Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation

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dc.contributor.authorCelik, Gorkem
dc.contributor.authorYilankaya, Okan
dc.creatorGorkem, Celik
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-15T03:12:37Z
dc.date.available2017-12-15T03:12:37Z
dc.date.issued2017-09-01
dc.description.abstractAbstract We study sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function, the symmetric equilibrium (where all bidders use the same cutoff) is less efficient than a class of two-cutoff asymmetric equilibria. Existence of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two-cutoff equilibria with resale. Moreover, the equilibria with resale are “more asymmetric” and (under a sufficient condition) more efficient than the corresponding equilibria without resale.en_US
dc.identifierDOI:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009
dc.identifier.citationGorkem Celik, Okan Yilankaya, Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation, In International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 54, 2017, Pages 148-174en_US
dc.identifier.issn01677187
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718716302661
dc.identifier.urihttp://nur.nu.edu.kz/handle/123456789/2909
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherInternational Journal of Industrial Organizationen_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
dc.rights.license© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectSecond-price auctionsen_US
dc.subjectResaleen_US
dc.subjectParticipation costen_US
dc.subjectEndogenous entryen_US
dc.subjectEndogenous valuationsen_US
dc.titleResale in second-price auctions with costly participationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
elsevier.aggregationtypeJournal
elsevier.coverdate2017-09-01
elsevier.coverdisplaydateSeptember 2017
elsevier.endingpage174
elsevier.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.009
elsevier.identifier.eid1-s2.0-S0167718716302661
elsevier.identifier.piiS0167-7187(16)30266-1
elsevier.identifier.scopusid85026552297
elsevier.openaccess0
elsevier.openaccessarticlefalse
elsevier.openarchivearticlefalse
elsevier.startingpage148
elsevier.teaserWe study sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff....
elsevier.volume54
workflow.import.sourcescience

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