i THE UNOFFICIAL RUSSO-QING TRADE ON THE EASTERN KAZAKH STEPPE AND IN NORTHERN XINJIANG IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY ХІХ ҒАСЫРДЫҢ БІРІНШІ ЖАРТЫСЫНДАҒЫ ҚАЗАҚ ДАЛАСЫНЫҢ ШЫҒЫС БӨЛІГІ МЕН ШЫҢЖАҢДАҒЫ РЕСЕЙ МЕН ҚЫТАЙ АРАСЫНДАҒЫ БЕЙРЕСМИ САУДА НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНАЯ РОССИЙСКО-КИТАЙСКАЯ ТОРГОВЛЯ В ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЧАСТИ КАЗАХСКОЙ СТЕПИ И СИНЬЦЗЯНЕ В ПЕРВОЙ ПОЛОВИНЕ XIX ВЕКА by DI WANG A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Eurasian Studies at NAZARBAYEV UNIVERSITY - SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES Astana, Kazakhstan 2018 ii © 2018 Di Wang All Rights Reserved iii iv THE UNOFFICIAL RUSSO-QING TRADE ON THE EASTERN KAZAKH STEPPE AND IN NORTHERN XINJIANG IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY ХІХ ҒАСЫРДЫҢ БІРІНШІ ЖАРТЫСЫНДАҒЫ ҚАЗАҚ ДАЛАСЫНЫҢ ШЫҒЫС БӨЛІГІ МЕН ШЫҢЖАҢДАҒЫ РЕСЕЙ МЕН ҚЫТАЙ АРАСЫНДАҒЫ БЕЙРЕСМИ САУДА НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНАЯ РОССИЙСКО-КИТАЙСКАЯ ТОРГОВЛЯ В ВОСТОЧНОЙ ЧАСТИ КАЗАХСКОЙ СТЕПИ И СИНЬЦЗЯНЕ В ПЕРВОЙ ПОЛОВИНЕ XIX ВЕКА by DI WANG Principal Advisor: Dr. Nikolay Tsyrempilov Second Advisor: Dr. Clare Griffin External Reviewer: Dr. Erika Monahan Electronic version approved: ✓ Prof. Alima Bissenova Director of the MA Program in Eurasian Studies School of Humanities and Social Sciences Nazarbayev University May 2018 v Abstract The Treaty of Kuldja (Ili) signed in 1851 between the Russian empire and the Qing empire marked the start of the official Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang. This thesis aims to explore the generally neglected pre-1851 unofficial Russo-Qing trade on the Eastern Kazakh steppe and in Northern Xinjiang by examining the trade in three areas: Semipalatinsk, Tarbagatai and Ili. This pre-treaty era Russo-Qing trade was regarded as illegal on the Qing side but legal on the Russian side. By comparing the information from Chinese and Russian sources, this thesis argues that the original legal and official Kazakh- Qing trade established in the 1760s was gradually transformed into an unofficial Russo- Qing trade in the first half of the 19th century. Besides analyzing the motivation and the stance of the Russian empire and the Qing empire, this thesis highlights the role of individual actors such as merchants, nomads, government officials and border guards in forging the trade. This thesis also discusses the commodities of the trade, the myth of silver flow and the discovery of the dramatic price change in the year of 1840. The analysis of travelogues and quantitative archival data of the imports and exports of the Semipalatinsk custom post from the 1820s to the 1840s complement the existing scholarship on this topic. By discussing the above-mentioned themes, the author reaches the conclusion that the pre-Treaty era unofficial trade was already marked by established institutions and diverse commodities, though with a high degree of informality. The 1851 Treaty of Kuldja which officialized the Russo-Qing trade in Ili and Tarbagatai did not establish a new trade, but was a result of the pre-Treaty period unofficial trade and carried many characteristics of the pre-treaty era trade. vi Acknowledgements First of all, I wish to express my immense gratitude to my thesis supervisors Professor Nikolay Tsyrempilov and Professor Clare Griffin, and my former supervisor Professor Beatrice Penati. I would not have been able to finish this master’s thesis without their constant encouragement, valuable advice and support. It was a long and difficult journey, but they have been supporting me wholeheartedly. I am grateful to have them as my supervisors. I would like to give special thanks to Professor Erika Monahan from the University of New Mexico for her insightful comments, and her illuminating works that enlightened my research. I would also like to thank Professor Alexander Morrison for proofreading my work, and Aidyn Zhuniskhanov for helping with transliterating Kazakh names contained in Chinese sources. I would like to thank the program director of Eurasian Studies Professor Alima Bissenova, the former program director Professor Alexander Morrison, and the faculty of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Nazarbayev University for maintaining academic integrity and creating an inspiring academic environment. I would also like to thank my friends and classmates who have been supporting me at each step of my research. My special thanks go to Nurgul Zhanabayeva, David Hansen and Saltanat Boteu, who have been supporting me both academically, with their good advice, and emotionally. I am grateful to my family for their unequivocal support, trust and love. They supported my decision to study in this field and have always been patient when I am chattering about my research. They are the source of love and support in any situation. vii Table of Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................................... - 1 - Chapter 1: The political background and motivation for the development of the trade.... - 12 - Introduction .................................................................................................................... - 12 - The Political and Economic Settings and Interests of the Two Empires ......................... - 13 - The Russian Empire ....................................................................................................... - 13 - The Qing Empire ............................................................................................................ - 16 - Negotiations and Treaties ............................................................................................... - 19 - Trade in Kiakhta under the Kiakhta Treaty system ........................................................ - 24 - The Kazakh-Qing trade in northern Xinjiang .................................................................. - 32 - Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... - 40 - Chapter 2: The unofficial Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang ...................................................... - 42 - Introduction .................................................................................................................... - 42 - The location and socio-economic background of Ili and Tarbagatai .............................. - 45 - The active role of Russia in establishing the trade ......................................................... - 49 - The Different Definitions of the Trade on the Russian and Qing Sides ........................... - 57 - Actors in the trade ........................................................................................................... - 70 - Russian and Tatar merchants ......................................................................................... - 70 - Central Asian merchants ................................................................................................ - 72 - The Kazakhs .................................................................................................................. - 75 - Chinese karun officials and Chinese merchants ................................................................ - 78 - Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... - 82 - Chapter 3: The commodities exchanged in the pre-1851 trade and the change of the trade after 1851 ........................................................................................................................... - 83 - Introduction .................................................................................................................... - 83 - The major commodities of the pre-1851 Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang ......................... - 85 - Opium ........................................................................................................................... - 85 - Silver ............................................................................................................................. - 88 - Tea .............................................................................................................................. - 105 - viii On the comparison of the volume of trade between Semipalatinsk-Tarbagatai and Ili trade and the Kiakhta trade .................................................................................................... - 112 - Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... - 118 - Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... - 120 - Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... - 127 - Appendix ........................................................................................................................... - 133 - - 1 - Introduction There is a general perception that the 19th-century overland trade was in decline with the rise of the sea trade.1 However, this view has been challenged in the recent decades with the growing number of scholarly works on the 19th century Eurasian overland trade.2 This thesis contributes to this debate by studying one particular aspect of it: the unofficial Russo-Qing trade on the eastern Kazakh steppe and in northern Xinjiang in the early 19th century. In previous scholarly works, this topic has generally less discussed compared to the Kiakhta trade, the Kazakh-Qing trade and the post-1851 Russo-Qing trade. This thesis aims to reconstruct the picture of the pre-1851 Russo-Qing trade in northern Xinjiang and highlight its importance in shaping the official post-1851 trade. Russia had been trying to establish itself as the intermediary of the trade between Europe and China. After difficult negotiations with China, the first market for Russo-Qing trade was established in Kiakhta near Lake Baikal in 1727. This thesis highlights an alternative trading spot to Kiakhta, though much smaller in terms of trade turnover. Before 1851, these alternative markets in Tarbagatai and Ili in Xinjiang were illegal from the viewpoint of the Qing authorities but legal on the Russian side. This small-scale unofficial trade gradually took over in importance from the Kiakhta trade by the end of the 19th 1 J. C. van Leur, Indonesian trade and society: essays in Asian social and economic history (Hague: W. Van Hoeve Publishers, 1967); Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, the East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1974). 2 Morris Rossabi, “The ‘Decline’ of the Central Asian Caravan Trade,” The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World 1350–1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 351–70; Stephen Frederic Dale, Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600–1750 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Scott C. Levi, The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade, 1550– 1900 (Leiden: Brill, 2002); Erika Monahan, The Merchants of Siberia: Trade in Early Modern Eurasia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016). - 2 - century. This thesis aims to discuss the origin of this pre-1851 unofficial Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang. In this way, it will to some degree contribute to the existing literature on the 19th century Eurasian overland trade. Previous historiography has dealt with many issues related to Russo-Qing trade, such as Russian and Chinese motivation to trade, the Kiakhta trade, the Kazakh-Qing trade, the post-1851 Russo-Qing trade and the conjuncture of the illegal pre-1851 Russo-Qing trade, and participants and commodities in the Russo-Qing trade. Khodarkovsky3 and Monahan’s4 works discuss Russian motivation to trade with the east, while Perdue,5 Yanagisawa6 and Newby7 cover Qing motivation to trade with the west. This thesis agrees with the arguments of the above scholars on the role of the states in shaping trade relations by expanding sovereignty and stipulating rules regarding the trade, but at the same time emphasizes the more important role of individuals in shaping the pre-1851 unofficial Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang. Monahan, Burton8 and Onuma’9highlight the importance of Bukharan merchant networks in Eurasian overland trade. This thesis highlights the role of other individuals (Qing officials, the Kazakhs and other Central Asian merchants) in shaping the pre-1851 unofficial trade in Xinjiang. 3 Michael Khodarkovaky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: the making of a colonial empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington– Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004). 4 Monahan. 2006. 5 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: the Qing conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). 6 Akira Yanagisawa, “Some Remarks on the ‘Addendum to the Treaty of Kiakhta’ in 1768”, Memoirs of the Research Department of The Toyo Bunko 63 (2016): 65-87. 7 L. J. Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: a political history of Qing relations with Khoqand c. 1760-1860 (Leiden: Brill, 2005). 8 Audrey Burton, The Bukharans: a dynastic, diplomatic, and commercial history, 1550–1702 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997). 9 Takahiro Onuma, “The Development of the Junghars and the Role of Bukharan Merchants,” Journal of Central Eurasian Studies, vol. 2 (2011): 83-100. https://books.google.com/books?id=KTmO416hNQ8C&dq=altishahr+seven+cities https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brill_Publishers - 3 - Perdue and Millward10 discuss the issue of tributary trade in their works, and how the Qing empire treated tributary trade differently from previous dynasties. This discussion strengthens our understanding of the uniqueness of Qing foreign trade compared with foreign trade of the previous dynasties; Foust’s11 work which extensively discusses the Kiakhta trade and Millward’s work on Kazakh-Qing trade both help the students of Russo-Qing trade to understand the two forms of official Qing-steppe trade. While Li’s12 work focuses on post-1851 Russo-Qing legal and official trade in Xinjiang, Noda13 mentions the existence of an active pre-1851 illegal Russo-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili, and the intermediary role of the Kazakhs in this trade. This argument reflects a new perspective of treating the Kazakh-Qing trade as a broader network of Russo-Qing trade. The result of this thesis supports Noda’s view on the intermediary role of the Kazakhs in the pre-1851 unofficial Russo-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili. Foust, Newby, Monahan and Noda all discussed commodities exchanged in Russo-Qing-Central Asia trade which provide valuable information to complement the quantitative data which I collected in the Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This research supports Jin Noda’s view that the Kazakh-Qing trade was part of a broader unofficial Russo-Qing trade with the Kazakhs as intermediary before the opening of the official Russo-Qing trade in 1851, but aims to deepen the understanding of this topic by analyzing travelogues to show how this trade is influenced by individuals, and by 10 James Millward, “Qing Silk-Horse Trade with the Qazaqs in Yili and Tarbagatai, 1758-1853,” Central and Inner Asian Studies, vol. 7 (1993). 11 Clifford Foust, Muscovite and Mandarin: Russia’s trade with China and its setting (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969). 12 Sheng Li, Xinjiang dui su’e maoyi shi, 1600 - 1990 [The History of Trade between Xinjiang and the Soviet Union and Russia, 1600 - 1990] (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1993). 13 Jin Noda, The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian international relations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Boston: Brill, 2016). - 4 - analyzing quantitative data to provide more concrete evidence of the existence of the trade and explore characteristics of the trade. The research shows how the alternative Russo- Qing trading spots of Kiakhta in Tarbagatai and Ili were established and developed throughout the years. Although the result of this research shows that the scale of the unofficial pre-1851 Russo-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili was much smaller than that of the Kiakhta trade in the same period, it nevertheless demonstrates that the later official Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang has a precedent. This research argues that the Treaty of Kuldja signed in 1851 did not have a profound influence on the pre-existing trade. The merchants who participated in the trade and commodities exchanged remained similar, with only a change in the scale of the trade. Besides, the research also points to the often- neglected gap between the official and unofficial attitudes of the Qing officials towards the “illegal” Russo-Qing trade. Furthermore, the research emphasizes the importance of silver in the pre-1851 Russo-Qing unofficial trade in Xinjiang, and brings up four hypotheses to explain the possible relation between silver and the trade during the period in concern. The main research question of this thesis is “what was the situation of the unofficial Russo-Qing trade in the eastern Kazakh steppe and northern Xinjiang before it was legalized in 1851?” To answer this big question, several sub-questions are asked: “What was the political background of Russo-Qing relations and the motivation for the two states to develop the trade?” (in Chapter 1); “What are the characteristics of this trade?”, “What was the official attitude of Russian empire and Qing empire towards this unofficial trade?” and “Who participated in the trade?” (in Chapter 2); and “What major commodities were exchanged?”, “Were there particular commodities that had a strong influence on the trade?” and “How does the trade differ from the post-1851 legal trade?” (in Chapter 3). Discussion - 5 - on the political context, the role of governmental officials, the profile of merchants, and the types, quantity and values of commodities can contribute to our understanding of the situation of the pre-1851 unofficial Russo-Qing trade. The main hypothesis of this research is that the pre-1851 Russo-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili did exist, and was not small in scale. In addition, the hypothesis also suggests that this trade substituted for part of the Kiakhta trade, and even had an influence on the Kiakhta trade. Although the result of my research shows that the quantity and values of goods in pre-1851 Russo-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili was only a small proportion of those in the Kiakhta trade, it nevertheless gives other meaningful results. First, the data on the imports and exports of the Semipalatinsk customs house clearly shows that the trade did exist. Second, although the quantity and values of commodities traded there were much smaller than those of Kiakhta trade, the data nevertheless give two meaningful pieces of information. First, the data show that the types of commodities in pre-1851 Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang remained similar to those of the post-1851 trade and only the scale of trade was bigger post-1851. Therefore, the signing of the Treaty of Kuldja in 1851 can probably be seen as less groundbreaking than it is perceived as the start of Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang. Second, the data also point out the role of silver in the price of commodities. The decreasing amount of silver that flowed to Semipalatinsk and the depreciation of silver were likely related to the price of other types of commodities. This discussion on silver in this trade can be put into the broader context of the discussion on silver supply of the Qing empire under the influence of the Opium Wars. The primary source base of this research includes sources in Chinese and Russian. The sources in Chinese can be grouped into four major categories: 1. The scholarly editions - 6 - of published works and essays on the politics of Xinjiang: Xichui yaolue14 which contains descriptions of the geography, karuns, governmental positions, military settlements and trainings, local ethnic groups and customs of Xinjiang, Xun Xian Lu15 which sketches out information on the geography and history of different towns in Xinjiang and Xichui zongtong shilue16 which is a comprehensive guide that not only covers the themes in Xichui yaolue, but also Qing political history, descriptions of towns, irrigation, natural resources, cattle-raising, local manufacturing, education and literature in Xinjiang; 2. published archival documents (mostly correspondence between Xinjiang local officials and the court): XDLZX17 which presents documents on the politics, migration and trade in Xinjiang and documents on the Kazakh-Qing trade and Russo-Qing trade, Tacheng and Aletai, Yili18 which contains collected documents on the Kazakh-Qing trade, cases of illegal trade, the nomination of government officials, and statistics on horses, cattle, food, and cloth; 3. published local chronicles of Xinjiang: Taerbahatai shiyi19 which describes the geography, demography, monetary policies, tax regulations, customs, provisions and funds for troops, 14 Yunshi Qi, Xichui yaolue [Survey of the Western Frontiers], Zhongguo fangzhi congshu: Daoguang, vol. 4 [Collections of Chinese Local Chronicles: Daoguang era, vol. 4](1837; reprint, Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968). 15 “Xun Xian Lu” [News Acquired while Traveling on An Official Mission] in Zhongguo bianjiang yanjiu ziliao wenku: bianjiang xingzheng jianzhi chubian: vol. 3 xibei he xinan [Records on the Materials on Chinese Border Studies: First Compilation on Administrative System of the Border Area: vol. 3 Northwest and Southwest] (Beijing: chishi chanquan chubanshe, 2011), 49-50. 16 Tingkai Wang and Yunshi Qi, “Xichui zongtong shilue” [On the General Issues of the Western Frontier] (1809) in Qingchao zhili xinjiang fanglue huibian vol. 23 [Compilation on Strategies of the Qing Governance in Xinjiang vol. 23] (Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2006). 17 Xinjiang difang lishi ziliao xuanji [Collections of Xinjiang Local Historical Materials]. ed. Guorong Ma and Bofu Xu (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987). 18 Zhongguo Xinjiang lishi wenhua guji wenxian ziliao yibian [Collections of the Translated Monographs and Archival Materials on the History and Culture of Chinese Xinjiang] (Atush: Kezilesu Ke’erkeziyu chubanshe; Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2016 and 2017). (1) Tacheng [Tarbagatai] and Aletai [Altai]: part 1, vol. 12; part 2, vol. 13 (2) Ili: part 2, vol. 4; part 3, vol. 5 19 Xingzhao, Taerbahatai shiyi [On the Issues of Tarbagatai]. (1805; reprint, Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969). - 7 - the development of different industries, and trade in Tarbagatai. (Qianlong) Yili shiyi20 presents information on the geography, demography, military settlements and trainings, local industries and required work for different branches of the government in Ili; 4. published collected materials on the Shanxi merchant group MQJXLZXB which contains descriptions of the management of the companies, their activity in different regions, and their connections with the government.21 All of the above works in the collections were originally written in the Qing period and were edited later. XDLZX and part of Tacheng and Aletai, Yili22and MQJSLZXB are contemporary collections of documents which also contain sources from pre-Qing times and the Republican era. All of the above works are highly descriptive and official in nature, and some were written with the same template of language. Besides the correspondence, other descriptions of local situation were also produced to provide information for the central government and for the purpose of archiving. Sources in Russian include archival data on the imports and exports of Semipalatinsk custom post in the year 1826, 1827, 1830, 1831, 1835, 1838, 1839, 1840, 1843, 1846, 1848 and 1849 (TsGA RK F.I-478 op.2)23 which I got access to in the Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan. These data were not used in any secondary literature I have reviewed besides Sladkovskii’s work24 which indirectly cited a work that 20 Yongbao, “(Qianlong) Yili shiyi” [On the Issues of Ili (Qianlong era)] in Zhongguo difangzhi jicheng: xinjiangfu xianzhiji vol. 9 [Compiled Chinese Local Chronicles: Xinjiang vol. 9]. (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2014). 21 Ming Qing jinshang shangye ziliao xuanbian [Selections of Materials on Shanxi Merchants in Ming and Qing Period]. ed. Zhengming Zhang etc. (Taiyuan: Shanxi jingji chubanshe, 2016). 22 ZXLWGWZY 23 TsGA RK F. I - 478 Semipalatinskaia tamozhnia Departamenta tamozhennykh sborov Ministerstva finansov op.2 (1731-1868). 24 M.I. Sladkovskii, Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem (do 1917 g.) [History of Economic Relations between Russia and China] (Moscow: Nauka, 1977). - 8 - probably cited part of these data. The dela I have examined contain the turnover of trade in each month of a year and tables which include the names, quantity, values and duties imposed on all the commodities imported and exported in a year. All of the dela I have examined contain a separate list of cases of smuggling (as defined by Russia) from the official data. Due to the limited time, I was not able to collect all of the data of this section for each year and track the change of it and make comparison with the data on the legal trade. However, the illegal trade mostly focused on two items: tea from China and salt which is described as “from the lakes on the Kazakh steppe.” In the dela of some years, there are lists of the names of the merchants who came to or left Semipalatinsk, where they were traveling from, and the amount or value of commodities they brought/took.25 Some dela also contain correspondence between the Semipalatinsk custom post and the Ministry of Finance.26 These data do contain errors in calculation, but the difference was clearly a result of miswriting or miscalculation rather than suggesting any meaningful pattern as the difference was often very small. Some parts of the data are illegible or contain massive amount of markings that cross the data out which prevail in the majority of the documents. However, most of the markings are done with pencil while the original numbers are written down in ink. Since most the markings are done systematically without particular attention paid to single entries, it is probably true that the markings were used as a way to tick the data while the data were being aggregated. Therefore the data can still be seen as valuable sources for our analysis. 25TsGA RK f. I-478 op. 2 d. 124 l. 7ob - 23ob (1830). “Godovaia o prishedshikh i otshedshikh karavanakh Semipalatinskoi Tamozhenoi za 1830 god.” 26 TsGA RK f. I - 341 op. 2 d. 10. L. 3, 3ob, 5, 6 (1827). “o vyvoze tovarov kitaiskim perevodchikam Dalantai dlia promeny Ust’-Kamen. Zastave.” - 9 - Other primary sources in Russian I have examined are: the collection of documents TSSPSD27 which contains reports, correspondence and tables of the Semipalatinsk local trade, trade with Xinjiang and discussions on the custom duties; travelogues of Russian travelers from the Eastern Kazakh steppe to Ili and Tarbagatai including “Poezdka N. I. Liubimova... v 1845 godu”28 and “Opisanie puti... perevodchika Putintsev.... 1811 g;”29 and surveys of the local situation in Semipalatinsk in OSOZ30 which contains descriptions and data of the demography, agriculture, cattle-raising, the development of different industries, geography, transportation and trade. Both of the materials in the collection of documents and the survey of the local situation in Semipalatinsk are highly official in nature, and their purpose is to inform the relevant governmental officials and to archive information for each year. The travelogues are valuable ethnographic works that present more information on the behavior of local people. However, as both of the travelers did not know the local language and most information was got through translators, their account may not reflect the real situation. Besides, the different identity of the two travelers might also had an 27 Torgovye svyazi semipalatinskogo priirtysh’ya (xviii-nachalo xx veka) sbornik dokumentov [Collected Documents of the Trade Relations of the Semipalatinsk Upper Irtysh Area (From the 18th to the Beginning of the 20th Century] ed. A. A. Aubakirov, G. T. Kasymova, and K. L. Esmagambetov. Upravlenie arkhivami Vostochno-Kazakhstanskoi oblasti, Tsentr dokumentatsi noveishei istorii Vostochno-Kazakhstanskoi oblasti (Semipalatinsk, 2004). 28 “Poezdka N. I. Liubimova v Chuguchak i Kul’zhu v 1845 godu pod vidom kuptsa Khorosheva” [The Travel of N. I. Liubimov in Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) and Kuldja (Ili) in 1845 under the name of a merchant Khoroshev], ed. N. I. Veselovskii in “Zhivaya Starina” vol. 2 section 1. 1908. 170-189. Accessed on July, 16, 2017. https://lib.rgo.ru/reader/flipping/Resource-728/RuPRLIB12047272/index.html 29 “Opisanie puti po kotoromu khodil perevodchik kollezhskii registrator Putintsev, sostoiashii pri general- leitenante Glazenape, po imennomu vysochaishemu ego imperatorskogo velichestva poveleniiu poslannye taino ot kreposti Bukhtarminskoi do kitaiskikh gorodov Chuguchaka i Kul’zhi pri karavane s tovarom kommertsi sovetnika i tarskogo 1-i gil’dii kuptsa Nerpina. 1811 g.”[Description of the road which the translator Putintsev, from Lieutenant-General Glazenap on behalf of his Imperial Majesty’s highest order, was sent secretly from the Bukhtarminsk post to the Chinese towns of Chuguchak and Kul’zha together with the caravan of the commissar advisor 1-st guild Taran merchant Nerpin with commodities. Year 1811] in Putevye dnevniki i zapiski rossiiskikh chinovnikov i issledovatelei o kazakhskoi stepi xviii - serediny xix veka [Diaries and notes of Russian officials and researchers of the Kazakh steppe from 18th-middle of 19th century]. ed. I. V. Erofeeva (Astana: Obshestvo invalidov - Chernobylets, 2012), 82-121. 30 Obzor semipalatinskoi oblasti za 1893; 1898 god [Overview of the Semipalatinsk Oblast’ for the year 1893; 1898] (Semipalatinsk: Tipographia oblastnogo pravlenia, 1894, 1899). https://lib.rgo.ru/reader/flipping/Resource-728/RuPRLIB12047272/index.html - 10 - influence on the treatment they received by the local people which is discussed in the second chapter. Nevertheless, the travelogues are highly valuable sources for my research as they complement the official information and statistics, and demonstrate the more individual side of the Russo-Qing trade. This research is conducted using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative research includes textual analysis of the compilations of archival documents, travelogues and secondary literature; while quantitative research is conducted to analyze and interpret the archival data on the imports and exports of the Semipalatinsk custom house. I transcribed data into spreadsheets and organized the data, created charts and graphs with the data, and tried to analyze and then interpret the data based on the spreadsheets, charts and graphs. This thesis contains three chapters. The first chapter discusses the political background and motivation for the development of the trade. This chapter includes the motivation for establishing trade relations on the Russian and the Qing side, political events that contributed to the development of the trade, trade in Kiakhta under the Kiakhta treaty system, and the Kazakh-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili. The second chapter concerns the unofficial Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang. This chapter includes the social- economic background of Ili and Tarbagatai, the Russian preparation of trade through expansion and regulations, the different definitions of trade by Russian empire and Qing empire, the attitude of Qing officials on the trade as seen by Russian travelers, and participants of the trade including Russian, Tatar, Central Asian (Bukharan, Khoqandi, Altishahri and Tashkenti) and Chinese merchants and the Kazakhs. The third chapter concerns the commodities exchanged in the pre-1851 trade and its comparison with the - 11 - post-1851 trade. This chapter includes discussions on the significance of the year 1840 in this trade including the importance of silver and opium, major commodities in this trade including cotton and silk, woolen products, leather products, tea, food and metal products, and the discussion on the post-1851 trade. Besides the Kiakhta trade, this thesis limits the discussion about trade in Xinjiang to only northern Xinjiang and eastern Kazakhstan. The trade in southern Xinjiang, though occasionally mentioned, is not discussed extensively to avoid extending the thesis to the enormous discussion of Russian and British rivalry in southern Xinjiang and Central Asia. - 12 - Chapter 1: The political background and motivation for the development of the trade Introduction By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Russian empire had advanced to the Kazakh steppe and the Qing empire had expanded its territory to Dzungaria. They started their expansion project with both similar and different intentions. The expansion of Muscovy started with the combined intention of securing the states frontiers and searching for commercial opportunities. For the Qing empire, their expansion was characterized by the search for security, while commercial interests were secondary. Initially, when the two empires encountered each other, violent local conflict was the pattern of communication. Russia started expanding into the Amur region in the mid- 17th century, and the Qing empire initially resorted to violence to curb the Russian advanceto the east. In 1686, the Qing authorities sieged the Cossack settlement in Albazin as a warning to stop Russian expansion. Gradually, the pattern of Russo-Qing communication shifted from violent conflicts to negotiations. The two parties were able to sign treaties due to the change of political situation in the region, though with great difficulties. The treaties solved some problems, but only temporarily. Aftera series of negotiations, Kiakhta was named as the first and the only legal trading point between the Russian empire and the Qing empire in 1727. In the beginning years of trade in the 18th century, the suspension of the market was very frequent when the two parties failed to achieve an agreement when border conflicts rose. - 13 - Not long after the establishment of the official Russo-Qing trade in Kiakhta, the Qing established trade relations with the Kazakhs in Tarbagatai and Ili in Dzungaria on the northwestern frontier of what today’s northern Xinjiang, following the collapse of the Dzungar Khanate in the 1760s. This trade served as an important source for the Qing empire to obtain horses for military uses. However, there were cases of Russian commodities flowing into Xinjiang. The frequent suspension of the Kiakhta trade brought suspicions that the Kazakh-Qing trade was indeed functioning as an illegal Russo-Qing trade while the Kazakhs were intermediaries of the trade before it was eventually legalized in 1851. In this chapter, I divide the Russo-Qing commercial relations into four periods: 1689-1727 is the period following the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) when the Russian empire unilaterally tried to establish trade with the Qing empire but did not succeed; 1727-1851 is the period following the signing of the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727) when the official Russo-Qing trade was established in Kiakhta while the unofficial Russo- Qing trade was developing in Xinjiang; 1851-1858 is the period when the official Russo- Qing trade was established in Tarbagatai and Ili following the signing of the Treaty of Kuldja (1851); and the post-1858 period when the whole of Qing territory was opened for trade with Russia following the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin (1858). The Political and Economic Settings and Interests of the Two Empires The Russian Empire Muscovy has emerged as an influential regional power by the end of the sixteenth century and started its expansion into Siberia. According to Michael Khodarkovsky, the - 14 - motivation of Russian expansion to the east was at first “defensive,” but gradually shifted to being “opportunistic.”31 The eastward and southward expansion started initially due to security concerns, but later continued due to economic incentives. Erika Monahan partially disagreed with Khodarkovsky’s explanations by highlighting the pragmatic rather than the ideological motivation of the expansion of Russia. Monahan has demonstrated that the incentive for establishing commerce indeed began from as early as the fifteenth century and continued as a pattern throughout the process of Russian expansion to the east in the reign of Peter I. Monahan called Muscovy an “activist commercial state” that “cultivated international trade relations, taxation policies, subsidized commercial activities, instructed privileged merchant ranks” and the state also participated in commerce as well.32 Under the Tsar Ivan IV, Muscovy had redefined itself as a formidable regional power, and was striving for further autonomy from the already disintegrated Golden Horde. Following a series of expansion projects, in the seventeenth century, Muscovy had grown into an empire under Peter the Great. Russia was able to stop paying tribute to the Crimean Khanate,33 and introduced the concept of submission to its nomadic neighbors. The nomadic groups took shert’ 34 as a way to seek temporary protection, while Russia saw this action as a sign of permanent submission. This misunderstanding created problems when they encountered the Kazakhs, as the Kazakhs would take an oath of allegiance to both the Qing empire and Russian empire. Parallel with the military expansion to Siberia and the Far East, Russia started searching for natural resources and animal products, especially fur. Fur was later paid as 31 Khodarkovsky, 221. 32 Monahan, 50. 33 Khodarkovsky, 67-69. 34 Shert’: “a written document stipulating conditions of peace and military alliance,” cited from Ibid., 53. - 15 - yasak to Russia by Kazakhs under Russian protection.35 One important factor of not building large-scale settlements until the 19th century was related to fur. This was due to the state’s perspective that building large-scale settlements and developing agriculture would destroy the fur trade.36 Nevertheless, fur was not the sole driver for Russian expansion to the east, and other commodities motivated the expansion as well. The international and domestic custom duties paid by merchants constituted a major part of state revenue that incentivized Russian expansion.37Feeding the population of the newly conquered land was another factor that drove Russia further east to look for more resources.38 Russia also started searching for trade opportunities in the steppe and Central Asia, and established trade networks from Tobol’sk and Tara to Bukhara.39 After accepting the petition of Abulkhair Khan of the Junior Juz40 in 1731 for protection against the Volga Kalmyks and Bashkirs, Russia was able to move further east and extended its fortified lines. The building of Orenburg was the first move to increase communications with southern Central Asia, and made Russia an intermediary between Central Asian and European markets. The establishment of Orenburg, and also other towns such as Orsk, Yamysh and Semipalatinsk attracted merchants from Kashgar, Bukhara, Khiva and even Europe.41 The Kazakhs were also serving as protectors of caravans to make sure the caravans would be safe to cross the steppe. 35 Monahan, 122. 36 Ibid., 122. 37 Ibid., 53. 38 Ibid., 79. 39 Khodarkovsky, 148. 40 The Junior Juz (which covers today’s western Kazakhstan) is one of the three tribal and territorial divisions of the Kazakh steppe from the late 16th century to the time of Russian annexation. 41Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v 16-18 vv., nos. 139, 142, 144, 149-51. Cited in Monahan, 165; Khodarkovsky. 158. - 16 - Russia put Islam “in the service of the empire” by sending mullahs among the Kazan Tatars “who could encourage the Kazakhs’ loyalty and ensure their peaceful intentions.” “Other Muslims, such as merchants of Bukhara and Tashkent residing in Tobol’sk, were exempt from local laws, taxation, or any service ‘in order to attract more of them to settle in the Russian Empire and expand trade with the neighboring peoples.”42 With the increasing control of Kazakh steppe by Russia through the establishment of fortified lines and the control of the economy of the steppe, the “khan” title was abolished in 1822 in the Junior and Middle Juz, and in 1860s the Senior Juz also came under the control of Russia. At this time, Russian empire was able to encounter the Qing empire directly at Qing northwestern frontier. The diplomacy of the two countries changed in a fundamental way as frequent communication was made possible by the expansion of both of the empires, and therefore they no longer needed to rely on sporadic missions as a means of communication as in previous centuries. The Qing Empire While Russia was consolidating its power through expanding to the east, the Kangxi emperor advanced westward with the goal of deterring the expansion of the Dzungar Khanate to the east. By the late seventeenth century, the Dzungar Khanate was able to “establish itself on the indigenous combination of two main factors: the military power of the nomads and the economic power of the oasis inhabitants.”43 The Dzungar Khanate, situated in Dzungaria (nowadays northern Xinjiang), had expanded its territory to the 42PSZ (Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii), vol. 22, no. 16,292, 493-95; no. 16,400, 604-6; no. 16,593, 951-52. Cited in Monahan, 217. 43 Onuma, 96. - 17 - Tarim Basin, Tibet and the territory of Khalkha Mongols. The westward expansion of the Qing empire was primarily due to security concerns of its western frontier, and Dzungars’ attack on Khalkhas which the Qing empire regarded as its neifan (inner vessels).44 Emperor Kangxi and Qianlong both had launched costly campaigns against the Dzungars. However, the Qing concern with the security of its frontiers did not vanish when the Dzungar Khanate collapsed. The Qing empire established its rule in the former territories of Dzungar Khanate including Dzungaria and Altishahr,45 after crushing the Ishaqiyya and then the Afaqiyya revolt in the 1760s. Nevertheless, continuous resistance from the Altishahr region, the revolt and emigration of the Dungans to Semirech’e,46 and the rise of the Khoqand Khanate, and later the annexation of Kazakh steppe by Russia all forced the Qing empire to remain in its position and to set maintaining security as its primary goal when dealing with its frontier issues. In contrast to Russia, the Qing empire did not develop a mercantilist motivation during its westward expansion. Commerce was often used as a tool to gain leverage in negotiations rather than being viewed as bringing real economic benefits. The Qing empire used its trade with the Dzungars as a tool to fulfill the needs of Dzungars who wished to trade with the Qing and to build peaceful relations.47 After the collapse of Dzungar Khanate, trade developed with the Kazakhs. Although the primary goal of developing trade with the Kazakhs was not building peaceful relations, 44 Newby, 8. 45 This term means “six cities” in Turkic languages, and is used to describe the Tarim Basin region (today’s southern Xinjiang) in the 18th and the 19th century. 46 This term means “seven rivers” in Russian. It denotes the region in Today’s southeastern Kazakhstan where rivers flow northwest to the Lake Balkhash. 47 Zhongguo Diyi Lishi Dang’anguan (LSDA), comp. “Qianlong 8 zhi 15 nian Zhungar bu zai Suzhou dengdi maoyi” (Suzhou trade with the Zunghars from 1743 to 1750). Lishi Dang’an 2 (1984): 13; Da Qing Lichao Shilu (Historical records of the Qing dynasty). Qianlong reigns. (Taibei: Huawen Shuju, 1970). QSLQL QL5/2 yimao j.110. Cited in Perdue, 259. - 18 - the building of this trade was again due to security concerns. For centuries, Chinese emperors had been seeking the importation of horses from nomadic populations to the north and the west because the horses were more suitable for warfare than Chinese horses.48 The goal of building trade relations with the Kazakhs was to obtain more horses, though the Qing empire had been more relieved from this problem than former dynasties because it could obtain horses from the Mongolian steppe and the newly conquered Dzungaria. The Qing empire used the opportunity to trade as leverage in negotiations with Russia. The rationale of establishing Russo-Qing trade in Kiakhta in the mid-18th century was to make sure Russia would maintain neutrality in the Qing-Dzungar war. Besides, the negotiations with Russia on border conflicts were progressing was reflected in the juxtaposition of the opening and temporary closing of the trade in Kiakhta.49 Only later in the mid-19th century when the Russo-Qing trade became official in Xinjiang did the Qing empire lose its ability to use trade as a leverage tool, and instead had to accept it as an existing fact in Xinjiang. In the early years following the collapse of the Dzungar Khanate, the Qing government was actively involved in the local development in Dzungaria and Altishahr, and in procuring horses and cattle from the Kazakhs more for security reasons than because they sought commercial benefits. At first the settlers in Dzungaria were predominantly soldiers from among Manchu bannermen and Han Green Standard troops who were asked to settle down with their families in the region, but gradually common people from the 48 Morris Rossabi, “The Tea and Horse Trade with Inner Asia during the Ming” in Journal of Asian History, vol. 4, no. 2 (1970): 136-168, 136. 49 Yanagisawa. - 19 - inner regions of China moved to this area, especially to Dzungaria, either searching for a better living, or after being exiled as a punishment to officials and commoners due to alleged crimes.50 The settlers were cultivating the land and tried to improve their welfare by establishing official shops through which commodities from the inner region would arrive. Nevertheless, this trade from the inner region was costly due to the harsh travel conditions of the Hexi Corridor,51 and trading with the western neighbors seemed to be a more economically beneficial way of obtaining commodities, although it was largely restricted before 1851. Negotiations and Treaties I would like to go back a little bit earlier in time to discuss the establishment of Russo-Qing relations from the 17th century to the mid-19th century. The discussion of the negotiations between the Russian and Qing empires, and the treaties signed by the two parties. reinforce the above-mentioned differences between their intentions of expansion and establishing trade relations. It can serve as the political background for the unofficial Russo-Qing trade which is discussed in the second chapter. Besides, the priorities of the Russian empire and the Qing empire in these negotiations changed over time. When the Qing empire started seeking Russian neutrality and aid in its conflicts with other states, Russia started gaining more leverage in negotiations with the Qing empire. From the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), then the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727), to the Treaty of Kuldja (1851) and the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), Russia was 50 Perdue. 328. 51 This term refers to the historical route which connects the northern China with the Tarim Basin. - 20 - gradually able to gain more and more commercial opportunities, though it initially made some concessions on territory. China was able to use treaties as a way to contain the Dzungar expansion with Russia’s promise of neutrality. This pattern eventually changed with the collapse of the Dzungar Khanate and the Qing failure in the Opium Wars later in the 19th century. Russia had been looking for ways to establish trade relations with China as early as the sixteenth century. Russia was only able to start sending missions to the Qing empire in the 17th century to negotiate possibilities to establish political and commercial relations, and most of them failed to achieve their goal. This was partly due to the different demands and frequent clashes over issues of court rituals. James Hevia has contributed to the discussion of the extent to which accepting or rejecting the Qing court rituals could affect how a diplomatic mission of a nation was treated, and how their demands would be received.52 For example, Milescu’s mission on behalf of Russia in 1675 was “a campaign to establish permanent diplomatic relations with the Manchu Empire on the basis of accepted European practice.”53 This mission largely failed because Milescu did not abide by the Qing court rituals to perform prostrations. The Qing authorities regarded Milescu’s envoy as a tributary, while the Russian side regarded Milescu as a diplomat who came to establish diplomatic relations with the Qing empire; trade was only part of the goal. The imbalance of expectations had created many diplomatic conflicts. Besides Milescu’s mission, there were 52 James Louis Hevia, Cherishing men from afar: Qing guest ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 118-134. 53 Mark Mancall, Russia and China: their diplomatic relations to 1728 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), 65. - 21 - several other Russian missions that also failed to achieve their goals due to court ritual issues.54 The attitude of the Qing authorities of strictly enforcing court rituals changed due to rising concerns over the activity of the Dzungars. In 1689, the Russian empire and the Qing empire signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The treaty temporarily solved the border issues in Amur region and established a trading system by which both Russia and China would nominally abide. This negotiation was made possible mainly because the Qing empire sought Russian neutrality in its conflict with the Dzungars. The Treaty of Nerchinsk enabled merchants from both of the states to trade without hindrance as long as they held proper passports.55 Russia aimed to establish itself as a middleman in East-West trade. Although fur resources had depleted in the late seventeenth century, Russia was still able to export less valuable furs to the Qing empire, and the trade with the east in general could make up for the depletion of fur resources.56 Russia signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk to obtain the opportunity to trade fur with China with the concession of giving up its settlements in Amur valley.57 Monahan commented that “the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 demonstrated that Russia prioritized commercial relations with China above the acquisition of territory in East Asia.”58 In 1727, the Russian empire and the Qing empire signed the Treaty of Kiakhta which delineated the border between the two states and opened up Kiakhta59 as the only official trading spot between them. The states found it more profitable to collect customs from 54 Ibid., 43. 55 Ibid., 157. 56 Monahan, 92. 57 Perdue, 88. 58 Monahan, 89. 59 Another market, Tsurukhaitu, was combined with the Kiakhta market later. - 22 - private trade in Kiakhta than to organize official trade there.60 Nevertheless, according to Clifford M. Foust, there might be a gap between trade in theory and in practice in Kiakhta, but Foust did not elaborate on this topic.61 In addition, Monahan mentioned that “in the 1760s Tobol’sk’s registered foreign trade turnover in ruble values was still more than double Kiakhta’s”.62 Therefore, the importance of the Kiakhta needs to be studied by comparing it to other markets of Russo-Qing trade. Besides, the Kiakhta Treaty did not address affairs in Central Asia.63 Russo-Qing relations in Xinjiang after the begining of Qing rule in the region may need further study to understand more of Russo-Qing relations under the Kiakhta system. The Treaty of Kiakhta also brought about diplomatic consequences. It solved border issues temporarily, but nevertheless created more complications. Russia refused to return Dzungar fugitives according to the Kiakhta treaty, saying that they were an independent force.64 Russia also used the Treaty of Kiakhta as a pretext to prevent Qing missions from coming to the Kazakh Steppe.65 The Russian Senate stated that “Because the Kiakhta Treaty declares neither jurisdiction nor border details regarding the Kazakhs, they were in a state of independence” and later used it as a pretext to justify its advance into the Kazakh Steppe.66 The specific discussion on the Kiakhta trade will be covered later in this chapter. The Treaty of 1851/Kuldja (Ili) was signed by the Russian empire and the Qing empire in 1851, mostly due to the Russian conquest of the Senior Juz in 1847. The treaty 60 Foust, 361. 61 Ibid., 104. 62 V. N. Razgon, Sibirskoe kupechestvo v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX v.: Regional’nii aspekt predprinimatel’stva traditsionnogo tipa (Barnaul, 1999), 185, Table 38. Cited in Monahan, 201. 63 Noda. 2016. 218. 64 Ibid. 2016. 127. 65 Ibid. 2016. 203. 66 Ibid. 2016. 142. - 23 - allowed “the opening of two towns in Xinjiang (Ili and Tarbagatai) for Russian merchants. A trade pavilion was also to be opened where tariff free-trade could be conducted”.67 Initially, Russia had demanded the opening of trade in Ili, Tarbagatai and Kashgar, but the Qing empire refused the demand on Kashgar trade with the pretext that the British would then demand similar rights in Kashgar as well.68 In addition, Jin Noda commented on the broader influence of the Treaty of Kuldja. Noda cited Akira Haneda’s argument that the Treaty of Kuldja was just an extension of the Kiakhta Treaty, which took over elements of the Kiakhta system, but Noda added that it was also a starting point for the negotiations over the demarcation of territory in Xinjiang.69 While the Qing empire was drawn into the Second Opium War (1856-1860) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), Russia and the Qing empire started negotiating over another treaty. In 1858, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States and the Qing empire signed the Treaty of Tientsin which opened the entirety of China to foreign trade without restrictions.70 Besides, the Dungan revolt (1862-1877) and the Russian occupation of Ili (1871-1881) complicated the situation of trade in northern Xinjiang, and the trade only grew after the sign of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg in 1881 when Ili was returned to the Qing empire and the trade between Ili and the rest of Xinjiang and the eastern provinces was reestablished. In sum, the diplomatic relations between Russia and China from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century were characterized by frequent shifts between 67 Ibid. 2016. 301. 68 Ibid. 2016. 298-306. 69 Akira Haneda, “Iri tsusho joyaki no teiketsu to sono igi” (The Conclusion of the Commercial Treaty of Ili and Its Significance) in Wada hakushi koki kinen toyoshi ronso (Tokyo, 1961), 737. Cited in Noda. 2016. 301. 70 Shannon R Brown, "The Partially Opened Door: Limitations on Economic Change in China in the 1860s." Modern Asian Studies 12, no. 2 (1978): 177-92. - 24 - cooperation (by establishing Russo-Qing trade relations and Russian neutrality in the Dzungar-Qing war), and small-scale conflicts (in the Amur region and Xinjiang). Neither of the two parties were initially interested in expanding their territories as Russia’s main interest was to build security and to establish trade relations, while China’s interest was mostly to maintain security. The treaties signed between the two parties between the 17th and the 19th century served as models that temporarily marked the political and trade situations of each period. With the defining of the border between the Russian empire and the Qing empire following their respective expansion projects, trade activities were increasing with the increasing political conflicts and negotiations. Trade in Kiakhta under the Kiakhta Treaty system The Treaty of Kiakhta was signed by the Russian empire and the Qing empire in 1727 as Russia was strongly motivated to establish a more stable trade system with the Qing empire. Russo-Qing trade had hitherto been conducted in Beijing and border towns in the Amur river region. However, this trade was small in scale,71 and conflicts arose due to the ineffective organization of the trade. The treaty of Kiakhta designated Kiakhta and Tsurukhaitu as the only trading posts between the Russian empire and the Qing empire besides the caravan trade to Beijing.72 Although in the early stage the private trade in Kiakhta was strictly regulated, it gradually increased in volume and influence. More merchants came to trade in Kiakhta, and the commodities traded increased in number and variety. On the Qing side, as at Nerchinsk forty years earlier, the negotiation in view of the 71 Caravans to Beijing were permitted only once every three years. 72 The Beijing trade was abolished later. - 25 - treaty was made possible on the Qing side largely because the Manchus were seeking Russian neutrality in their war with the Dzungars. The northern part of Kiakhta region, Kiakhta, was under the jurisdiction of Russia. The southern part of the region, Mai-mai-ch’eng, was under the jurisdiction of the Qing empire. Kiakhta was said to be a place for temporary transactions rather than a place to build settlements for merchants to stay for a long time due to its geographical location and climate.73 Merchants from Siberia mostly resided in places like Irkutsk and Selenginsk and went to Kiakhta for seasonal trade. Merchants from China who settled in Kiakhta for a long time were even fewer in number. The Qing government prohibited women from coming to Kiakhta to discourage male merchants from settling down with their families there. If the merchants would be able to settle down with their families, there would be a growing day- to-day communication between Chinese and Russians which the Qing authorities were not willing to see. Nevertheless, the communities in Kiakhta - Mai-mai-ch’eng grew and infrastructure was improving.74 According to the treaty, the trade in Kiakhta was intended to be tax-free for both sides. Barter trade became the mode of transaction because Russia prohibited the outflow of bullion and coins. Sometimes the same policy was implemented on the Chinese side as well.75 This was a common practice of other early modern mercantilist states, as state 73 Foust, 80. 74 Foust, 94. In addition, the opening of Kiakhta to trade was probably not a start of the Russo-Qing trade in that region but rather a concentrate pre-existing trade at that particular place. Selecting Kiakhta as the trading spot was possibly related to the pre-existing small-scale trade in its neighboring area. Before the opening of the official trade in Kiakhta, Russo-Qing trade was already going on in Mongolia in places like Urga and Naun. Merchants who frequented these places were only diverted to Kiakhta trade later after the Treaty of Kiakhta was signed. 75 Ibid., 214. - 26 - revenue ideally meant specie.76 At first, pelts and food were forbidden as articles of trade by private merchants to Kiakhta according to the policy of Russia. Nevertheless, the situation changed gradually. In the second half of the 18th century, the major commodities sold by Russian merchants were pelts and other Siberian goods - “ ‘iuft’ (hides), some small iron goods, animals, foodstuffs, etc.”77 Various suspensions of trade were unilaterally declared from the Qing side during the second half of the 18th century. The first suspension was from 1764 to 1768, as a retaliation to Russian illegal taxation on goods, the mutual stealing of horses, and allegations that Russian merchants had been misreporting the quantity of goods they carried. The second suspension occurred from 1779 to 1780 because Russia was not attentive in pursuing criminals who committed wrongdoings in Kiakhta. The third suspension happened from 1785 to 1792 after allegations that the Russians had robbed Chinese merchants. The suspension was also caused by Russia’s unilateral installation of wooden posts at the border. The Qing empire used the suspensions of the Kiakhta trade as a tool to gain leverage in their negotiations with Russia during the second half of the eighteenth century.78 The addendum of 1768 solved the conflict that led to the first suspension of the trade, but did not stabilize the trade and there were further suspensions until 1792 when the Kiakhta International Protocol was signed.79 During the frequent suspensions of trade in Kiakhta, Russia was searching for alternative places for exchanging commodities. Russia built a fortress in Bukhtarma in 76 Monahan, 51. 77 Foust, 208. 78 Yanagisawa, “Some Remarks.” 79 Zhenbo Mi, Qingdai zhong’e qiaketu maoyi [The Kiakhta Trade during Qing Period] (Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, 2003), 22. - 27 - 1764, and started focusing on the latter as a trade station during this period.80 The issue of illegal trade was also important in Kiakhta. “In 1758 Kiakhta customs house director Piatov reported that the secretive carriage of goods was impossible to prevent because of the great distances between the customs barriers and guardhouses”.81 Furthermore, illegal trade was going on in Xinjiang during the period when Kiakhta was closed, and Khoqandi merchants were said to participate in the illegal tea and rhubarb trade there.82 This possible influence of this illegal trade will be a major topic in the second chapter of this thesis. The participants of Kiakhta trade were Russian merchants (mainly Siberians, but also Russians from the European part of Russia), Chinese merchants (usually from the northern part of China), and Bukharan merchants (who were various groups of Turkic Muslim merchants from Central Asia). During the first decades of the open of Kiakhta trade, the merchants were predominantly local83 and their number was small. Some of the merchants who participated in this trade were bounded peasants in the first half of the 18th century.84 However, in 1758 the Russian Senate passed a decree to “prohibit peasants from trading abroad, either in their own names or others.”85 In 1755 and 1794, another decree by Catherine II was promoted which divided Russian merchants into guilds, and only merchants in the first guild were allowed to trade in Kiakhta. Yet, these policies were not 80 V. A. Moiseev. Tsinskaia imperiia i narody Saiano-Altaia v xviii v. Moscow. 1983. 109-110. Cited in Noda. 2016. 218. 81 Foust, 229. 82 Newby, 131, 135. 83 Most of them lived in Selenginsk or Irkutsk. 84 Foust, 208. 85 PSZ (polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii s 1649 goda), XV, No. 10862, 243 - 44. Cited in Foust, 211. - 28 - carried out successfully in Kiakhta. The petty merchants who were not in the guilds were still actively involved in Kiakhta trade.86 Besides the Siberians, there was also a group of merchants who were from the European part of Russia. They mostly did not come to Kiakhta themselves, but hired agents to help them participate in the trade. Even the agents themselves only stayed in Kiakhta for one or two months each year.87 However, during the later half of the 18th century, more merchants from European Russia and Europe, especially those from Prussia and the Baltic, came to dominate the Kiakhta market.” 88 The Chinese merchants, though small in number in the early years of the opening of the Kiakhta trade, were better organized than their Russian counterparts. This, according to Foust, gave them an advantage when trading with the Russians.89 They mostly came from northern China, especially Shanxi province. Their network, however, extended much farther than northern China. They obtained tea from Hunan in southern China, and transported the boxes of tea all the way up to Kiakhta.90 The Chinese merchant groups were bigger in scale due to the high costs of financing the long trip to Kiakhta. Small-scale merchant groups were mainly native Mongols who “did have the advantage of being the important carriers of rhubarb, silver, and gold, all of which the Russian state in particular was extremely interested in obtaining”.91 Bukharan merchants, a loosely defined Turkic Muslim merchant group, extended their commercial networks spread through Eurasia. They were also involved in the Kiakhta 86 PSZ, XX, No. 14327, 145-47: XXIV, No. 17223, 531-32. Cited in Foust, 212. 87 Mi, 91. 88 Foust, 210. 89 Ibid., 209. 90 Mi, 93. 91 Foust, 212. - 29 - trade. By the 1730s, Bukharan merchants had monopolized the rhubarb trade in Kiakhta.92 Newby cited the account of a British diplomat Harry Parkes, and stated that they were still enjoying this monopoly in the mid-19nth century.93 There were no large-scale companies formed for the purpose of trading in Kiakhta by Russian merchants, and most of the merchants organized their activities on the basis of families or small temporary associations.94 By contrast, the Chinese merchants formed eight “companies” and set prices by which every merchant in these companies was supposed to abide.95 A document about the “sixteen rules of conduct” for Chinese merchants in the Kiakhta trade stipulated by the “companies” reflected the strict organization of the latter. They tried to limit the amount of supplies of Chinese commodities so that the high prices would be maintained. People who committed wrongdoings against the “companies,” such as disclosing business secrets to Russians, would be temporarily excluded from trade, locked up, or forced to leave Kiakhta forever.96 This was very different from what happened among Russian merchants. The more influential Russian merchants were unsatisfied with the behavior of petty merchants, but could not rein them in. The petty merchants kept lowering the prices of their commodities which lead to lower prices and profit margins on Russian commodities.97 The major commodities in Kiakhta trade were fur and leather from the Russian side to the Qing, and rhubarb, cotton textiles and tea from the Qing side to Russia. 92 Newby, 130. 93 Ibid., on the basis of Parkes, ‘Report on the Russian Caravan Trade with China’, 311. 94 Foust, 209. 95 Ibid., 213. 96 Mi, 90. 97 Foust, 210. - 30 - The fur trade was very profitable during this period. The fur traded including squirrel, ermine (winter weasel), fox, sable, domesticated cat, muskrat (desman), beaver, ferret and rabbit skins.98 Among all the different types of furs, the most popular was squirrel fur, and the most expensive was sable. The proportion of the value of furs among all the exported commodities to China was declining throughout the eighteenth century. Foust suggests that the increasing amount of European commodities to Kiakhta market contributed to this change. Besides fur, leather was also sold in Kiakhta market. Leather products includes hides, lambskin and sheepskin. Russian and foreign cloth were sold in Kiakhta as well, and Russian cloth was usually cheaper than foreign cloth. Fur, leather and cloth represented 85 percent of commodities exported by Russia, whilst other products such as ironware, sheet iron, glassworks and mirrors were of smaller quantities. In addition, Bengali and Turkish opium were mentioned among the commodities exported by Russian merchants on the Kiakhta market.99 Rhubarb was an important resource that Russia had been seeking from China. Russia tried to maintain its intermediary position to rhubarb trade between China and Europe. In Russia, rhubarb trade was illegal when conducted by private unauthorized merchants. Any offences were to be punished with a capital sentence. And only in the early 18th century were Bukharan merchants able to obtain state permission to acquire rhubarb.100 In 1736, the Russian state appointed Simon Svin’in as the head merchant of the 98 Ibid., 346-350. 99 Ibid., 353. 100 Monahan, 61. - 31 - Kiakhta Rhubarb Commission.101 The latter was responsible for inquiring all along the way from Moscow to Kiakhta about any privately (albeit legally) transported rhubarb that had not yet been turned over to the Treasury or the Siberian Prikaz. In addition, the strict quality-control system for rhubarb built by Russia guaranteed the high prices of the rhubarb it traded.102 Cottons textiles of various kinds were also a major export by Chinese merchants. Kitaika and daba were the most popular cotton products in the Kiakhta trade. Silks textiles came second in volume, and it was traded in the forms of unprocessed, semi-processed and finished silk. There was a decline in the quantity of finished silks during the course of the trade. Foust argued that the reasons for this decline were the deterioration of the quality of silk, the development of the silk industry in Russia, and the more profitable supply from Persia.103 Finally, brick tea from China, besides being a popular product demanded by Russian merchants, also served as a unit of transaction in Kiakhta due to its sturdy nature in the dry climate in Mongolia.104 Cottons, silks and tea comprised 90 percent of Russian imports in the eighteenth century.105 Other commodities such as tobacco, porcelains, lacquerware and artificial and precious stones made up the rest. In sum, the Kiakhta system fundamentally changed the informal small-scale Russo- Qing exchange on Mongolian steppe into a large-scale and more regulated commerce. Both the Russian empire and the Qing empire increased their knowledge of each other through 101 Foust, 170. 102 Monahan, 61. They noted the price, made complete lists of the goods, and took signed letters from the owners that confirmed they would not sell rhubarb to anyone else than the State, otherwise they would face the death penalty. The Commerce Collegium informed Svin’in that this practice was exactly what the Dutch used in the East Indies with cloves and cinnamon. This probably reflected how Russia learned strategies from western Europe to facilitate its mercantilist policies. 103 Foust, 357. 104 Ibid., 358. 105 Ibid., 359. - 32 - the more frequent exchanges through both official trade and private trade. The Kiakhta trade system, together with the merchant networks developed around it, and the commodities exchanged in the system, served as a model that influenced another area of the Russo-Qing trade system in Xinjiang, which I will discuss in the second chapter. In the following section, I would like to start the discussion on Xinjiang trade by discussing the Kazakh-Qing trade in northern Xinjiang. The Kazakh-Qing trade in northern Xinjiang After having ended the Dzungar war in 1757 and the revolt of the Afaqi Khwajas in 1759,106 the Qing empire started building its western frontier on the territory of former Dzungaria. The Qing authorities appointed a General of Ili to oversee all affairs in Dzungaria and Altishahr. They also relocated many Manchu, Chahar and Sibo bannermen from the northeastern part of the empire and Han Green Standard Army to the new western frontier to settle down with their families. Han soldiers, together with some Sibe, Chahar and Solon bannermen were farming on these new settlements.107 As has been discussed earlier, horses had long been an important strategic resource throughout the history of China. Horses for military purposes were always in high demand. The Qing empire faced the same problem as well though not as urgently as in previous dynasties. This less urgent demand was because the Qing empire were able to obtain horses from Mongolia and then Dzungaria. The Qing empire started conducting trade with 106 Li, 30. 107 XCYL (Xichui yaolue) [Survey of the Western Borders] Qi Yunshi, comp. 1807. 2:13a-30a. Cited in Millward. 2006. 79. - 33 - Kazakhs to obtain horses in Urumqi in 1758, then decided to change the trading site. The Qing empire designated Ili a new trading site with Kazakhs in 1761, then followed by Tarbagatai in 1764.108 A trade pavilion (maoyi ting) was established at the outskirt of both towns. Kazakhs often came to trade between summer and autumn every year.109 They sold horses and cattle at a rate much cheaper than that in inner China. In addition, it was very costly to transfer cattle from inner China to Xinjiang. Therefore, purchasing horses and cattle from the Kazakhs was thus very economically beneficial for the Qing empire. This was the rationale of the Qing decision to establish this horse-silk trade with Kazakhs.110 The Sino-Kazakh silk-horse trade was highly formalised and regulated at first. Qing soldiers were asked to dress up as merchants and pretend to have come individually to the trade pavilions to buy horses from the Kazakhs. Only after the official part of the trade was done; were ‘true’ private merchants were allowed to come into the trade pavilions to buy leftover commodities. Oirats served as translators to facilitate exchanges between the two parties in this process.111 “Every summer and autumn, the Kazakh chieftains brought their cattle, horses, and carpets and the leather got from Andijani merchants to Ili, and sold them for silks and cloths. The same was happening in Tarbagatai. When Kazakhs just entered the karun,112 the Qing administrators and soldiers examined [their identities and commodities], and then permitted them to come to trade. Some other administrators and soldiers would take care of the Kazakh chieftains.”113 “Every time when there was heavy 108 Noda. 2016. 129. 109 Millward. 1998. 46. 110 Perdue, 401. 111 Millward. 1998. 47. 112 “Xinjiang’s karun were enclosed forts built in frontier zones between territory under close the Qing supervision and the pastures of independent nomads not enrolled in the banners.” Cited from Millward. 1998. 46. 113 Yunshi Qi. Xichui yaolue. 145. - 34 - snow in the region during the winter, Kazakhs were allowed to live near the karun by paying a land rent of one horse out of one hundred.”114 Every year, Xinjiang officials submitted orders to the Imperial Silk Factories (zhizao chu) indicating the types, colors and amount of textiles they wanted to trade with the Kazakhs according to the latter’s demand in the previous year. After receiving the orders, the textile factories in southern China would produce the silks and transport them to Xinjiang with the protection of official guards. The silks would arrive in Xinjiang in 18 months after the order was submitted.115 Textile factories in Jiangning, Soochow and Hangzhou in southeastern China were responsible for producing silks for trading with the Kazakhs.116 The Qing empire was also gradually adjusting its supply of silks to the Kazakhs.117 Another type of silk, jinghuajuan, was recorded as in highly demand among the Kazakhs according to a report in 1780 therefore the report instructed that more jinghuajuan should be produced.118 The Qing empire had been looking for ways to reduce its cost of trade in the first few years after its establishment. A special decree in 1760 imposed a cut in the high quality silk prepared for trading with the Kazakhs by 20-30 percent, while adding 4000 bolts of silk of average quality, in order to save input and gain more benefits.119 Yet in 1766 there were reports indicating that the quality of the silks sold to Kazakhs were declining, so that the 114 Ibid., 144. 115 Millward. 1998. 46. 116 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 10, 69. Quoted in XDLZX, 315. 117 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 9, 39. Quoted in Ibid., 312. A report dated 1773 showed that there was a high demand for red cloths but there was not enough in the markets, therefore more red cloths were asked to be produced for trading. 118 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 11, 12. Quoted in Ibid., 316. 119 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 6, 10. Quoted in Ibid., 310. - 35 - emperor asked for the establishment of a quality control system on the silks.120 The Qing government also started transferring cotton cloths made in Altishahr (huibu) to Tarbagatai and Ili to sell to the Kazakhs. This was due to the higher demand for cheaper cloth than more expensive silks by the latter. It was also possible that it was the lower transportation cost (compared with that of transporting from southern China) that induced the Qing government to take the decision to bring more huibu than silk to Tarbagatai and Ili. According to a decree of 1826, as the Kazakhs came to Ili with sheep to trade for cloths from March to September every year, it was required that about 90,000 bolt sof cloth (huibu) should be collected from Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan and transported to Ili for trading with the Kazakhs.121 Usually, the horses obtained in the trade with Kazakhs were directed to military camps in Xinjiang.122 After the Dzungar war, the Qing empire was at peace for a lengthy period (before the revolt of Jahangir Khwaja in the 1820s), and therefore the demand for horses was not as urgent as before. Throughout these years, there was an excess of horses brought by the Kazakhs. The General of Ili asked to send the surplus of horses to places like Urumqi, Barkol and Aqsu for breeding, and even inner China (Gansu first, then Shaanxi, Shanxi, and other northern provinces) if there were still more left.123 For example, more than 2000 horses were allocated yearly to Gansu and Shaanxi.124 Therefore, even though the Qing empire was actively seeking horses in the beginning of the trade, it had to adjust its way of distributing the horses when there was a surplus of them. 120 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 7, 75. Quoted in Ibid., 314. 121 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 10, 3. Quoted in Ibid., 316. 122 Ibid., 309, 310. 123 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 7, 95. Quoted in Ibid., 312. 124 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 13, 97. Quoted in Ibid., 313. - 36 - One interesting aspect of Kazakh-Qing trade is that it does not fully fit into the system of tributary trade. The “tributary system” model suggested by J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng defined China’s foreign relations throughout its history in the following way: China regarded itself as a central power that is higher in position relative to other countries, and defined its neighbors as tributaries. If a tributary paid tribute to the court of China, the court would grant much more valuable returns to the tributary. This was a way for China to symbolize the superiority of itself relative to its tributary nations, without considering the practical financial returns of this activity.125 Many scholars have challenged this model. In the case of Kazakh-Qing trade, both James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue provided evidence of why Kazakh-Qing relation did not fit into this model. Millward cited the Qianlong emperor’s edict in 1758 which specifically distinguished the Qing trade with the Kazakhs from tribute exchange.126 At the same time, however, in many documents contained in the Collection of Documents on Qing Chinese-Kazakh Relations I & II, the expressions “paying tribute with 125 J. K. Fairbank, and S. Y. Têng, "On The Ch'ing Tributary System." Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6, no. 2 (1941). 126 James A. Millward "Qing Silk-Horse Trade with the Qazaqs in Yili and Tarbaghatai, 1758-1853." Central and Inner Asian Studies, 1993, 10. Cited in James A. Millward, Beyond the pass: economy, ethnicity, and empire in Qing central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). Millward argued that the horse trade with Kazakhs in Qing period was different from the horse trade under previous dynasties. Millward discussed the characteristics of Sino-nomad horse trade from Han period to Ming, and argued that the Qing horse trade with Kazakhs did not fit into the model of tributary trade. The model suggests that: first, the trade between China and any other states or tribes had always had a strong ideological content (tributary system); second, the trade was always unequal for one party (goods were traded at less than their real value); third, the exchange always took place in the Chinese capital or around the Great Wall region; and last, the above- mentioned means of horse procurement always failed. Millward then argued that the Qing-Kazakh horse trade did not fit the model because: first, the trade was nominally conducted under the term of tributary system, but indeed conducted differently; second, the trade was based on mutual agreement although the Qing empire chose trading posts regardless Kazakh’s preference; third, the exchange took place in Dzungaria rather than a Chinese capital or around the Great Wall; and finally, the horse and livestock trade with Kazakhs contributed to the Qing conquest of Xinjiang. The tributary system, may apply for previous dynasties, cannot be used as the single model to explain the foreign relations of the Qing empire. - 37 - horses” and “coming to trade horses” were both used.127 The first one is mostly used when denoting Kazakhs who brought horses to town officials or to the court in Beijing as gifts, and the second one is mostly used when denoting Kazakhs who were conducting border trade. This difference can probably be explained by Perdue’s argument (which was built upon Nicola Di Cosmo’s argument) that “the concept of tribute is an ‘environment’:128 [tribute is] “a kind of intercultural language, serving multiple purposes for its participants.”129 Therefore, the difference in the use of language “tribute” and “trade” probably indicated the same kind of transactions, but only in different environments (at the border, yamen, or court). The Kazakh-Qing trade on the Qing side was highly formalized and regulated, and private trade between bannermen and Kazakhs was forbidden. An edict in 1761 prohibited private trade between Qing officials and Jazak princes with the Kazakhs, so that the settlements in Ili and Urumqi would not run out of horses.130 This was just after the war with the Dzungars and the Qing authorities might have been cautious of the supply of horses (which later was no longer a problem until the Jahangir revolt). Another report in 1765 shows that karun patrollers privately traded horses with the Kazakhs, and the Qing officials were afraid that this practice would cause the price of horses in official trade grow 127M. K. Abuseitova, Yongfu Xing. Qingdai zhong’ha guanxi dang’an huibian [Collection of Documents on Qing Chinese-Kazakh Relations] (Beijing: Zhongguo dang’an chubanshe, 2006 (1) and 2007 (2)). 128 Nicola Di Cosmo, “Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier: Tribute, Trade, or Gift-Exchange?” in Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries, and Human Geographies in Chinese History, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo and Don J.Wyatt (London: Curzon Press, 2003); Nicola Di Cosmo, “A Set of Manchu Documents Concerning a Khokand Merchant,” Central Asian Journal 41 (1997), 160–199; Nicola Di Cosmo, Reports from the Northwest: A Selection of Manchu Memorials from Kashgar (1806–1807) (Bloomington, Ind.: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1993). Cited in Perdue, 403. 129 Catherine M. Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 191. Cited in Perdue, 403. 130Qing qianlongchao manwenjixindang 03-129-2-014. Quoted in Tacheng and Aletai, 148. - 38 - higher than in private trade.131 Another edict dated 1771 recommended resorting to harsher penalties against private trade, which had become widespread.132 Altishahris were forbidden to come to Ili to trade with the Kazakhs, but trade with Khoqand and Andjian, especially the trade of cattle, was allowed, as “Altisharis were not good at raising cattle.”133 As I have discussed earlier, cotton cloths from Altishahr (huibu) were the main supplies to Kazakh-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili as a cheaper substitute for silk from inner China. During the period of the revolt of Jahangir (1820 - 1827), the demand for Kazakh horses for military activities in Altishahr rose in the Qing empire. Huibu became no longer available due to the revolts, thus the responsibility of preparing textiles was transferred to Gansu province.134 The Qing government was particularly suspicious of the Kazakh-Qing trade during the period of suspension of Russo-Qing trade in Kiakhta. The suspicion arose because there were traces of possible illegal Russo-Qing trade going on in Xinjiang. A decree dated 1767 touches upon the Qing’s policy on trade with the Russians in Xinjiang when the direct Russo-Qing trade in Kiakhta was suspended. The decree first states that the younger brother of Ablai Khan Sultanmambet’s135son Ikeme136 came to trade “yuan fox skin, average fox skin, otter and smoked cow hide” which were produced in Russia and obtained by the 131 Qing qianlongchao manwenjixindang 03-131-3-060. Quoted in Ibid., 222. 132 Qing qianlongchao manwenjixindang 03-134-5-005. Quoted in Ibid., 382. 133 Qing gaozong shilu vol. 780, 582. Quoted in Ibid., 240; Qing qianlong manwenjixindang 03-133-6-002. Quoted in Ibid., 318. The newly returned Torghuts who were living in Tarbagatai and Ili region were also forbidden to trade with the Kazakhs. According to an edict of 1772, the Torghuts were allowed to elect a representative who could come to trade in Ili and Tarbagatai, but only within the karun line. According to this edict, the Qing government used this policy to prevent the Torghut from stealing and robbing Kazakh horses. The Torghuts were in severe poverty when they had just returned to Dzungaria, and Qing government had been sending donations to them. 134 Qing xuanzong shilu vol.103, 700 and Qing xuanzong shilu vol.109 820. Quoted in Ibid., 640. 135 Transliterated from “Suo-le-tong-ban-bi-te.” 136 Transliterated from “Yi-ke-man.” - 39 - Kazakhs. Then the decree stated that “nowadays our trade with Russia in Kiakhta stopped. We could trade these Russian products from the Kazakhs, but it is forbidden to trade with the Russians in any places… no matter how cheap the commodities brought by the Russians are.”137 However, in a decree in 1788, Kazakhs were no longer permitted to bring Russian products to trade. This new policy is based on a report that described how a Kazakh taiji138 Toktarkuchuk139 brought duoluoni 140and tanned cowhide produced in Russia. “Since trade in Kiakhta stopped, the Kazakhs tried to obtain more profits, and it is obvious that it is the Russians who brought their commodities to Ili [and Kazakhs were trading these commodities]. For example, [we] found several thousand catties of rhubarb from Kashgarian141 merchants. Therefore we should prohibit Kazakhs from bringing Russian commodities…[If bringing Russian commodities is allowed], as time passes, the Kazakhs would bring only duoluoni and other commodities, rather than horses...Therefore, what is the difference between stopping Kiakhta trade and continuing Kiakhta trade if Russian goods were allowed to be sold in Ili?... If the Kazakhs bring small quantity of duoluoni and smoked cow hide, they are allowed to trade, but not a large amount.”142 Nevertheless, one year later in 1789, some Manchu bannermen bought 500 pieces of Russian snow weasel fur 137 Qing qianlong manwenjixindang 03-132-2-038. Quoted in Ibid., 246. 138 Probably means “sultan” here. 139 Transliterated from “Tuo-ke-tuo-ku-chu-ke.” 140 “A woolen material of wide width which was said to be imported from the west.” Cited from Ni Yibin, 2012, “Material Culture Matters in The Story of the Stone.” Accessed at: http://niyibin.org/ni_article/the_story_of_the_stone.html 141 Since rhubarb is not consumed locally in Xinjiang, it is very possible that the Kashgarian merchants (who are indigenous merchants in Altishahr) were selling these rhubarb to either the Russians, Kazakhs or Khoqandis to obtain Russian goods. 142 Qing qianlong manwenjixindang 03-139-4-066. Quoted in Tacheng and Aletai, 485. http://niyibin.org/ni_article/the_story_of_the_stone.html - 40 - from Kazakhs, and the Qing authorities requested that they be severely punished.143 In 1792, a new decree stated that Kazakhs who did not bring horses and cattle but only commodities were not allowed to come to trade.144 These reports and decrees show how the Qing empire feared Russian influence in the Kazakh-Qing trade, and the possible loss of opportunities to obtain horses and cattle from the Kazakhs. In sum, it is important to consider the role of Russia in Kazakh-Qing trade, especially in the later period of the trade before the official Russo-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili began. To what extent can we say Kazakh-Qing trade is indeed Russo-Qing trade with Kazakhs serving as intermediaries? These questions will be discussed in the following chapters. Conclusion Russia and Qing China had both grown into empires by the end of the eighteenth century, and their interaction was intensified in this process. Their communication started with different intentions: Russia was looking for opportunities to trade with the Qing empire, while the Qing empire was only using trade as a negotiation leverage. The Qing court was not interested in obtaining Russian goods at that time, only horses from the Kazakhs which were seen as a strategic resource. The sporadic diplomatic missions and then large-scale trade in Kiakhta facilitated communication between the two empires and the growth of conflicts. 143 Qing qianlong manwenjixindang 03-140-3-030. Quoted in Ibid., 496. 144 Qing qianlong manwenjixindang 03-141-1-035. Quoted in Ibid., 533. - 41 - The Qing empire was able to use trade as a negotiation leverage with Russia until the mid-19th century when Russia expanded to the Kazakh steppe. While the Qing empire was trying to cultivate their trade relations with the Kazakhs, they increasingly lost control of the trade in the beginning of the 19th century as Russian influence started prevailing in this trade. Smuggling of Russian goods started becoming a widespread phenomenon. At the same time, the different motivation to trade on the Russian and Qing side would continue being reflected by their strategies regarding this unofficial trade in Xinjiang before the signing of Treaty of Kuldja (Ili) in 1851. This will be the main topic of the next chapter - 42 - Chapter 2: The unofficial Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang Source: Kazakh Khanates during eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. Cited from Noda. 2016. 20.i1 Introduction The war-torn Dzungaria was left as a vacuum following the end of the Dzungar-Qing warii in 1757. The Qing government started its massive settlement project in northern Xinjiang in the 1760s and the demand of commodities rose with the project in this area. Although goods were transported from the eastern regions of the Qing empire to the frontier, the transportation took a long time because Tarbagatai and Ili were far from the core regions where the goods were produced. Soldiers with their families and exiled officials and criminals were the main groups of people being relocated to this area. The 11 J. Noda, Roshin teikoku to kazafu hankoku (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2011). Cited from Jin Noda, The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian international relations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Boston: Brill, 2016), 20. The border shown in the figure corresponds to the modern territory. The broken lines show approximately the border of the three Juz, and the dot-dashed line shows the territory claimed by the Qing Empire. - 43 - relocated Manchu community started building “official shops” which connected Xinjiang to the core regions of the empire. Managing these official shops contributed to finance for the community and diversify the types of goods available in the area. Gradually, however, some of these official shops started serving as marketplaces for foreign goods, including those from the Russian empire which were supposed to be contrabands according to the understanding of the Qing empire. For the Qing empire at that time, the trade with Russia was not supposed to exist in Xinjiang. The Qing empire and Russian empire defined this Russo-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili before 1851 differently. For the Qing side, the importing of Russian goods should be completely banned formally due to two reasons: first, by banning Russian goods, the Kazakhs would continue bringing enough horses and cattle, which the Qing government needed, rather than bringing Russian goods for trade. Second, opening another Russo-Qing trade post in Xinjiang was also opposed by Chinese merchants who frequented the Kiakhta market. They were concerned that the opening of the trade in Xinjiang would cause fewer Russian merchants to visit the Kiakhta market, and many of them would have to travel much farther. I propose two additional reasons for this prohibition: first, some local authorities in Xinjiang, who were illegally allowing the trade of Russian goods and received custom duties from the merchants, were not willing to see the open of the official trade which would transform the trade into a duty-free trade. Second, the horse supply of Xinjiang had accumulated over the years and the surplus were even sent to the eastern provinces, but they were still afraid of the potential lack of horses in Xinjiang in case of warfare or revolts (which therefore could reflect the Qing empire’s attitude regarding its governance in Xinjiang.) The Russian government, however, had unilaterally enacted - 44 - regulations on trading with Xinjiang. They had built custom houses in Semipalatinsk, Ust’- Kamenogorsk and Bukhtarminsk. The only trade with Xinjiang they considered to be illegal was smuggling goods without paying tax at the Russian custom houses (such as the illegal trade through the Siberian line.2) Even with the Qing opposition of this Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang, the trade grew gradually in the first half of the 19th century. The Qing officials who seemed to oppose the trade strongly in their reports to the emperor, were described as very welcoming to Russian merchants in the travelogues of Russian travelers who visited Tarbagatai and Ili. The post-1851 Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang is extensively discussed in the previous scholarship. The pre-1851 trade, however, was generally described merely as existing without much further information. This chapter and the following chapter aim to discuss the scale, the official attitude and regulations and the participants in the generally neglected unofficial Russo-Qing trade in Tarbagatai and Ili before the signing of the Treaty of Kuldja in 1851. Exploring more about the pre-treaty era trade can contribute to the understanding of why the treaty was signed, and how the entire Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang developed from its origins. In addition, comparing the pre-treaty and post-treaty era trade also furthers our understanding of how the signing of the Treaty of Kuldja made an impact on Russo-Qing trade in Xinjiang as a whole. In this chapter, I will first discuss the social and economic situation of Ili and Tarbagatai in the second half of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century, then I will discuss the preparation of the unofficial trade with Xinjiang through the establishment of posts and the enactment of regulations on the Russian side. After that, I 2 The “Siberian Line” refers to the line of fortresses built in the southern Siberia by the Russian Empire in the 18th century.