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SECURITIZATION AND EXCLUSION OF SALAFI COMMUNITIES IN KAZAKHSTAN

СЕКЬЮРИТИЗАЦИЯ И ИСКЛЮЧЕНИЕ САЛАФИТСКИХ ОБЩЕСТВ В КАЗАХСТАНЕ

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

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Abstract

In this research, I analyze what is behind the exclusion of quietist Salafi communities in Kazakhstan. In particular, I deal with the gap in the literature that does not focus on the communities, where Salafis are from the same ethnic group as the majority of the population. The literature rather analyzes the effects of structural factors or their beliefs vis-à-vis their exclusion in the context of European countries, where they are mainly from Muslim migrant origin. I demonstrate how securitization affects Muslims in Kazakhstan. Specifically, through conducting participant observations and in-depth interviews I show the resonance of securitization discourses and perception of securitization practices among the general Muslim population of the country. I also demonstrate the relationship between securitization and governmentality concepts. I show how governmentality works in the creation of an idea of what constitutes a population and who are the outsiders. Building on the theory of *safe communities* and *politics of identity* I reveal how quietist Salafi communities come to hold on to their religious identities ever tightly as a response to structural limitation created by the securitization from the government. Securitization, which creates structural problems in the form of discrimination, security checks, and negative attitudes, pushes the quietist Salafi communities to develop safe communities, where they can freely practice the religion according to their religious canons, thus, shielding themselves from the outside negative treatment.

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Introduction

Religion has played an important role in the social and political control of citizens in authoritarian states (Omelicheva 2011, 2016), in building the sense of nation and nationhood (Khalid 2007; Tazmini 2001), allowing certain policies that exceed the domain of normal politics (Croft 2012; Eroukhmanoff 2015). Especially, in Central Asia, Islam has attracted great scholarly attention. Yet, Islam has been a very sensitive topic in the region, and any academic research, especially when the study is related to the analyses of groups perceived to be radical, fundamental or non-traditional, faces various obstacles (Beissembayev 2016).

According to government rhetoric, Islam in Kazakhstan could be divided dichotomously to traditional versus non-traditional, official vs. non-official, local vs. foreign. The government overwhelmingly portrays the non-traditional Islam negatively and as a source of danger (Biard 2019; Omelicheva 2011). This negative rhetoric has been also widely reflected in the media, where a Google news search on the question of non-traditional Islam or Salafism produces hundreds of webpages with information depicting them as radicals. Sailaubekuly (2019) provides an extensive study of the use of media for controlling and manipulating public opinion in Kazakhstan. Sailaubekuly (2019, 29) outlines the results of content analysis of three most popular new sources in Kazakhstan, where Salafism is mostly classified as being morally bad, a threat to national security, or foreign to Kazakhstan. On the contrary, Hanafism is demonstrated as being traditional to Kazakhs. The literature analyzing the effects of countering violent extremism programs have demonstrated that certain types of policies directed at integrating different ethnic or religious groups to a general population might contribute to radicalization, alienation, and social exclusion (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011; Mitts 2018). However, most of the literature has focused on these effects related to Muslim migrants in the Western states.

Studies and my preliminary observations indicated that Salafi communities tend to be excluded from various areas of the socio-economic and socio-political lives in the context of Central Asian states, particularly in Kazakhstan, where most of the Salafis are ethnically Kazakhs. Some studies of the migrant communities argue that this division comes primarily as a result of their belief system (Adraoui 2019; Cesari 2007; Duderija 2014). On the other hand, other scholars demonstrate that this division comes due to securitization practices (Ayhan 2009; Croft 2012; Omtzigt 2009). The studies have thoroughly analyzed the question of exclusion of Muslims and Salafi communities specifically among migrant communities yet have not dealt with it in the context of exclusion within the same titular ethnic groups.

Based on this gap, this research aims to analyze what are the factors that lead to the exclusion of the Salafi communities from other groups of Kazakhs. In particular, I will analyze whether the observed exclusion comes as a consequence of the government securitization practices or from within the groups as a form of exclusion fostered by religious beliefs.

It is important to highlight that the classification of Salafism bears a very negative connotation in the Central Asia region because of securitization. Most importantly, the majority of respondents that I interviewed, whom I will classify as quietist Salafis in this thesis, do not identify themselves as such. One of the reasons can be security concerns. A number of authors employ other terms like piety movement (Schwab 2015), scripturalists (Schwab 2019), strict believers (Lemon and Thibault 2018; Thibault 2018) or neo-fundamentalists (Duderija 2014). However, for the purpose of this research I decided to use Wiktorowitcz's definition of *quietist Salafism* as I was not able to find an alternative definition that would describe the essence of the difference between the Hanafism and Salafism. On top of that, my research demonstrates that the group that I classify quietist Salafis is exposed to structural constraints that lead them to exclusion. In this regard, this classification may help with the government's policy making as in terms of taking action to liberalize policies and making steps in integrating of this

particular group into a broader society. For the government of Kazakhstan, almost anyone who does not entirely follow the directives of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), but who instead believes in purifying Islam is categorized as a Salafi.

Moreover, Salafism is not a single, unified movement/group of people that believe in a specific version of Islam. Even among Salafis, there are numerous differences and controversies. However, they can be united by their core ideological belief, which is the desire to bring the religion to the original form, the form that has been practiced by the pious ancestors (salaf al-salih) (Roex 2014, 51). Roex (2014) in his study of Salafism in Europe states that quietists and political Salafis distance themselves from the jihadist Salafis, whose primary ideology is waging a holy war to establish an Islamic caliphate. Nonetheless, as demonstrated earlier, the government of Kazakhstan unites all of these groups under the umbrella of foreign/radical Islam.

Cesari (2007, 57) highlights the difference between fundamentalism and radicalism. As demonstrated by the literature (Cesari 2007; Wiktorowitcz 2006) Salafism is not necessarily radical, in other words, related to violence and rejection of any kind of compromise. Salafism is generally fundamental in its desire to base its decisions primarily on the divine readings, strictly following the teaching of it. Hence, Salafis can be quietist (preaching Islam peacefully), political (engaging in political actions) and jihadi (preaching violent means of spreading Islam), some of them relying on violence, while others rejecting, yet all having fundamentalism at their core. In the context of this study, I will be analyzing quietist Salafi groups, which constitute the majority of Salafis in Kazakhstan (Biard 2019).

Additionally, this research contributes to the analysis of the research question by employing a sociological approach to securitization as opposed to philosophical one developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998). The term securitization owes its origin to the Copenhagen School and scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wile and others

(Emmers 2007, 110; McDonald 2013, 71). Securitization, as defined by Buzan and Wæver (2003, 491), is "the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat." It is this securitization by the state that brings something out of the realm of normal politics and allows for the extraordinary measures such as breach of privacy rights, detainment of people based on suspicion, or limitation of personal freedoms.

The detailed analysis of the differences between sociological and philosophical approaches is outlined in the theoretical framework part of the paper. As of now, it suffices to highlight that the traditional philosophical approach to securitization tends to conflate some logically distinct speech acts and exclude practices of non-verbal means of communication (Balzacq 2011).

The problem of exclusion is both academically and socially relevant. The academic relevance of the research is primarily vis-à-vis the research on securitization and exclusion. Overall, the literature on securitization's effect on religious communities tends to primarily focus on migrant Muslim communities. Research on Salafism is focused on the Western context, where the majority of the Muslim population are migrants, and Islam is not the dominant religion. Whereas in Central Asian states, Islam is the dominant religion, and quietist Salafis are from the same ethnic group as the majority of the population, yet still they become excluded from the broader society.

Research has a social significance as it addresses the problem of social, economic, cultural and political exclusion, which might become a source of various obstacles to societal cohesion. The research attempts to analyze and demonstrate why Salafi communities prefer not to work in certain economic sectors, pray in certain mosques and live in specific areas.

Based on my findings I argue that the exclusion of quietist Salafi communities from a broader society in Kazakhstan comes as a result of securitization that causes many structural problems in different domains of society. In particular, I argue that through discourse and non-discursive practices government constructs the division of “us” versus “them”. I will demonstrate that this practice of governmentality works in the creation of what constitutes a population and who are the outsiders. In the light of this delineation of boundaries, the quietist Salafi communities engage in the “politics of identity” as a form of strategy to tackle their isolation and exclusion. As a result, they form “safe communities” based on religion.

To demonstrate my findings, this research first begins by outlining the literature and the observations on Salafism in the context of Kazakhstan. Specifically, I start by demonstrating the roots of the dichotomization of religious communities in Central Asia by looking at practices established in the Soviet Union. These practices then have become the model inherited by the independent Central Asian states after the dissolution of the USSR. Additionally, I review the securitization literature as it plays a vital role in the literature on social exclusion. The following chapters (chapters 2 and 3) will outline the theoretical framework of the research, which is broadly divided into two sections: 1) sociological approach of securitization as opposed to philosophical one and 2) creation of safe communities as a result of the securitization. In the first part, I discuss the importance of the sociological approach of securitization and its relevance to the socio-economic and socio-political domains of life. Specifically, I demonstrate how securitization is not merely a speech act as argued by the philosophical framework, but also incorporates non-discursive practices. The second part sets the theoretical explanation of the exclusion of Salafi communities from different domains of society. Specifically, it explains the concept of “safe communities” and “politics of identity” tied to the concept of governmentality. The argument here is that the practice of governmentality outlines the domains of what is “good” and “bad”, what constitutes a

population, and what is outside of this definition. In this regard, I demonstrate how the dichotomous division leads to structural issues for quietist Salafi communities. In this regard, they engage into creating "safe communities" based on religion, that allow them to escape the consequences of exclusion and isolation. The fourth, research design chapter, explains the methodological part of this research. In this chapter, I highlight both the ethical and methodological challenges I had encountered in the process of conducting my research. The fourth chapter provides a data analysis from participant observation and in-depth interviews conducted in three cities of Kazakhstan. The next chapter provides the discussion part that relates the finding with the theoretical framework. The final chapter summaries the findings and provides suggestions for further research.

Chapter 1: Securitization of Islam and Social Exclusion

In this chapter I first outline how the Soviet Union instrumentalized religion to have control over it, with the Independent Central Asian states later pursuing this approach, and further securitizing the religion into official/traditional and radical/non-traditional. I will then outline two schools of literature that explains the reasons behind the exclusion of Muslim communities, and Salafi communities in particular. One school of literature argues that exclusion happens primarily as a result of structural problems that are the result of securitization by the government. Whereas, the second branch debates that it is the religious beliefs of quietist Salafis that push them away from the general population.

Legacy of USSR: from regulation to securitization

At the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was experiencing an Islamic revival in some of the Central Asian states. According to some estimates, the countries experienced a rapid increase in the number of mosques, published Islamic literature, and in the wave of religious missioners visiting the countries. For instance, approximately 3000 mosques were constructed and restored in Uzbekistan by 1992. Around the same time, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan had 130 and 500 mosques respectively (Tazmini 2001, 66).

Moreover, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in many of the Central Asian countries, this revival played a role in regulating the daily lives and politics in the countries. However, for one to understand the roots of the religious regulations in the region, one needs to analyze the politics of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Islam. As the Soviet Union represented itself as a secular state and was driven by the strongly atheist ideology of communism, religion was often characterized as under heavy suppression. Contrary to the authors that demonstrate that the Soviet authorities tried to eradicate religion (Anderson 1994), Tasar's work (2017) shows how the government worked on regulating and instrumentalizing it. Tasar (2017, 5)

demonstrates how the Soviet authorities attempted to register Muslims in the Central Asian region via the creation of Islamic regulation agencies (*muftiates,* known by the acronym of "SADUM").

Various authors argue that Islam's revival after the Soviet era was mainly driven as a revival of national identity. According to Thibault (2018), Central Asian governments used religion as a common identity marker, at the same time stressing the secularity of the state Khalid (2007, 118) argues that this revival was a national phenomenon, and for each state of the region, it had different forms. As Khalid (2007) highlights, for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it was more of a way to distinguish and solidify the identity of localness as opposed to Russian, which has experienced an influx during the Soviet time. A similar argument is proposed by Tazmini (2001) where he states that Islam played an important function in creating a Central Asian identity, the place which was experiencing a vacuum of self-identity. According to Tazmini (2001, 68) despite the secular nature of the states, "Islam along with their Turkish heritage, is what distinguishes the republics from Russia"

Khalid (2007) further argues that despite this association, and respect by the newly independent governments towards Islam, this respect was only reserved for the official (registered by the muftiates) Islam. In this way, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new heads of states adopted the same policies toward regulating Islam. The authorities often associate anything religious not approved by the government with backwardness, fanaticism and wrong kind of Islam (Khalid 2007, 132-133). Similarly, Borbieva (2017, 158) argues that the Soviet Union's attempt to unify the population of the state, accidentally led to the opposite result, by further classifying them according to their language, way of life, religion, etc. As Borbieva states "by allowing religion to inform the construction of ethnic categories, the Soviets inadvertently intensified Central Asians' identification with Islam". Yet, as was demonstrated earlier, the institutionalization of Islam through Spiritual Administrations of

Muslims allowed constructing the distinction between official Islam. Only these directorates have the right to license the Islamic clerics, approve permits for mosques, curricula for the religious education materials, for the Friday prayer lectures (wagz), the publication of religious books, etc. (Borbieva 2017, 162). It is this permission, that assigns an attribute of official or traditional, and anything opposite being unofficial/foreign, or even destructive/radical.

Thibault (2019, 167) outlines three Soviet legacy tools used by the government in Kazakhstan to manage religion, and in particular Islam: (1) law on the regulation of religious activities, (2) Ministry of Social Development, and (3) Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK). It is the third institution that is responsible for assigning imams (heads of mosques), the publication of literature, issuing fatwas (Islamic rulings), and training specialists and so on. In this light, SAMK serves as muftiate, a body that regulates Islam in a country and issues rulings on permitted and prohibited actions. However, Thibault (2019, 168-169) demonstrate that the freedom of this institution is largely limited, and for the most part SAMK's rulings are in line with the government and the law on the regulation of religious activities.

Omelicheva (2011, 2016) in her studies demonstrates how the Kazakhstani government securitizes and instrumentalizes Islam, by discursively dividing it into traditional/moderate/official versus radical/foreign. Omelicheva's (2011) main argument is that Islam in Kazakhstan is being increasingly securitized. Omelicheva (2011) uses the framework of the Copenhagen School of security studies to analyze the core of this event and maintains that from a political perspective the driving forces of this securitization are Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan, the Orthodox Church and the government. Omelicheva (2011) shows how the Board and the Church implement the discourse of tradition and foreign religion so to ensure the authority over the domain, whereas, the government uses this securitization to allow the imposition of stricter policies that regulate and control the

religious practices within the country. She also demonstrates that being a Muslim in Kazakhstan is often equated with being Kazakh.

In her later work, Omelicheva (2016) furthers her argument and demonstrates how Islam through the system of discourse is instrumentalized in the context of two countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for the purposes of social and political regulation and control. She analyzes the discourse on Islam in the period of 1992 – 2007. According to Omelicheva (2016, 155), all discursive presentations are used by the governments in a specific way, but with the common aim of legitimization of its control. The State discursively divides Islam into four types: traditional, official, radical/foreign, and moderate/modern. For each classification, there is a specific instrumental purpose. For example, the discourse on traditional religion is used to unite and emphasize leaders' nationalist credentials; *official* classification is used to legitimize regulations and the control over Islam; the radical discourse is needed to justify strong anti-democratic actions and measures; moderate discourse is used to create an international image of "modern and secular state".

In the similar vein, Schwab (2019) analyzing the debate between Sufis and scripturalists[1] demonstrates the types of rhetoric the groups employ to achieve their goals. In the case of Sufis, Schwab (2019) analyzed the internet posts and letter to Kazakhstan's ex-President Nursultan Nazarbayev by Zikiriya Zhandarbek, a Sufi nationalist intellectual, Schwab (2019) and showed how Zhandarbek constantly employs emotions in the rhetoric. Zhandarbek constantly refers to the departure from ancestral Kazakh traditions because of the influence of Saudi Arabia that sponsor Kazakhstani scripturalists. Whereas scripturalists

[1] Schwab (2019, 179) defines scripturalists as "a coalition of Kazakh Muslims who differ from broader Kazakhstani society in several ways: they believe that there is one true interpretation of Islam and that this interpretation must be based solely on the Qur'an and hadith; they pray on daily basis; they attend mosque regularly; they advocate for the wearing of the hijab or headscarves; and they dislike Islamic shrines and the veneration of ancestors."

primarily rely on religious arguments in their rhetoric. Schwab (2019) argues that the nationalist rhetoric is more successful in Kazakhstan than the one employed by scripturalists because of two reasons: (1) Kazakhstani government employs nationalist rhetoric more so as a justification for its policies; (2) At the same time, in general Kazakhs are less interested in scripturalist orientation of Islam than in Kazakh identity, family, marriage and economy (Schwab 2019, 186). These findings demonstrate the divide not only between Salafis and Hanafis, but also with the Sufis. Moreover, from this I also assume that for the Kazakhstani government Hanafi school is closer as it shares nationalist rhetoric, which can be employed by the government.

From this literature, one can see how the instrumentalization of religion in the Soviet Union contributed to the establishment of official Islamic discourse, which transferred to the practices of today's independent Central Asian states. As the following section will demonstrate, this division between "us" and "them" may have negative consequences. Nonetheless, the research on the exclusion of Salafi communities mainly concentrated on migrant communities in the west, leaving out states that are predominantly Muslim in their population composition.

From Securitization to Exclusion

Religion, among many other domains, gained close attention by the scholars of securitization (Bosco 2016; Croft 2012; Eroukhmanoff 2015; Omelicheva 2011; Omelicheva 2016). For instance, Eroukhmanoff (2015) argues that Muslim communities have been securitized by most Western states as the *threatening Other*. In particular, the author demonstrates how the US employs remote securitization via using euphemization and metaphors. On top of that, Eroukhmanoff (2015) argues that the attempts by the US security officials to create a pattern of conditions and behaviors that demonstrate radicalization leads to

the creation of the logic of expected consequences. The problem with this logic, as Eroukhmanoff (2015, 254-255) states, is that "it tends to ignore problems of exogenous uncertainties" meaning that once security practitioners observe certain characteristics, they are able to predict the behavior of a radicalized Muslim. Thus, one being religious and unemployed might automatically become regarded as a potential source of radicalization and violence.

Bosco (2016) highlights that in securitization, a referent object (things that need to be secured) does not have to be a tangible phenomenon, but it can also be a religion, a way of life, and ideology among others. In the same manner, the threats can also take the form of intangible things as a threatening ideology. Bosco (2016) demonstrates how Britain, France and the United States, in the aftermath of 9/11, attempted to securitize Islam by dividing it from within into an authentic versus radical Islam. In particular, Bosco (2016, 14) argues that discourses do not merely depict reality, but rather construct "social meanings and can even lead to new modes of self-understanding and collective identity".

The first school of literature argues that exclusion of Muslims emerges as a result of securitization. According to Omtzigt (2009, 3), exclusion can be defined as "a process that fully or partially excludes individuals or groups from social, economic and cultural networks". As the research on social exclusion demonstrates, the process takes place when communities define their identity dichotomously in terms of "us" and "them". Exclusion is not a negative phenomenon per se, yet as the division of "us" is created vis-à-vis a "dangerous them" or "radical them" may lead to negative consequences. As Yasmeen (2014, 15) states "it becomes problematic when the difference is coupled with a sense of superiority or power and disregard for others and/or when the interaction with the "other" is negative and unpleasant" Yasmeen (2014, 17) argues that social exclusion happens not because some groups exclude other, but it is highly depend on the actors that regulate governmental and non-government areas of the society. The research also demonstrates that exclusion based on ethnic grounds may have

negative ramifications in the form of creating a sense of unjust treatment (Schaafsma and Williams 2012).

The literature also demonstrates diverse attitudes towards Salafi communities vis-à-vis other religious groups (Amghar 2007; Bullock 2014; Cesari 2007; Duderija 2014; Gole 2017; Lambert 2008). Lambert (2008, 73) shows how despite attempts by certain Salafi communities to criticize the terrorist attacks in Europe and attempts to spread recruitment propaganda by groups like Al-Qaeda, they have been facing criticism from other Muslim communities. Lambert (2008) shows how Sufi Muslim groups in the UK stigmatize Salafi communities in the country. The study demonstrates that despite a lack of religious centralization in Europe, the division can take place between different Muslim communities (Lambert 2008). Yet the research has been mostly concentrated in the context of Western states, where the Muslim population is ethnically from another region.

Biard (2019) and Beissembayev (2016) based on one in-depth interview with a quietist Salafi reveals that Salafis economically exclude themselves. As Beissembayev (2016) shows Salafis trade with cell phones because there is no harassment from the police in that sector, and they could freely move there with their trouser cropped, with beards, and their wives covered in *hijab*. Beissembayev (2016) also state that the environment of private sector helps them to spread their knowledge by making new acquaintances there. Similarly, Biard (2019) demonstrates that government policies prohibit unregistered religious organizations to proselytize religion. Hence, Biard (2019) concludes that private sector is a way for quietist Salafis to conduct *dawah* (preaching), thus, overcoming the legal boundaries.

Ayhan (2012) analyzes the effect of securitization of migration in Europe vis-à-vis religion. According to Ayhan (2012), this construction creates an aura of fear and leads to societal ramifications in the form of division among groups. Ayhan (2012, 185) demonstrates that continuous securitization and stigmatization of migration can exacerbate the level of

Muslim exclusion and antagonism, particularly among younger generation Muslims. Therefore, in the context of migration, securitization of migration can foster the construction of religious identity.

Croft (2012) provides another study that contributes to this logic of securitization leading to exclusion. Croft (2012) develops further the concept of securitization of Islam. He analyzes how the sense of *Britishness* is constructed via intersubjective comparison to an Islamist Other. To develop his argument, Croft introduces the concept of ‘ontological security’. Croft (2012, 2) defines it as a “sense of order and continuity in the life of an individual that is produced intersubjectively”. As opposed to the conventional Copenhagen School approach, Croft employs ontological security not at the level of the state, but at the individuals one, terming it as a Post-Copenhagen approach. For Croft (2012), nationality is one of the sources of ontological security, and rhetoric of contradistinction to Radical/Terrorist Islam employed by the authorities, media and form other social sources after the terrorist attacks on the UK soil help to create this ontological security of Britishness. As he states, “that sense of nationality, that Britishness, has been redefined in direct relation with the terrorist other.” What is also important to note is that the sense of ontological security is not enjoyed by everyone. On the contrary, for some the securitization process might lead to the ontological insecurity. The creation of ontological security and insecurity develops structural problems for the integration of the Muslim migrants in their countries of settlements.

In the context of Kazakhstan, Yemelianova (2014, 286), in her work on nation-building and Islam, states that the authorities of Kazakhstan have responded to the revival of Islam in the country "distinctively ambivalent and even contradictory" Specifically, Yemelianova (2014) argues that the-then Nazarbayev's government made Hanafi school as a traditional form of Islam, whereas different branches of Salafism and Sufism were marginalized. According to, Yemelianova (2014, 294) this classification happened firstly, due to the illiteracy of the regime

due to the soviet practices of secularization, and the promotion of atheism and secondly, due to the increase in the number of younger-generation Muslims that view themselves as Muslims but of a Salafi nature. This increase, Yemelianova (2014, 295) attributes to the increased exposure to the international sources of Islamic knowledge that the youth gets from the Internet, foreign study programs like *Bolashaq*, etc.

Self-exclusion of Salafism

Most of the literature on exclusion primarily analyzes structural factors and their influence on societal relations. However, a number of studies demonstrate that some of the religious groups are innately self-exclusionist (Adraoui 2019; Cesari 2007; Duderija 2014). In Europe, as Cesari (2007,63) demonstrates, Salafism is not discriminated by other Islamic groups due to the lack of religious authorities and limited diversification of religious practices. Cesari (2007, 63) argues that in an environment where "formal [religious] education is dispersed, [religion] tends to be conservative and to promote withdrawal from and rejection of the non-Muslim environment." Thus, the rejection from the non-Muslim environment can be related to the self-exclusion due to their belief.

Duderija (2014, 139) argues that only some branches of Islam are self-excluding. He (2014) states that Neo-traditional Salafis (NTS), based on their belief of *al wala' wal bara* (loyalty and disavowal), self-exclude from any interactions with non-Muslim communities.

Similar to Duderija (2014), Adraoui (2019, 3) argues that French Salafis are isolationist due to their belief system. According to Adraoui (2019, 3), "the purpose of Salafist socialization is a strong degree of introversion in order to remain connected to the only Muslims supposedly following the right path-Salafis tend to believe in their exclusive salvation."

In the context of Kazakhstan, despite the lack of research in the domain of exclusion of Salafi communities, some sources discuss this matter. A news article by VRKnews (2016)

states that security officials have discovered videos with religious content in the cell phones they were selling, thus they specifically work in those types of places to spread their religion. Nonetheless, the news information is not a very reliable source, and more research needs to be done in this domain to discover whether these arguments hold true.

Overall, the gap in this array of literature is in its primary focus on the Muslim migrant communities in the West, who are from different origin than the majority of the population whereas in Kazakhstan Islam is the dominant religion and quietist Salafis for the most part are Kazakhs. In the context of migration belonging to a different ethnicity is determinant for the exclusion or discrimination. Whereas in Kazakhstan, Muslims from the same ethnicity and same nationality are treated differently and demonstrate signs of social, economic, political, and cultural exclusion. Therefore, my research contributes to the body of literature by analyzing whether Salafi communities in Kazakhstan are innately isolationist or securitization affect religious communities in the case of the same ethnic origin and the same citizenship. My research also provides a wider analysis of the different domain of exclusion, which includes political, economic, social, and cultural domains.

Chapter 2: Securitization Through Practices

This chapter first explains what constitutes a philosophical approach to securitization introduce by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) followed by the shortcoming of this approach. Then, I outline the sociological approach, which contributes to the securitization theory by expanding securitization theory from including only speech acts, to incorporating practices and context in the formation of a threat image. This extension of the philosophical approach is done for the reason that the society does not only perceive securitization and government from the discursive practices but also the practices in the forms of engagements with the security officials and policies introduced by the government. I conclude this chapter by demonstrating various types of non-discursive practices of securitization in Kazakhstan.

Securitization: Philosophical approach

The term securitization owes its origin to the Copenhagen School and scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wile and others (Emmers 2007, 110; McDonald 2013, 71). Securitization, as defined by Buzan and Wæver (2003, 491), is "the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat." It is this securitization by the state that brings something out of the realm of normal politics and allows for extraordinary measures.

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998, 2) were proposing a definition of security that would be wider in scope than a traditional definition that was exclusively militaristic. The answer to what makes something a security issue is related to the traditional understanding of it, which is a survival of a referent object. Enunciation of "security" by a head of state establishes an emergency condition, which permits the resort to means that it would not have been permitted or criticized otherwise (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilder 1998, 21).

According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998, 25) "securitization can be studied directly" by analyzing the discourse of a securitizing actor. They (1998, 25) state "if by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization."

A discourse by itself does not translate into an existential threat by utterance, as it would merely constitute a securitizing move. For a threat to become a securitized a level of audience assent is required, it can never be imposed. Nonetheless, according to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998**,** 25) "accept does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance-free discussion; it only means that order always rests on coercion as well as on consent." Yet the bar for that has not been set high, as it only requires, according to the authors, that the threat "has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity"

A speech act is the central element of securitization theory. It is the securitizing move that attempts to create an image of a threat. The securitizing does not have to refer to some real threat, as it is the utterance that is the act in itself. Essentially, "by saying the words, something is done" (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 26)

For one to study securitization, we must distinguish between three units in security analysis: 1) Referent object; 2) Securitizing actors and 3) Functional actors.

- *Referent objects:* things that are existentially threatened and in need of survival.
- *Securitizing actors:* main actors that declare an existential threat to a referent object

- *Functional actors:* an actor, who can substantially influence the dynamic of a sector and decisions within a security field. It is not a referent object, nor a securitizing actor (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 36).

Limitations of the Philosophical Approach

As mentioned earlier, the Copenhagen School treats security not as an independent entity that exists on its own but views it as a constructed one that comes into existence through a speech act that is uttered by a securitizing actor. This tendency of relying primarily on the speech act comes because of the nature of the Copenhagen School that is based on linguistic studies (Leonard and Kaunert 2011, 60). This criticism of focusing primarily on the discursive elements in securitization is criticized by various actors (Balzacq 2011; Bigo 2002; Leonard 2005; Leonard and Kaunert 2011). As Leonard (2005, 76-78) demonstrates there are numerous instances where security is present without any utterance by a securitizing actor as in the cases of operations conducted by the state's secret agencies. Above all, the Copenhagen School itself acknowledges the possibility of securitization existing without a speech act by a securitizing actor (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 28). However, the Copenhagen School fails to derive necessary conclusions from this shortcoming. The logical conclusion that follows from this is that one should not solely focus on discursive actions of securitization but incorporate non-discursive practices to better understand the emergence of a securitized phenomenon. S

Balzacq (2011, 19) also highlights a vulnerability with the conceptualization of securitization as both a speech act and an intersubjective process. The linguistic approach leads to the obscuration of the role of the audience by mixing illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

Illocution is “the act performed in articulating a locution[2].” (Balzacq 2011, 4). As Habermas (1984, 289) puts it, illocution is “to act in saying something” This has a direct connection to the performativity argument proposed by the Copenhagen School. The perlocutionary act is the consequential aspect of a sentence, which is directed towards “bringing something through acting in saying something” It is directed towards evoking feelings, emotion, beliefs of the target audience (Balzacq 2011, 4; Habermas 1984, 289)

The confusion, with the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, is often driven by a false assumption of the speech act incorporating both of those acts. On the contrary, as Balzacq (2011) demonstrates the two acts diverge in nature. The illocutionary act is tied with effects only if it meets the felicity conditions, whereas the latter act is context-dependent and may cause both intended and unintended results by uttering a particular utterance. A speaker uses an illocutionary act to bring a perlocutionary effect, which is the source of the confusion (Balzacq 2011, 5).

Sociological Approach

To overcome these challenges, Balzacq (2011, 22) proposes a sociological approach to securitization research. The approach is built upon symbolic interactionism, Bourdieu’s concept habitus, and Foucault’s concept of dispositif. Balzacq (2011) argues that securitization should be understood as a sociological practice with the aim “ to determine the universal principles of effective communicative action of security ” He highlights that discursive approach fails to account for the variations on the intensity of threat images within the processes of securitization (Balzacq 2008, 78). Balzacq (2008, 78) states that in some instances

[2] According to Balzacq (2011, 4) “locutionary [act] - the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference”

"securitization changes in scope and scale - new threats identified or specific threats are intensified - in the absence of discursive articulations" The sociological approach treats the securitization in the form of practices, which accommodate both discursive and non-discursive acts. As Balzacq (2011, 15) argues:

> Securitization occurs in a field of struggles. It thus consists of practices which instantiate intersubjective understandings and which are framed by tools and the habitus inherited from different social fields. The dispositif connects different practices.

Because of the blurred differences between the actor and audience, the argument is that some of the manifestations of securitization can be better understood through the analysis of policy tools employed by the agents to deal with referent subjects. Balzacq (2011, 16) continues:

> Security tools or instruments are the social devices through which professionals of (in)security think about a threat. They contribute to the taken-for-grantedness of security practices. Tools rest upon a form of background knowledge about a threat, and the way it needs to be confronted.

The problem with the discursive approach is that it provides an incomplete image of a threat at any given time, mainly because it cannot account for the variations of intensity of securitization process (Balzacq 2008, 78)

Henceforth, in this work, I will employ the sociological approach of securitization, which is defined by Balzacq (2011, 3) as:

> an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, polity tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development.

Non-discursive Practices in the context of Kazakhstan

In this light, the securitization practices include not only discursive acts that have been extensively studied by Omelicheva (2011, 2016) but also practices and policy tools such as the employment of "*Informatsionno Razyasnitelnaya Gruppa"* (outreach teams) to conduct extremism related lectures at public institutions, security checks conducted by various governmental agencies, as well as rules that regulate the dress code at schools and governmental organizations.

Policing activities

One of the types of securitization practices conducted vis-à-vis quietist Salafi is the police registration of their identities and obtainment of their fingerprints to include them into a database (Geist 2017). These practices are derived from the accounts of the interview respondents. Around six of the seven quietist Salafis indicated that they had an encounter with the police officers that came to their houses to register them into a certain list. Some of them even recounted a practice, where security officials spread information in the neighborhood that they are registered as followers of illegal destructive movements. The refusal in some instances was followed by threats of negative consequences. The following example provides an extensive recount of the experience:

> Interviewer: You said you had encountered oppression form the security officers. Can you tell me more about it?
>
> QS respondent: Before going to play football, I went to the mosque to read the maghrib [evening] prayer, after the end of the prayer all the doors and gates at the mosque were and they did not allow anyone out. They started registering everyone inside. There were police officers and people in civilian clothes that clearly were from some security agency. They took my details and my phone number. A week or two later a man in civilian clothes came to me, introduced himself as a committee [National Security Committee] member and asked where I want to have a conversation in a car or at home. After we went home, he began asking me question about Islam and about me, about those who live with me, who taught me how to pray, whether I read prayer 5 times a day, asked about literature and Arabic language. Then

> he asked me to stand up to see how long my jeans were. He behaved very inappropriately. He kept on telling that I was lying and wanted me to tell truth.

The practice of registrations does not occur only in mosques or privately. A Hanafi respondent recounting on the experiences of friends stated that at their university girls that wear veils or boys that grow beards also have to go through the process of interrogation by either a security official or teaching personnel.

This demonstrates how a securitization might emerge non-discursively, through practices in the form of creating databases of people that do not practice traditional Islam. In this case, the engagement with the security actors may lead to the creation among the general population the perception that Salafis are innately inclined towards radical or destructive ideas.

Outreach teams

Another form of securitization is done through the practices of conducting lectures by outreach teams. The “State Program on Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Kazakhstan” include conducting a series of lectures in various societal structures such as schools, universities, governmental and non-government organization (National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2018). In the reporting on the progress of the outreach team, the secretary of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan stated that around two groups that operate on state and regional levels include over three hundred theologists. The secretary emphasized that Salafism is a growing problem in the country, especially among the youth. As the representative of SAMK stated although Kazakhstan prohibits only one religious faction of Salafism [jihadists], they all rely on the same literature

of Abdul Wahab[3] (Alyokhov 2016). In this regard, in the lectures equating different branches of Salafism as having a potential for extremism can foster a threat image among the population.

Dress code regulations

In Kazakhstan, the government introduced policies that regulate School and Government dress code. At the school level the "Decree of the Ministry of Education and Science" outlines the requirements to the school uniform about the prohibition of any religious attributes, which among others include headscarves (Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2016). It is worth highlighting that one of the passages also indicate specifically the length of the trousers which must cover ankles. This latter point can be viewed in relation to the dress code among Salafi Muslims, who wear trousers above their ankles. The regulation of the dress code in the government sector is outlined in the "Code of Ethics for Civil Servants" document. However, the document serves as a template for the regulations, and specific regulations on the dress code are provided by each governmental organization on its own. Despite there are no specific prohibitions on beards and veils, the overall practice seems to prohibit it in the government structures. According to the then Minister of Religious Affairs and Civil Society, on the question of growing a beard and cropping one's trousers during a government service, responded that because of the secular nature of the government service, civil servants as a whole must not, by their behavior or with words, promote a particular religion (Today.kz 2016). As well demonstrated in the data analysis part, the respondents that worked in the government sector had to leave their jobs due to growing a beard and praying.

[3] Muhammad Abdul Wahhab is considered to be the founder of the movement known as Wahhabism (White 2017, 252)

Both the discursive and non-discursive elements contribute to the securitization of Salafism. As demonstrated, the non-discursive practices of policing, registrations of Muslims securitize Salafism, which in turn leads the creation of structural problems for their integration.

Chapter 3: Politics of Identity and Safe Communities

This chapter provides a theoretical explanation that demonstrates how migrant communities due to securitization engage in the "politics of identity" by creating "safe communities" that are based on ethnicity, religion, and traditions. In this, I connect securitization to the concept of governmentality coined by Foucault. This section sets an outline for the later data analysis part that will demonstrate how the securitization drives Salafi communities to exclusion.

In his book, Ayhan (2009) analyzes how the securitization affects the Muslim origin migrants in the Western European states. He demonstrates the process of how Muslim migrants build hyphenated identities based on ethnicity and religion in the countries of the settlement. In particular, Ayhan (2009) highlights that apart from exogenous events like 9/11, or London and Madrid bombing that contributed to the increase in sense of Islamophobia, the Western European countries have not explicitly drawn lines between migration and terrorism, thus, equating in a way these two terms in the eyes of citizens. Securitization by political discourse, practices at the borders and even depiction of maps have all contributed to further the exclusion of migrants in the region. For instance, the maps drawn by the European Union to demonstrate migration movements to the continent use the symbols of arrows that were identical to the ones used during the World Wars, which creates the sense of an attack or danger that is coming from outside the borders of the European countries (Ayhan 2009, 15). According to Ayhan (2009), this is a form of identity politics, which allows the migrants to establish safe communities to deal with exclusion and isolation.

Ayhan (2009) states that "the security discourse conceals the fact that ethnic, religious and identity claims of migrants and their reluctance to integrate" actually results from existing structural problems of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, xenophobia, nationalism, and racism.

Securitization and exclusion are tightly connected to the practices of governmentality. The concept first introduced by Foucault which combines the two concepts *government* and *rationality* (Dean 2009). According to Foucault, the term government means the conduct of conduct, where the first part represents a verb as to guide; lead, while the second one stands as a noun indication a set of behavior, an ideal toward which others should strive. Whereas, rationality to quote the author is "is simply any form of thinking which strives to be relatively clear, systematic and explicit about aspects of 'external' or 'internal' existence, about how things are or how they ought to be." (Dean 2009, 18-19). Thus, the term governmentality is related to the conduct of the set of behaviors, where an individual assumes the oughtness and appropriateness of that set. Governmentality vis-à-vis Islam, as an approach of governing people's conduct, not by the means of sovereign power, but rather via positive ones, implying the cases where the governed participates willingly. Governmentality deals with the governing of the population rather than a territory, and in the matter concerning the well-being of the population it brings up the question of "who is to be defined as population" (Doty cited in Ayhan 2009). Hence, immigrants are securitized in this way by being identified as outsiders to the definition of population, culture, and conventions. According to Ayhan (2009, 10) "that line of thinking, which excludes those who do not culturally, ethnically and religiously belong, presumes the immigrant against whom the nation, the population, should be redefined" Therefore, Inda (2006) states that practices of anti-illegal immigration serve as a tool of anti-citizenship, which defines those who included and excluded from the citizenry. In the context of Western European states refugees, illegal migrants, drug traffickers are all in the list of anti-citizens. An article by Martin (2014) argues that the UK's 'Prevent' counter-terrorism policies represent an extension of governmentality that acts at the level of the potential threat, before the threat that is being targeted has come to exist. Martin (2014) shows that the government does so by prescribing certain indicators that create these *risk communities* Among many, the

indicator of marginalization and lack of integration are shown as causing vulnerabilities among individuals that create in them the potential of violence. Martin demonstrates how the Prevent policy helps to create governmentality vis-à-vis Britishness, and any disassociation from that image and the conduct of Britishness problematizes the individual making one appear to be ever-potentially vulnerable to radicalization and extremism. In this regard, the definition of Britishness with the list of qualities that constitute it contributes to the delineation of the definition of population. Bigo (2002, 65) states that securitization of migration is "transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease, or to encourage it if it does not yet exist, to affirm their role as providers of protection and security"

In the context of Central Asia, Lemon and Thibault (2018) demonstrate that counter-extremism measures employed in Tajikistan are not purely destructive, but also productive. Specifically, the counter-extremism measures and dichotomous discourses of 'good' versus 'bad' Islam are used in the form of disciplinary power and biopower to produce secular citizens, who are resistant to extremist ideas. In this case, disciplinary power is used on the basis of socially constructed division of "normal" and "abnormal", leading to the implementation of the measure to conform the abnormal subjects to a normal life. Whereas, biopower is grounded on the promotion of 'good' ways of living a life (Lemon and Thibault 2018, 2-4). In addition, Lemon and Thibault (2018) building on Foucault's understanding of these concepts demonstrate that the disciplinary power and biopower are not simply imposed on the people but can be subject to resistance. The study outlines the examples of support, acquiescence, and resistance to these practices by the population in Tajikistan. Lemon and Thibault (2018, 15) demonstrate how individuals can resist this subjectification by these powers via alternative modes of self-making. The resistance can come in the form of continuation of the 'bad' practices such as continuing to grow a beard or put on a veil despite government's prohibitions.

An interesting finding from the research is that strict believers in Tajikistan react to the government's exercise of disciplinary power by holding on to their faith. According to Lemon and Thibault (2018, 15) "Islam offers a spiritual and moral sanctuary for those who adhere to it. First, it places transcendence over immanence, allowing the believer to focus on the hereafter. Second, internally, it allows believers to focus on an inner struggle within themselves. Third, externally, it provides a moral guide for living in and coping with the secular world." Hence, building on these arguments, excluded communities that do not want to conform to the disciplinary power can resist it by employing religion as a form of self-autonomy.

Furthermore, Inda (2006, 12) argues that the decision to form communities based on ethnoreligious networks is the product of the post-social state, which transposed the responsibility to ensure the usage of services such as education, healthcare, pension and security systems upon individuals, families, localities, and communities. In other words, in the world of the market economy, individuals must be responsible on their own to ensure their well-being. In this context, Rose (1996, 331) further argues that "the social" is being replaced by "the community" where individual and collective existence is administered "upon which micro-moral relations among persons are conceptualized and administered" In this regard, Rose (1996) identifies a shift in politics of security, where individuals must take care of themselves and their families by ensuring their access to private healthcare, pensions, etc.

In this regard, the logic of Ayhan's (2009) argument is that due to the structural changes and pressures to ensure one's security Muslim migrants "come to hold on to religion, ethnicity, language and tradition", the things that cannot be taken away from them from the outside, more strongly. For the most part at Ayhan (2009) demonstrates these actions by the migrants are mistakenly interpreted by the government and the society as a conservativeness and a resistance to the integration with the wider society. Such solidarity networks serve two important

purposes for migrant communities. First, they allow them to form an identity, which in the light of securitization must be reconceptualized. Giddens (1994) terms this action as a *life politics*, which implies a politics through which the migrants can emancipate themselves from the challenges faced in a state. According to Ayhan (2009), this type of politics serves as a shield, for the groups being pushed to the margins, to create their autonomy. In this regard, creating communities based on religion, ethnicity and traditions provide them a ground to develop an autonomous self. The second purpose, defined by Bauman (2001) as heteronomy, of this type of politics is to provide these groups with survival strategy against the challenges of sense of isolation and exclusion. Hence, the migrant communities do not just isolate as a consequence of structural challenges, but also engage in the creation of communities as a tool to develop autonomy and secure themselves from exclusion by employing religion, ethnicity as a foundation.

In this case, the perception of dichotomous division, usage of “Us” versus “Them” rhetoric is a strategy against the exclusion (Ayhan 2009). Moreover, practices like rituals, mass ceremonies, gatherings serve the purposes of establishing the “authentic” culture among Muslim origin migrants (Ayhan 2009). It is important to highlight that the migrant communities are not immune from exogenous influences, and as Wilpert (1987) states the identity formation is tightly related to the “other” through the mutual recognition actions of each other. As a result, in this dialogue of mutual recognition the boundaries of what constitutes “I” and what constitutes “them” are established and helps with the development of self-consciousness. The Salafi communities are constantly denied the entrance to the identity as the local and defined according to government rhetoric. Thus, the construction of “we” get established by the communities opposed to them and within the communities of Salafis.

MacIntyre (1971) states that there are two types of identity politics: politics of those within and politics of the excluded. The politics of those within allow the population to access

legitimate political institutions as parties, parliament, the media to achieve their goals. Whereas those, who are excluded are reliant on politics of the excluded, which primarily employs religion, ethnicity, honor for those purposes. To quote Ayhan (2009, 177) this is "a form of politics initiated by outsider groups as opposed to the kind of politics generated by those within" In other words, the politics of the excluded initiated from the outside groups and structural factors, rather than within the group.

To summarize, this section demonstrates how government via securitization of certain groups of populations engages in the practice of governmentality. This means that the government creates the image, the understanding of what constitutes the "population", the "nation" and/or the "citizen" versus the ones that are outside that image.

As a result, the securitized, or referent subject is viewed outside the domain of population and seen as a risk to the security, an enemy from within. Consequently, the structural obstacles arise for the outsiders of that population, which are pushed to the margins. As demonstrated above, faced by such structural problems of discrimination and exclusion the outsider groups engage into the politics of identity, the politics of those excluded to build safe communities based on ethnicity, religion, and traditions.

Chapter 4: Research design

In this research design chapter, I outline the methods that were employed to test my two hypotheses. I explain the methods that were used, outline ethical challenges that were encountered during the research and finally I explain why I failed to employ one of the initially planned methods (online surveying). As I discussed earlier my research aims to analyze the factors that are behind social, political, economic and cultural exclusion of Salafi communities in Kazakhstan. However, it is important to highlight the fact that the topic is very sensitive in this region. Salafism is viewed as a threat as was shown earlier, and any attempt to obtain information in this regard was difficult. Therefore, the methodology to obtain information was based considering this context. To analyze what are the factors behind the observed social exclusion of Salafi communities I conducted a series of in-depth interviews and participant observations.

Additionally, in this section I also outline the hypotheses obtained from the literature to test whether there is an effect of securitization on exclusion of quietist Salafi communities or their exclusion is based on the religious groundings. I define important concepts used in this work and demonstrate differences between Salafism and Hanafism.

In-depth Interviewing

The in-depth interview is a very effective tool to utilize the power of language to illuminate meaning, meanings people attribute to their experiences, to their environment and social interactions (Legard et al 2014, 139-140). Personal narratives help to uncover the construction of the self, understand the agency and motivations of a respondent, and the changes through time (Maynes et al 2008, 30-35). It is this interest in understanding the motivations behind exclusion, interest in the personal history and its connection to the social, cultural context of the country led to the choice of personal narrative inquiry.

The interviews were conducted in three cities of Kazakhstan, which include Nur-sultan, the capital of Kazakhstan, Shymkent and Saryagach both located in the southern part of the country. The selection of the cities was based on the locations I was present during the research period and wanted to compare the results whether they would demonstrate any variations. What was more important in all these places are the marketplaces where they trade phones, and sell religious goods, mosques close to those locations and so on. According to various reports Salafis are known to work in bazaars and markets (Beissembayev 2016; Exclusive.kz 2020; Matrekov 2016; Total.kz 2018; VRKNews.kz;). In the case of Nur-sultan I attended the "Artyom" bazaar, located on the right bank of the city, with "Saduahas hazhi Gylmani" mosque located next to it, and "Chubary" district on left bank, where "Al-Ghani" (also referred as Chubary mosque) mosque is located. Based on the discussions with ex-members of the outreach groups (groups that conduct lectures on the questions of extremism in Kazakhstan), news reports and my personal observations I decided to attend these locations to collect my data. Both of the mosques are said to attract high number of quietist Salafis in the city. In Shymkent, this type of area is called Garant, where they sell cellphones. In Saryagach, I got into touch with them through personal connections. The interview collection period lasted from October 1, 2019 till February 28, 2020. It is important to highlight that there is lack of reliable information on the question of Salafism in Kazakhstan. Therefore, most of the decisions on the choice of site locations were based on news reports, discussion with experts in this domain, and personal observations.

The sampling of the participants was purposive as opposed to conducting a random sampling. The participants were selected from specific locations and based on their attributes and their religious beliefs. The differences between Hanafism and Salafism is discussed later in this section. After getting into contact with one respondent I mainly followed the snowball methodology. As I already mentioned, due to the sensitivity of the topic not everyone would

be open to share their personal views and experiences vis-à-vis state and society interactions. The snowballing process started with me attending the "Al-Ghani" mosque, where, based on the outside attributes (beard and cropped pants) and the praying rituals, I approached my first interviewee. I arrived at the mosque half an hour earlier before the prayer time and observed the praying rituals of the Muslims attending the place during the *Sunnah* (complementary) prayers. As we completed an obligatory prayer, as everyone stepped outside, I approached my first interviewee. I began by introducing myself as student from Nazarbayev University and explained the purpose of the research, after which thoroughly explaining the complete anonymity of respondents and all the ethical considerations taken in conducting this research. The responded agreed to participate, after which time and place were decided based on the respondent's preferences. After the completion of the interview, I asked the participant to introduce me to other people that are relevant to my research.

It is important to acknowledge that while some of the participants may state that they are Salafis, the majority might refrain from labeling themselves with the term. Yet, for the convenience of the study, the focus was not on the term they use to define themselves, but rather their creed (aqida) and practices (fiqh). I asked all the participants whether they would identify with one of the four schools of Islam, and as will demonstrated in more detail most of the quietist Salafis responded negatively stating that they follow Qur'an and Sunnah. Following that I asked them what they considered to be the main difference. To cite on of the respondent's answers:

> QS Respondent: We profess Sunni Islam and obey the ruler. To be honest, the problem is not in 4 madhhabs, the 4 madhhabs taught on fiqh issues [Islamic practice]. In Kazakhstan, it is possible to follow the madhab Abu Hanifa so as not to create problems once again. But aqida [creed] is different, and aqida is in the heart, and this is more important. But we do not support destructive movements and terrorist organization

As above-mentioned, a detailed clarification on the differences between both branches is discussed below.

Alongside interviewing quietist Salafis, I conducted interviews with Muslims that uphold the teachings of Imam Abu Hanifa, who established the school of *fiqh* that is followed by the majority of the population in Central Asia and termed as the tradition school of Islam in this region. The school is promoted by the official clergies of Central Asia. In the same manner as with the interviewees from the quietist Salafi groups, the sampling was based on the outside attributes and the prayer rituals. It is important to mention that if the outside features might be similar in terms of beards, Hanafis do not wear short pants. At the same time, their praying rituals differ noticeably. Establishing contact with this group of Muslims was much easier due to the large number of acquaintances that attribute themselves to this school.

Due to the sensitivity of the topic and difficulty of establishing contact, I initially planned to interview 10 respondents. However, at the end I managed to interviewee 17 people of which 7 constitute quietist Salifsts and 10 Hanafis. As mentioned earlier I used personal connections to get in touch with some of the respondents from the quietist Salafis.

To code and analyze the interviews I used a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). In particular, I used a software called Nvivo, that is well-known for its extensive tools to analyze rich text-based data. I also used a software called Tableau to visualize some of my data results.

Participant observations

The conduct of participant observation was not initially part of my research methodology. However, because the originally planned online survey did not turn out to be feasible (discussed below), and because I encountered interesting findings during my trips to the research sites, I decided to use this as a methodology that would contribute to answering

my research question. According to Ayhan (2009) “in order to provide reasons for the failure of the integration regime, one should look into the ways in which ‘communities’ are producing and reproducing themselves.” Things like rituals, architecture in the areas where the quietist Salafis mainly pray and work, their practices, interactions and so on can shed light on the nature those communities. Based on these considerations, I attended six mosques in Nur-sultan: (1) Al-Ghani; (2) Saduahas hazhi Gylmani; (3) Nur-Astana; (4) Hazret Sultan; (5) Ryskeldi hazhi; and 6) Raisa Ana mosques. I observed and noted the positioning of the Muslims within the mosque, their praying rituals, interactions between Muslims, etc. I also observed the surroundings of those areas. For the most part I acted as an outside observer, yet, managed to communicate with some of the Muslims in these places. The observations and the patterns discovered during the participant trips will be discussed in the data analysis section.

Online survey

As I indicated earlier, initially the second methodology to answer my research question was online surveying. The reason behind this method was primarily driven because of high cost to conduct a country survey, and the amount of time that it would require. Therefore, I assumed online surveying would have a potential to gather data from a high number of internet users. At the same time, web-based surveys would overcome the geographical limitation and substantially decrease the cost of the project. The venue for my web-based survey was the social networking website “vk.com”. I employed a research conducted by a non-governmental organization that monitored religious discourses on social media platforms in Kazakhstan. Their research analyzed social media groups and communities according to the religious content shared on the social network community pages. The report classified the social network pages based on the content that was shared there, either belonging to a Hanafi school or Salafism.

After completing all the questionnaires, I communicated with the administrators of the social network community pages on the possibility to locate a link with a description to my questionnaire on their page. Out of 10 pages that I sent a request to seven of them rejected based on the grounds that they do not allow distribution of questionnaires on their pages, and three did not respond. Despite this shortcoming, I decided to go through the list of participants in those communities and contact them personally. I had a similar result as before, with people unwillingly answering, or simply ignoring my messages. At the end, I managed to survey only one respondent. This may be primarily related to the fact that the topic of religion is very sensitive in Kazakhstan, heavily securitized and digitally monitored. Therefore, due to these challenges I decided that this particular methodology in this context would not produce fruitful results. Yet, this can serve as a guide to those, who might plan to conduct a research in this domain in the future.

Ethical Considerations

Considering the sensitivity of the topic in the country, a careful attention was paid to ethical considerations. In particular, to obtain genuine answers from the respondents, specifically from the quietist Salafis, ensuring them on the complete anonymity was a substantial task. The research does not include any names of the respondents or any personal referral that would indicate, who the respondent was except an identification whether the respondent is from a Hanafi or quietist Salafism branch. Therefore, to do that I approached the respondents with introducing myself, yet without asking their names and explaining them that if they wish they may abstain from telling me that. Information about age was asked for the research purpose to analyze whether a younger generation Muslims would provide answer that would be different or similar with the older ones. Yet, as I mentioned in the research non-of the information provided vis-à-vis a certain respondent. Except for the quotes given to

demonstrate the narratives of the respondents, most of the data are provided in the form of aggregated results that exclude any personal information. Upon the approach and initial consent of the respondents, I provided them with the written consent form, which indicates the purpose of the analysis and the importance of the anonymity of the respondent. Only after their consent, I would proceed further, with ensuring the location and time that would be the most suitable for them. For researchers that may be planning to conduct interviews in this domain, the ethical consideration aspect is highly important, as the responses from the quietist Salafis provide personal experiences and encounters with the security agencies. Moreover, out of 18 conducted interviews, only one of the respondents from the Salafi group requested me to not include his answers from the research. This may indicate that overall, the sense of insecurity is present among the respondents.

Hypotheses

In this section, I outline two hypotheses generated from the literature review process and provide definitions of the important concepts in this research.

The literature demonstrates that the government of Kazakhstan has been dichotomously dividing Islam into traditional and non-traditional, local and foreign, peaceful and radical. As Yasmeen (2014) demonstrated this dividing rhetoric might lead to the creation of exclusion. Moreover, other researches outlined that securitization might even become a source of their further radicalization. Ayhan (2009) argues that because of securitization, Muslim migrants in Europe become disintegrated from social, economic, cultural and political sectors. As I demonstrated in the literature review section the first school of literature argues that exclusion of quietist Salafis happen as a result of securitization, which crates structural obstacles for their integration (Ayhan 2009; Biard 2019). Thus, my first hypothesis attempts to test whether securitization is the primary factor that leads to exclusion of quietist Salafis.

Hypothesis 1: Securitization of Salafism leads to socio-economic exclusion

Second school of literature argues that compared to other orientations of Islam quietist Salafis are self-exclusionist because of their belief. Duderija (2014) states that Neo-traditional Salafis (NTS), based on their belief of *al wala' wal bara* (loyalty and disavowal), self-exclude from any interactions with non-Muslim communities. Adraoui (2019) similarly argues that "the purpose of Salafist socialization is a strong degree of introversion in order to remain connected to the only Muslims supposedly following the right path-Salafis tend to believe in their exclusive salvation." Thus, based on the second school of literature I explore whether there are religious arguments that contribute to their choice of work and integration with a wider society.

Hypothesis 2: Quietist Salafist self-exclude because of their religious belief

To test these hypotheses, I employ several concepts from the literature. The concept of exclusion is the dependent variable in the context of my research. In other words, I aim to test whether the communities are excluded by outside forces or self-excluded. According to Omtzigt (2009, 3), the exclusion is defined as "a process that fully or partially excludes individuals or groups from social, economic and cultural networks." However, I demonstrated earlier the literature also discusses aspects of their self-exclusion. Hence, based on this, I define self-exclusion in the case of quietist Salafis as an exclusion justified primarily by their religious arguments. A short example of this could be seen in the form of statements such as "It is prohibited in the religion to practice this" or "We are not allowed to work in this industry"

Another important concept that I defined earlier, is a concept of securitization. The research employs a sociological approach, based on the definition provided by Balzacq (2011), who defines securitization as "an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, polity tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions), about the

critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development" (Balzacq 2011, 3) In this context, I analyze whether the securitization practices of the government in the discursive and non-discursive forms build a set of feelings, sensations, thoughts and attitudes among the relevant audience.

Two other important concepts that require clarification are the concept of Safe community and politics of identity. The concepts that are extensively clarified in the theoretical framework chapter, yet as of now, it is important to state those safe communities are communities that are formed by the excluded groups on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, traditions to protect themselves from the effect of exclusion and isolation. In this regard, these communities engage in the politics of Identity that allow excluded communities to emancipate themselves from the effects of exclusion and develop a sense of self-autonomy based on ethnic, cultural and religious grounds. This concept is also defined by MacIntyre (1971) as the politics of those excluded as opposed to those who are within. In this case, MacIntyre states that those who are within can use legitimate political instruments in the form of parliament, parties, the media, while the excluded ones employ ethnicity, religion, and culture for those purposes.

The following section will outline the differences in what constitutes Hanafism and Salafism and what are their distinguishing factors.

Differences among Salafism and Hanafism

To distinguish two Islamic factions (Hanafism and Salafism) one must look into their *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and *aqida* (creed). The question of aqida is eloquently explained by Wiktorowicz (2006), where he demonstrates that the uniting factor among all different factions

of Salafism is their aqida (creed). In broad terms, Wiktorowicz (2006, 208) divides Salafism into three types: The Purists (also referred to as quietists), the politicos, and the jihadis. However, all three factions uphold the same creed, which as Wiktorowicz (2006, 207) states "revolves around strict adherence to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God) and ardent rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire" This is the dividing line between other branches in Islam. For instance, the Islamic scholar Imam Abu Hanifa (the founder of the most widespread school of Islamic jurisprudence in Central Asia) on the question of creed followed the teachings of Asharites and the Maturidis. This is the official stance of Kazakhstan's muftiate, which states that they follow the school of Imam Maturudi in the question of aqida. The difference between Salafis and Asharites with Maturidis is in the usage of human reasoning in explaining the question of tawhid and God's attributes (Wiktorowicz 2006, 211). In the Qur'an, various passages describe God's attributes using adjectives that are normally used to describe human beings. However, it also prohibits the practice of anthropomorphism (the attribution of human characteristics or behavior to God), God is unique and not like any of its creations. Asharites and Maturudis strongly reject the practice of anthropomorphism and state that those qualities should be defined metaphorically, not literally. In this case, phrases in the Qur'an that mention God's eyes can be interpreted to represent God's divine knowledge. Whereas, Salafis also denying anthropomorphism reject employing human reasoning and logic to interpret these attributes. They engage in a literal interpretation of the Qur'an as if God actually has hands, yet that does not resemble the ones of any of God's creations (Wiktorowicz 2006, 211). All four Islamic scholars of *fiqh* (jurisprudence) uphold one of two schools of *aqida* (Asharii or Maturudi). There is a debate whether the founder of Hanbali school of *fiqh* followed one of the two schools of *aqida*, yet there is no definite answer on the question. Nonetheless, the line that clearly defines a division between Hanafi school Muslims in

Kazakhstan and quietist Salafis is the question of creed. Yet, there are also differences in terms of jurisprudence.

Fiqh (jurisprudence) deals with the questions of practices of Islam (how to pray, ablution, how many times to pray complementary prayers and so on). In general, among Sunni Muslims, there are four commonly accepted great scholars of *fiqh*: Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik, Imam al-Shafii, and Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (muftiate) follows the school of Imam Abu Hanifa, also referred to as Hanafi school. According to this school, the praying style is different from the ones upheld by quietist Salafis. As described in the official website of Hazret Sultan mosque (central mosque in Nur-sultan city) during the prayer, while standing Muslims hold their right hand over the left one placing them both below the navel. At the same time, after completing the compulsory passage “surah Fatiha” one has to silently pronounce the word “Ameen” (Muslim.kz 2019). On the other hand, Salafis do not follow one particular school, rather they base their argumentation on Qur’an and Sunnah. As described in one of the most popular Salafi branch sources Islamqa.info, the hands during prayer are placed on the chest as opposed to placing below the navel. The pronunciation of the word “Ameen” is also cried out loudly (Islamqa.info 2019). This website is supervised by Muhammed Salih al-Munajjid, a well-known scholar among Salafis (Fakude 2014).

Another *fiqh* related difference among Hanafism and Salafism is vis-à-vis beard and shortening trousers. If the question of whether growing a beard is obligatory debated among scholars of Abu Hanifa schools, among Salafis there is a strict prohibition on shaving the beard. However, concerning shortening trousers, Kazakhstan’s muftiate and the general teaching of Abu Hanifa school states that this is optional, whereas Salafis believe that lowering one’s trousers below ankles is haram [a sin] (Islamqa.info 2008; Muhammad. 1998, Muslim.kz 2020).

In general, as later will be demonstrated in the data analysis part, Hanafi Muslims in Kazakhstan attitude towards the beard is either neutral or negative, and most men do not grow one. On the other hand, quietist Salafis based on their *fiqh* can be distinguished by long beards and cropped trousers and praying rituals. Most importantly, the greater divide comes in the aspects of a creed that allows one to distinguish whether someone upholds more “traditional” schools of creed or follows the teachings of Salafis as outlined by Wiktorovitz (2006, 2011).

In my interviews, I asked a question on the perceived differences between quietist Salafis and Hanafis. My results demonstrate that quietist Salafis in general tend to know more about the differences, especially in the aspect of creed than Hanafis. On top of that quietist Salafis state that it is the obligation of a Muslim to seek religious knowledge.

Chapter 5: Data Analysis

This chapter demonstrates the findings of the data analysis from the participant observation and in-depth interviews. In short, in the participant observation part, I demonstrate patterns that emerged during my 20 field trips to 6 mosques in the capital city Nur-sultan. The findings from participant observation show that the surroundings around two mosques known to be attended by quietist Salafis differ significantly compared to the other four mosques. The data also demonstrates that quietist Salafis pray differently in those two mosques. The findings from both participant observation and from interviews show that quietist Salafis prefer to live nearby those two mosques. In the section in-depth interviews, I demonstrate the results from coding and analysis of the interviews of 17 respondents (10 Hanafis and 7 quietist Salafis). From the interviews, I discover that the overall attitude towards Salafis is negative among Hanafi Muslims. I also show that this negative attitude leads them to exclusion. These findings support my argument that as a result of securitization quietist Salafis are forced to engage in politics of identity creating safe communities based on their religious views.

Participant observation

To begin my research, I have conducted a series of field trips to observe the environment and the place for the data collection. I attended six mosques in Astana, two central mosques (Hazret Sultan and Nur-Astana mosques), two newly constructed mosques (Yryskeldi hazhi and Raisa Ana mosques) and two mosques that are known to be largely attended by Salafis. One such mosque is located in the Chubary micro-district and another is found behind the Astanalyk (also known as Artyom) bazaar. In total, I conducted 20 trips to those mosques, three times I attended the service at the Al-Ghani mosque, twice visited “Saduahas hazhi Gylmani” mosque, once I attended the service at the two newly constructed ones, and I went to the Nur-Astana and Hazret Sultan mosques thirteen times.

I commenced my observations by visiting the Astanalyk bazaar to see where I could find Salafis to interview there. As I set out my initial assumptions based on news articles and personal observations that many of the Salafis trade phones in Kazakhstan. However, as I arrived at the location, I have not found any Salafi trading phone or selling in a shop at the bazaar. Therefore, my initial assumption appeared wrong. The same trend I have noticed in Shymkent, in the place known as “Garant”, fewer and fewer Salafis can be seen on the street selling phones. When I entered the Artyom mall, I have only managed to find one or two shops with religious people working in them. Most of the people who trade with the phone were women, all appearing to be very attractive as this might resemble a new strategy to attract more clients, assuming they all trade the same products.

However, after not having my initial assumptions supported, I decided to attend the “Saduahas Hazhi Gylmani” mosque, which is located right behind the Artyom mall. What I noticed was that even before entering the mosque, around it there are various shops with religious signs on them. Restaurants advertise halal food, and shops that sell religious attributes, as well as accessories, are all located in front of the mosque. Inside the mosque, when the time came closer to make a call for prayer (adhan), more people began gathering. I have noticed that within the mosque Salafis clustered and prayed on one side of the mosque as a large group of Salafis. On top of that, during the prayer, Salafis cried out loud the word “Ameen”, which is not practiced by Hanafi Muslims (out of four Islamic schools only Shafii school practices saying Ameen loudly) and prohibited to do in other mosques. Other Muslims also attend the mosque, yet they mostly stood next to other non-Salafi Muslims.

After I completed the prayer, and everyone started to leave the mosque, I decided to enter the shops that were selling religious attributes, as went in I noticed that the worker had a long beard, and a woman, I assumed to be his wife wearing a hijab. I also went to observe whether a lot of Salafis attend the restaurant in front of the mosque. I have observed a lot of

people that satisfied the visual description of quietist Salafi Muslims eat in the restaurant, as I counted 10 people fitting the description of a Salafi people out of the 13 that were eating there. Above all, the owner of the place, as I heard some customers referring to him as "*baseke*", which in informal Kazakh language means the boss, seems to be a Salafi himself. He was standing at the cashier machine and having a friendly chat with the customers while counting the cost of the food on the food trail.

After, noticing this pattern in the mosque, I headed to my second destination, which was the "Al-Ghani" mosque located at the Chubary microdistrict. The micro-district is known to be populated with Salafis and according to rumors spread on the news, the ex-imam of the mosque Ibragim Tairzhan was a Salafi himself, yet this only remains a rumor. As I arrived an hour earlier to prayer time pupils were practicing how to read the Qur'an, along with a few other Muslims as well. Until prayer time, their relative number was very small. However, as I was thinking that the mosque is not attended by them or the time was not the right, a large number of them started arriving at the mosque. Overall, they all stood to the right side of the mosque. Yet due to their large presence, they were all over the mosque. Most of the people in the mosque seemed to be in their 30s or 40s. They followed all the described Salafi prayer habits (placement of their hand while praying, raising hands and saying "Ameen" loudly) with the following external identifies (beard, cropped pants).

On the same day, I attended the service at the Hazret Sultan mosque, which is located on the left bank of Nur-sultan. What I have noticed is that as in other mosques the number of Salafis is less than the number of Hanafi Muslims. At the same time, the similarity is that they all group in one place. In the case of the Hazret Sultan Mosque, they mostly gathered on the right-front side, and some were on the left-front side. What was significantly different than in other mosques is the fact that Salafis do not pronounce "Ameen" out loud. Whereas, in both other mosques they would do that freely.

At another central mosque (Nur-Astana mosque), I observed similar trends as in the Hazret Sultan mosque. I observed an interesting difference vis-a-vis praying style in central and other mosques. As I mentioned earlier Salafis in Hazret Sultan mosque do not pronounce the word “Ameen” out loud during the prayer. The same trait was observed in the Nur-Astana mosque. This time, I stood close beside the Salafis, who prayed the way outlined in the paper, yet they did not pronounce “Ameen” here either. The praying style in mosques that are located in places where Salafis work or reside is the same as in central mosques, yet they do not abstain from crying “Ameen” loudly. Another difference I have noticed is that they do not pray sunnah (recommended) prayers with the rest of the group. As soon as the *fard* (obligatory) prayer finishes, they move towards the back of the mosque and pray there alongside other Salafis.

In my second trip to Al-Ghani and Saduahas hazhi Gylmani mosques, I observed the same patterns as before, a group of people, which I assume to be the followers of the “traditional” Islam praying according to the Hanafism school, and quietist Salafis gathering on the right side of the mosques and pronouncing “Ameen” loudly. However, in my second trip to Al-Ghani mosque, I noticed after the prayer that several young people, who were approximately 27-30 years old with beards selling religious attributes, in particular, the Arabic perfume called “Musk” They had a lot of people gathered around their car, where all the perfume bottles were stored. I also noticed how outside the mosque people were chatting with each other, nonetheless, I noticed that the interactions were only taking place with people that matched the described appearance of Salafis. In my third and last trip to Al-Ghani mosque, I approached a Salafi, to request permission to conduct an interview. After a bit of hesitation and my explanation of the anonymity, he gave his consent. After the interview, I discovered that he lives in this area, and a lot of people that attend the mosque live nearby in the micro-district. Therefore, his decision to pray in that mosque was primarily based due to the location. However, the choice of location was due to the acquaintances that lived in the area that were

also religious. A pattern that I observed in all the visits to the above-mentioned two mosques, is that most of the attendants of the mosque that matched the description of a Salafi arrived there five to ten minutes before the obligatory prayer. From this, I assume that either they work or live in the nearby area.

I visited two other mosques (Yryskeldi hazhi and Raisa Ana mosques) to see whether I would observe anything similar as to the central or Al-Ghani and Saduahas hazhi Gylmani mosques. There were noticeably fewer people praying in the two mosques. There was a number of Salafis praying there, however, as in the central mosques the pronunciation of "Ameen" was silent. The surrounding of the mosque was also different, in the case of Yryskeldi hazhi mosque placed at the periphery of the city without a lot of buildings surrounding it, and Raisa Ana, which had only one large restaurant next to it, and living apartments.

The rest of my trips to Hazret Sultan and Nur-Astana mosque were based on different praying times (out of 5 prayers). However, there were no noticeable differences compared to my first trip to those places. Only during the Friday prayer, the number of attendants is significantly larger, yet the prohibition of saying "Ameen" loudly was followed by the majority.

In-depth interviews

I have conducted a series of interviews in different locations of Kazakhstan. Due to the financial and time constraints some of the interviews took place via phone and some participants were interviewed online through messengers. In total, I have managed to interview 18 Muslims (10 Hanafi School and 8 Salafi Muslims) most of whom were residents of Nur-sultan city. However, at the last moment, one of the interviewees from the quietist Salafi group requested to withdraw his responses from the research for which the person refused to explain. Thus, a total of 17 interviews were coded and analyzed

The results of the interview demonstrated a divide between the responses of those two groups. In the case of Hanafi Muslims, the rhetoric would be that the government supports Islam by creating the infrastructure for praying and obtaining religious education. The results are presented in sections with an explanation of the findings.

Government's attitude to Islam

To assess the overall perception of the Muslims on the government's attitude towards Islam, I asked them how they would assess the government's relation to religion. The table (Table1) below provides information on whether the respondent viewed the government's attitude positively, negatively or as neutral.

Table 1. Perception of Government's attitude across Islamic branches

Codes	Hanafism	Quietist Salafism	Total
Neutral	0	0	0
Negative	3	7	10
Positive	5	0	5
Total (Unique)	6	7	13

It can be seen from this table how substantially the opinions on the government's attitude towards Islam differ across religious branches. For instance, most of the respondents, who refer themselves as Hanafis perceive the government's attitude positively. It is worth highlighting that the attitude 'negative' was coded among followers of Abu Hanifa school when they also stated that government is negative towards non-traditional, Salafi and/or destructive groups. To quote one of the respondents in this regard:

> HS (Hanafi School) Respondent: Here, two points must be highlighted: the first is the attitude towards religious organizations recognized in Kazakhstan

> and the second is the attitude towards the destructive movements of the so-called Salafis, Wahhabis, to some extent Jehovah's Witnesses, etc. In the first case, the state fully supports them and builds a friendly dialogue since religion is an integral part of our society, so to speak a part of our identity. Especially for Kazakhs, Islam is the same as being a Kazakh. We have many mosques, schools where you can get knowledge.

Among quietist Salafis the government's attitude is mainly viewed through the domain of practice. This point highlights that securitization of Salafi communities does not only appear in the form of discourses but also in practices conducted by the state agencies.

> Interviewer: Do you feel any prejudice from the government towards you?
>
> QS (Quietist Salafi) Respondent: Of course, I will say yes, because it was shown to me by the government that it was only because my daughter, because of her hijab, they would take measures to prevent me from working. They contacted the office lessor and started pushing him to pressure me to remove my daughter's hijab at school. I think this relates directly to this issue [of prejudice].

Moreover, these practices are perceived dichotomously as the government's action is directed against "us" as a community. The following interview excerpts demonstrate answers to a question whether the respondents experience any prejudice from the government:

> QS Respondent 1: Well, yes, it is. Somewhere, they restrict our rights, there is, for example, at work. The government does not treat us as fair and honest.
>
> QS Respondent 2: Yes, I think it discriminates us in many aspects.
>
> QS Respondent 3: I think so, they consider us all to be radicals. There are radicals with bad intentions and views, but we are not like that,

None of the Hanafis indicated that they experience difficulties in their practices of Islam. The government, in this case, viewed positively by providing necessary infrastructure and the ability to pray freely. Participants differentiate between the government's attitude toward traditional, which they consider as positive, and non-traditional Islam, toward which the government is negative, which was commended by the Muslims of Hanafi School.

Attitude toward beards and hijabs

The results of the interviews also present interesting findings regarding the general attitude of the Muslim population towards veils and beard. The table (Table 2) below demonstrates the attitude among branches towards beard and veils. It is import that the tab includes respondents' attitude towards beard and also demonstrates the feelings of the broader community's feelings in Kazakhstan as answered by the participants. In this case several Hanafi respondents indicated that they have neutral stance regarding beards. On the other hand, their perception of attitude of the Kazakhstani general population toward beards and hijabs state that it is negative, combined a sense of fear and discomfort.

To demonstrate the point, the following is an excerpt from an interviewee, who claimed to have a neutral attitude towards beards, yet perceived the societal attitude as negative:

> Interviewer: What is your attitude towards people who wear hijab / niqab, grow beard?
>
> HS Respondent: Definitely not negative. That it is their choice, and I do not blame them, as some of my friends do.
>
> Interviewer: You say that your friends condemn it, how do they do this?
>
> HS Respondent: They usually look reproachfully at them, and say that it is not traditional, that it does not look normal. Kazakh traditions, they mean that the Kazakhs do not wear hijab and beard. Niqab and hijab is from the Arabs. They think in think in this way.

An interesting pattern can be viewed in the cell that demonstrates the perception of Quietist Salafis. All of the respondents stated that in the community the attitude towards these religious attributes is negative.

Table 2. Attitude towards beards across Islamic orientations

Codes	Hanafism	Quietist Salafism	Total
Positive	0	0	0
Negative	5	6	11
Neutral	7	0	7
Total (Unique)	10	6	16

Perceptions of Salafism

The interview analysis revealed that perceptions of Salafism are overall very negative. All the referrals by the Hanafi Muslims to Salafism and the experiences of Salafis in regard to how people react to them were coded. As demonstrated on the chart (Figure 1) below the most recurring perceptions is that they are 1) Radicals (11 instances); 2) from Saudi Arabia (10 instances), and 3) Should be avoided and Destructive (6 instances for each).

The first case is quite straightforward, which includes all the instances, where respondents equate Salafism to radicalism or when quietist Salafis reported to be referred that way by others. The second most stated perception, 'Saudi Arabia', demonstrates all the cases where respondents stated that either Salafis are from Saudi Arabia, that they belong there, or should go back to Saudi Arabia. This point will be later demonstrated with more focus, in the section of identity analysis. As of now, it demonstrates how securitization practices contribute to the creation of national identity in the form of governmentality. This is an important aspect as it proposes to the population what the population consists of and who is outside of this population. The third two perceptions are 'Should be avoided' and 'Destructive'. The former indicates all the cases where people stated that they do not feel comfortable around them, perceive them as dangerous and try to avoid any communications with them, whereas the latter

demonstrates cases where people perceive quietist Salafis to be destructive to Kazakh traditions, culture, and identity.

Economic, Social and Cultural Exclusion

Both Biard (2019) and Adraoui (2019) demonstrate that Salafi communities in Kazakhstan and France work in the domain of the private sector. Biard (2019, 3) states “Both external signs such as sporting long beards and ritual practices such as the five daily prayers – they can only work in the private sector.” Thus, exclusion on the economic level is not *de jure*, but *de facto* institutionalized by the government only allowing them to work in the private sector. The experiences of quietist Salafi interviewees show that their absence from government or quasi-government sector is primarily due to the securitization and lack of religious freedom. For instance, one of the interviewees have commented the following:

> QS Respondent: “in my previous job, after they made it clear to me that I cannot pray during working hours and grow a beard, I realized that I need to make a choice either to work here and agree to their terms, or to look for a new job in the private sector.”

What is more significant is that the prohibition of certain religious aspects creates a sense of fear among employers in the private sector as well. The association of employers with Salafis is related to the fear of the government’s security apparatus. The following two examples demonstrate the practices of securitization by the government which leads to economic exclusion. The first example by a Hanafi respondent who states that employers are afraid to hire Salafis to avoid interaction with the security sector, whereas the second one demonstrates how the employers are actually pressed by the security sector:

> HS Respondent: Many people do not want to deal with bearded people and women in veils and because of this they simply do not want to employ them. Afraid that he/she will have problems with security agencies. This is a normal reaction.

> QS Respondent: […] they [security officials] contacted the office lessor and started pushing them to pressure me to get my daughter's hijab off at school. I think this relates directly to this issue.

As a result, many of the quietist Salafis are forced into the private sector, where they either open their own business or work in industries like construction or oil and gas industry.

In the domain of the social sector, the most visible exclusion is related to the education sector. The Decree of the Ministry of Education and Science outlines in the requirements to the school uniform about the prohibition of any religious attributes, which among others include headscarves. It is worth highlighting that one of the passages also indicate specifically the length of the trousers which must cover ankles. This latter point can be viewed in relation to the dress code among Salafi Muslims, who wear trousers above their ankles. Nevertheless, the interviews indicate that due to this regulation they are forced to hire private teachers, which is related to the aspect of the economic exclusion.

In the cultural domain, the exclusion can be viewed both as self-exclusion due to the religious canons and forced exclusion in terms of lack of religious freedom. Forced exclusion is directly related to the freedom of conducting missionary activities. According to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Religious Activities and Religious Associations, the missionary acts are allowed only to the registered religious organization. This implies that the only Islamic organization that can conduct missionary activities is SAMK. This point is studied by Biard (2019), which demonstrates how quietist Salafis adapt to this limitation by preaching in private.

Figure 1. Perceptions of Salafism



The aspect of self-exclusion can be seen through the interpretation of the concept of "*Al Wala Wal Bara*" (To love and hate for the sake of Allah) by the quietist Salafis. To illustrate this, I provide a mind map (Figure 2), where the main aspects of the interpretations are demonstrated. Three main aspects that are highlighted from the responses to this question are (1) Self-exclusion from cultural events; (2) Treatment of all Kazakhs as a brother; and (3) Hatred of the bad deeds of fellow Muslims. For quietist Salafis, only two celebrations are allowed, which include *Eid Al-Fitr* and *Eid Al-Adha*. Apart from these events, the celebration of other events is considered as a sin. Whereas two other aspects the sense of brotherhood and hatred towards bad deeds are interrelated. For all the respondents treat Kazakhs as Muslims

and express love for that fact, love for the sake of God as they state. However, the hatred (*Wal bara*) aspect is directed towards deeds that go against the teaching of the religion. The interview example demonstrates this:

> QS Respondent 1: *Al wala wal* bar means that Muslims should be friends with those who are in the way of Allah and not be friends with enemies. We are slandered by the fact that they think we do not want to communicate with other Muslims, *Astagfirallah* [I ask forgiveness]. They are also our brothers, but they are afraid of us because of everyday propaganda. You cannot be friends with those who openly go against Allah and the Prophet
>
> QS Respondent 2: Love and hate for the sake of God. We believe that all Kazakhs are Muslims and they are our brothers. We hate their bad deeds that go against Allah but love them because they are Muslims. We try not to go to events where there is alcohol or the celebration of holidays. This is for us *al wala wal bara*.

Therefore, the aspect of cultural exclusion can be interpreted in both ways, as a form of forced exclusion as well as self-exclusion due to religious teachings.

In terms of political exclusion, results demonstrate that Salafis do not engage in political activities. From the table (Table 3) below, it can be seen that none of the Quietist Salafis voted in the previous election. In an in-depth interview, they indicate that they fully support the Elbasy[4] (leader of the nation) and the President and do not go against them. According to them disobeying the ruler, no matter how irreligious his/her policies may be, is a big sin. If a policy contradicts the commands of God, they still do those practices but adapting to the local constraints. The prohibition of veils in school is a clear example of this adaptation. As two of the respondents with daughters indicated that they now have to hire private teachers. This is not to imply that the governments' actions are not viewed as a discrimination or prejudice against them. On the contrary, they view those practices and policies as directed directly against

[4] *Elbasy* is an official title give to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in 2010. The title literally means that "Leader of the Nation".

them. Nonetheless, they state that they are obliged to follow the leader in the country. To quote one of the respondents:

> QS Respondent: “We have no dangerous thoughts. We obediently obey Elbasy. We will not go beyond the law. We are far from jihad”

Thus, one can assume that the exclusion from politics is based on religious grounding.

Muslims that follow Hanafism differed in their answers. For them, politics and religion are separated. One can be political and religious at the same time. Four of the respondents stated that they voted in the last election, while 6 of them did not. This may indicate that the general population is not politically active, at least in the form of voting activities. However, this is a question for another research.

Table 3. Voting during previous elections

Codes	Hanafism	Quietist Salafism	Total
Vote: Yes	4	0	4
Vote: No	6	7	13
Total (Unique)	10	7	17

Safe Community

Various articles pointed at the aspect that Salafis are isolationist in their nature due to their religious views. However, rather than interpreting their isolation as the form of self-exclusion, looking at the structural constrains can shed a better understanding of the issue. The exclusion mainly happens as a result of discrimination and practices of social, cultural and economic exclusion. The interview results demonstrate that in most cases “traditional” Muslims feel the sense of discomfort and try to avoid interaction with quietist Salafis. This in turn, as indicated by most of the quietist Salafis pushes them away from the larger society,

which consequently leads to the cessation of relations with other people in the society. This attempt to escape discriminatory practices as Ayhan (2009) argues leads to the formation of safe communities, which are based on religion and serve a strategic tool of dealing with isolation and exclusion. Hence, they form these communities where they can practice their religion outside the interference by the state and negative attitudes from the general population.

Figure 2. Interpretation of "Al Wala Wal Bara"



To quote one of the QS respondents:

> QS Respondent: It's getting harder to communicate. They avoid us and do not want to talk us. But as I said, at the end we just stop interacting with them, and practice Islam where we are not called extremists for this. For example, I go to the Artyom mosque where no one tells me how to pray.

> Also, a lot of my brothers attend the mosque, which always make it a good time for me

In these statements, the directional chain of cause can be indicated. Despite the cultural aspect, the quietist Salafi community does not avoid communication per se but rather forced to isolate due to the difficulties in interaction and attitude of discrimination to them.

The respondents indicate that they live nearby mosque primarily where they can practice their religion freely and without negative criticism of their actions. The following is another example that indicate how quietist Salafis try to live in areas where they can freely practice the religion. The interview excerpt outlines a statement by a female quietist Salafi respondent, who lives near Artyom bazaar:

> Interviewer: Are there any difficulties in practicing Islam in Kazakhstan?
>
> QS respondent: Honestly speaking depends on a location. Overall, attitude from people differ significantly. We work and live close to a mosque. A lot of our friends also live in this area and work. Here we feel safe and free to practice religion without negativity from people. As we go to other areas, you can feel how people react to a hijab and more so on niqab.

Identification as Citizens

It is worth pointing that during the interviewing process a recurring pattern among Hanafi school Muslims was self-identification with reference to citizenship. Almost all of the respondents, when they were asked to tell about themselves and their journey to Islam, began their response first identifying that they are citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This may be interpreted as the identification of citizenship in Kazakhstan is tightly connected to the ‘traditional’ Abu Hanifa School Islam among the majority of the Muslim population. Statements like “Islam is the same as being a Kazakh”, or “Islam and Kazakhstan are tightly connected” occurred often. For instance, one of the Hanafi respondents stated

> HS respondent: Islam and Kazakh culture have been developing since ancient times together since the 900s. Being a Kazakh is almost the same as being a Muslim. And they are trying to destroy these foundations.

Moreover, this identification of citizenship is opposed to the “other”, “foreign” and “radical”. As can be seen in the word map (Figure 3) provided below, Salafism is viewed as the product of Arabs, in particular of Saudi Arabia. Despite many of the Salafis are ethnically Kazakh, statements in the form of “let them go to their Saudi Arabia”, or “Salafism is what came to us from Saudi Arabia” occur often among Hanafi school Muslims.

Nonetheless, not being the primary identity, identification with citizenship occurs among quietist Salafi respondents as well. However, the reference of “they” and “us” is present on both sides. It is important to highlight that except for one interviewee none of them defined themselves as Salafi, but rather the followers of the Qur'an and Sunnah. All of them state that they do not follow one particular school (among 4 schools of Islam), but rather try to find what is the truth from the Qur'an and Sunnah. Therefore, the term Salafism or referral to the interviewees as Salafis is not a correct one.

Another recurring result among quietist Salafi respondents was perception these difficulties as a test from God. Specifically, as several interviewees indicated, prejudice from government, avoidance and discrimination by people strengthens their *imaan* (belief) and makes them stronger as Muslims. This point is elaborated with reference to the concept of ‘politics of identity’ in chapter 7.

Figure 3. Usage of the Word “Saudi”



In this chapter, I demonstrated my results from participant observations and in-depth interviews. The results demonstrated that quietist Salafis practice religion differently depending on the places where they pray. Moreover, participant observations showed how within the mosque people stand nearby those, who share the same beliefs. On top of that, the interview results demonstrated that a broader societal attitude towards the quietist Salafis is negative. They are perceived as radicals, dangerous, foreign. On top of that, quietist Salafi express both discursive and non-discursive practices of securitization directed against them. As a result, several QS respondents indicated that these actions push them away from the broader society and help them become stronger as Muslims.

Chapter 6: Discussion of the results

In this chapter, I will discuss the findings from the data analysis part, where I outline the findings from the participant observations and interviews. Specifically, I will demonstrate how despite Quietist Salafis being mainly of the same ethnicity as the majority of the Muslim population, they are forced to engage in politics of identity by isolating themselves into safe communities. This come as a result of the securitization that creates structural problems in the form of economic (prohibitions on growing a beard in the government sector and fear of hiring quietist Salafis in the private sector), social (prohibitions on wearing hijabs and shortening ones trousers), cultural (prohibitions on conducting religious preaching) obstacles.

Overall, the securitization discourse and practices closely resonate with the respondents of the Muslims that follow Abu Hanifa School. In this regard, the perception of religion is viewed as authentic and traditional and opposed to the foreign and radical Islam of Salafism. From the analysis of the data, the general attitude towards Salafism among people, media and the government is negative. As demonstrated in the findings the Salafis are viewed as radicals, a product of Saudi Arabia, and avoided by the majority of the interviewees of the Hanafism branch. This sense of fear is furthered by the practices of the government in the form of conducting security checks among quietist Salafis, registering personal information and taking their fingerprints, conducting public lectures on the danger of radical Islam in public institutions like universities and schools (see chapter 2). This contributes to the broader sense of insecurity among the general population from Salafism, which in turn results in their exclusion from the economic and social sectors. The securitization also takes place by the policies introduced to prohibit veils and other religious attributes.

What is worth noting is the fact that this dichotomization of Islam contributes to the formation of an identity. In this regard, this can be viewed as a form of governmentality by the state to delineate what constitutes to be a Kazakh, a citizen, and what is outside of these

definitions. In this regard, the above-mentioned point of anti-citizenship practice (Inda 2006, 53) is not only viewed vis-à-vis migrants but can also be conducted towards the same ethnic communities that do not meet the criteria of what constitutes a "citizen" according to the government rhetoric and practices. As demonstrated in the data analysis part a recurring pattern among Hanafi school Muslims was self-identification with reference to citizenship. Almost all of the respondents primarily identified that they are citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This may be interpreted as the identification of citizenship in Kazakhstan is tightly connected to the 'traditional' Abu Hanifa School Islam among the majority of the Muslim population. Statements like "Islam is the same as being a Kazakh", or "Islam and Kazakhstan are tightly connected" whereas, the quietist Salafis in the perception of Hanafi school Muslims are viewed outside of this identity. Above all, quietist Salafis are viewed as a threat to the nation, a form of destructive movement that threatens the Kazakh culture and traditions. As was shown earlier, despite many of the Salafis are ethnically Kazakh, statements in the form of "let them go to their Saudi Arabia", or "Salafism is what came to us from Saudi Arabia" often occur among Hanafi school Muslims. On the contrary, Salafis primarily identify themselves as Muslims.

These negative discourses towards Salafis are experienced by them in the form of discrimination, prejudice, injustice, and ridicule, which results in the form of structural problems that pushes them into exclusion in economic, social, and cultural domains. As demonstrated in the participant observations section, Salafis live, work and pray in certain areas as communities constituted largely by the followers of the same branch of Islam. Locations around Artyom bazaar and Al-Ghani mosque in the Chubary district, in this case, present a form of "Safe communities". Moreover, a similar pattern of experiences among quietist Salafis from different cities might indicate that this form of discrimination is institutionalized on the country level. Yet this assumption needs further analysis.

One interesting aspect that contributes to the theory, is the argument that the social discrimination and ridicule and government prejudice is a test from God. An interviewee states that these tests make them even stronger in their *Imaan* (belief). The same pattern is discovered with several other respondents. This aspect resonates with Ayhan's (2009) analysis of Muslim origin migrant communities in Western Europe. These actions of discrimination and forced exclusion in certain aspects foster their religious identity by creating them vis-à-vis of them versus us, people and Muslims on the right path. As a result, more and more you can find how these people start creating groups that share their ideas and identity, pray at the mosques where there is an extent of freedom on their religious practices.

Quietist Salafis complain that the only legitimate Islamic organization allowed to conduct a missionary is SAMK, which represents the Hanafism branch of Islam in Kazakhstan. In this regard, this can be viewed as a form of cultural exclusion by limiting the religious freedom of these groups. Biard (2019) argues that quietist Salafis adapt to these challenges in the form of conducting missionary activities in the private sectors, where government control and grip is to some extent absent. According to Biard (2019, 3) "halal business – that is, business is done in a halal way (no payment of bribes, refusal of *riba* [interest], no collaboration with banks, etc.) – has become a vehicle for a group of economic-cum-religious entrepreneurs to engage in Salafi preaching in Kazakhstan without running afoul of legal restrictions" Adraoui (2019) demonstrates a similar patter among Salafis in France, where the private sector is also viewed a tool of preaching Islam through success stories.

As opposed to Hanafi respondents, the quietist Salafis indicated that there are numerous obstacles to the freedom of practicing Islam in Kazakhstan. Adraoui (2018) in his analysis of French Salafis argues that one of the practices in Islam regarding the structural constraints that limit freedom of religion is performing Hijra (relocation to a state, which does not limit Islam). However, instead of opting to Hijra, as Adraoui (2019) demonstrates that they tend to adapt

economically and isolate into communities where they can freely practice their religion. Interview conducted by Thibault (2018, 131) shows how because of the prohibition to wear hijabs in schools, strict believers want to either relocate or find other options without going against the religion. The following excerpt from Thibault (2018, 131) demonstrates the point:

> Hoji, another interviewee, was outraged when I mentioned those cases and suggested that these girls should drop out of school. When I asked him what he would do when his daughter would be of schooling age, he said they would move to another country because he would not betray his religion. During this conversation, Hoji also asked me if the classes at the university were mixed. I replied that they were and he seemed rather surprised and offended by the news. He reiterated that his daughter would not attend regular schools because of that.

This line of thinking, in contribution with the argument outlined by Ayhan's (2009) analysis of Muslim origin migrants, shows that quietist Salafis in this manner develop safe communities, which are primarily created to establish freedom of religious practices that is not interfered by the government and outside of the negative criticism from the society.

Thus, despite constituting the same ethnicity and same citizenship these groups are pushed by the general population into the process of creating safe communities. The general population avoids interaction with them, as one of the quietist Salafi interviewee states ", they avoid us and do not want to talk us. But as I said, in the end, we just stop interacting with them, and practice Islam where we are not called extremists for this."

An interesting observation comes from different age group respondents. The younger generation Muslims that follow traditional views differ vis-à-vis their attitude towards quietist Salafi groups. Young people tend to treat them neutrally, whereas the older generation demonstrates a more negative attitude towards them. I assume this may be the result of reliance more on information from social networks rather than state-sponsored news outlets or the lack of exposure to Soviet atheist propaganda. Both of the respondents below the age of 25 indicated that they have not encountered negative news towards Salafism and respect their beliefs. They

also indicate that the attitude of their parents and society, in general, is negative towards them. This aspect needs further analysis in future research.

Additionally, a pattern emerges from the data in regard to the political exclusion of these groups. Data demonstrates that quietist Salafi groups are excluding from political activities primarily based on religious grounds. However, as demonstrated by Biard (2019) and Adraoui (2019) they are obedient to the country's leadership. As Biard (2019) states

> "there is also local adaptation of Salafism to the social and political conditions of Kazakhstan. One of the main features of this localized Salafism, at least among the new urban middle classes, is its quietist political stance. The quietist Salafism views the secular Kazakh regime as legitimate. The majority of Salafis in Kazakhstan embody this Sunni quietism, which maintains that rulers must be obeyed, however irreligious they may be. Kazakh Salafis loudly proclaim their loyalty to the ruler, Nursultan Nazarbayev."

The same pattern of obedience is indicated in the context of French Salafis (Adraoui 2019), and protests against them are condemned in the religion. The results of the data are in line with this and demonstrate that rather than protesting to the policies that go against religion, the Salafi communities adapt to them.

Participant observation also demonstrates similar patterns that is in line with the logic of "safe communities" The quietist Salafis isolate themselves in specific areas that shielded from the government's and general population's negative attitude. The surroundings of those areas also have religious tones as in the form of 'halal' restaurants or shops that sell religious attributes. Their living area is also close by particular mosques that allow them the freedom of practice according to their beliefs. This point is further demonstrated by the interview responses, where quietist Salafis state that the negative attitude towards them varies depending on the location in the city and that they live and practice Islam in areas where government does not limit their religious freedom. Hence, from the data analysis, we can conclude that the hypotheses that quietists Salafis are excluded from the economic, social and cultural domains

due to securitization are confirmed. This is demonstrated by the sense of fear among the general population, which results in the unwillingness to interact with them, employ them due to the fear of the security sector. Politically, they self-exclude based on the religious teachings, yet without opposing the government and preferring to adapt to these changes by forming a safe community.

Conclusion

In this research, I attempted to observe and analyze the exclusion of quietist Salafi communities. The literature can be divided into two schools, first school arguing that quietist Salafis exclude from the general population due to securitization by the government. Omtzigt (2009) demonstrates that the creation of "us" versus "them" discourse can lead to the exclusion of minority groups from the general population. In the same manner, Yasmeen (2014) argues that exclusion highly depends on the actors that regulate governmental and non-governmental areas of society. In this regard, as Omelicheva (2011, 2016) shows the Kazakhstani government has continuously used the rhetoric of "us" versus "them", "traditional Islam" versus "foreign Islam". The second school of literature argues that Salafism is self-isolationist because of religious beliefs. Duderija (2014) analyzes the concept of *al wala wal bara* (love and hate for the sake of God), concluding that quietist Salafis avoid interaction with those that do not follow Islam in the manner as they do.

However, in this research I dealt with the gap in the literature that does not focus on the communities where Salafis are from the same ethnic group as the majority of the population, rather analyzing the effects of structural factors or their belief system in the context of European countries, where they are mainly from Muslim migrant origin. Therefore, the context of Kazakhstan allowed me to analyze quietist Salafi groups in a country with the majority Muslim population and where they are mainly from the same Kazakh ethnic group.

Based on the literature, I analyze how securitization affects Muslims in Kazakhstan. Specifically, through conducting participant observations and in-depth interviews I demonstrated the resonance of securitization discourses and perception of securitization practices among the general Muslim population of the country. My results demonstrate that overall attitude to quietist Salafi among Hanafi respondents is negative. Quietist Salafis are

perceived as a source of the threat, danger, and destruction to a traditional way of lie. This, in turn, creates socio-economic and socio-political problems for quietist Salafis.

Building on the theory of safe communities and politics of identity I demonstrate how quietist Salafi communities come to hold on to their religious identities ever tightly as a response to structural limitation created by the securitization from the government sector. Discrimination, security checks, and negative attitude push the quietist Salafi communities to develop safe communities, where they can freely practice the religion according to their canons, thus, shielding themselves from the outside negative treatment.

I also briefly touched upon the question of creating a citizenship identity in the form of governmentality. As I discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, state's governmentality actions delineate the concept of what constitutes the 'population' and 'citizen', and what is outside of it. In general, Hanafi respondents equated their belief with the concept of citizenship, primarily identifying themselves with Kazakh citizenship. For them being Kazakh is almost equal as being a Muslim. However, as I mentioned earlier this concept of citizenship is identified as mainly for the practitioners of traditional Islam, and quietist Salafis perceived to be foreign that belongs to Saudi Arabia, to Arab traditions and culture. As a result of the securitization, quietist Salafis encounter various obstacles to their integration into economic, social, and cultural domains of the society.

However, the closer analysis of the concept of *al wala wal bara* allowed me to identify that in certain societal domains quietist Salafis practice self-exclusion. Specifically, the findings demonstrate that religious canon that quietist Salafis follow prohibits them to celebrate non-Islamic holidays and participate in events that go against the rulings of God. Thus, quietist Salafi self-exclude from certain areas of a cultural domain such as celebration holidays other than *Eid Al-Fitr* and *Eid Al-Adha*. However, this does not prevent them from integrating into

other societal domains. It is the structural problems as a product of securitization that leads towards their exclusion.

Finally, this research has an implication for future research initiatives. Future research can closely focus on the aspects of the political exclusion of the quietist Salafi communities. In addition, the age differences may play an important role in the perception of Salafism among the population. Thus, a survey that would include a larger set of respondents from different age categories may provide interesting insights. As I demonstrated younger generation Muslims have a neutral attitude towards quietist Salafis and respect their views. This may be related to the differences in the sources of information they obtain from or the lack of exposure to Soviet propaganda.

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