SELF-SELECTION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
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Date
2022-04
Authors
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Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Public Policy
Abstract
In this paper we explore how self-selection in the job market affects outcomes in
the public sector. We utilize the self-selection model to focus on the choices of
individuals between public sector and private sector employment. These choices
depend on observable and unobservable characteristics. One of the implications of
the self-selection model is that the unobservable characteristics are not randomly
distributed in the private and public sectors. These affect outcomes in developing
countries, and we specifically focus on the case of anti-corruption policies in Kazakhstan
– a country that consistently ranks highly in corruption scores despite the
numerous attempts in policy. One of the reasons why anti-corruption policies/strategies
fail in the case of Kazakhstan, is not because they are improperly drafted
or implemented, but because they fail to take into account the self-selection problem.
We find evidence for self-selection into public sector by subjects who are
more likely to cheat in a dice task game. Secondly, altruism has no significant
correlation with public sector career choices but negative correlation with the
corruption. More importantly we find that the correlation between altruism and
honest behavior is more likely to be due to framing effects.
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Type of access: Embargo
Citation
Ashikbayeva, Zh. (2022). Self-selection and good Governance. Nazarbayev University Graduate School of Public Policy