BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS TO COMBAT CORRUPTION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

Abstract

In this study, I explore the potential of behavioral interventions as complementary tools to deter corrupt behavior. By conducting an online between-subject experiment with 482 participants recruited from the Prolific.com platform, I test the effectiveness of moral reminder (prompting participants to reflect on their ethical standards), commitment (asking participants to promise that they will report honestly) and moral warning (explicitly requesting honesty and warning about the unethical nature of misreporting) nudges in reducing dishonesty. Participants play a ten-round mind game, guessing a randomly generated number from 1 to 6 in each round, with the opportunity to misreport to increase their earnings. Results indicate that commitment and moral warning nudges significantly reduce cheating, consistent with predictions of the reputational model, which posits that behavioral interventions can increase the perceived risk of detection by making this risk salient. Unlike the mind game, where participants only risk reputational losses if caught cheating (due to the absence of monetary punishments), real-life bureaucrats not only risk their reputation but also face substantial penalties if detected. Therefore, in real world contexts, using behavioral interventions may contribute to reducing corruption by amplifying the perceived risk of getting caught.