PROFIT SHARING AND INCENTIVES

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dc.contributor.authorOzdenoren, Emre
dc.contributor.authorRubanov, Oleg
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-07T08:44:30Z
dc.date.available2023-02-07T08:44:30Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractWe model a firm as a team production process subject to moral hazard and derive the optimal profit sharing scheme between productive workers and outside investors together with incentive contracts based on noisy performance signals. More productive agents with noisier performance signals are more likely to receive shares which can explain why man- agers are motivated by shares, and law or consulting firms form partnerships. A firm that grows by opening branches is held almost entirely by outside investors when its out- put noise grows faster than the number of branches. Otherwise, insiders hold substantial amount of a large firm’s shares.en_US
dc.identifier.citationOzdenoren, E., & Rubanov, O. (2022). Profit Sharing and Incentives. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 83, 102857. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102857en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nur.nu.edu.kz/handle/123456789/6928
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherInternational Journal of Industrial Organizationen_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 United States*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/*
dc.subjectType of access: Open Accessen_US
dc.subjectTeam productionen_US
dc.subjectMoral hazarden_US
dc.subjectProfit sharingen_US
dc.subjectPartnershipsen_US
dc.subjectIncentivesen_US
dc.titlePROFIT SHARING AND INCENTIVESen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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