed. As a result, existing theories that base their explanation on the high bargaining power of the destination states are unable to explain why certain remote control practices succeed, while others fail. Therefore, a more appropriate explanation would involve the perspective of both destination states and transit/origin states and their mutually beneficial interests.

This research proceeds as follows. The first section will be devoted to the discussion of the literature on externalization of migration. This section demonstrates that the current literature mostly focuses on the reasons for and the effects of externalization on the destination states, mostly those within the EU. The literature does not thoroughly address the perspective of third parties involved in externalization, e.g. the transit states. In this sense, the scope of the actual influence of transit states is somewhat understudied, meaning that it is difficult to identify whether states are just complying with the destination states' demands or if they actually are more independent in the initial decision-making. It is assumed that an asymmetrical power balance exists between the two, meaning that most of the time the more powerful destination state is able to advance its interests, leaving the transit state with the options of taking a potentially suboptimal deal or refusing it and the benefits that accompany such a deal. As such, an excessive focus on liberal states as destinations and on their perspective is potentially taking away from a more comprehensive understanding of

externalization efforts. Such an approach potentially allows identifying the mechanisms of externalization.

The next section is devoted to the development of the theoretical framework for the externalization of migration management in transit states. This paper attempts to remedy the issue that I described above by focusing on the perspective of transit states. I put forward the incentive-based approach as the main concept of my theory as it explains the dynamics between the states that engage in policies aimed at migration control and sharing of responsibilities. In this sense, I argue that transit states' interests in obtaining substantial benefits from agreeing to externalization plays a more significant role in determining success in the implementation of those migration policies on their territory, regardless of the way remote control practices were imposed. This approach sheds a light on how remote control practices are implemented and what kind of forces drive transit states in particular to engage in externalization based on these potential benefits. On top of that, I identify how externalization plays out within the larger context of immigration control policies.

Then I will discuss cases of externalization of migration by focusing on cases of Morocco and Mexico. Particularly, I will focus on externalization processes that affect both states. Morocco and the EU established a Mobility Partnerships in June 2013 that requires this North African state to take a more proactive role in combatting irregular migration and readmit irregular migrants that the EU wants to expel from its territory. Mexico, on the other hand, did not have an active role in formulating the US Migrant Protection Protocols in June 2019, which allows the US to return asylum seekers to Mexico. Nevertheless, it has assented on some level to the new policy context. Additionally, I will also cover the larger context of the implementation of these remote control practices. These two cases demonstrate the implementation of externalization within the framework of transit states. Both of these states

play a significant role in determining the initial outcome of externalization and whether transit states would enact such policies.

These two cases demonstrate two different starting points for the implementation of remote control practices. Morocco represents a balanced cooperation between two asymmetrical powers, whereas Mexico illustrates a conventional power based approach, where a more powerful actor imposed its policy onto a weaker one. Despite, this initial variance externalization still succeeded in both scenarios, which leads to conclusion that success of implementation should be attributed to other factors. Mobilization of these countries by more powerful destination states, the EU for Morocco and the US for Mexico, to control migration shows how willingness of destination states can result in the employment of various strategies in order to incentivize transit states to adopt remote control practices. Such strategies involve the financial support to these countries, as well as the possibility to open discussions about expansion of trade and diplomatic avenues, such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in the case of Morocco, and the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement in the case of Mexico.

More importantly, these two cases show how the needs of the transit states play a significant role in the success of the implementation. Not only are benefits that come from adopting externalization important in the initial decision to implement remote control practices; these two cases also demonstrate how transit states can utilize transit migration to achieve their goals. What the findings suggest is that transit states are effective at curbing illegal migration immediately once the externalization process begins, but their governments put little effort into addressing the root cause of irregular migration, as well as improving the well-being of migrants within their territory. This allows transit states to demonstrate results, compliance with the agreements and, at the same time, keep the issue of transit migration as an ever-present issue, which they can exploit in the future.

Chapter 2. Literature review

Externalization in more general terms is in line with the migration theories, which demonstrate that the receiving side attempts to restrict access to its territory and discourage ‘unwanted’ migrants from arriving at its borders. Migration control is one of the most prevailing issues that states in the Global North face in their policy-making. This is especially evident from the case of Western countries that are predominantly viewed as the desired destination for migrants, i.e. the US and the EU. In such circumstances, these states have largely attempted to discourage migrants from arriving at their territory by introducing various restrictive measures aimed at achieving this goal (Zaiotti 2016, 3). Moreover, the framing of the migration problem as a crisis has allowed those states to justify on various levels their actions directed to stop immigrants. This narrative is further reinforced in the context of turmoil events regarding the refugees and the burden of governments to resolve those situations urgently, e.g. the migrants drowning in their attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea (Specia 2019; Tondo 2019) or the separation of families at the US-Mexico border (Human Rights Watch 2019; Lind 2018; The Guardian staff and agencies 2020).

In the situation where a government faces condemnation from international and domestic human rights organizations for its treatment of migrants and the frequent policy failures, there is no question about the intention of those states to move their responsibility away from within its borders. This is precisely the reason why governments of destination state engage in remote control practices of migration control. The externalization of migration control has been practiced by states for a quite long time. In the case of European countries, the idea of offshoring the asylum procedures has been suggested in the 1980s (Flynn 2014). Following this trajectory Australian officials redefined the status of certain islands with the implementation of its ‘Pacific Solution’ in 2001 in order to process migrants there (Magner 2004). In recent years it has become a more widespread course of action for the states, while

the scope and variation of tools available to the government in achieving the goal has also broadened. In such a context, the question of how remote control policies affect the various actors involved in this phenomenon is especially appealing for investigation.

As such, the question has been at the heart of extensive research in political science that explores externalization and the way migration policies are outsourced outside of one's territory (Guiraudon 2000; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006; Lavenex 2007; McNamara 2013). This review proceeds as follows. First and foremost, I will discuss the migration control in general in order to provide a context for the study of externalization of migration policies. In particular, this section focuses on the determinants of migration policies and how various actors on different levels approach the issue of migration. The migration control covers several aspects of policy-making and other actions by the involved parties both at the international and domestic level.

The next section will analyze the externalization of migration policies, which is the main focus of this research. This section revealed that the literature on externalization predominantly discusses migration policies from the perspective of the powerful actors, i.e. the EU, that initiate these policies, which in this case leaves open the potential to explore this issue from the perspective a receiving actor, i.e. the state that agrees to the remote control efforts of the destination states. This leads to the final section of this literature review, where I examine the notion of transit states, which are considered to be the main actors that externalization efforts are directed to and, thus, are the ones to have the largest impact on such efforts. I will conclude with the overall consideration of a potential gap that this literature review provides regarding the central question and how this research can contribute to the scholarly debate on the topic of externalization.

Migration control in general

The externalization of migration control allows destination states to control the flow of migrants and process them before they arrive at their borders. In this regard, the fact that destination states are constrained by the rules that they enacted and by the international human rights regime means they can pursue restrictive actions through remote control practices without any pushback. In other words, shifting responsibility of dealing with irregular migration through externalization is a way to avoid criticism over human rights practices. International migration is one of the central issues in international relations theory and comparative politics, which affected the debate concerning the globalization processes that influence the national sovereignty and the role of the international norms in restricting the national policy-making (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 163). The debate was framed in the context of the states losing control over the flow of migration due to certain inherent mechanisms of migration and the rise of the international human rights regime on the one hand and increasing will of the states to manage the issue of migration on another (Joppke 1998; Sassen 1996).

This was especially evident in the post-Cold War era and the subsequent fall of the Iron Curtain, which resulted in the growing fear of the Western governments that there would be an influx of migrants from the former Soviet bloc states, as well as following the events of 9/11. Both of these events led to the emergence and strengthening of various actors on the domestic, regional and transnational level that deal with migration management (Geiger 2016, 262). As the aftermath of these exogenous shocks, the states started to be more proactive in implementing the policies aimed at restricting the flow of “unwanted” immigrants. The set of discourses around the topic of migration and the practices that different actors utilize in conjunction with it create a complex approach to migration control. In this sense, what one may potentially observe is the disconnect between the discourse that actors develop in order

to justify their actions and the actual practices that they employ in reality (Geiger and Pécoud 2010, 2). In order to further investigate how migration control evolved to include the externalization mechanisms, it is first necessary to understand why the migrant issue itself a controversial and paradoxical notion is.

Economic conditions of a state have been identified as one of the major determinants of migration patterns (Casas-Cortes and Cobarrubias and Pickles 2015, 896). People move from economically disadvantaged states to a state that is more economically stable. Even though such explanation can predict migration patterns to a certain extent, it tends to overlook the complexity of this phenomenon. What it fails to capture is that immigration is a costly and risky venture that requires a certain level of pre-established wealth, aspiration and social capital in order to achieve the goal of settling in another country. That is why large-scale migration does not occur from the poorest states (De Haas 2014, 34). Nevertheless, the disparity between receiving and origin states in terms of development still takes place. This is ultimately what has been shown to be an integral process in the relationship between more developed and economically prosperous the Global North and, to a lesser extent, the Global South that is not as wealthy or at the same level of development in the context of contemporary globalization processes (Castles 2004, 871).

In terms of understanding international migration patterns, it is important to note that this phenomenon is a social process that contains its own distinct dynamics (Castles 2004, 870). The social structures embedded in the migration processes allows it to be more a self-sustaining and internally oriented process (De Haas 2010, 1591). Such a system can be described “as a set of places linked by flows and counter-flows of people, goods, services and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between places” (De Haas 2010, 1593). In such cases, sustainability of migrant flows can be attributed to the migrant network and social capital.

One aspect that plays an important role in the study of immigration patterns is the policy oriented to controlling the flow of migrants (Meyers 2004). This is especially evident in cases where one can observe a large number of people that attempt to emigrate. In such instances, immigration policies largely shape the scope of people entering by limiting or enabling opportunities to do so. Such policies are mainly determined by the set of socioeconomic and foreign policy factors and the type of immigration (e.g. labor migration, permanent or temporary, refugee, etc.) considered (Meyers 2004, 10). Thus, the role of the state and its interests is what defines the orientation of immigration policies. The national interests of the state in determining the direction of migratory politics, according to Rudolph (2003, 605), can be captured along three dimensions: “geopolitical security, production and accumulation of material wealth, and social stability and cohesion”. In this sense, framing migration as a potential threat to domestic well-being potentially determines the initial emergence of such policy. Thus, what is evident in the question of migration is that it is not solely a bottom-up approach, where domestic actors through lobby or other instruments lead to policy change; it is also true that the state itself is a crucial political actor that advances and shapes policy outcomes (Rudolph 2003, 319).

Since state is a crucial actor that influences the decision in accepting migrants, it is important to discuss the way those policies unfold and what affects the initial decision. In this context a state faces what is called a “liberal paradox”, which is the main source of occasionally contradictory migration policies (Castles 2004, 854). There is no doubt that migrants are beneficial for the receiving state in terms of cheap labor force (Joppke 1998, 270). Due to the need for such workforce, domestic political actors push for more open migration policies. Additionally, the globalization process and international human rights regime ultimately force liberal states to accommodate the migrants (Joppke 1998, 268). However, at the same time immigration policies face a certain degree of domestic backlash.

Migrants compete for limited resources and jobs and potentially also contribute to overpopulation in a given territory (Joppke 1998, 270). All of these factors are the underlying reasons behind the implementation of migration policies and integration of migrants in the system of a given state.

The image of control is thus an important aspect in defining these policies. The state has an interest in maintaining its legitimacy and overcoming past policy failures (Castles 2004, 871). Such state centric approach even though oversimplifies the complex interaction of various actors involved, advances the understanding of the incentive to preserve the certain discourse, even if it does not correspond with actions on the ground. In this sense it is possible to explain, for instance, the relationship of the EU and its Member states and third states as a multi-level game, where in order to identify the outcome of the interaction it is necessary to examine the preferences of all actors involved in this intercourse (Reslow and Vink 2015).

Some scholars suggest that the way migration unfolds at the territory of such liberal states does not necessarily follow similar patterns in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries (Natter 2018; Norman 2016). The bottom-up processes that are in line with the neo-institutionalist and post nationalist approaches to the migration force states to adapt specific types of migratory politics. There are also instruments available for domestic actors in terms of judiciary systems that play a certain role in promoting migrant rights (Norman 2016, 423). However, more restrictive authoritarian states in developing part of the world base their decision-making on a different set of priorities (Natter 2018, 17). In contrast to liberal states that heavily rely on their electorate base and public support, more autocratic states can restrict the role of domestic actors in determining migration policies and the well-being of migrants. In such instances, international mechanisms of dealing with such states play a more incremental role in shaping and alternating policies regarding migrants in those states.

Understanding these underlying mechanisms of general migration control efforts provides a starting point for the investigation of the remote control practices. The fact that states strive for better control of their borders points to the broadening of the scope of policies and actions that they utilize in order to achieve that level of control. In such a framework, externalization efforts of the destination states and its impact on the actors involved attain a special significance within the discussion of the migration control policies. In particular, the willingness of destination states to control migration and introduce more restrictive policies actually makes them more vulnerable and less strong in the initial position in externalization talks. Thus, it becomes clear that transit states have a better starting point than what was previously assumed. The next section will delve deeper into the topic of externalization.

Externalization of migration control policies

Attempts to theorize the actions of destination states, such as the US or EU, beyond their traditional borders use terms such as remote control, extra-territorialisation, juxtaposed control, external relations, and foreign policy to characterize these efforts (McNamara 2013, 326). As a part of a larger migration control efforts, border externalization includes several practices that states may possibly utilize, such as international law instruments (the readmission, visa facilitation, visa liberalization and visa reciprocity agreements), arrangements and bilateral agreements with third countries that are concluded through FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and mobility partnerships (Papagianni 2013, 289).

The externalization of migration policy to third states is mostly discussed in the context of the EU and its efforts to affect the influx of different types of migrants by shifting border control to third countries, predominantly to neighboring states along the Mediterranean coast (Geddes 2005, 278; McNamara 2013, 327). The idea behind such remote control

practices is to control the flow of migrants before they arrive into the territory of the EU, since upon arrival of migrants it would be problematic to return them due to international commitments to human rights and domestic constitutional principles, such as equality before the law, and protection of fundamental human rights (Guiraudon 2000, 259). The result of externalization efforts is the increased role of the EU and its member states in arranging bilateral and/or multilateral readmission agreements with migrant-sending third countries (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010, 43). These agreements address various issues depending on the type of migration they intend to address, e.g. refugees, asylum seekers, labor migration, etc. These readmission agreements are predominantly part of larger negotiations, which include more general issues, such as development and foreign aid (Tokuzlu 2010, 9).

The external dimension of the EU migration policy exists mainly as a response to both internal and external challenges (Papagianni 2013, 283). There are several approaches to the modes of external governance of the EU. The institutionalist explanation suggests that internal modes of governance of the EU is what shapes the external one. The power based approach, on the other hand, attributes the external governance to the EU's interdependence with third countries and alternative powers on the international arena, i.e. the US and Russia. Finally, the external governance and the way it affects the third states is associated with domestic structures of those states (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 792). Regardless of such explanations, what one may potentially observe is that the EU member states play a more proactive role in the implementation of migratory politics in the neighboring states (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010, 43), compared to other states that experience a considerable influx of immigrants. As a result, the EU strives for policies that would change the power balance in its favor (Guiraudon 2000, 252).

The main problem with the literature on EU border externalization is that it implies the existence of asymmetric relationship between two actors, i.e. the EU member states and neighboring developing states. Therefore, instead of solving the issue of migration collectively, the EU shifts the burden to the transit states (Wolff 2015, 4). Such relations have been explained in terms of a suasion game, where there is little interest to cooperate from the side of a more powerful actor, whereas a weaker actor can refuse to accept an offer and lose potential benefits or it can withdraw from an agreement (Betts 2008, 174). This approach is problematic due to the fact that third parties that engage in externalization play less of a role in the success of remote control practices. As a result, the interests of these transit states have been overlooked in the externalization literature (Geddes 2005, 278). Thus, the incentive to further control the issue of migration in those states is under question, as there is a lack of motivation to adopt policies addressing the issue. Transit states often times are persuaded to implement remote control practices without providing substantial contribution to the negotiations (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010, 68). However, such explanation is dismissive of the fact that certain policies and negotiations initiated by the EU and its member states have ultimately failed in achieving their desired goals.

What is of particular interest in the way externalization efforts of the EU member states is that civil society organizations in the neighboring states played a more crucial role in addressing the issues of migrants than any other actors, whether an international organization, the EU, or the ruling authority in these states, and, thus, it strengthened their role in domestic policy making. International organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), contributed to the externalization efforts of the EU to control migration flows (Lavenex 2007, 7).

The fact that the issue of migration involves a human element at its core means that the topic of remote control policies also involves normative framework and the way it shapes

the behavior of the actors involved (Geiger 2016, Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). Due to these reasons, externalization of border control to neighboring states involves a certain level of criticism from both the international civil rights community and scholars that study the subject of migration patterns in this region (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010, 46; Papagianni 2013). This is especially evident in the case of refugees and their condition in the territory of transit states. The marginalization of those communities in transit countries, limited opportunities to integrate into society in order to sustain themselves further complicated the conditions of refugee communities (Grabska 2006). On top of that, indifference of the transit state and the subsequent rise of informality in the realm of migration have led to growing insecurity and increase in abuses of refugee communities (Mourad 2017). The externalization efforts of the EU in this sense are predominantly viewed as a catalyst of human rights abuses of the refugees in neighboring states, which in turn affects the image of the EU and its member states on international level or for that matter any actor involved in this process, including the transit and origin states.

Transit states

The concept of transit states refers to countries that migrants travel through in order to reach the desired destination (Parliamentary Assembly. Resolution 2073 2015). This concept has been most prominently used in recent references to the states in Northern Africa. In international migration patterns the migrant routes include more than one state before they settle in one country or return to their origin country in certain instances (Artuc and Ozden 2018, F306). The notion of transit states is closely affiliated with the refugees and undocumented migrants, and also has a sense of temporariness attached to it (Artuc and Ozden 2018, F308). These transit states are playing a more significant and proactive role in dealing with migrant issues both on domestic and international level in recent years,

especially in the context of externalization efforts of destination states. Such increasing influence is instrumental in shaping the behavior of these states.

Nevertheless, the question still remains of whether transit states are prepared to deal with migration effectively. The reason is that these states are predominantly at the developing stage in this context. These states mostly served as countries of emigration due to their nature and only recently have been established as a receiving side. Thus, they did not develop coherent policies that can deal with the immigrants on a larger scale (Fargues 2009, 571). This leads to what Norman (2019) describes as an indifference-as-policy of those states, where the government shifts its responsibility in dealing with migrants and providing basic services to international and civil society organizations. What this does is allows authorities to distance themselves from the burden of dealing with migrants and at the same time utilize the presence of migrant communities as a leverage in order to attract more support from international donors (Mourad 2017, 266).

Additionally, the term transit state is in itself ambiguous and does not reflect the reality of migrant experiences. From the three types of migrants in countries of South and East Mediterranean, including labor migrants, refugees, and transit migrants, the latter one represents the smallest part of the three (Fargues 2009, 573). In the Libyan case, which before the events of Arab Spring and the subsequent fall of the Gaddafi regime was the host for a large number of labor migrants from Africa and the Middle East, the notion of transit route also hardly can be applied (Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2013). The reason is that migrants predominantly viewed Libya as their final destination. The term “transit” was utilized in accordance to the domestic and international demands that the immigration policies and issues be linked, which resulted in interchangeable labels between labor migrants and transit migrants (Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2013, 61).

The close examination of the literature concerning the externalization of migration control policies reveals that there is a substantial gap in terms of identifying the interests of the states to which those externalization efforts are directed. This does not necessarily imply that destination states or any other actors involved play a lesser role in the implementation of remote control policies; rather, it means that by emphasizing the role of the third states in this context it is possible to provide a clear picture of externalization phenomenon. What is important in this context is to move away from the traditional Marxist views on the migration control policies (de Haas 2010; Van Hear 2014) and, in particular, asymmetrical relations of the North-South (Collyer 2016; Lavenex 2007).

Based on this review, the next step is to investigate more thoroughly the remote control practices from the perspective of the third parties. In this sense, the more suitable case would be the transit states, i.e. countries neighboring the destination states, as they are considered the primary agents in addressing the issue of migration due to the urgent necessity to solve the problem. In other words, the close proximity of transit states to destination states raises their profile in the attempts of the latter to outsource its migration control. Such approach of destination states to the remote control practices means that these transit states will become a main priority in the attempts to shift responsibility of dealing with migrants.

Chapter 3. Theoretical framework

The introduction of remote control practices serves as a means of reorienting policy instruments in destination states. Such practices allow states to control and sort prospective migrants, stopping those that they deem ‘unwanted’ before they arrive at their territories (Joppke 1998). Given the circumstances, these states have largely attempted to discourage migrants from arriving to their territory by introducing various restrictive measures designed to limit their entry, going as far as declaring the situation a crisis in some cases (Zaiotti 2016, 3). The governments in destination states face certain difficulties in terms of judicial constraints they face in implementing restrictive migration policies (Guiraudon 2000, 259). However, the framing of the migration problem as a crisis allows those states to justify on various levels their actions directed to stop immigrants. This narrative is further reinforced in the context of crisis regarding the refugees and the burden of governments to resolve with urgency various critical situations, such as migrants drowning in the attempts to cross the Mediterranean Sea or the separation of families at the US-Mexico border. Although the decision with regards to externalization efforts is quite straightforward from the standpoint of destination states, it removes third parties, i.e. transit and origin states from the discussion over these remote control practices.

One of the main issues that is linked to the studies of externalization is the fact that it suggests that an asymmetric relationship that exists between more powerful receiving states and less powerful sending states guides the political discourse and determines dynamics of such relations. In this sense, externalization is predominantly viewed as a matter of a destination states and, as such, studies are more focused on the effects that remote control practices have on these states, leaving both transit and origin states out of the discussion (Laube 2019; Lemberg-Pedersen 2019; Papagianni 2013). Such an approach to externalization largely is dismissive of the bigger picture of development in migration

management, where transit and origin states also play a significant role in determining whether externalization takes place. This is precisely why it is important to pay attention to the specific cases of transit and origin states that are part of the externalization efforts of destination states. In this sense, this research is aimed at answering the question of why exactly transit states are willing to engage in externalization. This in turn would potentially shed a light on how externalization of migration unfolds and in what instances it would lead to the successful implementation of such policies.

Conceptualization

In order to establish a coherent theoretical framework and a firmer understanding of this research it is necessary to identify and explain key concepts that I will utilize throughout this paper. First and foremost, since the discussion revolves around the notion of externalization processes it is important to delve deeper into this concept. Even though the term “externalization” is a fairly recent concept within the political domain and scholarly works on migration, the idea of shifting the burden in order to deal with migrants to third parties has been a long-standing instrument of states to manage migration. Such practices of outsourcing are known under various terms, such as remote control practices, externalization, juxtaposed control, etc. (McNamara 2013, 326). Due to the fact that such terms have the same meaning I will be utilizing them interchangeably throughout the research.

Externalization of migration suggests that rather than processing or enforcing certain policies and actions to manage migration in one’s own territory, a state resorts to using bilateral and multilateral trade or political agreements with third parties in order to move the border away from its territory in a metaphorical rather than a physical sense (McNamara 2013, 327). Such considerations in the context of contemporary development, where borders are not so concrete as states would like to think, are of especial importance (Anderson and

O'dowd 1999; Lahav 1998; Walters 2006). In other words, it can be defined as a process that involves policies and practices that are aimed at controlling migrants utilizing third parties and other agencies outside of one's own territory, which are closely related to the notion of outsourcing and extra-territoriality (Lemberg-Pedersen 2019). This can take the form of providing capacity-building support to border authorities in Mexico from the US by providing financial aid in order to encourage Mexican authorities to process migrants that are headed to the US. Another example could be the EU-Turkey negotiations that encourage actions, such as building detention centers or stopping illegal boat smugglers by providing direct financial contribution to the Turkish government. The main intention behind the implementation of externalization practices is to shift the burden of dealing with migrants to third parties, i.e. transit and origin states, and defuse the political costs of migration management in their countries (Zaiotti 2016, 10).

Externalization in a theoretical sense is part of the securitization of migration management (Williams and Mountz 2016, 31). In broader perspective, migration is still viewed as an emergency situation and the way to deal with it in most cases is to restrict access to incoming migrants (Zaiotti 2016,3). The opportunity to frame migration as potentially threatening can lead governments to justify more restrictions and mobilize the population and draw support to such policies. This implies that a state has the ability to devote more resources in order to manage migrants, whether they use these resources internally or divert them to other states. In terms of the remote control practices this presupposes that states are able to utilize their resources in order to incentivize third parties, in this case transit states, to implement the externalization efforts of destination states. In this sense, externalization of migration takes various forms, which are all directed to create opportunities for migrant management and process outside of the one's territory, ranging from providing direct training

to the migration agencies and increasing their capacities to tackle this issue to indirectly assisting the state through foreign development aid.

The fact that the issue of migration involves a human element at its core means that the topic of remote control policies also involves the normative framework and the way it shapes the behavior of the actors involved (Geiger 2016, Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). Due to these reasons, externalization of border control to neighboring states has received a certain level of criticism from both the international civil rights community and scholars that study the subject of migration patterns in this region (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010, 46; Papagianni 2013). This is especially evident in the case of refugees and their condition within the territory of transit states. The marginalization of those communities in transit countries limit the opportunities they have to integrate into society in order to sustain themselves further complicates the condition of refugee communities (Grabska 2006). On top of that, indifference of the transit state and the subsequent rise of informality in the realm of migration have led to growing sense of insecurity and increase in abuses of refugee communities (Mourad 2017). The externalization efforts of the EU in this sense are predominantly viewed as a catalyst of human rights abuses of the refugees in neighboring states, which in turn affects the image of the EU and its member states on the international level. Such ethical considerations of externalization are also a significant aspect in the implementation of the remote control practices. Potential criticism that goes along with the implementation of remote control practices is yet another dimension that both destination states and third states have to consider. In other words, in order to convince third parties to accept externalization destination states have to somehow overcome this aspect, meaning that the potential deals should be constructed in a way that will not negatively affect the image of a transit state. This is precisely where incentivization strategies come into play as a factor that determines the success in implementing externalization, which further reinforces the idea that

third parties have a more privileged position. The ethical considerations and protection of human rights also play a role in the policy discourse in transit states (Norman 2016).

The significance of transit states in this research project is underlined by the urgency and prioritization within the externalization efforts of destination states compared to origin states. As it stands, the proximity of the transit states to borders of destination states opens up a possibility to implement remote control practices urgently and effectively, especially for joint operations that the destination and transit states might implement together.

On some level, the notions of destination, origin and transit states are artificial. Even though it is easy to comprehend the distinction between destination states and origin states, since the meaning of the words ‘destination’ and ‘origin’ already establishes the relational structure of the migrant flow, the term ‘transit’ is somewhat more complicated to incorporate in the discussion. The reason is that it is hard to determine whether migrants are indeed on a path to another state; in addition, migrants are not concerned with identifying themselves as transit or otherwise. According to Fargues (2009) among various types of migrants in the South and East Mediterranean, i.e. labor migrants, refugees and transit migrants, the latter represents the smallest proportion of the three. Similarly, Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar (2013) found that in the Libyan case the majority of sub-Saharan migrants viewed Libya as their final destination and that the term ‘transit’ applied specifically in the domestic and international policy domains in order to influence certain decisions.

Nevertheless, since the term transit state is utilized in the official documents, such as the Rabat Process or Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2073 (2015), and in the policy discourse of discussion of agreements regarding migration, it suggests that the transit state plays a significant role in shaping the externalization processes. That is why I will incorporate the term ‘transit state’ in order to examine the way it would influence the decision to implement externalization in states that are typically described as transit. What I imply by

'transit state' is a country that migrants cross en route to their desired/preferred destination. Another way to frame this problem is to distinguish between the state perspective versus the individual perspective; the former relies on simply the number of people looking to get in and the latter deals with the intention and will of the migrant, i.e. where their stated destination is.

Incentive based approach

A traditional explanation of asymmetric relationships presumes that in certain aspects of foreign policy issues a more powerful state has more influence over the initial outcome of certain policy decisions, which it is able to achieve through coercive methods and pressure of the less powerful actor (Collyer 2016; Lavenex 2004; 2009). Such implicit line of argumentation dominates the literature on externalization, which resulted in scholars paying little attention to the migration management in transit states and a resulting inability to explain why externalization succeeds in certain instances and not in others. Power-based explanation, which presumes high bargaining power of a destination state (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, 803), fails to explain the mutually beneficial nature of externalization deal and large incentivization strategies that destination states provide.

In terms of understanding why externalization succeeds it is necessary to look beyond the asymmetrical relationship between destination and transit states. Since externalization is a process where two sides engage in order to achieve the result, i.e. shifting control to third party, it is expected that both sides have maintained their interests. Whilst, from the perspective of destination state, the interest lies in attempts to decrease costs associated with irregular migration and process migrants before they arrive on their territory, the part which explains the interests of the transit states is unexplained. In this sense, what I expect to observe is the presence of both implicit and explicit incentives that explains the black box, which is the main factor in explaining the transit state engagement in externalization whether

it is unilaterally imposed as in the case of Mexico or more equally implemented as in the case of Morocco. This key component is a missing point in the overall puzzle of externalization success, or, in other words, it explains why remote control practices take place in transit states even when it seems like they do not have any other choice. Thus, the next step is to identify these incentives that compel transit states to engage in externalization.

First and foremost, one of the most straightforward benefits that comes with externalization agreements is financial support that encourages states to adopt certain policies. This political instrument is especially important, since it is predominantly the developing states that utilize this aid in order to develop certain areas in their economy or strengthen their capacity to address potential issues. In the Moroccan case, for instance, in 2002 the EU issued €70 million so that Morocco could develop its Northern regions as an encouragement for the potential negotiations of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EURA), as well as other financial incentives that came along after that (Wolff 2015, 94). In a more recent development of relations, following advocacy of Spain the EU approved the aid of €140 million in order to assist the government of Morocco with migration related issues it faces (Eljechtimi and Laessing 2019; The GlobePost 2019; Teevan 2018; Valdivia 2018). The effectiveness of this instrument is still a matter of discussion; however, the fact that the EU is willing to incentivize states through financial aid can be viewed as a determination of European countries to engage in externalization. Thus, what I expect to observe in the cases that I investigate is a certain level of financial support from the destination states to transit ones that is directly linked to the issue of migration or potential increase in financial support that can be attributed to the externalization that took place.

The second incentive that I identify in this research concerns trade and political agreements. Increasing cooperation and expansion of existing trade and diplomatic avenues is another aspect that incentivize states to adopt externalization. Remote control practices

potentially open a path for the larger cooperation in political and economic domains. In this sense potential benefits that can be obtained based on the externalization deal outweighs initial costs of dealing with migrants (Tokuzlu 2010, 8-9). For instance, the aspiration of states like Morocco or Turkey to expand their cooperation with the EU and potentially become a member of the Union can possibly explain their willingness to accept readmission agreements and manage migration on their soil. Specifically, in the case Morocco adoption of readmission agreements coincided with the launch of negotiations over the 'Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement' (DCFTA) (den Hertog 2016, 281). Therefore, once externalization takes place it is expected that there will be some sort of indication of development in other areas, e.g. trade agreement, start of negotiations in other political domains that benefits transit states, etc.

Third, reputation and increasing legitimacy both on the international and domestic level are among the factors that incentivize transit states to implement externalization policies. Although it is not as explicit as financial support or trade agreements, what is equally important in understanding the reasons behind the externalization is improving the human rights record of the transit state. The reason for such consideration lies in the fact that migration involves dealing with humans, which means that one cannot escape the ethical side of the discussion. In this sense the growing human rights regime and the subsequent pressures from the civil society organizations and international organizations may also influence the initial decision to accept externalization that will assist the capacity of the state in migration management. This in itself can potentially be viewed as an attempt of the state to address migration and assist vulnerable parts of the migrant population. This positive step of state toward migrants increases legitimacy of the state both in the eyes of the international community and its domestic population, which can ease the pressure from these groups to a certain extent. According to Norman (2016) the civil society organizations were instrumental

in the implementation of migration reforms in 2013. This further provides evidence that a government has to consider the interests of these groups in their initial decision-making process. The consideration of increasing legitimacy through the means of accepting externalization is not directly related to the benefits that come straight from destination states, but rather it is an indirect benefit that can also potentially influence the decision to implement remote control practices.

So, in terms of concrete terms what I expect to observe with regards to the legitimacy concerns is a certain rhetoric from the ruling authorities in transit states that is linked to migration. What it will show is that governments of these states indeed try to affect their image as a country that protects the rights of migrants at their territory. That in turn will indicate that externalization is not an isolated event, but rather an opportunity that a transit state utilizes in order to improve its image. On top of that, I also expect to see the acknowledgement from the destination state of transit state's efforts in ensuring human rights protection (or migrant rights in this case).

All the aforementioned reasons are important in the decision of transit states to engage with the remote control practices of destination states. Since the main aim of this research project is to explain why transit states implement externalization, the dependent variable is the success of implementation. What I mean by success is when a transit state actively manages migrants in their territory in response to a destination state's efforts to externalize migration control. This could include more passive readmission of migrants rejected by destination states or more active efforts to increased control over the flow of migrants at the borders of the transit state. The independent variables include incentives for the transit states to adopt externalization, including financial support, broader cooperation in political and economic domains, increase in legitimacy.

Table 1. Typology of incentive based approach

Incentives	
External	Internal
Financial support	increase in legitimacy
broader cooperation in political and economic domains	

Thus, what I expect to observe with the cases I have selected for this research is the connection between the incentive strategies for the externalization deal and compliance of the transit states with the remote control practices. In other words, for incentive based approach to explain the success of externalization, there need to be certain actions of the transit states directed at controlling or increasing capacity of managing migration at their territory once remote control practices are implemented.

Case selection, methodology and data

I use the cases of Mexico and Morocco in order to demonstrate the specific incentives that drive decision-making process in transit states with regards to implementation of remote control practices. In the case of Morocco, it is the implementation of Mobility Partnership (MP) in 2013 that requires them to combat irregular migration and readmit migrants from the EU. In the case of Mexico, I will cover the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) in 2019 that allow the US to return asylum seekers to Mexico.

Case study is the most appropriate method within the framework of this research since the notion of a transit state in the context of externalization of migration requires a more nuanced understanding of a limited selection of cases. Even though the case study approach presents certain disadvantages in terms of generalizability of findings, the theoretical framework of the study would benefit from an in-depth look at cases that feature variance in

key measurements. This method can also overcome the common problem in the migration literature of excessive focus on single-case studies, where cross-case variation is limited.

To a certain extent, these two cases appear similar. Both countries are in close proximity to large liberal entities, the US in the case of Mexico, and the EU in the case of Morocco. Furthermore, both Mexico and Morocco have developed close political and economic relationships with their neighbors. However, these two countries are dissimilar when it comes to other relevant dimensions. As such, the level of interaction differs in terms of institutions involved in the process of externalization. Mexico deals with another state, whilst in the Moroccan case the transit state interacts with a supranational institution, as well as with individual European states.

More importantly, there is a significant difference in the way externalization plays out in each case. Specifically, in the case of the EU and Morocco the MP is a bilateral agreement between two entities, whereas in the case of the US and Mexico the MPP is a unilateral policy of a destination state. This in itself creates a different condition for the initial observations of how externalization proceeds between destination and transit states. As such, Mexico represents a conventional case, where a more powerful actor (the US) imposes a policy on the transit state; whereas, Morocco represents a case of a balanced cooperation between two asymmetric powers. Such difference in the initial conditions is important, since it allows to see a larger issue where traditional power based approach fails to account for success in different instances. Both of these cases are successful cases of externalization, yet even the traditional asymmetrical relationship between the US and Mexico cannot account for this success absent a discussion of incentives.

There are other key differences. First, geopolitical circumstances of the two states in terms of migration are different. Mexico is the primary route for Central American migrants in reaching the United States by land. On the other hand, Morocco is only one of several

options for African migrants in entering the European soil, who would have to journey across the Mediterranean to reach Europe. Second, cultural dynamics differ between the two, as Mexico and other Central American states share the same language, whereas African migrants are much more diverse. Third, there is a considerable difference in state capacity. Mexico has had challenges in exercising its full capacity due to contestation of power with drug cartels, which control portions of the state territory. Morocco does not have such problems; in contrast, it attempts to solidify its control of Western Sahara, which has been a problem in its regional relations. Finally, there are divergences in historical background. Mexico is not a former colony of the US, even if there is an extensive history of interaction between the two countries. Morocco, being a former European colony, has ties to France, a key EU member, and, to a lesser extent, Spain.

The data for this research relies on document analysis, with specific focus on externalization documents (Mobility Partnerships and Migrant Protection Protocols), as well as secondary analysis by scholars. This includes investigation of how the MP and the MPP came about, what kind of incentives coincide with the initial decision to implement them, state rhetoric with regards to migration and issues related to migrants at the borders of transit states. Such range of resources allows me to draw conclusions on what factors determine the success of adoption of externalization agreements from the perspective of transit states.

Chapter 4. The case of Morocco

This chapter will focus on the case of Morocco and how externalization unfolds between the EU and the Moroccan government. Specifically, I will cover the implementation of Mobility Partnerships in 2013. The specific focus on this agreement between the two sides demonstrates how such a complex process as externalization develops and also shows that incentives play a more decisive role in the initial success of implementation than what previously has been suggested. In this sense, success means that externalization in the form of the MP has been established between the EU and Morocco as a result of a joint declaration. Financial support, broader cooperation in trade, and legitimacy concerns guide the decision-making of the Moroccan authorities and determines whether or not they would agree to accept remote control practices.

These incentives play a more significant role in determining the success of remote control practices than coercive measures on behalf of the destination state. In other words, the EU failed to pressure the Moroccan side to implement remote control practices by enforcing a unilateral deal or a deal without significant concession to Morocco. In this sense, I argue that it is impossible to understand the implementation of the Mobility Partnership with Morocco without considering the aforementioned incentives that come with the adoption of this agreement. Incentive-based approach is an important part of the puzzle that helps to explain the initial success of the agreement between the EU and Morocco. Therefore, this chapter demonstrates how various incentives affect the decision-making process of the Moroccan government with regards to externalization.

First, I will show why Morocco is an attractive target for the EU's attempts to externalize migration control. The EU's desire to shift responsibility outside of their territory provides an opportunity for Morocco to utilize the issue of irregular migration in their favor to obtain benefits for themselves. Next, I will lay out incentives behind the initial decision-

making process of Morocco in its adoption of Mobility Partnerships, according to the framework I established in this research.

Morocco as a target for the externalization

This section helps understand why the case of Morocco is so important for the EU and why it spends a considerable amount of efforts and resources on its southern neighbor, and how the Moroccan side utilizes this in their favor. Although outsourcing migration management is an EU-driven process and the EU is the one that initiates talks over externalization, it has to be a mutually beneficial agreement to be successful. In this sense, Morocco is leveraging their position vis-à-vis the EU to obtain benefits for themselves. The process of leveraging includes using the continual need to fight irregular migration through Morocco to raise their profile in the foreign policy of the EU. Such position, despite the asymmetrical power relations between the two, allows Morocco to draw significant benefits for themselves from the implementation of remote control practices.

Historically Morocco has been a country of emigration. Morocco's proximity to mainland Europe and its historical past as a former colony played a significant role in shaping their migration history. As such, early migration patterns in the 1960s took course towards France, which attracted Moroccan citizens through various guest working and military programs, and further brought about family reunification programs. The predominant characteristic of the Moroccan migration in 1990s is its increasingly undocumented nature and diversification of destinations that the Moroccans targeted (Bilgili and Weyel 2009, 18). This historical development of migration in the case of Morocco resulted in a vast majority of Moroccan citizens residing in different parts of the European territory. This history of migration relations between the EU and Morocco creates a foundation for cooperation in this domain.

In recent years Morocco also became a country of transit to the European soil for the West African and Sub-Saharan migrants (Ghazouani 2019). The policy dynamics and development of migration patterns in the region in a broader context influenced this shift from country of emigration to country of transit migration. On top of that individual characteristics of Morocco also contributed to this shift. Firstly, the proximity to the Spanish territory, which is separated from Morocco by the strait of Gibraltar makes this state a favorable destination. Additionally, there are also enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and John Pickles 2015) next to the Moroccan territory and the rarely mentioned Canary Islands that provide an opportunity for migrants to enter the European territory and stay there (Godenau 2014). Such considerations drive thousands of migrants to Morocco each year, which affects the situation in this state on both domestic and international levels. Thus, addressing the problem of migration on behalf of the EU in the case of Moroccan transit migration requires both of entities to take more proactive actions.

Border fences around the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla represent “an appropriate model to study to what extent governments could harmonize between stated purposes and hidden objectives” (Saddiki 2010). These fences are a part of “Fortress Europe”, both real and virtual border that the EU attempts to build. In other words, it is a demonstration of the extent to which the EU is willing and determined to control the flow of migration. Nevertheless, it appears that these restrictive measures are not effective in slowing down the flow of irregular migration of African migrants to the European territory. There are still hundreds of migrants storming border fences into Spain’s enclaves and thousands arriving by sea to the Spanish territory (Alami 2018; Jones 2018). According to UNHCR, in 2019 alone 32,513 migrants arrived in Spain either by sea or land (UNHCR 2019). Thus, it is possible to observe how the unresolved issue of transit migration becomes a significant issue that the EU needs to resolve in an urgent manner.

The shift from being mainly a country of origin to a transit one is a significant development in the relationship between the EU and Morocco. Under such conditions, transit nature of Morocco raises its profile in the pursuit of the EU to address the issue of irregular migration. The reason is that in this context proximity of Morocco to the European border and the fact that many migrants utilize this route allows the EU to act urgently and efficiently by utilizing remote control practices in transit state rather than in various origin states. By emphasizing the role of Morocco, the EU and its member states increase the importance of their southern neighbor in the process of externalization. Subsequently, the Moroccan side uses their newly significant role to increase their bargaining position vis-à-vis the EU. This allows them to reject an agreement if it does not satisfy their interests. The importance of Morocco is further emphasized in a joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States, where it specifically states:

“RECOGNISING the specific characteristics of Morocco as country of origin, transit and, increasingly, final destination in terms of migration flows, and EMPHASISING Morocco's continued efforts to tackle migration routes, including maritime routes, to fight illegal immigration and combat cross-border networks involved in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings;” (Council of the European Union 2013, 3)

The problem with the notion of transit migration in the case of Morocco is not only its ambiguity and politicization of this term, but also the way it affects the relationship dynamic between the EU and Morocco. As such, the EU approaches the issue of migration in Morocco by heavily emphasizing its role as a transit state. This means that the EU not only puts Morocco to the forefront of their foreign policy agenda in constructing policies and strategies oriented towards migration. It also suggests that the EU would turn Morocco into a test field of its remote control practices in an effort to outsource management of migration. In this

sense, it means that the EU spends a considerable amount of their resources and efforts to incentivize Morocco to enact these policies through various programs and support systems, such as direct financial aid or visa facilitation or enlargement of existing trade deals. On top of that, proximity of the Moroccan territory provides an opportunity to diffuse costs associated with migration in case of successful implementation of externalization and subsequent reduction in the number of migrants arriving at the European border, which in turn allows the EU to further create conditions for managing migration outside of its own boundaries. Demonstrating the importance of Morocco for the EU in controlling migration helps to understand why Morocco has a privileged position and how it can use its bargaining position in order to obtain substantial benefits from externalization or reject them altogether, even though Morocco is relatively weaker than the EU.

Externalization of migration in Morocco. Adoption of Mobility Partnership

Outsourcing migration policies and responsibilities via various agreements requires transit states to take a more proactive role in managing migrants. These states allow externalization in exchange for political and economic opportunities that destination states provide. The EU largely attempts to include other non-European countries to contribute to the management of migration and induce them to comply with the European policies and strategies on migration (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Annelies 2010; Betts 2008; Guiraudon 2000; Limam and Del Sarto 2015). This is especially evident in the willingness of the EU to construct agreements and partnerships with the goal of reducing irregular migration.

Nevertheless, under such framework it is not entirely evident how the third countries, such as non-EU members engaging in externalization are able to affect the initial outcome of the agreements and why efforts of the EU in this domain are not always successful given their relatively stronger position. Externalization signals a more balanced approach of parties

involved in the process, rather than an asymmetrical relationship, where both the EU and Morocco have their own interests that they would like to achieve. This is precisely what the proposed incentive-based approach explains in the case of Morocco. Specifically, the presence of financial support from the EU, expansion of a trade deal with Europe and legitimacy concerns as an incentive for the Moroccan government make it clear why this particular externalization succeeded.

One of the ways that the EU attempts to influence migration politics in third states and strengthening control of its own borders is the establishment of the Mobility Partnerships. These cooperative arrangements allow the EU and primarily neighboring states to establish a bilateral framework in order to address issues related to migration through dialogue and practical means (Migration and Home Affairs 2016). Mobility Partnerships are aimed at combatting irregular migration and human trafficking, readmission of irregular migrants, strengthening border control and, to certain extent, ensuring decent working conditions for people at the territories of partner countries of the EU in exchange for various financial and technical assistance programs (Broczka and Paulhart 2015, 1). These agreements between the EU and non-EU countries are not legally binding and mainly take the form of political declarations among participating states. A significant aspect of the Mobility Partnership programs is the fact that the EU utilizes these agreements as a means of expanding their influence outside of the European territory. It is also one of the steps that the EU is undertaking in order to move forward with negotiations over the readmission agreements (Abderrahim 2019, 7).

The EU and Morocco signed the migration and mobility partnership in June of 2013 as part of the broader attempts by the EU to incorporate the region of Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) within the European political and economic spheres. This made Morocco the

first state to establish such a set of political objectives and initiatives related to migration in the Mediterranean region including:

- Managing temporary movement of labor migrants
- Strengthening cooperation on migration between Morocco and the EU
- Combatting illicit migration, human trafficking and smuggling, as well as promotion of effective return and readmission policies that respect fundamental human rights
- Protection of refugees in accordance with the ratified international laws
(Council of the European Union 2013, 4)

Morocco is not only the first country in the MENA region that signed the MP (Seeberg 2014, 2), it is also the largest recipient of the EU funding under these Partnerships (den Hertog 2016, 277).

It is not the first instance of Morocco attempting to influence a potential deal from Europe in their favor in order to create a balanced cooperation between their government and the EU. During the Rabat conference in 2006 Morocco pushed the EU to negotiate over the readmission agreements with other states in the region. The aim was to shift most of the focus away from Morocco, because it refused being treated simply as a transit country to Europe (Cassarino 2009). This gesture of the Moroccan government has a considerable effect on further development of migration talks between the EU and Morocco by establishing the latter as an equal partner that is able to take stance if they deem it necessary. Such development would only be possible if Morocco obtained a stronger strategic position vis-à-vis the EU in the domain of migration, which Morocco has been able to achieve.

Joint Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership

In this section I will discuss the Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European. I will focus on the way this agreement is constructed, which explains why Morocco signed it in the first place. Specifically, I will cover the various incentives that the document either states or implies. It also should be noted that, although the EU has also signed Mobility Partnerships with other states, such as Moldova in 2008, Georgia in 2009, Armenia in 2011, the content of MP that the EU has established with Morocco drastically differs from others in many aspects, and understanding the difference is key in terms of identifying the underlying motivation of Morocco signing it. This is especially important given the exceptional role that this regional player occupies within the foreign policy of the EU. Thus, in order to understand the success of the MP it is necessary to explain how incentives are tied to it.

One of the most important parts of this document is that, from its very beginning it establishes migration as a “key element of the exemplary partnership which has linked Morocco and the EU for several decades” (Council of the European Union 2013, 1). This aspect of the agreement is exceptional when compared to similar agreements between other states and the EU. Mobility Partnerships with other states, such as Armenia (Council of the European Union 2011), Georgia (Council of the European Union 2011) or Moldova (Council of the European Union 2008), do not include the specific recognition of migration as a key element of partnership that takes place between the EU and these states as a consequence of these agreements. What also distinguishes the case of Morocco and the agreement it signed with the EU is that Morocco managed to include visa and readmission facilitation agreements within the MP, whereas other states signed the EURA and the MP separately (Wolff 2014, 16). Linking the readmission agreement to the MP’s broader agenda demonstrates the ability of Morocco to use this policy instrument to reflect their inherent political choices. Thus, the

way the MP is established with Morocco differs in many aspects of the agreement, which in return begs the question of why it is the case and what one can expect from cooperation on migration between the EU and Morocco.

The MP points to the presence of mutual benefits, though the document itself does not clearly establish the incentives themselves within its length. The document puts a special emphasis on “the need to work together in a spirit of partnership with a view to ensuring better management of migration based on a comprehensive and balanced approach, to the mutual benefit of the parties concerned” (Council of the European Union 2013, 1). This in turn demonstrates that both parties not only have their own interests and are attempting to achieve them by introducing this agreement, but, more importantly, they do realize this aspect, which already puts in jeopardy the assumption that the EU enforces their agenda on weaker neighboring states. Although it may be clear from the perspective of the EU and its member states that they are interested in shifting responsibility of dealing with migrants to third parties, it is still quite unclear what kind of interests are Morocco after, especially given that the document does not openly specify them. Explaining this part of the puzzle is the ultimate aim of this research.

Nevertheless, if one delves into the specific language of the document and the way some of the aspects are covered there, it becomes evident what Morocco pursues with signing this agreement. First of all, implementation of this partnership entails that the EU and its member states will provide financial and technical resources in order to sustain the intended aims, including combatting illegal migration (Council of the European Union 2013, 12). Such approach implies that the EU will provide financial support to Morocco once they sign the MP. Indeed, one of the actions by the EU in this direction was boosting support through programs worth €389 million in 2019 (for more on that see the section on incentives in the Moroccan case). On top of that, the EU also points out that they want to increase and enhance

the capacity of the Moroccan authorities (Council of the European Union 2013, 8).

Considering that in order to achieve and deliver this part of the agreement the EU would need to allocate certain resources, it can be expected that the agreement entails boosting the financial support of Morocco, which is something that would compel this state to sign the MP.

Next it is important to identify whether it is possible to tie the MP to a larger context of cooperation between the EU and Morocco and assess whether signing this agreement can in fact point in the direction of broadening political and economic domains of the partnership. The MP itself as a document is a natural progression of previous cooperation between the EU and Morocco. More specifically the document states that it acts within the larger framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which also provided Morocco with an Advanced Status in 2008 (Council of the European Union 2013, 2).

Although this part does not directly link the MP with the further broadening of cooperation in other domains, it nevertheless points in that direction and it is possible to interpret certain actions of the EU and Morocco in such a way. If one considers the MP as a natural progression of the partnership between the EU and Morocco as it states in the document, it then comes as no surprise that negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the two states, for instance, starts the same year the MP is signed. Parallel negotiations of the DCFTA and the MP in 2012 significantly contributed to furthering of partnership in migration control (Wolff 2014, 12). Viewing the MP as a tool for the progression of cooperation in political and economic domains helps in understanding relationship development between the EU and Morocco and demonstrates key aspects of their partnership.

Increasing legitimacy of the Moroccan government by utilizing this opportunity to sign the agreement and improve their profile both domestically and internationally is yet

another aspect that requires unpacking. As I mentioned in the previous chapter (see the section on Externalization of migration control policies (p 15) in the thesis for the reference) migration issue should be approached with caution due to its ethical dimension, since it may potentially affect the state image if it fails to act in appropriate ways. In this sense, constructing and signing an agreement involving the issue of migration or, in this specific context, externalization requires that both sides cautiously frame it in such a way that would not damage profile of actors involved. As such, the document includes parts that emphasize the humanitarian aspect of the deal and specifically acknowledge the unique contribution of Morocco in the case of signing this agreement:

“RECOGNISING the specific characteristics of Morocco as country of origin, transit and, increasingly, final destination in terms of migration flows, and EMPHASISING Morocco's continued efforts to tackle migration routes, including maritime routes, to fight illegal immigration and combat cross-border networks involved in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings;” (Council of the European Union 2013, 3).

Such approach to Morocco on behalf of the EU, which is an institution that champions the human rights regime globally, is a significant factor that compels Morocco to sign the agreement and cooperate with the EU in general. This is especially important in the light of the Arab Spring events, which negatively affected the legitimacy of the ruling authority in Rabat. It is expected that they would utilize any opportunity to restore their image. Signing an agreement that acknowledges and emphasizes their role in combatting illegal migration and contributing to the development of proper migration management is considered as one of such opportunities.

This analysis of the Mobility Partnership between the EU and Morocco points to several important reasons behind the European efforts to shift migration control to a third party. First of all, it is necessary to look beyond the straightforward incentives that the MP

offers, such as increased mobility and visa facilitation. In fact, taking into account the difficulty of assessing the impact of the MP on increased mobility and myriad of other factors that affect the flow of migrants (mainly economic factors) there is no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that implementation of the MP contributed to mobility (Reslow 2015, 119). Thus, I argue that it is necessary to deconstruct the MP in order to identify the “real” force behind the success of its implementation. This approach demonstrated that there are several distinct incentives, such as financial support, cooperation within the broader context between Morocco and the EU, and legitimacy concerns that account for the implementation of this agreement in the first place and that go beyond the framework of the MP.

The conclusion that the MP serves as a tool of achieving broader interests and the EU has to take into account preferences of regional players that they are partnering with is consistent with findings of other scholars on this subject (Limam and Del Sarto 2015; Reslow and Maarten Vink 2015; Wolff 2014). What a closer analysis of the documents reveals is that it is constructed in a way that satisfies interests of both parties that signed the agreement. This in turn confirms an earlier argument that for an externalization agreement to succeed it has to be mutually beneficial and represent a more or less balanced form of cooperation. In terms of incentives that drive the Moroccan side, this analysis demonstrates that it is not only external incentives from the EU, such as financial support and cooperation in broader terms, that explain the decision of Morocco, but also their internal incentives. Particularly, the fact that for years the EU were unable to provide a compelling document for Morocco to sign, the MP came at a crucial time, after the events of the Arab Spring (Limam and Del Sarto 2015; Wolff 2014), which might explain such a keen interest behind cooperation on behalf of this a North African state. Taking into account these insights from the analysis of the MP, the next step is to inspect these incentives.

Incentives for the implementation of Mobility Partnership

Implementation of the MP demonstrates that in order to move forward with implementation of remote control practices it is vital for a potential deal to be mutually beneficial for both the destination and the transit state. MPs are a soft political instrument of the EU. As such, I will further discuss each individual incentive that explain the success of implementation of the Mobility Partnership.

Financial support as an incentive for Morocco. One of the most important and straightforward benefits that come from the cooperation with the EU on migration is financial benefits. The Moroccan government largely benefits from the financial support that the EU provides to them. Morocco heavily relies on development assistance, which represented 2.1% of its GNI in 2014 with a record \$2.25 billion allocated to Morocco that year (Aghoutane and Karim 2017, 87).

As one can observe from the chart below, the EU has consistently provided financial support, albeit to varying degrees in each year. In the literature on the development aid scholars mainly point to two models of behavior: egoistic and altruistic (Berthélemy 2006). The question is then, how one can say that the motives of the EU in providing financial support are not purely altruistic, but rather ones where the EU pursues a certain political objective. If altruistic nature of the EU was the main explanation for the financial support, then there would be a marginal difference between Morocco and its neighbor state Algeria, since they are quite similar, except in the issue of transit migration to European soil. However, considering the data from the Financial Transparency System, the difference between Morocco and Algeria is substantial and consistent over time. Even in 2013, which is the year of a joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States. Morocco obtained 235,503,948 €, while Algeria only secured 17,752,288 €.

The next question that needs to be answered is how one can tell that the political goal of the EU is externalization. An answer to this question lays in the consistent rhetoric of the EU in its cooperation with Morocco. As such, in the European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations with Morocco one of the issues that is emphasized is the migration and asylum (European Commission 2020). On top of that, the EU openly states in their financial support programs that a large share of funding would go to migration. One of the most recent steps of the EU in supporting Morocco is the adoption of programs that are worth €389 million, €101.7 million of which are directed to the support of border management (European Commission 2019).


Most importantly the Joint Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union and its Member States specifically states that: “partnership actions will be implemented subject to the financial and technical resources to be deployed by the EU, the EU Member States and, in the case of the EU, in compliance with the division of powers between the EU and the Member States” (12). Although the document does not specify how exactly the EU would provide this support, the fact that the declaration accounts for the financial support from the EU is significant. All of this reinforces the idea that the EU would spend much of their resources to migration control and their determination is to incentivize Morocco to cooperate with them. At the same time, further down the road one can observe spikes in terms of financial support, which is indicative of the way Morocco is utilizing transit migration, more significantly this demonstrates how vital financial is for the success of remote control practices.

Table 2. EU budget implemented directly by the European Commission between 2007-2018

Year	Total amount for all beneficiaries	Number of budgetary commitments
2007	56,555,079 €	27
2008	227,203,256 €	28
2009	302,356,967 €	97
2010	305,323,868 €	121
2011	120,229,186 €	43
2012	135,232,359 €	31
2013	235,503,948 €	61
2014	200,801,526 €	60
2015	309,272,125 €	47
2016	284,032,869 €	52
2017	170,618,085 €	49
2018	129,240,843 €	25

Source: Financial Transparency System (2020)

Figure 1. EU budget implemented directly by the European Commission



Source: Financial Transparency System (2020)

The expansion of cooperation with the EU in trade. Another incentive that compelled Morocco to sign the MP is the expansion of its trade with the EU and closer integration with the European market. In terms of the incentive-based approach, such measure proposed by a destination state is one of the factors that explains why externalization takes place at a particular moment and not some other time. This is especially important given that trade developments that did not necessarily occur in previous years. On the other hand, launch of negotiations over the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with Morocco in 2013 is part of the puzzle that explains the success of implementation of the MP in that same year.

When looking at trade as a whole it is possible to observe how significant and desirable the European market for Morocco is. In 2017 alone the EU accounted for approximately 60% of the overall trade in Morocco. On the other hand, this represented only 1% of the EU's trade with the world (Morocco - Trade - European Commission n.d.). On top of that, although it is overall beneficial for both sides from a macroeconomic perspective, the expected economic impact of the DCFTA is marginal for the EU. As such, according to estimates the proposed trade agreement would bring € 1.4 billion for the EU and € 1.3 billion for Morocco in the long run, which, considering their economies, translates into a 1.6% increase of the Moroccan GDP and a close to zero increase for the EU (Ecorys 2013, 12). This in itself demonstrates that successful negotiations over a trade deal is indeed of huge importance to Morocco and brings clear benefits with it. All of this points to imbalance in significance of trade relations for Morocco compared to the EU regardless of time period.

Considering the marginal role that this trade deal has in the case of the EU, there arises a question of why the EU spent so much effort integrating Morocco into the European market? This is especially important if one takes into account the fact that the EU and Morocco launched negotiations over the DCFTA in the same year that the MP was adopted. Under such circumstances, the EU does not necessarily pursue economic interests in dealing

with Morocco. The other country that is part of negotiations over the same trade deal is Tunisia, which is another transit state. Thus, the EU wants to pursue certain political goal that is connected to the strategic location of these two countries within the Mediterranean region rather than merely achieving economic growth.

The next step is to identify whether the political goal is indeed linked to migration and whether it is indeed part of incentivization strategies that compel Morocco to sign an externalization agreement. In the context of the EU-Morocco relations one of the aspects that separates Morocco from other countries in the region is the issue of migration, while other reasons for cooperation such as cultural exchange, security, justice and trade are not unique to Morocco (Badre 2014, 3). Considering that irregular migration poses a serious threat to the EU and that the EU desperately needs to decrease political costs associated with it, the DCFTA becomes an opportunity to make a deal over externalization mutually beneficial for both sides.

Increasing legitimacy. So far, I have discussed external incentives that affect the decision of Morocco to adopt externalization. However, in the context of the incentive-based approach, there is also an intrinsic motivation that pushes Morocco towards an externalization agreement. Specifically, implementation of the MP provides an opportunity for the Moroccan government to increase its legitimacy. In this sense, close integration with the EU and norm and rule alignment with the EU Acquis Communautaire (the binding set of EU agreements) through the adoption of the MP serves as a means of affecting the international and domestic perception of Morocco (Pernille and Bremberg 2014, 17). This is especially significant in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and a subsequent damage to the country's profile (Norman 2016).

Legitimacy is a significant aspect in the discussion of externalization. Legitimacy is best understood as perceptions and attitudes of people about the government (Pakulski 1985,

35). In this sense, considering how beneficial it can be for the ruling authority, one can expect that the government would attempt to influence popular perception in various ways. In terms of the dimensions of measuring legitimacy (Von Haldenwang 2016, 9), signing the MP serves as a symbol of the government's claim to political procedures and civil rights. Specifically, political objectives that the MP establishes, such as legal rights of migrants, cooperation in migration domain, combatting irregular migration and promotion/protection of human rights (Council of the European Union 2013, 4), demonstrates that Morocco is indeed on the path of improving the domestic situation with regards to migrants. This in turn affect attitudes and opinions of people both domestically and internationally. As it can be seen in the chart below, Morocco has steadily increased its human rights records over the past several years.

Figure 2. Human Rights Scores of Morocco between 1990-2017



Source: Our World in Data (2020)

Nevertheless, how is it possible to establish that signing a joint declaration establishing the MP aims at increasing legitimacy and is not just an isolated event that took

place due to other reasons? Here it is important to look at whether the Moroccan government also employed similar strategies that would positively affect the image of the state in the domain of human rights protection, specifically concerning irregular migration. In the same year that Morocco and the EU signed the MP King of Morocco Mohammed VI announced the reformation of the national migration policies (Norman 2016, 428; Norman 2020; 8;). The reform itself is a part of ongoing domestic changes that followed the Arab Spring protests and mainly serves as a response to growing domestic and international criticism of the regime. Thus, I argue that any actions that can be potentially seen and framed as aimed at improving conditions of people and as actions towards democratization are ultimately beneficial. Viewing the decision to sign the MP from this perspective explains the interest of Morocco in cooperating with the EU.

On top of that, in general, any cooperation with the EU and further integration with Europe is seen as a positive step by those who supported democratic reforms in Morocco (Pernille and Bremberg 2014, 17). The EU Neighbourhood Barometer survey in 2014 demonstrates that 91% of Moroccan population feel the EU has good relations with Morocco and 84% acknowledge the fact that the EU is an important partner (European Commission 2014). This indicates that cooperation with the EU and closer integration in political and economic domains is a positive step for the government to undertake.

Since the MP is not legally binding for either the EU and its member states or Morocco it takes an effort from each side to comply with objectives of the deal. In terms of the way these incentives led to the success of implementation, here it is important to point to actions of Morocco in the domain of migration under the framework of MP. As such, these actions include:

- strengthening Moroccan operational capacities for the verification of false travel documents with the overall budget of 330,715.49 € that took place between November 2017 – July 2018; (Mobility Partnership Facility 2020).
- MENTOR, the Mediterranean Network for Training Orientation to Regular migration with the overall budget of 543,231.54 € that took place between June 2017 – October 2018 (Mobility Partnership Facility 2020)
- AKT on Smuggling by Air Action for knowledge transfer on migrant smuggling by air and document fraud in select MP and CAMM countries with the overall budget of 219,252.46 € that took place between February 2018 – October 2018 (Mobility Partnership Facility 2020);

Such actions under the framework of the Mobility Partnership points to the fact that the aforementioned incentives indeed have an effect on the initial success in implementation of remote control practices in the case of Morocco. It might not necessarily be clear in terms of effectiveness in controlling irregular migration, since the number of migrants arriving through the Moroccan territory did not significantly change after the implementation of the MP. Such state of affairs and the absence of coherent evidence that would indicate the effective control on behalf of the Morocco could potentially indicate that this transit state is not interested in solving issue of transit migration in long run and, thus, potentially losing benefits that come with the adoption of externalization. This is, however, beyond scope of this research and requires more in-depth view in terms of leveraging the transit migration.

Nevertheless, actions of Morocco show how it would actively engage with the EU in the domain of migration given the benefits of externalization. On top of that, frequent raids of Moroccan forces on migrant camps near the borders of the EU also signal that Morocco complies with the MP objective of combatting illegal migration within their territory.

Demonstrating their willingness to work under the framework of the Mobility Partnership

with the EU and signaling compliance with the European rules and norms mean that incentivization strategies indeed helped achieving its intended goal, i.e. implementation of remote control practices.

This chapter demonstrates how various incentives, both external and internal, compelled Morocco to sign the MP in 2013. Financial support from the EU, initiations of negotiations on the new trade deal between the EU and Morocco and legitimacy concerns of the ruling authority of North African state played a significant role in the initial success of the adoption of the MP. Each individual component, whether it is financial support, trade deal or domestic reforms, can be seen as occurring independently from migration concerns. However, if one takes a look at it from the proposed incentive-based approach it becomes clear why such actions took place in a given time and space and how it ties to the question of externalization.

Chapter 5. The case of Mexico

This chapter will focus on the case of Mexico and the implementation of Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), or what media outlets call “Remain in Mexico”, a program which allows the US to return those individuals that entered its borders illegally to Mexico for the duration of processing their claims by the US courts. The MPP itself is a part of a Joint declaration between the US and Mexico. The main aim of the MPP is to curb the number of illicit migrants that enter the US through the Mexican territory. Specifically, this chapter will focus on the incentives that led Mexico to comply with this US policy and engage in externalization of migration.

The case of Mexico represents a case of conventional asymmetrical power, since the MPP is a unilateral US policy. Nevertheless, this chapter demonstrates that power based approach fails to account for the success of externalization, since interests of the transit state (Mexico) are still important in the initial success of externalization. The destination state (the US) still provided certain level of concessions, despite its relative power. Thus, incentives determine the success of externalization, meaning that incentive-based approach prevails over the conventional asymmetric power based approach.

Mexico as a country of transit migration to the US provides an insight into externalization and how this process unfolds within this region. In this sense, Mexico has gained prominence recently as a route to the US territory for the migrants from states that constitute the Northern Triangle of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador). Such state of affairs and the attempts on the US side to curb the irregular migration on its southern border resulted in enforcement of various tactics, which intended to decrease the number of migrants entering its territory, including the ‘Remain in Mexico’ policy that allows the US to return irregular migrants to Mexico, while they wait for their cases at the US courts. These efforts of the US also include attempts to shift the burden of dealing with migrants onto

the Mexican government and force them to take a more proactive role in addressing this issue. This is the primary reason why Mexico as a case study of externalization in transit states is important and needs to be included in the discussion of the process.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I will discuss the dynamic of the US-Mexico relations when it comes to migration and how Mexico became a primary target for externalization in the foreign policy agenda of the US. Transit migration in the case of Mexico becomes an important factor in curbing illegal migration to the US, which explains why its northern neighbor is interested in pushing the Mexican government to accept remote control practices. Then, I will cover the 'Remain in Mexico' policy and potential benefits Mexico can access from the MPP.

Mexico as a target for externalization

Mexico provides the US with the opportunity to outsource its migration control policies to an external party with minimal drawbacks. Historically, Mexico has been a country of emigration, sending large numbers of migrants to the US to meet the demand in the job market there. Basically, it is possible to describe the history of migration between the US and Mexico as a period of alternation between openness and restrictive policies, where any change responds to various economic factors, particularly the aforementioned demand for cheap labor force that Mexican migrants could meet. The predominant characteristic of the Mexico-US migration is the existence of mutually reinforcing processes, where formation of social and human capital, as well as market consolidation play a major role (Massey and Espinosa 1997). Due to these reasons the number of Mexican citizens in the US steadily increased over the period of time since the mid-20th century, specifically with the help of programs, which led to Mexican citizens becoming the largest immigrant population within the US (Alba 2013, 2). Nevertheless, with the decline of Mexicans arriving at the US territory Mexico started to lose

its relevance in the US foreign agenda, and this development pushed the Mexican government to find alternative ways to resolve this loss in relevance (Donnelly 2014, 11).

Such state of affairs signified a shift from the main concern being not the Mexican migrants, whose number actually decreased and reached the historically low levels, but rather the non-Mexicans, who attempted to enter the US soil via the Mexican territory. According to the Pew Research Center (Gonzales-Barrera and Krogstad 2019), there has been a steady decline of unauthorized Mexican immigrants to approximately 2 million people each year starting from 2007, which led to this particular migrant community constituting fewer than half of unauthorized migrants in the US. At the same time there has been a rise in illegal migrants from other countries. This shift created both challenges and opportunities for the Mexican government in the realm of transit migration, as well as, in their foreign policy considerations.

In the recent decade Mexico has transformed from a country of emigration to a transit country for the people from the Northern Triangle of Central America (The Northern Triangle of Central America refers to the three Central American countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) (Donnelly 2014, 3). This is evident from the fact that the number of people apprehended at the southern border of the US is mostly non-Mexican. Such a surge of migrants will most likely continue in the near future due to economic and political circumstances in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, where organized criminal gangs, human trafficking and extreme poverty became an ever-present issue for those states. Citizens of these countries account for 71% of the total amount of apprehensions in 2019 (Gramlich and Noe-Bustamante 2019). On top of that, the issue is that it is not men individually seeking employment who attempts to enter the US territory, but rather families with children, which poses other challenges in terms of the nature of treatment such migrants should face, meaning

that the changing profile of apprehended migrants requires changes in previously established protocols.

Changing the nature of migration patterns in the case of Mexico affects the way the US establishes their policy discourse and implements related decisions. As such, a significant part of the rhetoric that the US government recently pushed forward was related to transit migration from Central America and that Mexico should devote more attention to that problem (Semple 2019). Talks about migrant caravans and potential security concerns that these illegal migrants raise instigated the implementation of various strategies, including the Border Wall initiative by the Trump administration (Miroff and Blanco 2020). Under such conditions of high securitization of migration issues, it appears that Mexico has resurged in prominence within the US foreign policy agenda. What this suggests is that in the attempts of the US to address the surging problem of irregular migration at their southern borders and explore a possible solution, Mexico became the main partner that is able to assist in dealing with illicit migration. Due to this reason, it is beneficial for the US to cooperate with Mexico and to decrease political costs associated with migration. Externalization in the case of Mexico can be understood as an attempt of the US to shift responsibility to the third states with minimal political consequences for themselves.

Taking into account such circumstances where Mexico gains a prioritized position it can be expected that its government would pay more attention to the issue of migration, since it would be the main point of cooperation between the US and Mexico. Increase in the number of immigrants within Mexico means that the state has to take a more proactive role in controlling the flow of migrants, as well as ensuring proper conditions for their well-being within the state territory, in order to demonstrate their commitment to addressing the question of migration. One of the earlier measures undertaken by the US and Mexico is the implementation of the Southern Border Program by both Mexico and Guatemala, also known

in Spanish as Programa Frontera Sur (PFS) (Donnelly 2014, 6). The main objective of this policy initiative is to ensure protection of transit migrants and strengthen the security and development in the region. Such policies demonstrate that cooperation in the domain of transit migration is not a new phenomenon for either Mexico or the US.

Development of shared responsibility for migration between Mexico and the Central American states is yet another issue that the Mexican government attempted to focus its efforts on under the framework of PFS. By utilizing the term “shared responsibility” (“corresponsabilidad”) the Mexican government acknowledges its part in providing sufficient standards for immigrants on their territory. At the same time, the problem with this part of the strategy in addressing the issue of migration is that it only briefly discusses these shared responsibilities, in other words, there are no specific strategies in terms of financial resources or aid that Mexico commits to (Donnelly 2014, 9). Such approach from the Mexican government to the migration issue demonstrates their disinterest in resolving the core problem, that being political and economic conditions in Central American states, that drives thousands of migrants to take this journey. This in turn raises concerns over the long-term goals of Mexico with regards to transit migration and whether the government wants to keep migrants as an ever-present issue, so that it would remain relevant within the framework of the US foreign agenda.

Both the US and Mexico attempt to frame the issue of migration in terms of interest that both sides share, at least at the level of general rhetoric. These states are mainly concerned with the security aspect of illegal migration and how it might affect the situation within both of their territory. Such framework not only guides the decision-making process of both governments, but also allows them to draw support for certain actions that otherwise would be challenging to undertake. This is especially true given the amount of resources that both governments spent in order to tackle irregular migration and curtail the number of people

that cross borders illegally. The US has secured \$9.8 billion since January 2017 on construction of the border wall system (Rodgers and Bailey 2019) and provided \$139 million in 2018 in aid for the Mexican government (Report to Congressional Requesters 2019). In the case of Mexico efforts such as deployment of national troops and construction of check points on its northern border (BBC 2020; Verza and Sherman 2019) also point to the necessity of addressing this problem on behalf of Mexican authorities. It is important because this country has other urgent issues, such as drug cartels. In this sense, the fact that Mexico embodies the transit dimension of migration phenomenon further raises the importance of the Mexican government as a partner that is able to assist in curbing irregular migration to the US. Externalization, thus, becomes a tool that the US utilizes in order to achieve that.

Externalization of migration in Mexico. The case of Migrant Protection Protocols

Cooperation of the United States and Mexico regarding migration demonstrates traits of an asymmetrical power relationship, which mainly has to do with the nature of the externalization in this case. The main reason for that is the fact that the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) “are a U.S. Government (USG) action” (Homeland Security 2020). Nevertheless, in the case of the Mexico-US migration the US provides certain incentives to Mexican government through various strategies to adopt the externalization agreement and shift the responsibility of dealing with unauthorized migration, which would potentially decrease domestic political costs associated with this issue, despite the fact that the MPP is imposed unilaterally. Externalization of migration in the case of Mexico allows to observe how implementation of remote control practices serve in bringing benefits to both sides. From the perspective of Mexico, such benefits include financial support, broadening cooperation in political domains and in trade, and increasing their legitimacy both domestically and internationally.

In the case of Mexico addressing the migrant issue became even more urgent in recent years due to the influx of immigrants from the neighboring countries. Many citizens fleeing their origin states due to security concerns and/or economic conditions means that these migrants are now entering the Mexican soil in order to reach US territory. In 2019 more than 800,000 people were detained on the Southern border of the US (Rodgers and Bailey 2019), which also resulted in thousands of children separated under the zero tolerance policy (Aguilera 2020). In such circumstances, the US government attempts to reduce the influx of unwanted migrants, so enforcing remote control practices by the Mexican government is a tactic that they are pursuing in order to achieve just that. As I previously discussed, externalization in this sense allows the destination state to reduce tensions and diffuse the costs of dealing with migration by shifting the burden to the third parties outside of their territory and particularly in this case shift this responsibility to Mexico. That is precisely why pushing for actions that would oblige the Mexican government to take a more proactive role in controlling migration is the goal that the US attempts to achieve. Such considerations coupled with an artificial emergency of the issue of illegal migration that the US government created by securitizing this issue allows it to draw support for rather drastic actions and justification for the implementation of restrictive measures with regards to illegal migration from its southern borders.

What is evident from the case of Mexico and transit migration in this country is the willingness of the state and state officials to cooperate with the US on the issue of migration. As such, one of the most recent efforts to tackle illegal migration issues led both the US and Mexico to release a joint declaration on 7 June 2019 (U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration, 2019). The end result of the discussion between two states posits that Mexico commits to curb the flow of irregular migration with prioritizing its southern border. This means that Mexico would deploy its National Guard in order to deal with illegal migrants heading to the US

through their territory, as well as take actions against human trafficking and criminal networks related to the issue of migration. Mexico deployed around 21,600 police and troops on its northern border, as well as installed check points on its highways leading to the US borders. These efforts of Mexican authorities helped to reduce the number of migrants from 144,266 in May down to 63,989 in August 2019 (Verza and Sherman 2019).

Another significant part of the joint declaration that both parties agreed to is implementation and expansion of Migrant Protection Protocols or what media outlets call “Remain in Mexico”, a program which allows the US to return those individuals that entered its borders illegally to Mexico for the duration of processing their claims by the US courts. The main reason for the implementation of MPP, as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) puts it, is to address the “security and humanitarian crisis on the Southern Border” (MPP 2019). This means that the DHS would have a right to provide a “Notice to Appear” and return certain migrants, where they leave the final decision for themselves, until the initial court hearings. The justification for such actions stems from the security framework and the issue of securitization related to illegal migration. Since MPP was introduced in 2019 around 60,000 migrants have been sent back to Mexico (BBC 2020; Sherman 2020).

The main aspect of the MPP in the context of the research on externalization is the fact that it is a U.S. Government (USG) policy and that it entails “citizens and nationals of countries other than Mexico arriving in the United States by land from Mexico -- whether or not at a port of entry -- may be returned to Mexico pursuant to Section 235(b)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) while their U.S. removal proceedings are pending under Section 240 of the INA” (Homeland Security 2020). What it means is that, unlike the case of Mobility Partnership between the EU and Morocco, it is a US policy rather than a bilateral agreement. This is precisely why externalization in the case of Mexico differs from the case of Morocco, with all other factors being the same.


According to the DHS (Homeland Security 2020) immigrants returned to Mexico “generally remain in Mexico throughout the duration of their removal proceedings”, and therefore the Mexican government should take a more proactive role in dealing with the immigrants and ensuring their safety. In dealing with people, the Mexican government has to take into account conditions of migrants to a certain extent, since inaction of Mexico leading to human rights abuses may result in damaging their image both internationally and domestically. Given an enormous burden that the MPP puts on Mexico it is necessary to delve deeper into the question of why such an action took place at a particular time period. In this case it is necessary to unpack the incentives that might encourage Mexico to comply with externalization and to understand that even though it is the case of power-based approach, it follows general patterns that I put forward in the incentive-based approach. These incentives accounts for the success of implementation and not the power asymmetry between Mexico and the US.

Incentives for the implementation of the MPP

Financial support. In the case of Mexico one of the most straightforward incentives that comes from the cooperation with the US is financial support. Mexico benefits from the support that comes with the bilateral cooperation. In the chart below one can observe that the aid from the US is somewhat consistent throughout the last several years, which is an expected factor given that financial aid is one of the tools that powerful states use in order to influence politics in other states. What is important here is identifying whether financial support is indeed one of the factors that drove the decision making of Mexico to comply with the US in implementing the MPP. If one takes into account the number of migrants apprehended at the US-Mexico border, it is possible to observe the links between the number of migrants and the amount of financial support. Specifically, in 2019 with the decline in

financial support there is also an increase in the number of migrants apprehended at the US-Mexico border. This is not of course to suggest that the sole purpose of financial incentives is to influence migration, but rather to point to the fact that there is a possible connection. This is further emphasized given that the large portion of the financial aid is allocated to the peace and security category (Foreignassistance 2020) and the fact that according to the DHS illegal immigration is a significant threat to the US (Homeland Security 2020).

Figure 3. Foreign Assistance in Mexico and Southwest Border Apprehensions by the US between 2006-2019



Source: Foreignassistance (2020); US Customs and Border Protection (2020)

Table 3. Foreign Assistance in Mexico and Southwest Border Apprehensions by the US between 2006-2019

Year	Foreign Assistance in Mexico	Southwest Border Total Apprehensions
2006	\$66.97 M	1,071,972
2007	\$65.38 M	858,638
2008	\$405.85 M	705,005
2009	\$432.78 M	540,865
2010	\$757.60 M	447,731
2011	\$262.83 M	327,577
2012	\$413.14 M	356,873
2013	\$265.06 M	414,397
2014	\$206.90 M	479,371
2015	\$164.21 M	331,333
2016	\$160.16 M	408,870
2017	\$138.57 M	303,916
2018	\$151.26 M	396,579
2019	\$162.41 M	851,508

Source: Foreignassistance (2020); US Customs and Border Protection (2020)

It is also important to point to the fact that the US-Mexico relationship frequently revolves around the issue of illegal migration, especially in recent decades with the rise of immigrants from the Northern Triangle. According to the US Foreign Assistance page, the US considers Mexico, first and foremost, as “a strong partner of the initiatives that complement the United States' programs to address the root causes of unlawful migration from Central America” (Foreignassistance 2020). Financial support is a crucial part of any explanation for the decision to sign the MPP. Financial benefit as an incentive for Mexico is especially significant if one takes into account other incentives and observes the connection between these benefits and the success of the MPP implementation.

Cooperation in the broader economic and political domains. Another part of the incentives that is connected to the implementation of the MPP is the possibility to broaden cooperation between Mexico and the US in trade and political domains. Considering the fact that the US government is heavily involved in tackling the issue of illegal migration on its southern border and even goes as far as framing it in terms of an emergency crisis (DHS 2020), it means that the US would attempt to address this problem in various ways. In this sense, providing certain concessions to Mexico, such as a trade deal, plays an important role in determining whether the Mexican government would honor the MPP. This is precisely why it is necessary to consider this fact as a part of incentives that pushes Mexico towards accepting an externalization.

Next step is to determine whether trade expansion is indeed a sufficient incentive for Mexico to adopt the MPP. Here it is important to understand the overall US-Mexico trade dynamic and the significance of the US for the Mexican market. As such, according to the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR 2020), Mexico is the 2nd largest partner in terms of goods exports and imports in the year 2018. Overall trade of goods and services between the US and Mexico in 2018 totaled an estimated \$671.1 billion (Ibid.) and in 2019 that number totaled at \$614.5 billion (Forbes 2020). This is way larger than in the pre-NAFTA years, which points to the fact that Mexico is highly interested in keeping such relationship and if there is a possibility of expanding or renewing the existing trade deal it would potentially utilize that possibility. This is precisely where the MPP and new US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) come into play.

It is also important to identify whether the broadening trade cooperation indeed played the role in the initial decision-making process of Mexico in accepting the externalization. In the present, actions that the Mexican government takes to address the issue of irregular migration, specifically adoption of the Joint Declaration and subsequent implementation of

the MPP coincides with the renewed talks over the trade agreement (Office of the US Trade Representative 2018). In this regard, it is possible to observe how talks over the updated trade agreement took place at the same time as the US border patrol registered 851,508 migrants entering the US between 2018 and 2019, which is the highest number of migrants since 2007 (Narea 2020). This in itself does not necessarily prove that the trade agreement and migration are directly connected, but in the context of the incentive based approach it becomes quite clear how such actions can be interpreted within the framework of externalization.

Such approach of the Mexican government resembles a somewhat similar strategy that they employed during the preparations to enter NAFTA (Alba and Castillo 2012, 5). During that period of time, Mexico adjusted their policies and actions related to immigration as a response to the growing number of Central American immigrants that attempted to cross its borders with the US. The strategies aimed at reducing illegal immigration to the north clearly indicate the intention of the Mexican government to integrate economically with its northern neighbors. At the same time, it did not resolve the issue of transit migration, as Central American migrants simply started to rely on irregular routes to enter the US, which only increased the risks of being abused by human smugglers (Ibid).

Increasing legitimacy. The last incentive that I will discuss in this chapter concerns the legitimacy aspect of the Mexican government both on the international and domestic levels. Compliance of the Mexican government with the US policy allows them to demonstrate that they are attempting to resolve issues concerning migration. The success of implementation of externalization therefore can be explained with regards to how it affects the image of a transit state, i.e. Mexico.

In terms of considerations regarding the MPP it is important to point how it can affect the image of Mexico on both domestic and international levels. As such, the MPP pushes the Mexican authorities to take a more proactive role in combatting irregular migration and pay

attention to the migrant communities within their borders. In the light of the domestic issues that the Mexican government has faced from various non-state actors, such approach demonstrates the willingness of the state to improve its image as a country that is able to address the issues of people and protect them from violations of their rights. The growing violence associated with the drug cartels and inability of the government to address this problem significantly affects the way international community and domestic population perceives legitimacy of the Mexican authorities (Kuperus 2019). In addition, Mexico has been suffering from the corruption for quite an extended period of time (Grasso 2017). According to the Transparency International (2019), Mexico ranks 130 out of 180 countries, with the score of 29/100. Therefore, any action that would potentially affect their image in a positive way is of immediate interest for the government.

Adoption of the MPP aids the Mexican government in this case. It allows Mexico to present an image of a state that is determined to improve on its current record, from being considered a state that does not have full control over its territory to being a state that has firm control of irregular migration. Even though effectiveness of implementation of the MPP in terms of controlling flow of illegal migration is debatable, the mere symbolic value of implementing the MPP is important in order to demonstrate the willingness of Mexico to assist migrants within their territory.

One of the questions left to answer in case of connection between increasing legitimacy and the MPP is to determine whether it was a deliberate consideration on behalf of Mexico and not just a byproduct of the MPP. In this sense, it is important to show that the adoption of the MPP is not an isolated event to improve the well-being of migrants within the Mexican territory. Since the start of his presidency in 2018 Andrés Manuel López Obrador promised to address the situation of migrants and “a new, more humane approach to the migration of Central Americans and others who come to Mexico to either settle there or travel

north, to the United States” (Meyer and Isacson 2019). He also advocated for the joint response of Mexico, the US and Central American states to the growing issue of regional migration. If one considers the perspective to migration of the president of Mexico then it becomes quite clear that the Mexican government would utilize opportunities, such as the MPP, that will allow them to deliver on their promises.

So, in terms of the way that these incentives led to success of implementation it is necessary to unpack what sort of actions the Mexican government undertook after the MPP. Initial assessment of the MPP by the US DHS in October of 2019 reveals that it “has demonstrated operational effectiveness” and that it is an “indispensable tool in addressing the ongoing crisis at the southern border and restoring integrity to the immigration system” (DHS 2019, 2). In more concrete terms, what DHS states is that with the help of MPP they returned more than 55,000 migrants to Mexico by October of 2019. Moreover, total enforcement actions from May to September of 2019 have decreased by 64% and apprehension of families from Central America, which was one of the main reasons for the declaration of border crisis, have decreased by 80% (Ibid.). Such numbers signal to both sides that implementation of remote control practices in this particular case succeeded and that there is a connection between incentives and enforcement of actions aimed at outsourcing migration control to transit state.

On top of that, individual actions of Mexican authorities also mean that aforementioned incentives played a significant role in the success of externalization. Mexico started intensifying its migration enforcement, which includes deployment of National Guards on their border with the US, adding checkpoints on highways and increasing capacity of the government immigration agency (Frederick 2019) after externalization deal took place. These actions of Mexico demonstrate that this transit state is willing to comply with the migratory

rules of the destination state and help them in controlling and outsourcing their migration management onto them. Such signaling is important, since it shows how incentivization strategies assist the US in achieving the intended goal of implementing remote control practices.

This chapter demonstrates that various incentives, such as financial support, broadening cooperation in trade and increasing legitimacy, exists in the case of externalization in Mexico and accounts for the success of externalization in Mexico. Such considerations are especially significant, given the fact that the case of Mexico represents a conventional case, where powerful destination states unilaterally impose remote control practices. What it shows that power based approach fails to explain the continuous presence of incentives that destination states utilizes as well as the benefits that transit states obtains by engaging in externalization. This is in turn emphasizes the role of incentive based approach as a factor that explains the success of externalization.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

I have established the framework for the study of externalization of migration policies in transit states by emphasizing the incentives that drive their decision to implement externalization efforts of destination states in this research. The main question that I attempted to answer throughout the research is whether transit states play a role in determining the success of externalization. This research demonstrated that interests of transit states play a much more decisive role in the initial decision to implement remote control practices than what the dominant power-based explanation might predict. More specifically, consideration of potential benefits in terms of financial support, economic or political expansions, and increasing legitimacy are the driving forces behind the decision to adopt externalization and not the power asymmetry between destination and transit states as previously suggested in literature. Thus, in order to understand and predict whether certain externalization management will take place and will succeed it is necessary to look at incentives as a main factor behind it.

The preferences of transit states play a more significant role in determining whether remote control practices take place than what the literature has previously suggested. Such line of argumentation runs contrary to the preconceived views of asymmetrical relations, where more powerful actors determine the outcome of interaction. Both cases of Morocco and Mexico demonstrate that incentives determine the success of remote control practices. These includes financial benefits, cooperation in broader political and economic domains. These findings are especially important given the initial difference between two cases, where Morocco represents a balanced cooperation, whereas Mexico represents a conventional power based approach. Thus, this research sheds a light on a larger picture of externalization, where both destination and transit states have their own interests.

This research in itself contributes to the current literature of externalization by emphasizing the role of transit states and by providing an explanation to the initial decision-making process with regards to such outsourcing of migration management. In this sense, the logic that drives states to maintain disparity between restrictive measures that they push for and the way migration actually proceeds in the traditional literature on migration control can also be applied in case of transit states, but for totally other reasons. In case of transit states and implementation of externalization the gap between rhetoric that government controls migration and the states of affairs of transit migrants on the ground persists due to the state intentions to keep utilizing this situation in order stay relevant in the foreign policy agenda of destination states.

Nevertheless, the limited scope of this research which is based on the two cases of transit states may potentially put into question whether similar forces drive the decision to comply with implementation of externalization for other states engaging in externalization. Similarly, it is possible that certain specific traits of Morocco and Mexico have helped them to enact these policies with considerable benefits that came with the implementation. Therefore, the obvious next step is to investigate cases of other origin and/or transit states and include the result in the discussion of externalization.

Overall, this research demonstrates that the implementation of externalization is a mutually beneficial process for both sides. In this regard, destination states achieve their goal of shifting the burden of dealing with migrants to third parties and decrease political costs associated with migration. Transit states, on the other hand, gain benefits that come along with this implementation, such as development aid, expansion of trade deals and increasing legitimacy on the domestic and international level.

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