Shocks, Constraints, and Learning: Explaining Investment Treaty Redesign in Kazakhstan

Abstract

This thesis investigates the possible drivers of changes in Kazakhstan's bilateral investment agreements and the reason why these changes differ noticeably depending on the partner country. For example, Kazakhstan has signed new modern agreements with Singapore (2018), Kyrgyzstan (2024) and China (2025), but has not redesigned the agreements with the United States (1992) and the Netherlands (2007), in spite of the fact that state has already accumulated negative experience of participating in international arbitration disputes. The thesis applies rational choice institutionalism as the main theory, while In the methodology section, the thesis uses a structured comparison of five cases, process tracing, analysis of treaty texts, and two semi-structured expert interviews. The findings indicate that a systemic shock is a necessary but insufficient condition for a redesign, and the main source of differences is the bilateral negotiation constraints between the countries. This thesis contributes to the literature on the political economy of the investment regime, as it examines a post-Soviet country that rarely gets into comparative studies of this type.