Targeted sanctions: when are they effective?

Abstract

Given the increasing use of targeted sanctions despite the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of targeted versus non-targeted sanctions in the existing literature, the aim of this thesis is to investigate when targeted sanctions are more likely to be effective than non-targeted sanctions in terms of achieving desired policy objectives. The thesis achieves this aim in several steps. First, instead of debating on sanctions effectiveness in general, this work aims to disaggregate sanctions by their “targetedness” which allow us to see how the design might influence the success of sanctions. Second, using selectorate framework (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005) as a starting point of my theory, I explore whether designing sanctions in accordance with political institutional constraints of the targeted state can predetermine sanctions success. Third, given the importance of the threat stage along with the imposition stage, I examine the effect of sanctions design at two different stages of a sanction episode. To account for the threat and imposition stages on empirical part, I use an updated Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014), which is the only dataset that embraces both stages of a sanction episode. The underlining argument of this study claims that targeted sanctions can be effective if articulated in accordance with the targeted state’s conditions. Specifically, the model suggests that in small winning coalitions, targeted sanctions are more likely to be effective than non-targeted sanctions. While empirical evidence on the imposition stage provides mixed support for theoretical arguments, findings on the threat stage allow me to claim that the design of sanctions do have positive relationship on sanctions success. Thus, the clear implication of this study for policymakers entails that choosing the right design of sanctions consistent with targeted state’s political conditions is one of the crucial (but often times neglected) determinants of sanctions effectiveness