EXPLAINING VARIATION IN MEETING KYOTO PROTOCOL TARGETS AMONG ANNEX I DEMOCRACIES

Abstract

One of the most orthodox wisdoms among scholars studying compliance with international environmental agreements (IEAs) is that democratic states are far better compliers compared to autocracies. However, such focus on comparison of these two regimes has in many ways neglected the variation in meeting treaty commitments among democracies themselves. In fact, the case study of the Kyoto Protocol not only demonstrates that such variation exists, but also provides specific conditions under which democracies do not comply with international agreements. In this context, the main goal of this research was to investigate why even the most developed industrialized democracies like Australia, Norway and Japan sometimes do not fulfill their commitments to IEAs. The research theorized that this might happen due to increased unexpected costs, particularly during oil price shocks, when governments reconsider the opportunity cost of compliance and are more inclined to take advantage of higher oil prices by producing more petroleum goods. This in turn leads to the increase of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions. The findings of the statistical analysis of the changes in GHGs emission levels among Annex I member-states of the Kyoto Protocol from 1990 to 2015, support the main hypotheses associating oil price shocks with higher amounts of CO2 emissions and greater probability of non-compliance....