Targeted sanctions: when are they effective?
Loading...
Date
2016
Authors
Kabdulinova, Azhar
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Nazarbayev University School of Sciences and Humanities
Abstract
Given the increasing use of targeted sanctions despite the ongoing debate on the
effectiveness of targeted versus non-targeted sanctions in the existing literature, the aim of this
thesis is to investigate when targeted sanctions are more likely to be effective than non-targeted
sanctions in terms of achieving desired policy objectives. The thesis achieves this aim in several
steps. First, instead of debating on sanctions effectiveness in general, this work aims to
disaggregate sanctions by their “targetedness” which allow us to see how the design might
influence the success of sanctions. Second, using selectorate framework (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2005) as a starting point of my theory, I explore whether designing sanctions in
accordance with political institutional constraints of the targeted state can predetermine
sanctions success. Third, given the importance of the threat stage along with the imposition
stage, I examine the effect of sanctions design at two different stages of a sanction episode. To
account for the threat and imposition stages on empirical part, I use an updated Threat and
Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014), which is the
only dataset that embraces both stages of a sanction episode. The underlining argument of this
study claims that targeted sanctions can be effective if articulated in accordance with the
targeted state’s conditions. Specifically, the model suggests that in small winning coalitions,
targeted sanctions are more likely to be effective than non-targeted sanctions. While empirical
evidence on the imposition stage provides mixed support for theoretical arguments, findings
on the threat stage allow me to claim that the design of sanctions do have positive relationship
on sanctions success. Thus, the clear implication of this study for policymakers entails that
choosing the right design of sanctions consistent with targeted state’s political conditions is
one of the crucial (but often times neglected) determinants of sanctions effectiveness
Description
Keywords
sanctions