In Defence of the Will Theory of Rights

Abstract

Nicholas Vrousalis has aimed to recast an old objection to the will theory of rights by focusing on Hillel Steiner’s version of that theory. He has argued that Will Theorymust either be insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, or be incomplete, because it has no argumentative resourceswithin its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify restrictions on the amount of discretion exercised by legal officials. I showthat both charges are problematic.They rely on someof Steiner’s inferenceswhich are simply unjustified because they are based on misinterpretations of the logic of Hohfeld’s terminology. The problem for Vrousalis is that his critique takes for granted some of these flawed arguments. The critique is also misdirected to the extent that it assumes that the problems with Steiner’s theory affect Will Theory in general.