Semi-externalization, semi-internalization, misalignment costs, and CEOs' assessments of venture capitalists' support
dc.contributor.author | Khanin, D. | |
dc.contributor.author | Turel, O. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-11-04T09:11:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-11-04T09:11:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.description.abstract | Advancing transaction costs economics (TCE), we propose that hybrids (e.g., alliances) may be preferred to markets and hierarchies whenever the benefits of semi-externalization (partial adoption of the market mode of governance) combined with semi-internalization (partial adoption of the hierarchy mode of governance) less the misalignment costs that arise when these two conflicting modes of governance are combined exceed the benefits of full-blown externalization less the transaction costs and/or full-blown internalization less the administrative costs. | ru_RU |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9786018046728 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nur.nu.edu.kz/handle/123456789/756 | |
dc.language.iso | en | ru_RU |
dc.publisher | Nazarbayev University | ru_RU |
dc.subject | semi-externalization | ru_RU |
dc.subject | semi-internalization | ru_RU |
dc.subject | misalignment costs | ru_RU |
dc.subject | venture capitalists | ru_RU |
dc.title | Semi-externalization, semi-internalization, misalignment costs, and CEOs' assessments of venture capitalists' support | ru_RU |
dc.type | Abstract | ru_RU |