Informed middlemen and asymmetric information

dc.contributor.author	Kirysheva, I.
dc.date.accessioned	2015-11-04T09:30:13Z
dc.date.available	2015-11-04T09:30:13Z
dc.date.issued	2014
dc.identifier.isbn	9786018046728
dc.identifier.uri	http://nur.nu.edu.kz/handle/123456789/759
dc.description.abstract	In this paper I look at a two-sided asymmetric information game where agents make a collaborative decision not knowing types of each other. An intermediary has full knowledge about the types of agents and can make a decision that brings information to some types. However, once he puts the information on the table agents are not obliged to pay him, which undermines his incentive to participate in the first place.	ru_RU
dc.language.iso	en	ru_RU
dc.publisher	Nazarbayev University	ru_RU
dc.subject	informed middlemen	ru_RU
dc.subject	asymmetric information	ru_RU
dc.title	Informed middlemen and asymmetric information	ru_RU
dc.type	Abstract	ru_RU