

**«PARTY SYSTEMS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN»**

a thesis presented

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ii. Abstract.

This study attempts to answer the question of how demographic changes shape what a country's party system is, as little research has been done on youth wing and youth quota. In particular, party system changes and party system stability literature never studied loyalty of young voters and perceived activities of youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy" and youth quota and vice versa. Therefore, this study looks at whether and how youth wing and youth quota, party system stability and party system change relate to one another.

Empirical evidence has been gathered using mixed-method research to study the issue of youth voting in Kazakhstan. This research involved data collection in 17 regions and 3 cities of Kazakhstan. Youth online surveys were conducted to explore the perceived activities of the youth wing called "Zhastar Rukhy" and youth quota, as well as socio-demographic factors that might impact voting for the Amanat party through satisfaction with the creation of the youth wing and youth quota. The semi-structured interview was used to complement the online survey results by studying the professional views and work experience of Members of Parliament (MPs), deputies of Maslikhats and others on the role of youth wing and youth quota in youth voting, including voting for the Amanat party.

The research findings suggest that the youth wing's mobilization and their ability to pay attention to youth issues in Parliament significantly impact voting for the Amanat party. Additionally, the satisfaction level among young people with the creation of a youth wing and youth quota has a positive effect on their voting for the Amanat party. The results of a semi-structured interview with the political elite indicate that in terms of socio-demographic characteristics (age, ethnicity, language, education) everything matters. Moreover, youth leaders who support party can influence significant portions of peers. If youth are involved in party activities, they will remain with Amanat party.

The policy implication is that if the ruling Amanat party wants to remain in power, it must invest more resources in ensuring the success of the youth wing, "Zhastar Rukhy." Specifically, establishing mentoring of youth wing employees under the guidance of experienced Heads of regional political departments of the Amanat party. This will give Amanat party move away from a centralized form of management to decentralized one, evaluate activities and nominate employees. It will also

contribute to creation of youth projects with diverse needs of youth focus – groups (disabled, unemployed, rural, and urban youth) as well as develop political youth leadership in rural and urban areas of youth wing.

Keywords: youth wing «Zhastar Rukhy», youth quota, Amanat party, Kazakhstan, party system stability, party system change, party system indexes, fluidity index.

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Terms	Definition	Source
Fractionalization	Separation into parts by fractionalizing or the sum of squared proportion of party's parliamentary seats and subtracted from 1.	(Rae, 1967)
Volatility	"The percentage of party votes or seats in one election compared to another election divided by two.	(Pedersen, 1979)
Fluidity	Multiplication of frequency, scope, and variety, that is measured within seven patterns of party system interactions.	(Nwokora and Pelizzo, 2018)
Party system change	According to cyclical patterns in which mass mobilization occurs first then converge and institutionalize, which can become outdated, provoking minimal interest, and leading to aging pattern party orientation.	(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997)
Loyalty	"The behavioral impulses that drive to repeat customer purchases; to create customer loyalty, political parties engage into repeated process of positive voting over an extended period of time".	(Hirschman, 1970)
Youth wing	A sub-organization created to mobilize support from young people and promote its members to political positions within a larger organization as a political party.	(Bekus, 2017)
Youth quota	The percentage of political party seats that are reserved for young parliamentary candidates.	(Belschner, 2021)

Chapter 1. Introduction.

The present study highlights the importance of youth wing and youth quota in fulfilling the demands of young voters. An ethnographic study conducted in September 2021 as part of the academic semester at the Graduate School of Public Policy at Nazarbayev University served as the motivation for researching the issues of youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” under the Amanat party and the youth quota on a systematic and long period of time. The literature review suggests that Kazakhstan has experienced demographic change as the youth amounts to approximately 29% or 5,727,000 of the country’s total population aged between 14 - 35 in 2023 (3,561,000 of these young people from urban areas and remaining 2,166,000 from rural areas). This signifies an increase of 1,812,000 people over the number recorded in 2000s. Moreover, the birth rate in Kazakhstan has increased, with women aged 20–24 and 25–29 years. These two age cohorts show that women on average have three, four and five children in Kazakhstan. Therefore, it is important to understand whether a). it will lead to party system change and b). whether two policy measures adopted to consolidate loyalty of young voters have worked or not. More specifically, we explain whether the activities of youth wing and creation of youth quota played any role in securing the loyalty of young voters. There are some literatures on party system that explain the change in party system such as the change in the structure of old cleavages to new cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mair, 1990; 1997). The openness of competitive structure of government formation by (Mair, 1997; Bertoa and Enyedi, 2017) or changes in values of younger generations researched by (Inglehart, 1984; 1987; Flanagan and Dalton, 1984). Other literature on demographic change suggest that left wing parties are gained much voter’s support, and this increased support is explained by an update in demography (Gustavo de Armas, 2008) or due to mortality rate of older generation traditional political parties lose a large share of electorate and this lost cannot be considered insignificant since approximately 170,000 people drop out from the electorate list (Canzani, 2000). Literature on youth wing instead aims to study how party youth wings actually succeeded in attracting members over the last decades or how variations in party youth wing membership be explained (De Roon, 2019). Other literature on youth wing studied youth wing in terms of contribution to authoritarian resilience in Cambodia since

youth wing that have close links with ruling Cambodian People's party (Norren-Nillson, 2021). The durability of Leninist legacy is highlighted by Sharipova (2019) who argues that similar structures and institutions and application of similar strategies by ruling Nur-Otan party, more specifically, creation of youth wing "Zhas-Otan" (later renamed to youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy") reflect hierarchical and centralized structures copied from Soviet youth organizations. Literature on youth quota much less studied in contrast to youth wing and party system change, party system stability since the interest of scholars to this topic started to emerge from the last decade (Belschner, 2021; Stockemer and Sundstrom, 2018; Dukeev, 2015). Youth quota have been studied under the comparison with woman quota, where the youth quota was not part of civil society movements but top-down initiatives from political elites. Moreover, youth quota literature argues that this policy measure was selectively applied to increase percent of young deputies in Parliament rather than focusing on proportional electoral system and age of candidates that have the right to stand in election (Stockemer & Sundstrom, 2018). Finally, Dukeev's (2015) article on youth in local representative body (Maslikhats) showed that the social attraction is the most optimal option to increase attraction young people to political activity than mandatory presence young people in the list of candidates from political parties. Youth quota is seen as part of legitimacy seeking and policy measure oriented on stabilization.

Considering all of these literatures on party system change, youth wing and youth quota, they were never merged. Party system change and party system stability literature were never studied a). loyalty of young voters and b). perceived activities of youth wing and youth quota and vice versa. Therefore, we want to explore whether and how youth wing, youth quota, party system change, and party system stability relate to one another.

The goal of two policy measures introduced in Kazakhstan is to increase the number of young voters who are loyal to the ruling party. This will ensure that the party system remains stable. At the beginning of independence, the party system in Kazakhstan underwent a significant change. It moved from a hegemonic party system, represented by the Communist Party under the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, to an atomized party system and then to a moderate pluralist party system (Sartori,

1976). The party system of Kazakhstan finally stabilized, acquiring hegemonic features in face of the ruling Amanat party during the decade from 2004 – 2021, respectively (Sartori, 1976; Pelizzo, 2022). This change in the party system was primarily due to political and historical changes that occurred during the formation of independent Kazakhstan, following the *perestroika era* in the Soviet Union. These changes led to the signing of the *Belovezhskaya Agreement* on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the irrelevance of *communist* propaganda in Kazakhstan as noted by Isaacs (2022, 2013, 2020). After years of instability, the parliamentary party system then stabilized with the creation and success of Nur-Otan party. In January 2022 Nur-Otan party renamed to Amanat party. Demographic changes could potentially destabilize the party system since new cohorts of young voters with a different value system may gain the right to vote. To prevent or minimize the destabilization of the party system induced by the demographic change, policy measures discussed above were introduced. Given background PhD thesis plans to answer whether these two adopted political measures work?

The study aims to perform a micro-level analysis of young voters to see how loyal they are and what factors shape their loyalty (Katz, 2001). Whether the perceived activities of youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” and the creation of youth quota adopted to consolidate loyalty of young voters have worked or not. We do so because if ruling Amanat party is able to preserve the loyalty of young voters, the party system will not change, and the stability of party system will be preserved. The World Values Survey conducted between 2017 and 2020 revealed that 61.7% of young respondents in Kazakhstan, who are under 29 years old, would vote for the Nur-Otan party (Amanat party) in a national election. We want to test whether Amanat party is still, popular party among youth owing to two policy measures?

The objectives of the study is to:

- 1). Assess the extent of impact perceived activities of youth wing and youth quotas on voting for Amanat party through youth satisfaction.
- 2). Systematize the concept of the party system.
- 3). Explore the determinants of party system change and party system stability.

4). Analyse the party system using static and dynamic measurements from 1990 to 2023 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan.

5). Develop recommendations to support active youth engagement into politics through the youth wing and enhance voting among Kazakhstani young people.

6). Draw picture of potential youth voters based on social-demographic characteristics (age, education, region, gender) for future microtargeting mobilization in parliamentary elections.

Based on the aim and objectives of the study, the literature review and theoretical framework assessment of the quality of product used in the study, as well as analytical data, the study will address the following **questions**:

1). What factors explain young voters' vote for Amanat party?

2). What is the role of ruling Amanat party, the youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy" and youth quota in daily routine of working with people?

3). What indexes measure the party system of Kazakhstan and why?

4). What is the policy implication of this study?

Based on the above questions, the study identified the following **hypotheses**:

H-1: All other things being equal, the Amanat party is better prepared for youth voting than other political parties due to the perceived activities of the youth wing.

H-1a: All other things being equal, perceived activities of the youth wing will have a positive impact on voting for the Amanat party through youth satisfaction with the creation of the youth wing.

H-2: All other things being equal, the Amanat party is better prepared for youth voting than other political parties due to perceived activities of youth quota.

H-2a: All other things being equal, perceived activities of youth quota will have a positive impact on voting for Amanat party, through youth satisfaction with the creation of youth quota.

To conduct this study, we utilize mixed method research. Specifically, sequential explanatory design (Creswell, 2003). The aim of using sequential explanatory design is to examine the large number of samples before diving into specific case studies under qualitative method of research. Quantitative method of research is given priority. The benefit is that if unexpected results arise from

quantitative method of research, the qualitative study can be used to explore those results. As for quantitative method of study, we conducted online survey in Kazakh, Russian and English languages of university or college's students aged 18 years and above in 17 regions and 3 cities of republican significance (Astana, Almaty and Shymkent) in Kazakhstan. We collected data twice, 1 wave of online survey conducted between December 2022 and January 2023 and 2 wave of online survey conducted in March 2023 from more than 100 local universities. Number of observations constitutes approximately 4,000 respondents. As for qualitative method of study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 12 political elites. Participants were recruited from Astana and Shymkent cities, Abay, Karaganda, and Kyzylorda regions. The broad and contextual professional opinions of deputies from Amanat party, Respublica party, deputies of Mazhilis and Senate Parliament and candidates of deputies participated in 2023 parliamentary elections and others allow for a detailed examination of semi-structured interview findings and explore different views on the role of Amanat party, youth wing and youth quotas in parliamentary elections. We provided evidence of the importance of both measures by analysing the micro-level electoral volatility of past and future youth voting for political parties, running logit models including socio-demographic variables and finally, using structural equation models to assess the quality of youth wing and youth quota. In turn, the semi-structured interview results complemented the online-survey findings with a deep contextual understanding of the activities of youth wing in the regions and the use of youth quota since their legislative introduction in Kazakhstan.

The literature review on party system stability identifies several approaches to measuring it such as stability of patterns interparty competition (Pedersen, 1979; Bartolini and Mair, 1990), strong roots in society (Berghlund et al., 1997; Budge, 1994; Cox, 1990) and the legitimacy of political parties (Kaase, 1994; King, 2002). Each of these approaches based on widely accepted and worldwide used concepts. Pedersen's (1979) electoral volatility that is measured by comparing electoral volatility of political parties or Bartolini and Mair's (1990) division into within block and between block electoral volatility identified party system stability within party block that means voters vote between existing parties. Vice versa for between party blocks since new parties enter and leave electoral arena, it

indicates the weakening of cleavage structure on which party system is build. Comparing all of three approaches of measuring party system stability, it indicates that to assess the stability of cleavage structure we need to use micro-level electoral volatility instead of aggregate electoral volatility. Katz (2001) insists on individual data arguing that only real voters' behaviour shows the true condition of political parties in the party system. While the aggregate data shows the overall performance of political parties from one election to another. Micro-level electoral volatility compares past and future votes of young voters to political parties. The results indicate a high loyalty of young people in voting to the Amanat Party, about 92% in national elections and 95% in regional elections. The second most preferable political parties among young electorate that constitute loyalty above 50% are Auyl party and Republic party. Thirdly, the Communist People's party and National Social Democratic party were not popular among young people. Finally, it is alarming that many young people did not vote in the 2021 parliamentary elections, but this number decreased in voting in the 2023 parliamentary elections. In addition, we assessed the influence of demographic characteristics and developed a theoretical framework assessment of the quality of youth wing and youth quota based on three domains such as procedure, content, and outcome. This allows to assess the impact of youth wing and youth quota's procedures on outcome (loyalty) through content (satisfaction of youth wing and youth quota) (Morlino, at.al., 2011).

The policy implication of the study lies in maintaining the success of the youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy" and youth quota since the loyalty of young voters and voting for Amanat party depends on both measures. To maintain the success, Amanat party should invest more resources in the youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy". Moreover, move away from clumsy, centralised form of management to decentralised form through mentoring of employees' youth wing under the guidance of experienced Heads of regional political departments of Amanat party by legally assign the responsibility for nomination of candidates and evaluation of activities youth wing. Other policy implications include expanding the percentage of youth quotas, developing political youth leadership in schools, universities, and colleges in rural and urban areas, as well as holding competitions to identify thinking youth with establishment prize funds, posting photographs on the information portal or office

stands/websites of youth wing and Amanat party. The final policy implications suggest youth wing align with diverse needs of youth focus-groups by creating projects according to disabled youth, unemployed youth, rural youth, urban youth, business youth.

However, study encounters with several limitations it was too long, had no financial initiatives and enforcement mechanisms. The sample of voting for political parties did not include respondents who did not participate in parliamentary elections. For example, these are those who thought about voting this time, but did not or those respondents who usually vote, but did not this time. Further, youth studying at universities and colleges participated in the online survey but did not include working and non-working youth. Finally, due to the length of the online survey, we did not include volunteers and youth wing members. These limitations identified the following areas for future study, such as the availability of funds and forced mechanisms. Ask additional question, if young people thought about voting or usually vote, then which political party would they vote for? Include working and non-working youth and compare their attitude to the activities of the youth wing and youth quotas, voting for political parties. Add to the structural equation model volunteers and members of youth wing or youth candidates elected according to the 30% youth quota and its effects on perceived activities of the youth wing and youth quota, satisfaction, and vote for political parties. The likely conclusion is that asking additional questions or comparing working and non-working youth, as well as expanding the structural equation model, will likely increase the probability of voting for the Amanat party, although the opposite is possible.

This research contributes to the abovementioned literatures in several ways. Firstly, the literature on party system changes and party system stability does not pay much attention to the youth wing and youth quota. It is well known; this study is the first study that look at analysis of this relationship. Secondly, this study is new in terms of collecting the largest dataset from representative national survey to explore the issue of youth voting for political parties in Kazakhstan. Thirdly, this study is original from methodological point of view. The sequential explanatory design does not used in literature on youth wing and youth quota. Fourth, we provide data and analyse Kazakhstan's party system from 1990–2023 using static and dynamic indices such as the fractionalization of index (Rae,

1967), effective number of parties index (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979), volatility index (Pedersen, 1979) and the index of fluidity (Nwokora and Pelizzo, 2018). In addition, this study provides information between number of votes for political parties and young electorate according to their demographic characteristics. Finally, the public policy significance of this study based on invaluable policy recommendations for effectively improving the linkage between youth, the youth wing, youth quota, and Amanat party.

This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 includes a literature review that defines the concept of party system and examines the determinants of party system stability and change. Chapter 3 measures the party system of Kazakhstan from 1990 to 2023 using static and dynamic indices. The chapter also addresses the issue of demographic change and party system change in Kazakhstan. Chapter 4 explores the definition of youth and investigates the foreign and Kazakhstani context of research into youth wings and youth quota. Chapter 5 introduces the concepts of party systems and its measures, as well as the theoretical basis, and theoretical framework for assessing the quality of youth wing and youth quota. Chapter 6 provides a detail overview of the mixed method research application, ethical obligations, quantitative and qualitative research design, and data collection. Chapter 7 presents the quantitative and qualitative research results. Chapter 8 presents an overall overview of the quantitative and qualitative findings, discusses policy implications and recommendations, outlines research limitations and future study implications, and concludes with final comments.

Chapter 2. Literature review

2.1. Introduction.

A party system is the pattern of inter-party competition for electoral mandates and government control. The party system theory has been studied in the context of comparative analysis of countries' public policies, where the key feature is the number of parties in a system that participate in parliamentary elections and receive seats in parliament. Owing to the number of political parties, voters have a choice when submitting ballots, and the formation of government by parliament depends on the number of parties.

In this regard, the interest of scholars in party system theory is characterized not only by its classification but also by an understanding of causes and consequences noticeable both in the legislative aspect, in particular in law on election, on political parties, and in literature on electoral systems, electoral instability, cleavages and their influences on party systems. However, most research on party systems is found in the context of studies of developed countries, such as the two-party system in the US (Blondel, 1968) or studies of multi-party systems in Western and Eastern Europe, as well as in the testing of indices specifically designed to measure the fluidity or stability of party systems in the context of least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kuenzi et al., 2019; Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001, 2005; Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016), in Latin America (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005), in Eastern and Central Europe (Cotta, 1994).

The study of party systems in Russia and the successor states has been largely neglected: there is “a comparative study of political institutionalization in Baltic states, Russia, and Ukraine” (Meleshevich, 2007) and there are only a couple of studies on the Kazakhstani party system that employed party system indexes (Pelizzo, 2022). Therefore, despite the significant amount of research conducted on party systems in both developed and least developed countries, there is still a need for more studies to be conducted in post-Soviet countries. This chapter aims to fill this gap by systematizing the concept of the party system, taking into account the unique characteristics of Russia and Kazakhstan. While existing concepts describe the Western understanding of the party system, it is important to also understand the party system in these contexts. In subchapter 2.1.1. we will review

scholars' approaches to defining the party system and provide our own interpretation of it. In subchapters 2.2.1. and 2.2.2. of chapter 2.2. we will explore the factors that determine party system stability and change.

2.1.1. Party system definition and its typology.

The main feature of party system literature is its division into a qualitative and a quantitative camp (Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016). While studies conducted in the quantitative stream of inquiry have been concerned with issues of measurement, studies conducted by qualitative means have focused instead on classification criteria and development party system typologies (Duverger, 1954; Blondel, 1968; Sartori, 1976; Mair, 1997; Rae, 1968; Pedersen, 1979; Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2015).

The recognized founder of the theoretical study of quantitative party systems is Maurice Duverger, who explored party systems in the context of electoral systems in his study «Les parties politiques» (Duverger, 1954). Meanwhile, being a representative of the classical party system theory, Duverger (1954) believes that party systems were the results of history and institutional design, most notably the choice of the electoral system. He conducted a comparative analysis of party systems, based on which he developed his typology and divided it into one-party, two-party and multi-party systems. Despite the exclusively quantitative characteristics of parties, he defined the notion of party system vaguely. Duverger (1954) emphasized just two aspects of the party system. This is an internal organization of each party and relative properties of parties about each other, most accurately defining “party sizes, alliances and geographical localization”. It is noteworthy that Blondel (1968), Lane and Ersson (1983), Lijphart, et.al., (1999), Wolinetz (2004), Rae (1968), Pedersen (1979) also supported the discourse of quantitative party system typology, focusing on the properties of parties.

Lijphart, et.al., (1999) presented the following components of party system properties: minimum winning coalitions, government duration, effective number of parties, and disproportionate voting outcomes. Lane and Ersson (1983) argued about a set of party systems operating in a state based on a specific organizational model.

The implicit definition of a party system refers to “considering the number of parties, the strength of parties, the place of parties on the ideological spectrum, the nature of support, the

organization and type of leadership of parties” (Blondel, 1968). In contrast to a simple count of political parties, Blondel (1968) relied on a count of the share of votes won by political parties after parliamentary elections and their relative size or strength. Blondel (1968) transformed Duverger’s (1954) three types of party system into two-and-a-half-party system, multiparty systems without a predominant party and multiparty systems with a predominant party. For example, when classifying the party system, the average share of votes won by the two largest parties was considered, and only then was the share one party was correlated in relation to the second and third. Such a simple method of counting votes allowed him to classify the US, Great Britain, and Australia as a two-party system, where two parties had a high percentage of votes and were balanced. In a two-and-a-half-party system, two equal parties had no absolute majority. However, they included another party that would constitute a parliamentary majority in a coalition with one of them. The Federal Republic of Germany is a striking example, where one of two major parties, SPD and CDU, was joined by a free democratic party, in a coalition with which a majority in parliament was created. A multiparty system with a predominant party was characterized by one dominant party with a high percentage of votes about the second and larger parties. Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Sweden, and Norway are prime examples of this party system. Moreover, for a multiparty system without a dominant party, which includes countries such as France, Finland, Netherlands and Switzerland.

Therefore, based on the peculiarities of the quantitative classification of party system, several scholars created their typologies of party systems, developing and supplementing the previous ones. The usefulness it brings to the comparative analysis of party systems in several countries has had theoretical and empirical consequences in the form creation of measures counting parties in a political system such as Rae's (1967) index of fractionalization, Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) index of effective number of parties, Pedersen’s (1979) index of volatility or “changes in party votes or the number of seats between elections”, Pelizzo & Nwokora (2016) index of fluidity or structure of pattern of interparty competition. The party system definition among researchers of quantitative typology reflects “the properties of the constituent parts of party system” and ways of counting the party system, but not relationships between parties.

Sartori's criterion for quantitative-qualitative classification of party systems was based on "system properties", which made it possible to distinguish a monopolized one-party from hegemonic, predominant, and atomized party systems competing for power. Sartori (1976) emphasized that a system is created only when parties are part of it. Hence, a party system means "a system of interactions resulting from pattern inter-party competition". Emphases on "systemic properties" allowed him to argue that not just the number of parties but the number of "relevant" parties and ideological polarization between parties is essential in the formation of a leading coalition if there are a sufficient number of seats in parliament, and inter-party ideological distance can influence party competition. Therefore, Sartori (1976) divides the party system into one-party, hegemonic, predominant, two-party, moderate pluralism (from 3 – to 5 parties), polarized pluralism, (5 and more parties) and atomized party system.

For Sartori (1976), it was clear that the pattern of inter-party competition is a necessary but insufficient condition for regarding a pattern of inter-party competition as a properly structured party system. A pattern of inter-party competition can be regarded as a party system only if it is stable over time. Otherwise, Sartori (1976) argued that it should be considered a fluid polity – an idea that was eventually refined in recent years (Nwokora & Pelizzo; 2015; Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016).

Using Sartori's (1976) classification of party systems as a starting point, recent scholars have been able to develop an instrument, the index of fluidity, measuring the stability or change of party systems, as well as make theoretical adjustments to the predominant party system by replacing ideological polarization into power alternation (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2014, 2018; Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016).

Cleavage theory by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1969) in the seminal book "Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives" defines party systems according to the socioeconomic and sociocultural conflicts that arose in the first half of the twentieth century. In other words, the allied-opposition structures underlying such cleavages include national revolutions – this is a cleavage between church and government, as well as industrial revolutions - cleavage between land interests and industrialization created unique party systems that differed geographically

between Western and Eastern and central European countries. In many ways, the work by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) inspired Sartori (1976). Sartori (1976), in fact, explicitly stated that the format of a party system, that is, the number of (relevant) parties, is a function of the cleavage structure (or the number of cleavages) while ideological polarization – which is the second criterion used by Sartori (1976) to classify party systems – is a function of the depth and the divisiveness of the cleavages.

Mainwaring & Scully (1995), Mainwaring & Torcal (2005) define a party system as “a combination of interrelated parts that interact in a pattern to create a complex whole”. In other words, the party system is the interaction of a set of parties, forming a single whole. The authors mention “interaction” to mean adherence to essential competition rules. At the same time, “system” refers to the continuity of the components that make up the party system and the minimal stability of patterns of interparty competition. If there is a sharp gap in the components, another system may displace the previous one. Therefore, a party system, as Sartori (1976) had spelled out, is more than the properties of its constituent parts.

In developing post-Soviet countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan, the party system manifests itself differently than in developed and least developed countries, due to specific characteristics associated with the underdevelopment of a pattern of inter-party competition after the collapse of the USSR, and the relative youth of post-communist states (Isaev, 2024; Gelman, 2006; Isaev & Vlaskina, 2016; Fierman, 1991; Grzymala-Busse & Luong, 2002; Hale, 2005; Levitsky & Way, 2002; World & McFaul, 2002). Since Kazakhstan and Russia have a common historical, political and party path, comparing the definitions of party systems in foreign and Russian literature is reasonable.

An analysis of the literature reveals that in the 1990s, little research on the party system was published in the Russian Federation (Meleshevich, 2007). The most cited study is by Dawisha and Parrott (1997), “Democratic changes and authoritarian reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova”. The book explores the power of political parties and party systems but fails to address the conceptual and categorical framework. Primarily, Russian scholars define the party system from an institutional standpoint. Shaposhnikova (2022) believes that it is important to start with the concept of system, which refers to a group of interconnected elements that form a coherent whole. Tereshkin

(2004) argues that a system is characterized by its constituent elements and its inextricable connection with the environment in which the system operates. Alisova (1996) associates the party system with the political structure, describing it as a collection of different types of political parties that have strong links with each other, the state and other institutions of power. These parties operate under specific conditions and have varying views on the fundamental values of political culture within society. They also differ in their degree of agreement on the implementation of ideological doctrines. Shmachkova (1996) defines a party system as “a political configuration composed of a variety of independent elements such as parties, which is determined by parameters that include the number of voters and the types of internal structures.

Ashkerov, et.al., (2007) defines party system as the set of political parties and their interactions in political activities that influence the formation and implementation of state power. The relations between legally operating political parties that participate in rivalry or joint struggle for power are also considered to be part of the party system (Vyatr, 1979). The mechanism of interaction between parties in the struggle for power and its exercise is another definition of the party system (Vasilik, 2001). Additionally, a party system consists of political parties legally existing in the country that participate in the formation of public authorities (government) and influence the development and implementation of country’s domestic and foreign policy development strategy (Chicherin, 2000). Finally, Petrov (2014) defined the party system as “an institutionalized circle of influential associations that take a real part in public administration”. While there is a tendency among Russian scholars to attribute the party system to the circle of the environment surrounding the party system as political and other social institutions. Tereshkin (2004) argues that a relationship between the party system and the environment should not be established.

Based on the literature review of the party system definitions, we have drawn the following conclusions. The main foreign typologies of party systems have been identified in their historical sequence, starting from the 1950s to the twentieth century. These typologies emerged as a result of specific visions of the political system and the party system as a whole. In addition, we have also revealed concepts of the party system in the post-soviet period. Each approach to theory and its

classification was argued based on a specific political-legal, socio-cultural and socio-economic situation. As a result, we concluded that the party system takes shape depending on these and other factors.

According to Russian scholars, the party system, interacts with its environment and impacts the country's political strategy. In a narrower sense, it represents the degree of coherence of society's views when parties implement their ideological doctrines. Since foreign and Russian-speaking authors have defined the theoretical understanding of party systems, we have used methods of abstraction and specification, to give our interpretation. We define the party system as a set of political parties that are in stable inter-party competition, have strong ties with institutions of power (government), and participate in its formation. Meanwhile the party system maintain a degree of consistency of public views regarding the ideological doctrines of parties.

2.2. Determinants of party system stability and change.

There is a significant increase in literature on party systems. A broad overview of literature on party systems can be seen in Lipset and Rokkan (1969), Sartori (1976), Mair (1997), Bartolini and Mair (1990), Lane and Ersson (1983), Mainwaring & Torcal (2005), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Chiaramonte and Emanuele (2019), Casal Bertoa and Enyedi (2016), Nwokora and Pelizzo (2018). These studies, among other things, cover the properties of party systems and issues of measuring party systems in detail. Most literature on party systems approaches stability or change through the lens of cleavages, electoral volatility, strategic and ideological factors while paying little attention to why this happens. Moreover, the existing literature on party systems is much more prominent in developed countries (Western Europe and Eastern Europe, Scandinavian countries, and African countries) than in countries with transition economies, such as Kazakhstan. For example, Latin American countries were researched by Bendel, (1993), Coppedge (1995), Kitschelt (1989), Mainwaring & Torcal (2005), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Schedler, (1995), Van Cott, (2000). Party systems in Africa were studied by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), Nwokora and Pelizzo (2017), party systems were covered by a large number of studies in Asia and post-communist countries other than Central Asia (Stockton, 2001; Bielasiak, 2002; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Mair, 1997; Markowski,

2000; Tavits, 2005). Bartolini & Mair (1990) and Lane & Ersson (1983) represent several significant cross-country studies examining the reduction of cleavages evident in patterns of electoral instability in developed countries. Given the extensive literature review, we will examine the determinants that contribute to both party system stability and party system change in the following subchapters.

2.2.1. Party system stability determinants.

The literature has long discussed the stability of party systems (Lipset and Rokkan, 1969; Sartori, 1976; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). Sartori (1976) even stated that the stability of the pattern of interparty competition is a necessary condition for the existence of the party system itself.

Central to the concept of party system stability is the classic notion of cleavage structure (and voter alignments) developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1969), whose work is so often cited in Western, Eastern, Southern, and Central Europe (Pennings & Lane, 2005). At the country level, research has examined how specific cleavage characteristics influence electoral volatility (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). In other words, they were owing to cleavages, first-party associations and oppositions arose, which in various historical periods formed cleavages between center and periphery (during the Reformation or Counter-Reformation 17th century); cleavages between state and church (during the national revolution), cleavages between land and industry (during the industrial revolution). Cleavage could explain the differences in the format of Europe's party systems and why those party systems remained “frozen” until the 1960s. As Lipset and Rokkan (1969) mention in their study, “the party systems 1960s reflect, with few but notable exceptions, the divisive structures 1920s” because party system did not change since then. Based on the cleavage theory, Lipset and Rokkan (1969), Bartolini and Mair (1990), Rose and Urwin (1970), Wolinetz (2004), and Kirchheimer (1966) tested the “freezing” hypothesis. As the macro-level analysis of electoral volatility showed, there was a bias towards stability, and over time, this bias has become more and more pronounced. As for the nature of class cleavage and its development over time, it manifested itself even more clearly in further decades. Therefore, when cleavages were frozen entirely, in other words, voters identified themselves with specific cleavages. There was a lack of electoral mobility across cleavages, which ultimately implied electoral stability in voting behaviour. Indeed, the “freezing hypothesis” was confirmed by a

decline in variability class cleavage just as 1920 began (Lipset & Rokkan, 1969). The reason for this has been considered to be the introduction of universal suffrage, which “narrowed the electoral support market” and massively mobilized the electorate. Meanwhile, scholars have faced the dilemma of which cleavage: class, religion, or language are the best predictors of party choice (Lijphart, et.al., 1999). Lipset (1960), Budge, et.al., (2010), Budge (1994) argued that despite the influence of religious differences on party support, the fact of class division was of paramount importance and influenced votes among voters in different ways. Voters from the lower income groups will vote for left-wing parties. In comparison, right-wing parties were voted by higher income groups in developed countries, but Rose and Urwin (1970), Lijphart (1971) believed otherwise, arguing that religion is essential in eleven European countries. Only Lancelot (1975) confirmed the importance and strength of both cleavages. In addition to religious and class cleavages, linguistic cleavages between French-speaking and English-speaking groups in Belgium and South Africa (Lijphart, 1999; 2019) became more pronounced.

However, current theorists have linked social divisions to the electoral system (Cox, 1997; Ordeshook & Shvetsova, 1994), arguing that given the existence of social diversity structures and a proportional electoral system, the number of parties in the country will increase. In a socially homogeneous society, a proportional system does not increase the number of parties, in contrast to a socially heterogeneous society. Likewise, a majoritarian electoral system with a socially diverse structure does not lead to party expansion. The critical components in the growth or decline of political parties are heterogeneity or homogeneity of social cleavages, and a proportional or majoritarian electoral system. However, what is more important is that the heterogeneity of social cleavages is not politicized or particularized (Ordeshook & Shvetsova, 1994). This requires leadership, financial resources, and access to media, which contribute to the politicization of social divisions and the activation of citizens (Cox, 1997).

The majority of the (other) studies on party system stability focus on social cohesion according to demographic characteristics. The determinants of socio-demographic characteristics are empirically analyzed by Bartolini and Mair (1990), building on the research of Rose and Urwin

(1970), both within political parties and between party systems and society. Analysis of cohorts in several countries based on demographic characteristics (age, gender, and education profile) showed a lack of cohesion in party support between adult, middle and young age cohorts in the UK. In other words, age did not matter in voting for political parties. In France and Italy, there were visible differences in party support between old and young cohorts (Rose & Urwin, 1970). Moreover, Lipset & Rokkan (1969) argued that age profile mattered in voting for the Labour Party among younger cohorts, as opposed to older cohorts voting for the middle-class and religious party.

Gender differences were not evident in voting cohesion for political parties, which is in significant contrast with education indicators, where some parties were based on the support of college-educated voters (Rose & Urwin, 1970). For example, in Norway, 85% of votes for the Conservative Party is noticeable among educated supporters, while voters without education had a significant vote for the working-class party. In Italy, the presence of basic primary education among the electorate translated into 90% support for Communist Party (Dogan, 1967).

Kirchheimer (1966), Wolinetz (2004), Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Lane and Ersson (1983) argued for the abandonment of the «freezing hypothesis» in favour of today's realities where cleavage theory could not explain the stability of party system due to increase in alternative factors such as the strategies of dominant parties or strong party roots (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; 2008; 2009).

Another determinant of party system stability was represented by the dominant/predominant status that some parties enjoyed in some states (Lane and Ersson, 1983). Such countries are conditionally divided into PR, which includes Sweden with the Social Democratic Party and Italy with the Christian Democratic Party, as well as countries without PR, such as Japan with Liberal party, Great Britain, and France with Conservative parties. To maximize electoral support, dominant parties chose strategies to suit voters' preferences and sought compromises to achieve office and control of politics. In addition, the strategy of party systems with dominant parties was distinguished by an institutional environment in which politicians could exercise rule-making control over a system of rules that included election laws and rules for cabinet formation. Such control is expressed

primarily in party competition's electoral, parliamentary, and executive aspects. In terms of electoral party dominance, despite the homogeneity of social structures electorate, dominant parties have endogenized competitive processes (Laver & Hunt, 1992) through influencing the content of information or financing, where dominant parties typically receive the lion's share of votes, and survive (Casal Bertoa & Spirova, 2019) and are considered independent in party system (Katz & Mair, 1995). It has been established that all five system indicators of the party system such as total electoral volatility, number of new parties, number of parties winning votes at least 0.5%, and raw number of parties winning legislative seats have high average levels in public funding indicating party system stability and support for "cartelization" thesis (Katz & Mair, 1995; Casal Bertoa & Spirova, 2019).

In the parliamentary aspect, the dominant political parties used the mechanical aspects of electoral legislation expressed in the formula for the distribution of seats, establishing thresholds for the representation of parties in parliament and the number of constituencies. The executive aspect of the power of party dominance is expressed as opposition to any reforms that correct any "unfair" results beneficial to the dominant parties. The opposition to any reforms based on non-cooperative electoral strategies only supports the dominant political party. While cooperative strategies or electoral pacts, where the formation of cooperative opposition party alliances breaks the executive monopoly of the dominant party. The result of the electoral strategies is executive power, which is achieved either through an absolute majority of government in the parliament of the dominant party, or through the coalition potential in the formation of the government. In turn, the coalition potential of the dominant party is strengthened due to its central, spatial position in the ideological spectrum, where it not only influences small parties located in the right and left continuum of the party system but has the opportunity to pit small parties against each other (Pelizzo & Cooper, 2002).

Finally, another factor in party system stability is associated with the strength of party roots in society, manifested through empirical variables such as programmatic or ideological connections between the electorate and parties. The strong party roots are evident in the literature on party system institutionalization. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1998) focus on two of its four

dimensions—the aforementioned strong party roots and the stability of interparty competition. To identify strong party roots in society, expressed as voters' attachment to political parties according to their programmatic or ideological preferences, Budge (1994), Cox (1990), Rabinowitz & Macdonald (1989) developed directional spatial models and proximity spatial models, which revealed the partisan proximity of voters on a left-right scale and along party ideological orientation (Inglehart, 1984; Inglehart, 1988). Empirical results of measuring voters' preferences on a left-right scale indicate that there is a high ideological predictability among voters in countries with low electoral volatility; the correlation was 0.56 (significant at $p < 0.001$). At the same time, in some post-communist countries such as the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, ideological stability is observed among voters despite high electoral volatility. This result suggests that interparty competition is not programmatic or ideological given the high dispersion of ideological voting. Therefore, Mainwaring and Torcal's (2005) hypothesis argued that when parties have a weak ideological attachment to society, voters have a dispersed distribution along the left-right scale and vice versa for a strong ideological attachment. Scholars emphasize that voters' attachment to parties according to their programmatic and ideological postulations is more noticeable in developed industrial countries, the programmatic and ideological ties are much weaker in competitive regimes.

2.2.2. Party system change determinants.

Since institutionalization, dominant party strategies, and socio-demographic cleavages have focused on party system stability, other studies have examined party system change (Mair, 1997; Casal Bertoa & Enyedi, 2016; Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016; Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2018). Party system change has been explained by changes in old cleavages structure (Lipset & Rokkan, 1969; Bartolini & Mair, 1990) to new cleavage structure (Mair, 1997), the competitive structure of government formation openness (Mair, 1997; Casal Bertoa & Enyedi, 2016), new generations' values change (Inglehart, 1984; 1988; Dalton, 2008) and pattern of inter-party competition (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2018). Below, we will examine each of determinants party system change in detail.

As Mair (1997) states, more is needed to consider a change in party system instead of just a political party change. For example, it went from a Socialist left party to a new Left (environmental) party. To see a change in the party system requires that a new environmental party be represented in Parliament, or a Socialist left party fall below five percent threshold. In other words, essential properties of the party system change are party size, ideological appeal, and its systemic role that influences the direction of competition and the process of government formation.

The theory of party system change was based on changing the electoral arena to the arena of government since they think that this is the core of the party system (Sartori, 1976; Mair, 1997; Casal Bertoa & Enyedi, 2016). Mair (1997) states that electoral shifts cannot change party systems because of its inability to influence on the structure of competition.

Mair (1996) divides the structure of competition is into open (unpredictable) or closed (predictable) depending on three formats of competition for government such as alternation in government, innovation, and familiarity (governing formula), and access to government (Sartori, 1976). Alternation in government considers three alternation schemes, characterized by wholesale alternation, where parties in government are replaced by new parties or coalition parties previously in opposition. Partial alternation in government states that a new incumbent government is joined by one party that was previously part of the previous government. Lack of alternation in government represents only the same party maintaining control over time. The governing formula refers to whether a party or combination of parties has had similar experience of governing in a particular format. As Western countries, Germany and Ireland have not experimented with a new governing formula since Social Democrats and Liberals, Fianna Fail and other coalition parties, came to power in 1969. However, in a system with partial alternation of parties in government, there are opportunities for innovation in the governing formula, where, along with Christian Democrats in Italy, the government has also been governed by new coalitions. The innovation of governing formulas was evident in systems where new party combinations changed with surprising frequency. Finally, access to government determines how parties cross the threshold of government or whether it remains an advantage for a limited number of parties. The exclusion or inclusion of parties from

access to government depends on whether the party is considered anti-system or an outsider and whether these new or outsider parties can break through the government threshold.

Therefore, considering the competitive structure of the party system through the lens of government (Mair, 1997; Bertoa, 2017; Casal Bertoa & Enyedi, 2022; 2016) argue for the differences between changing the nature of the party system on the one hand and changing electoral preferences on the other hand. From this point of view, it was previously noted that the electoral vote can change without affecting the party system's competitive structure; conversely, the party system can change without any electoral change. In the first case, it meant that even with significant electoral change, such as in the 1973 elections in Denmark, which led to an increase in the number of parties and a decrease in the percentage of votes for pre-existing parties, in the Danish party system, as before, there was a massive or partial change of government, which were essentially similar to other center-right coalitions that governed Denmark in the period 1950–1960s. The party system was innovative in its governance formula as the highly fragmented and polarized political parties made running the government more difficult. In addition, new parties entered the government, making the party system relatively open. Electoral change was not associated with party system change in governmental arena.

In the second case, the party system can be changed without electoral vote change. For example, the nature of the Irish party system changed significantly due to the rigid competitive structure of Fianna Fail parties that formed the government over a long period from 1973 to 1987, including regular turnover of positions with a coalition of opponents. This allowed Fianna Fail to form a government on its own, oppose mergers with other parties, and be in opposition where it could not provide a working majority for other reasons. Fianna Fail subsequently entered into coalition twice with the Progressive Democrats in 1989 and with the Liberal Party in 1993. Thus, the Irish party system was transformed as the previously existing bipolar structure of competition, with the Fianna Fail party at one end and its opponents at the other end, destroyed by a coalition with other parties. Consequently, the Irish case indicates that despite significant changes in the party system, the electoral vote remained stable.

Returning to the cleavages theory as the next factor in the party system change, Dalton and Flanagan (2017), based on analysis of surveys, Dalton (2008) concluded that the development and division of social cleavages are revealed according to “cyclical patterns”, in which the mobilization of masses occurs first, and then convergence and institutionalization, which can subsequently become an outdated, provoking minimal interest and leading to an ageing pattern of party orientations. For example, in place of traditional cleavages between the working class and bourgeois parties, “new cleavage” appears - post-industrial revolution. This new cleavage contrasts with the Industrial Revolution and is expressed as a conflict between manual and mental workers (Inglehart, 1984). The weakening of traditional social cleavages is evident in those countries where there has been an erosion of support for communist and socialist parties with the development of capitalism.

Another determinant of party system change is considered to be a direct connection between cleavage structure and electoral volatility (Rose & Urwin, 1970), the empirical evidence of which indicates the failure of the “freezing hypothesis” due to unstable party support of electorate (Wolintez, 2004; Kirchheimer, 1966; Pedersen, 1979). However, Mair (1997) argues that the main reason why the party system was considered stable for many years is due to the inadequacy of presented indicators measuring electoral tendencies. For example, most indices, such as Pedersen’s volatility index, Rae’s fractionalization index or Rose and Urwin’s regress votes of parties in time, measure indicators of stability or changes in electoral preferences of voters for individual parties. Moreover, indices of electoral change do not show changes between supporters and opponents of cleavages; in other words, indices do not reflect changes in cleavages manifested in the loss of votes from left-wing parties to right-wing parties. Inferences drawn from the volatility index are suitable for measuring changes in party strength in elections but not for accounting for party system changes since the party system can remain stable despite high electoral volatility and vice versa (Mair, 1997; Katz, 2001; Pedersen, 1979; Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016). Casal Bertoa and Enyedi (2016; 2022) developed an index of closure by modifying it from Mair's index of governmental alternation (1997), which is based on the Pedersen volatility index (1979), where the percentage of votes is replaced by the percentage of ministers from one government to another divided into two. Despite the usefulness of recent indices, Mair (1997)

argues that party system change does not occur frequently. A concept that shows system change will be needed even in the absence of party system typology change. Mair (1997) and subsequently, Casal Bertoa and Enyedi (2016; 2022) conceptualize indices based on three attributes of the governmental arena, but these indices do not require the format and mechanics on which Sartori's (1976) party system typology is built.

Although the abovementioned indices could not capture trends in party system typology, for example, Pedersen (1979) volatility index was calculated by changes in votes or seats in several subsequent elections, Mair (1997), Casal Bertoa and Enyedi (2016; 2022) index of closure measured percent of ministerial volatility according to government alternation, formulae and access to government, nevertheless, these indices are considered excellent tools used by scholars, and as Sartori believes (1976) that in addition to attributes, it is necessary to take into account government alternation in order to determine whether systemic changes have occurred. Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014) argue that the mechanics of the party system, namely, ideological polarization, is considered a redundant dimension for the limited number of parties in the system, since there is no ideological polarization in a one-party system. Therefore, by combining format – this is the number of parties, mechanics – this is ideological polarization, and government alternation together, Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014) believe that Sartori's (1976) party system typology can be used to assess the stability and instability of party systems.

Therefore, to capture the essence Sartori's (1976) party system typology, Nwokora and Pelizzo (2018) subsequently developed the index of fluidity that measures party system change based on both strict “systemic” or “functional properties” (Sartori, 1976), degree summing up a set of party system attributes such as fragmentation and ideological polarization, and government alternation in order to determine whether systemic changes have occurred. The unit of measurement of the index of fluidity is the change in the party systems type. By extracting each type of party system from the attributes mentioned above, authors created the index of fluidity that reflects the definition of the party system as a “system” that defines “pattern interactions”. In other words, the index of fluidity is used within the existing seven patterns of interaction of party systems: one-party system, hegemonic system

belonging to authoritarian regimes and others: predominant, two-party, moderate pluralism, polarized pluralism, and atomized party system. The index of fluidity includes three different degrees of systemic change:

1. The frequency of change is calculated by dividing the number of changes in the party system by the number of elections.
2. Scope, which measures the distances between party system type, and
3. Variety shows the number of type changes.

The index of fluidity is created by multiplying frequency, scope, and variety. Fluidity = Frequency * Scope * Variety. This unique measure will show a country's party systems' stability or change in specific election years. In the next section, we will measure the party system of Kazakhstan based on the above indices.

Finally, the party system change is associated with materialist and postmaterialist values factors (Inglehart, 1984; 1988; 2008; Norris, & Inglehart, 2012), as well as with other significant cultural changes (Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2022). Inglehart's central thesis was that significant changes had occurred in Lipset and Rokkan's (1969) cleavage structures to create a new political polarization, with the traditional left-right axis traversed by a new dimension of polarization. The new political polarization addresses post-materialist values, including environmentalism, opposition to nuclear energy, peace movements and consumerism (Norris & Inglehart, 2012). The post-materialist axis was thought to have little influence on voters' voting behaviour due to the latter's long-established loyalties and connections between political parties, churches, and trade unions, as well as the traditional family voting culture established over the years. However, as the author argues, this may not be the case because political parties no longer represent the forces that mobilize people to activism (Inglehart, 2008). Inglehart (1968) argues that the "new axis of conflict" promotes active protest and, changes in the institutionalized class axis. The class axis involves the working class voting for left-wing parties and the middle class voting for right-wing parties. The neutralization of class cleavage by the emergence of postmaterialist values was due to the fact that young voters grew up and were socialized in periods of economic and physical security after the Second World War and were thus considered

to be a more affluent society, with a sense of community and quality of life. Additionally, postmaterialists were dissatisfied with the society in which they lived (Inglehart, 2008; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). In other words, intergenerational change in values contributed, for example, to the undermining of the US Democratic Party in 1981, when the Labor Party divided into a Neutral left wing and a new Social Democratic Party, or as in West Germany in 1982, it contributed to creation Green parties, which won six seats in Parliament.

Other factors of party system change are considered to be changes in the parameters of the party system, including the level of ideology, organizations, and competition (Kirchheimer, 1966). The fifty-year period of electoral voting in Ireland (1932–1982) shows that party interests and the nature of ideological appeals have changed. In organizational and competitive style, “affective commitment” voters declined, where voters competed with each other, thus making voters available to alternative parties, and changing the Irish government by 1970. Irish case shows that the extent to which parties can adapt to changing conditions through changes in party strategies, changes in competitive models, the means of electoral mobilization and ideological transformation affects the overall level of support, which amounted to a net electoral volatility of 8.9. Such electoral support can remain unchanged due to the efforts of parties, despite changes in the parameters of the party system (Mair, 1997).

In conclusion, we explore both sides of one coin: the stability of the party system and the change of the party system. The social divisions of society form a party system based on the socio-demographic position of voters in society, such as class, ethnicity, urban or rural residence, linguistic background, age, or education. The social division served as the basis for promoting the interests of different segments of the population. The reflection of such interests was seen in the program - ideological documents. The more strongly the society’s position towards a particular political party was expressed through the parties’ programmatic and ideological documents, the more precise the voters’ vote. This indicated that party systems in such countries are predictable and stable. Despite the exogeneity of the above factors, endogenous factors such as electoral, parliamentary, and executive aspects of power are also crucial in determining party system stability. However, along

with the stability of the party system, there is the party system change that scholars extensively study. Determinants of party system change are considered reclassification from one type to another type of party system, changes in the number of parties in the party system, and changes in the ideological programs of parties. Therefore, echoing Shamir (1984), the party system is not stable; short-term fluctuations occur along with the long-term equilibrium of party system stability.

Chapter 3. Context of research.

3.1. Introduction.

Although there is awareness of identifying, classifying, measuring, and understanding the determinants of party system change, more attention must be paid to why this occurs. One reason why this may be occurring is demographic change, namely the fact that new youth cohorts are entering the electoral market (Miller et.al., 1996), and new generations of young voters with different views and values (Inglehart, 1984; 2009).

Since Kazakhstan is experiencing a “positive demographic trend”, and the existing Kazakhstani electorate will experience a generational change, there are some concerns that rising demographics may not only lead to a generational change but a change in the preferences of the electorate, which could affect party system transformation in Kazakhstan.

In order to avoid the risk of party system change and retain the votes of the young electorate, politicians took measures to represent the interests of young cohorts through youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” and youth quota. The youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” is a connecting “link” between politics and youth, promoting national-patriotic education among youth, and the involvement of youth in significant social, environmental, cultural, and mass events in the country. The dissertation aims to explore the attitudes of youth living in different regions of Kazakhstan to the perceived activities of the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” and youth quota and to assess the impact on voting for the Amanat party. The next few subchapters will reveal the essence of the study, moving from broader dimensions of the party system and demographics to more specific topics such as youth, youth wing and youth quotas, considering them from the point of view of foreign and national context. This chapter provides an analysis of the party system of Kazakhstan through static and dynamic indices and also measures the correlation between dimensions: ENP, fractionalization, the index of fluidity and % seats Amanat party. The next chapter is devoted to demographic change and party systems, where, according to the first wave of online surveys, we will present a picture of young people willing to or (not) vote for political parties according to socio-demographic characteristics.

3.1.1. Static and dynamic indexes of parties and party systems in Kazakhstan.

Although cleavage theory is essential in understanding why party systems do not change (Lipset & Rokkan, 1969; Mair, 1997), it is also essential that while old cleavages may become obsolete and new cleavages might arise due to demographic-generational change (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009). The preferences of a large number of voters began to change from election to election, and at the same time, the party system began to change; more and more new parties appeared in the electoral arena, which, in their organizational style and the style of the political issues raised, began to radically differ from old parties, trying to displace the latter by mobilizing an even more significant number of electorates, Kazakhstan is not an exception. The organizational and representative decline of parties and their inability to involve citizens in decision-making led to an even more remarkable party system transformation (Kitschelt, 1989; Dalton, 2008; Pedersen, 1979). Primarily, these allegations are rooted in electorate changes, namely in their attitude towards political parties, which depends entirely on the demographic state.

The attributes of Kazakhstan's party system are calculated using the measurement's static properties, Rae's fractionalization index (1967), Laakso and Taagepera's effective number of parties index (1979), Pedersen volatility index (1979), and the measurement's dynamic properties, Nwokora and Pelizzo's fluidity index (2018).

The formulas are presented further:

(1) Rae's fractionalization index formula: $F = 1 - \frac{1}{n(n-1)} \sum f_i(f_i - 1)$, to make Rae's fractionalization formula more intuitive (2) Laakso and Taagepera changed Rae's formula into the effective number of parties that is $ENP = \frac{1}{1-F}$. (3) Pedersen's volatility index formula: $TEV = - \sum \frac{V_{i,t} - V_{i,t-1}}{2}$. (4) Nwokora and Pelizzo's the index of fluidity formula: Fluidity = Frequency * Scope * Variety.

We analysed the party system based on these indices; however, unlike Pelizzo (2023), we added full election periods, including one year before Kazakhstan's independence in the 1990s and the 2023 parliamentary election results. Considering the index of fluidity, period calculations will present a complete and more accurate picture of ongoing party system change or stability in Kazakhstan.

Moreover, if the index of fluidity allows us to identify changes in the party system according to the party system typology developed by Sartori (1976) and determine this change according to functional properties of party systems types, then fractionalization index, the effective number of parties (ENP) index, volatility index calculate the degree of fragmentation, the number of relevant parties and volatility, where the unit of analysis is political parties, as well as the percentage of votes and seats. The latter indexes are considered static measurements because they reflect the number of political parties, their relative weight in the party system, and the overall volatility of vote percentages. Moreover, both indices (the fractionalization index, ENP) are often calculated simultaneously, and their intuitive ease of calculation also distinguishes them. Despite their positive aspects, they have several disadvantages. The effective number of parties overestimates the weight of the ruling party and underestimates the weight of smaller parties. For example, a large party can occupy a significant share in the ENP index and exceed 1. Consequently, in one-party and two-party systems, the effective number of parties often coincides since a significant share in the value of the index belongs to the ruling party.

On the contrary, the index of fluidity is considered a dynamic measure because it can calculate the frequency of change depending on the number of elections and changes in the party system. Frequency is calculated by dividing the party system change by the number of elections. Scope considers the overall range from one end of the party system to the other. For example, a change from a hegemonic to an atomized party system corresponds to five since between two party systems have predominant party, two-party, moderate pluralism, and polarized pluralism party systems. Variety reflects the number of party system change types. For example, a transformation from a hegemonic to an atomized party system corresponds to two, whereas with an atomized party system on moderate pluralism, there are three transformations; from moderate pluralism to moderate pluralism there are again three transformations since there is no change in typology. In other words, change will be considered until the party system changes to a new type of party system. If there are no changes in the party system type in subsequent parliamentary elections, there will be no changes, and transformation will correspond to the previous number. Aggregate frequency*scope*variety reflects

the overall index of fluidity (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2018). Therefore, we have shown the difference between static and dynamic measurements of the party system. Below, we have calculated the index of fluidity for 1990 – 2023.

Table – 1. The fluidity of the Kazakhstani party system between 1990-2023s.

Party system type	Year	Number of elections (№ election)	Party system change (PSC)	Frequency (F=PSC /№ election)	Scope	Variety	Fluidity
Hegemonic	1990	1	0	0	1	1	0
Atomized	1994	2	1	0.5	5	2	5
Moderate Pluralism	1995	3	2	0.66	5	3	9.9
Moderate Pluralism	1999	4	2	0.5	5	3	7.5
Two-party	2004	5	3	0.6	5	4	12
Hegemonic	2007	6	4	0.66	5	4	13.2
Hegemonic	2012	7	4	0.57	5	4	11.4
Hegemonic	2016	8	4	0.5	5	4	10
Hegemonic	2021	9	4	0.44	5	4	8.8
Predominant	2023	10	5	0.5	5	5	12.5

Source: Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, compiled by author.

Moreover, Table - 2 presents the complete calculations of the index of fractionalization, the effective number of parties, the index of fluidity and volatility for parliamentary election periods between 1990 – 2023.

Table – 2. Fractionalization, effective number of parties, fluidity, and volatility indexes.


Year	Rae's fractionalization (1967)	Laakso and Taagepera's effective number of parties (1979)	Nwokora and Pelizzo's fluidity (2017)	Pedersen's volatility index (1979)
1990	0.095	1.1	0	-
1994	0.773	4.4	5	-
1995	0.808	5.2	9.9	-
1999	0.779	4.5	7.5	-
2004	0.632	2.7	12	-
2007	0.156	1.2	13.2	11.20
2012	0.385	1.6	11.4	10.83
2016	0.372	1.6	10	2.53
2021	0.472	1.9	8.8	11.85
2023	0.582	2.4	12.5	21.32

Source: Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, compiled by author.

Between the 1990–2023s parliamentary elections, Kazakhstan experienced one of the most dramatic changes in the party system since the hegemonic party system was formed a year before the independence in 1990 (Figure-1). This refers to the transition from the atomized party system in 1991, when People's Union of Kazakh party first emerged, which was subsequently renamed to the Otan party, then the Nur-Otan party and finally the Amanat party. This party occupied a dominant position among other parties during the elections between 2007 - 2021.

There was a moderate pluralism party system during the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections. According to the party system typology by Sartori (1976), the moderate pluralism party system was based on competition between the Otan party and other traditional parties: the Communist party, the Agrarian party, the Civic Party of Kazakhstan, and the Federation of Trade Unions of Kazakhstan. The party system again changed in 2004, transforming into a two-party system between the Otan party and the Agrarian and Civic Union of Workers bloc.

Figure – 1. Fractionalization, effective number of parties, and fluidity.



Source: compiled by author.

Before independence in 1990, the party system of the KazakhSSR was considered hegemonic due to the existence of one single Communist Party that received all 342 seats out of 360 seats and

the subsequent transition from an atomized to a moderate pluralism system, and then to a two-party system between 1994–2004. Such periods can be characterized as radically unstable party systems.

The data states that in 1990, in the Supreme Council of KazakhSSR of the twelfth convocation, the effective number of parties was 1.1, and the fractionalization of parties was 0.095. The 1994 parliamentary elections to the Supreme Council of the thirteenth convocation of independent Kazakhstan consisted of 177 mandates. They were accompanied by increased fractionalization of political parties of 0.77 and an effective number of parties was 4.4. After adopting the new Constitution, The People's Union of Kazakhstan party in 1995 received a relatively small number of seats in the Parliament until 2004. Only by 2007, after a merger and several renamings, first into the Otan party and then into the Nur-Otan party, this party become stronger and remain the only influential pro-presidential party in Kazakhstan. The data indicate that from 1994 through 2007, fragmentation decreased, as evidenced by the fact that the ENP (from 5.2 to 1.2) and the fractionalization index (0.77 to 0.15) decreased, while the fluidity index remained unstable, first decreasing in 1999 to 7.5, and then increasing until before 2007 until 13.2 (Figure-1).

Boban (2017), Isaacs & Whitmore (2014) believe that before independence, the Supreme Council of Kazakh SSR had broad powers in the executive and legislative branches, all financial and budgetary issues were agreed upon with Moscow. In other words, deputies only partially used the broad powers vested in them. However, by the end of 1980, due to the *perestroika* and *glasnost* regime during the reign of Mikhail Gorbachev, the policies softened, and countries of Eastern Europe began to act independently, which led to the strengthening of opposition and the eventual collapse of the communist regime. This first served to create a unicameral parliament; after the adoption of the new Constitution in 1995, the Parliament was divided into the Senate (upper) and the Mazhilis (lower) (Isaacs, 2013; 2022).

The second period, according to calculations of the fractionalization index, the effective number of parties, and the index of fluidity, was the 2007–2021 period, which was characterized by the presence of a hegemonic party, the Nur-Otan, and extreme stability of party system in Kazakhstan (Pelizzo, 2023). Dave (2007) argues that these periods are associated with adopting a presidential

form of government in the Constitution, which gave “the President unlimited powers and limited the powers of Parliament”. During these periods, Parliament lost the Accounts Chamber and the right to appoint the Prosecutor General, and at the same time, all levers of influence on the Presidential Administration. According to Sartori (1976), these periods refer to hegemonic party systems, where only one party dominates, and there is no inter-party competition. This is evidenced by values of fractionalization index that are 0.39 in 2007 and 0.47 in 2021. Effective number of parties was 1.2 in 2007 and 1.9 in 2021. Finally, the index of fluidity dropped from 13.2 in 2007 to 8.8. in 2021 (Tables – 1 and 2 and Figure – 1).


These data confirm that the ruling Nur-Otan party received majority seats in the sixth Parliament (Sarsembayev, 2011; 2013; Bowyer, 2008; Karmazina, 2008). This was preceded by constitutional amendments to the Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan in May 2007, and then changed to the Election Law, which reformed the electoral system from a mixed to a proportional system and increased the number of deputies in the lower and upper houses of representation from 77 deputies of the Mazhilis up to 107 deputies with a 7 percent barrier in place, where 9 seats out of 98 were given to the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. The Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan was an umbrella association created in 1995, representing the interests of various ethnic groups (Sarsembayev, 2011; 2013). The number of Senate deputies appointed by the President increased from 7 to 15, while the remaining number of 32 Senate deputies elected indirectly by deputies of the local representative body remained unchanged. Therefore, the total number of deputies in the lower and upper houses increased by 38 seats from 116 to 154 deputies.

Institutional and legislative changes helped expand the powers of parliament while maintaining the presidential form of government. However, this did not happen in the 2007 elections, and the subsequent ones were not truly multi-party, and this does not change the form of government. In addition, the composition of the parties in the 2007 elections changed significantly; the once dominant Otan party turned into a super party, which was joined by three parties at once (Asar, Agrarian Party and Civil Party) and was renamed to Nur-Otan People's Democratic Party, whose

leader was the then-president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev (Bowyer, 2008). The early parliamentary elections were a surprise for most other parties, giving them little time to prepare. The opposition parties were seen as fragmented and weak, with little time to decide on merging party structures and adapting campaign strategies to new electoral rules. Once “viable” opposition to the ruling party, the Communist party refused to participate in elections, its communist past barely helping to maintain a small electorate, which consisted mainly of a Russian-speaking population nostalgic for the past (Sarsembayev, 2011; 2013; Bowyer, 2008; Karmazina, 2008).

Although the legislature passed an amendment in 2009 allowing second-place parties to enter parliament despite failing to pass the seven percent threshold, this allowed for the appearance of a multi-party system. Similar scenarios were repeated in the parliamentary elections of 2012, 2016 and 2021, where the Nur Otan party took a significant number of seats in Parliament (Sarsembayev, 2011; 2013). Bowyer (2008) believes that the high seven percent threshold was detrimental to minor parties that were not popular and strong enough, and that the post-Soviet party system of Kazakhstan inherited from the Supreme Soviet of SSR was weak, in which people associated politics more with a charismatic leader than with ideas.

Figure – 2. Seats won by political parties of Kazakhstan.



Source: compiled by author.

Therefore, the stability of the party system of the second period was achieved only due to the dominant position of the Nur-Otan party, which was headed by the then-president of Kazakhstan and received an absolute majority of seats in the Parliament due to insufficient competition and the brake on the development of party factions and groups of deputies (Figure-2).

The third period of the party system is 2023, and it turned out to be characterized by rising levels of instability. According to calculations of the three indices, the parliamentary elections held on March 19, 2023, were characterized by a slight increase in the fractionalization of parties (0.58), the effective number of parties to 2.4, and the index of fluidity indicator increased again to 12.5, which reflects a change in the direction of the inter-party competition model from a hegemonic to a predominant party system (Table – 2 and Figure – 1). Although such a change in the party system is not considered radical, according to Sartori (1976), the hegemonic and predominant party systems, according to their functional properties, belong to two different typologies of party system and to two different political regimes. A hegemonic party system is associated with an authoritarian regime, while a predominant party system is associated with a democratic regime. Moreover, unlike the hegemonic party system, which is defined according to the traditional theoretical dimension of format (fragmentation) and mechanics (polarization) of the construction of other typologies of party systems, the predominant party system is formed based on alternation of power (Sartori, 1976; Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2014). Sartori (1976) defines a predominant party system as “a power configuration in which one party rules alone, without alternation, and continues to obtain an absolute majority in elections”. To be more precise, the relevant criterion is to have a majority of seats in the elections, but not votes, and to have a majority in three subsequent elections. The absence of formal and actual competition for power distinguishes the hegemonic party from the predominant party system.

Nwokora and Pelizzo (2014) later built Sartori's (1976) typology by combining three attributes: number of parties, ideological polarization, and power alternation, noting that the hegemonic party has a fragmented party system but no power alternation. In other words, even with existing second-class parties, party alternation in power is not provided for. Meanwhile, in a predominant party system, the alternation of power is limited. Scholars reconstruct the predominant

typology into alternating, continuous, coalitional, arguing that Sartori (1976) overlooks the coalition arrangement through which parties ensure a unimodal concentration of power and a permanent majority in parliament. Moreover, the temporal and spatial boundaries of the predominant party system are subject to a peculiar fragility, where a small institutional change can change the party system. The discontinuous predominant party system pattern illustrates an abnormal pattern of deviation and reversion to normal (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2014). Finally, the spatial boundary of the predominant system is national in Sartori (1976), while Bardi & Mair (2008) have questioned it, arguing that subnational character matters where policies are decentralized separating the subnational from the national or regional party system. Therefore, from the point of view of the predominant party system, the 2023 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, according to the mechanical properties of Sartori (1976), are characterized by a unimodal concentration of power by the Amanat party and a limited number of alternations of power. According to the secondary attributes of format, duration, and integration (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2014), the Amanat party was considered a single party rather than a coalition. In terms of duration, the dominance of the Amanat party was considered continuous and long-lasting, given that the Amanat party has held most seats since 2007. Regarding integration, the Amanat party showed homogeneous dynamics of the party system both at the national and regional levels.

The criteria for classification as a predominant party system include a reduction in seats in the representative body from 76 seats or 71% in 2021 to 62 seats or 53.9% in 2023. Firstly, a significant decrease in mandates in parliament indicated changes in the party system in Kazakhstan. Secondly, the increase in the number of parties and the emergence of new parties such as Baytak (Green) and Republic, in the political arena contributed to the revision of Sartori's (1976) typology from the hegemonic. However, it is difficult to classify the Republic of Kazakhstan as a consolidated democracy, which includes a predominant party system, since the consolidation of democracy exists “for twenty years after its transition”, as evidenced by observation periods to prove this classification rule. On the other hand, we cannot attribute the party system of Kazakhstan to a consolidated

authoritarian regime, which includes a hegemonic party system in connection with the results of the 2023 parliamentary elections.


Rather, Kazakhstan's party system lies between predominant and hegemonic, closer to the liberalization of autocracy than consolidated democracy. In a consolidated democracy, the regime operates based on the rule of law, a developed civil culture, and a system of checks and balances; however, Kazakhstan abuses the institutions of power. Boban (2017) argues that it is also impossible to call it a consolidated autocratic system, as it is characterized in most literature since there are restrictions expressed in the form of political pluralism, extensive education, and access of citizens to information, which makes it difficult for authoritarian regimes to be completely indestructible. Such a regime cannot be consolidated, it can be strengthened for a certain period of time because opposing forces want to change the autocratic system and overthrow the existing government. Boban (2017) believes that the strengthening and survival of the Nur-Otan party largely depend on the then-president and control over administrative resources. Nur-Otan party has unique characteristics different from the ideological-hegemonic or pragmatic-hegemonic party, according to Sartori (1976), since it is determined by hegemony within the party system but not in the political system (Boban, 2017). After the departure of the then-president, the Nur-Otan party is unlikely to be able to survive the existing authoritarian regime (Boban, 2017), as evidenced by our measurements (indexes of fractionalization, ENP, fluidity and volatility), the transition from a presidential-hegemonic type to a hegemonic-predominant one. Therefore, calculations of dynamic property of measurements, i.e., the index of fluidity five times defined a hegemonic party system, once an atomized party system, two times moderate pluralism, once a two-party system and once a predominant party system out of 10 parliamentary elections since 1990 – to 2023 (Table – 2).

The party system changes in Kazakhstan, namely the formation of a new Parliament of eighth convocation elected under a mixed electoral system, is associated with the constitutional reform in 2023. The new Parliament of the eighth convocation was created through institutional changes that simplified the creation of political parties. This affected the reduction in the number of regional initiative groups to seven hundred people, the reduction in the number of party members in order to

undergo state registration from twenty thousand to five thousand people, the restriction on presence in political parties for the President of Kazakhstan, Chairmen and judges of the Constitutional Court, members of Central Election Commission and others, elections of Mazhilis deputies according to the proportional system of party lists of candidates, as well as in single-mandate territorial electoral districts, and finally lowering the threshold barrier for entering Parliament. The political reform of President Kassym - Zhomart Tokayev was supposed to become fertile ground for the institutional and organizational development of political parties, increasing the number of parties and strengthening political competition (Sheryazdanova et.al., 2023). These novels help citizens choose a real candidate and not a hidden one behind a list of parties.

The correlation between ENP and % seats of the Amanat party is indicated in a rectangular coordinate system or a scatterplot below (Figure-3). The correlation coefficient between the ENP axis and the % seats of the Amanat party axis indicate a significant negative relationship $r = -0.9399$. In other words, with an increase in the effective number of the party (4.4, 5.2, 4.5), the % of seats of the Amanat party will decrease, and vice versa; with a decrease in the effective number of the party, the % of seats of the Amanat party will increase.


Figure – 3. Correlation between ENP and the % seats of the Amanat party



Source: compiled by author.

The scatterplot for the fractionalization index and % seats of the Amanat party illustrates the same pattern. The correlation coefficient between the fractionalization index axis and % seats of Amanat party axis show a significant negative relationship $r = -0.9399$. Since with an increase in fractionalization of political parties (0.77, 0.78 and 0.81), % of seats of the Amanat party will decrease. Moreover, with a decrease in the fractionalization of political parties (0.63, 0.16, 0.39 and others), % of seats of the Amanat party will increase (0.55, 0.92, 0.78 and others).


Figure – 4. Correlation between fractionalization index and the % seats of the Amanat party.



Source: compiled by author.

Finally, the two-way scatterplot graph shows that the coefficient correlation between the index of fluidity and the % seats of the Amanat party is positive and significant ($r = 0.7559$). In other words, an increase in the index of fluidity indicates an increase in the % of seats of the Amanat party. For example, with insignificant values of index of fluidity 5, 9.9 and 7.5, % seats of the Amanat party are insignificant around 0.19, 0.37 and 0.30. Meanwhile, with significant values of the index of fluidity 12, 13.2, 11.4, the % seats of the Amanat party grow around 0.55, 0.92, 0.78.

Figure – 5. Correlation between the index of fluidity and the % seats of the Amanat party



Source: compiled by author.

Therefore, the party system change in Kazakhstan can be considered insignificant if we consider that one-party, hegemonic, and predominant party systems are in strict sequence one after another. On the other hand, in terms of political regimes, which include each type of party systems, it is considered significant because the predominant party system refers to a consolidated democracy, however, in the case of institutional changes taking place in Kazakhstan, the transition to liberalization of autocracy in party system is obvious. In the case of Kazakhstan, we would summarize it as a gradual transition to liberalization of autocracy rather than to democracy, but the latter is not excluded. Indeed, as predicted by Pelizzo (2023), and according to our analysis (Figure-2.), the number of seats won in parliament by the Amanat party is gradually declining despite its relatively high share of votes received among other parties.

3.1.2. Demographic change and party system change in Kazakhstan.

Although there was a change in the party system of Kazakhstan in 2023, a decrease in the percentage of votes and seats in Mazhilis of Parliament, few attribute this trend to a demographic change in the electorate or a change in the conjuncture of the electorate. The gradual transition from the presidential-hegemonic to the hegemonic-predominant party system began with the results of the 2023 parliamentary elections, when two new parties, the Republic party and the Baytak (Green) party,

began participating in the electoral race for votes. After a long authoritarian rule of the Amanat party, the 2023 parliamentary election was considered unique because, for three decades in a row, the party system changed and belonged to different types of party systems. From 2004 to 2023, there were stages of gradual growth and decline in the percentage of votes for the Amanat party, which peaked in 2007 (88.41%) and ended in a cycle of decline in 2023 (53.9%). The once stable party subsystem has changed the dynamics of interparty competition, typical to the hegemonic party system. The circle of voters and political parties functioned around two fields of identification – the Amanat party and several new parties. One of the features functioning of the party system as a hegemonic - predominant party system is considered to be competition for the electorate between the ruling party Amanat and traditional parties Auyl, Akzhol, Communist Party, NSDP, as well as two new parties, Republic party and Baytak (Green) party. It should be noted that there was a significant drop in electoral votes for the Amanat party from 5 148 074 or 71.09% to 3 431 510 votes (53.9%). At the same time, regarding the percentage of votes received (8.59%), the new Republic party was ahead of the long-functioning Communist Party by 1.79%, NSDP by 3.39% and Akzhol by 0.18%. Considering that the ruling party Amanat lost about 1 716 564 votes, which means a reduction of 17.19% relative to the previous 2021 parliamentary election, it is explained by the transfer of votes between new parties and traditionally functioning parties. This transfer of votes argues that a new interpolar dynamic of competition has been created between new political parties on one side and traditional others political parties on the other side.

The basis of this is a significant transformation in voter preferences. Therefore, explaining the reasons for changes in the electorate is necessary. There are different opinions; for example, Gustavo De Armas (2008) believes that “the increase in votes for left-wing parties is explained by an update in demography or the so-called demographic model”. Gustavo De Armas (2008) cites Aguiar (2000), who states that parties' electoral bases will grow even when voters do not change their preferences. In other words, between 1971 and 1999, the estimated demographic proportion of the EPFA party was 1%, and by 2004, it would have risen to 5% owing to demographic change. While Canzani (2000) argues that due to the mortality the older generation, traditional political parties will lose a larger

share of the electorate than non-traditional parties, there are no exact estimates on this matter; however, the approximate value of losses is not considered insignificant because about 170,000 people may drop out of electorate list. Queirolo (2006) states that the generational nature of the electorate introduces significant inertia into party system change, although such transformation occurs slowly. Party voting increases as age decreases because the electorate is being renewed, shifting the voting dynamics. The demographic effect states that the electoral arena includes young cohorts voting for the first time by coming of age. At the same time, citizens who previously voted in previous elections may leave the electoral field due to death or due to emigration.


This circumstance is very relevant for Kazakhstan, which gained independence in 1991 and is at the stage of transformation processes, requiring a revision of traditional views to the views of a new generation. In connection with the growth of demographics in Kazakhstan, where the total fertility rate, the number of children per 1 woman in 2019 was 2.90, which indicates the conscious desire of Kazakhstani families to have three or more children, states that youth, upon reaching eighteen ages, will have the right, by the Law “on elections” and “political parties”, participate in voting.

According to the Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, as of October 1, 2023, Kazakhstani youth in the age group from 14 to 28 at the beginning of 2022 amounted to about 20% or 3,833,400 people of the total population (19 million 967 thousand people). 2,044,500 of the youth lived in urban areas, and 1,333,662 lived in rural areas. An analysis of the demographic situation in Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2022 shows that over the past 22 years, the number of youths in age group 14-28 years has decreased slightly by 4.4% or 173,400 people compared to the beginning of 2000, where youth was about 3,914,500. (Figure - 6).

However, in 2023, the number of young people increased significantly, amounting to 5,726,629 people. The reason for the growth in the number of youths is the adoption of the Law “On State Youth Policy” as amended on December 26, 2022, where the age limit for youth was increased from 14 to 35. Currently, young people aged 14 to 35 make up about 29% of the total population. The urban youth population is 3,560,613 people, and the rural youth population is 2,166,016 people.

In addition, the growth of youth in 2023 is compensated by a younger generation of children aged 0–15 years, who in 2022 amounted to 31.1% of the total population of Kazakhstan. Moreover, the state’s demographic policy is aimed at the return of repatriates - these are about 5 million Kazakhs who migrated to more than 40 countries due to the famine between 1929 and 1933. Ethnic Kazakhs are provided with benefits in the fields of public employment, education, medical services, and social benefits.

Figure-6. Youth demography in Kazakhstan between 2000–2023s.



Source: Bureau of National Statistics, compiled by author.

* In 2000–2022 data on youth is formed by the age group 14–28 years.

** From 2023, youth are citizens of Kazakhstan from 14–35 years old.

As the above statistical data show, the population’s age structure is positive, classified as “young”, which, together with civic duty to vote influences a generation’s change in society and change in voting behaviour. In this regard, the combination of demographic change and party systems may significantly influence the transformation of the structure of inter-party competition, because young voters may be inclined to vote for other parties.


One can discern a strong connection between the demographic change of the electorate (age, gender, education, and others) and the number of votes given to political parties in Kazakhstan. Since

we conducted an online survey in December 2022 - January 2023 on youth voting preferences in 2021 parliamentary election. The following figures will present youth (non-voting) voting intentions by gender, age, education, and other characteristics.

Figures – 7, 8, 9, 10 present interesting data on the participation of Kazakhstani youth in voting for political parties, considering individual characteristics such as gender, age, regions, and nationality.

Figures – 7 and 8. indicate individual socio-demographic characteristics such as gender and age. Overall, the percentage of women who are confident that they voted in 2021 parliamentary elections is higher (21.24%) than men (15.59%). According to the results, men are more likely not to vote 84.4%, as opposed to women 78.76%. While voting for ruling party Amanat in the context of Mazhilis, men and women showed almost identical results. Approximately 79.71% and 79.05%. At the regional level in Maslikhats, women are more likely to vote for political party Amanat (78.24%) rather than men (75.68%).

Figure - 7. Youth voting by individual characteristics in Kazakhstan: gender.



Source: compiled by author according to first wave survey, conducted between December 2022-January 2023.


Therefore, despite the high percentage of non-voting among males and females, the number of respondents who were confident that they voted was divided into those who voted for the Amanat party and those who voted for other parties. At the same time, the number of respondents who voted for the Amanat party was higher than that of those who voted for other political parties.

The turnout varies across the various age groups. Figure – 8 shows the high percentage of respondents who “did not vote in parliamentary elections” amongst the age cohort between 18–24 years (82.19%), 30–34 years (72%) and between 25–29 years (63.49%). On the contrary, those respondents who are “confident in voting for political parties” are in the age cohort from 35–59 years old (60.53%) and from 25-29 years old (36.51%). Less confidence in voting for political parties showed respondents aged 18-24 (17.81%) and 30-34 (28%).

The following data, namely voting for the political party Amanat in Mazhilis elections, displays that 18–35 years respondents amounted to 185 youth or (78.39%) voted for the Amanat party than the adult cohort 35-59 years amounted to 17 people (80.95%). Conversely, when voting for “other political parties”, the majority comprised youth aged 18–24 years (21.61%), in contrast to other age groups.

While voting for the political party Amanat at the Maslikhat level, age categories from 18–24 and 36–59 showed almost similar results in percentages of voting, approximately 76.19% and 76.10%. Although in absolute values there are differences, those who voted for the Amanat party from 18–24 years old have been 191 people, against respondents aged 36–59 only 16 people. Voting for “other political parties” in Maslikhat elections has been only 23.90% or (60 respondents) aged 18–24 years old and 23.81% or (5 respondents) aged 35–59 years. Therefore, we observe a W-shaped pattern by age group.

Figure - 8. Youth voting by individual characteristics in the Republic of Kazakhstan: age.





Source: compiled by author according to first wave survey, conducted between December 2022-January 2023.

Figure – 9 indicates the category University location, which reflects the turnout of respondents and preferences of voting for political parties according to regional aspect.

Almaty city, Atyrau oblast and Karaganda oblast indicate a reluctance to participate in voting in parliamentary elections, indicating a high percentage of 89.43%, 88.48% and 87.88%, respectively. For the other two important indicators, where respondents answer: “I’m sure I voted”, in Mazhilis and Maslikhat levels, Karagandy oblast, Pavlodar oblast and Shymkent city showed equally moderate percentages of approximately 66.6%, 50% and 43%. A higher percentage of voting for the Amanat party is observed in Kyzylorda oblast approximately 92.6% and Atyrau oblast about 75.0%, than in Almaty oblast (62.5%) and Karaganda oblast (33.3%). In other regions, such as North Kazakhstan, Turkestan and Ulytau oblast, there is high tendency to vote for Amanat party.

Figure – 9. Youth voting by individual characteristics in the Republic of Kazakhstan: regions.




Source: compiled by author according to first wave survey, conducted between December 2022-January 2023.

Finally, Figure-10 indicates the division of respondents by ethnic characteristics. A large number of respondents were “confident that they voted” (306 people) and respondents “who did not vote” (1 273 people) consider themselves as Kazakhs. Then, Russians - 80.6% and other ethnic groups such as Dungan, Turk, Tatar, Uzbek and Uighurs - 82.86% claimed that “did not take part in the vote” in 2021 parliamentary elections.

Following Kazakhs, Russians, and other ethnic groups, 50% of Ukrainians indicated non-participation in voting, while the other half reported to have participated in election voting. Therefore, reporting an equal % share among Ukrainians. The smallest percentage of those who voted was observed among Koreans - 12.5% and Germans - 16.67%. In general, in terms of voting for political parties in the 2021 parliamentary elections in Mazhilis and Maslikhat, the Amanat party has a high amount of support amongst Kazakhs, which amounted to 80.08%, then Russians, who amounted to about 81.2% and other ethnic groups about 60%.

Figures-10. Youth voting by individual characteristics in the Republic of Kazakhstan: ethnicity.



Source: compiled by author according to first wave survey, conducted between December 2022-January 2023.

In conclusion, according to the above analysis in the context of individual characteristics such as gender, age, education, and ethnicity:

1). Respondents most often report voting for the political party Amanat if she is a woman who participated in local elections (Maslikhats), aged between 18 and 35, studying at the University of Kyzylorda region, Kazakh by nationality.

2). Respondents most often report voting for “other parties” if he is a man, who participated in Maslikhat elections, aged between 36 and 59, studying at the Universities in Almaty or Zhambyl regions, Kazakh, Uyghur, or Dungan by nationality.

3). Respondents most often report “not to participate in 2021 parliamentary elections” if he is a man, aged 18–35 years, studying at universities in Almaty, East Kazakhstan and Atyrau regions, and belonging to Kazakh or Russian ethnic groups.

Because the online survey contains youth attitudes towards voting in the 2021 parliamentary elections. The analysis shows that young voters’ preference to vote for the ruling party, Amanat, remains consistently high, in contrast to voting for other parties. However, as more and more young cohorts enter the electoral arena, favored by young new parties, the weight of new parties is growing, as can be seen from the analysis of the online survey second wave collected in March 2023 in next chapter and the 2023 parliamentary election results.

Chapter 4. The youth wing, youth quota and the Nazarbayev generation.

4.1. Introduction.

The previous chapters explain why patterns of interparty competition have maintained the status-quo and remained stable over time. The stability of the party system was due to the fact that the ruling party can adjust or adapt to the changing demands of voters, and its ability to maintain power due to the President. A survey conducted among Kazakhstani youth indicates a difference in values between the adult and younger generations (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2020). Kazakhstani youth are less concerned about issues of social inequality, i.e., the access of wealthy people to the best medical services (by 6%), and they express less support for active government intervention in regulating business and industry (by 8.8%) than previous generations. They are more tolerant of economic inequality (by 9.3%), and they are less concerned that the government must guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living (by 7.3%) than the adult generation (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2020). This difference is owing to the fact that the generation of the early 2000s, or the so-called “Nazarbayev generation”, grew up during the post-Soviet market economic system, which was characterized by paid education and paid medical services. Youth expectations regarding the socialist welfare state are much more modest, in contrast to the older generation, which was accustomed to receiving a wide range of services and support from the state (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2020; Sharipova, 2019). Kazakh youth have become economically liberal and support the market economy (Junisbai & Junisbai, 2020; Sharipova, 2019).

Demographic - intergenerational change in the composition of the electorate during several elections can change the fate of parties since the system’s stability is determined by the stability of the electoral fortunes of its constituent units, i.e., political parties. Therefore, the concept of institutionalization of the party system has a vital role in explaining stability both “at the level of masses (voters and parties) and at the elite level” (Morlino, 1998; Casal Bertoa, 2017). Although often used in research, the concept of party system institutionalization, originally developed by Huntington (1968) and then applied by Panebianco (1988) as a multidimensional phenomenon, using four, three, or even two or one dimension depending on context and research question (Bielasiak,

2002; Meleshevich, 2007; Mair, 1997; Casal Bertoa, 2017). Still, the stability in the pattern of interparty competition, the stability of strong roots in society, the legitimacy of political parties and elections, and the cohesion of party organizations are generally accepted measures of party institutionalization (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), that have subsequently been widely extended to study of Latin America, Asia, Africa and post-communist Europe (Stockton, 2001; Kuenzi & Limbright, 2001; Boogards, 2007).

Meanwhile, until 1998, all PSI dimensions were formed around the mass level, but Morlino (1998) argues that the elite level is essential because it reflects the extent to which the party leadership was able to support the structure of the party system. Often, problems with the replacement of party leadership were considered the main problem, for example, in Spain in 1988 after the death of PSD leader Francisco Sa' Carneiro, since it led to severe internal conflicts and cleavages among elites, including the creation of new parties and searching for a worthy candidate for the post (Morlino, 1998). Mass level (maintaining loyalty among the electorate) and individual level (continuity of transfer of power) require institutions of power to create political measures that reflect the interests of specific segments of society.

In this regard, we will try to understand whether these political measures - youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy" and youth quota contribute to maintaining loyalty among young people to the ruling party Amanat and, therefore, maintaining the party system stability, and to what extent the creation of youth wing and youth quotas as political measures reflect perceptions young cohort is a satisfactory measure. This subchapter will first consider the definition of youth, then draw parallels between foreign and domestic literature of youth wing and youth quotas.

4.1.1. Youth and its legal framework in Kazakhstan.

Youth has several definitions used by international UN entities: UN Secretariat, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, and African Youth Charter. The definition of youth first appeared in a UNGA resolution in 1981, which defined youth as a "broad category containing different subgroups but not a demographic entity". Particular subgroups of youth often included youth with special needs (disabled people), divided into rural and urban youth and young women, who demanded that institutions take

the necessary measures to meet their needs (UNGA Resolution 50/81, 1995). Then, Resolution 50/81 (1995) defined the world's youth statistically as those aged 15 to 24. Moreover, UN Security Council Resolution 2250 classified youth as being between ages 18 and 29 (UN Security Council, 2015). The UN Population Fund (2015) defined youth in the age range of 10 to 24. At the same time, the UN believes that youth should be defined by the transition from childhood to adulthood when a person completes basic education and finds their first job (UNDESA, 2015). OECD (2015) expands the age limit to 29 years since young people study at universities longer and enter the workforce later. There is no consensus on youth age categories, and various definitions are used differently in regions and organizations.

A comprehensive vision defines youth (UNESCO, 2014) as “agents of change, social transformation, peace and sustainable development”. Therefore, UNESCO (2014) defines four life stages of transition from continuing education to entering work, from realizing citizenship to developing a healthy lifestyle. These life stages of transitions are contained in the Program of Actions and Directions for Work with Youth in the Youth Operational Strategy between 2014–2021. UNFPA (2015) highlights the phenomenon of “demographic dividend”, which refers to the potential for economic growth as a result of changes in the age structure of the population. The demographic dividend occurs due to the excess of the working population aged 15–64 over non-working population less than 15 and over 64 years old. Properly implemented supportive policies and investments in human capital, particularly youth, can have significant cumulative effects. It needs a strong economic-political supporting framework (UNFPA, 2015).

Youth in Kazakhstan is defined statistically. The age limit for Kazakhstani youth is 14-35. Youth issues were reflected in the Strategy of Kazakhstan – 2050 for the first time, approved by the then-President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. The main goal of the Strategy is to reach the number of thirty developed countries in the world by 2050. In this, a significant role is given to youth, whom the state hopes to continue the creative path of the adult generation and ensure prosperity and recognition for the country. By 2013, a new concept of state youth policy is adopted – “Kazakhstan - 2020: the path to the future”. Two years later, the Law “on State Youth Policy in Kazakhstan,” dated

February 9, 2015, was approved, which determines the age limit of youth - these are citizens aged 14–29 years and defines the goal and objectives of youth policy. In 2022, as part of the improvement Law “on youth policy”, amendments were introduced to volunteer activities, the concept “NEET youth” (unemployment youth) was adopted, and activities of youth resource centers were expanded. In addition, the age limit for defining youth was increased to 35 years.

The legal regulation of the status of youth is enshrined in Law “On General Military Duty and Military Service” of 1993, aimed at preparing youth for military duties and defence of the country. The Law “On Physical Culture and Sports” of 2014 provides for the provision of a healthy lifestyle and the development of physical culture for youth. The state creates children's and youth sports schools, children's clubs, health camps, specialized schools for disabled children and medical clinics. The Law “On Employment” of 2001 regulates the state’s provision of assistance in the employment of target groups of the population, which includes youth under 21, children in orphanages, orphans, and those without parental care under 23. Finally, the Law “On Education” of 2007 spells out the rights of citizens to free primary and secondary education provided by the state. The universal right to free education dates to Soviet times and was continued in independent Kazakhstan. The regulatory and legislative framework of Kazakhstan contains provisions affecting the life of youth and reflect progress in the country. Since 2013, the National Report “Youth of Kazakhstan” has been published annually in Kazakhstan with the support of the Committee on Youth Affairs of the Ministry of Education and Science of Kazakhstan that analyzes general provisions and the state youth policy in the areas of education and science, labour, healthcare, employment, entrepreneurship and socio-political processes (National Report, 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021; 2022).

Therefore, youth is a change from a dependent condition to an autonomous condition without an established age range, but for political and statistical purposes, it is still determined by age cohort (UN Security Council, 2015), which is the primary means of social transformation (Tremmel et.al., 2015), or the country’s demographic dividend containing the potential for further economic growth and development of the political system (UNFPA, 2015).

Youth are often expressed in non-traditional means of participation, such as mass movements against long-standing regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (Ashmawy, 2018; Collins, 2011) or resort to informal forms of participation in the form of crime, extremism, or terrorism, which poses a threat to the political stability and national security or is politically apathetic or distrustful (Quintelier, 2007). In traditional means of participation, youth are expressed in the form of support or rejection of certain party principles or ideology, enjoyment of party membership, participation in discussions, obtaining political office, and influencing public policy (De Roon, 2020; Doyon, 2020; 2023; Malafaia, 2018).

In fact, there is little empirical research on the role of youth wings in engaging youth in traditional means of participation (Ohmura et al., 2018; Hooghe et al., 2004), and little research on the extent to which the creation of youth wings is legitimate and promotes support for voting for political party.

4.1.2. Youth wing: application in foreign states and Kazakhstan.

At the country level, studies on youth wings have focused on the gender gap in electoral (participation in elections) and non-electoral (working in parties) ambitions among young women and men (Ammassari et.al., 2022), bringing legal clarity to the regulation of youth wing (Chandranegara, 2021), in the support by the youth of the youth wing of PAS Youth (Malaysia) of (neo)conservative views and a state oriented towards Islamism, despite the initially assumed hypothesis of supporting post-Islamism (Liow, 2011; Muller, 2014), the transformation of young recruits as they enter youth organization of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China (Doyon, 2023), processes of mobilization, involvement in party activities, participation in the decision-making process, taking into account their opinions when making decisions, nominating youth to functional positions, and approving young candidates to participate in legislative elections and local government and membership (Ashmawy, 2018; Noren - Nilsson, 2021; De Roon, 2020).

Empirical evidence indicates that membership of nine youth wings in the Netherlands is declining faster than that of the mother party, suggesting that young people are less likely to join political parties than their older counterparts (De Roon, 2020). However, disaggregated data from

party youth wings and their political parties showed mixed results, with some youth wings having a high membership base in contrast to other youth wings. In addition, the results of testing in a multilevel model reject the assertion that youth wings with postmaterialist values have more members than youth wings adhering to social conservative ideology. The hypothesis of a positive relationship between organizational age and youth wing membership was also not supported, despite previous suggestions that increasing organizational age may influence youth wing membership levels (De Roon, 2020). Noren-Nilsson (2021) finds that the transition from competitive authoritarianism to a hegemonic regime was accompanied by the significant influence of the youth wing under the Cambodian People's Party. As it turned out, the opposition of young people against the revival of authoritarianism was soon eclipsed and obscured by the vast youth apparatus. Youth wings in Cambodia, created by the ruling elite, have successfully curbed political competition. The youth mobilization by the youth wing was supposed to improve youth representation. Instead, it became a political tool that determined the nature of activism and strengthened the natural reproduction of generations, where children of the political elite built their political careers (Noren-Nilsson, 2021).

Other studies have been devoted to the activities of various participants in opposition youth wings and other non-governmental organizations (Vong, 2022; Doyon, 2019; Kaliyeva et al., 2019; Schwartz, 2007). Examples from post-Soviet countries confirm an unexpected level of dynamism in youth mobilization, where many youth wings: Youth Yabloko under the Liberal Yabloko Party, the Union of Youth "For the Motherland" under the Nationalist Motherland Party or Liberal Union of Right Forces party opposed Putin administration, participating in all kinds of protests, unlike other pro-Putin youth wings Nashi and Youth Guard of the dominant party (Schwartz, 2007; Petukhov, 2020; Radaev, 2019). Alternatively, the protests of Kyrgyz youth against the deployment of OSCE police mission aimed at suppressing violence in the south, in which four youth wings, Ak Shumkar, Ar Namys, Ata Jurt and Communist Party interacted at once (Yuldashev & Sahin, 2015). Political elites have realized that they will need to win the support of young people at the expense of the welfare of the larger society. Therefore, in authoritarian regimes, classical resource mobilization theory emphasizes the critical role of the organization in coordinating collective action (McCarthy &

Zald, 1977) are sometimes youth wings called *ersatz-social movements* that have the characteristics of social movements but are deliberately developed and supported by essential regime actors. Unlike Russia and Kyrgyzstan (Schwartz, 2007; Koesel & Bunce, 2013), youth wings in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine have different characteristics that have made them successful. Otpar in Serbia, then Kmara in Georgia and Pora in Ukraine created a joint opposition front against electoral fraud. The spirit of youth revolution in these countries played an important role in mobilizing a wide range of people to achieve a range of social goals. Coordinated communication inside and outside the youth wings enabled the link centre and the periphery to be fully efficient.

In Russia, according to the Levada Center in 2005, most Russian youth know about subcultures such as *skinheads and neo-fascists* than about youth wings, where 48% could not remember at least one youth wing. The situation is similar in Belarus under President Lukashenko, where students were recruited into the Republican Youth Union to participate in pro-government mass events (Korosteleva, 2013). In other words, in Russia and Belarus, youth wings were created to support the goals and objectives of political parties. However, there is a lack of awareness among young people about youth wings that can penetrate society thoroughly despite holding numerous forums.

Most authors testify that the pro-government youth mobilization is particularly pronounced during election periods (Koesel & Bunce, 2013), which, in addition to youth, also indirectly affects other segments of society. In other words, high mobilization during election periods discouraged the opposition from challenging the election results because the expectation of political change was low and, conversely, with a low level of mobilization potential by government institutions, it led to coup attempts (Jenkins, 1983; Liow, 2011; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). Thus, the mobilization of young society during election periods warned about the strength of the regime and thereby complicated opposition mobilization efforts.

Much research on youth has addressed the topic of declining voter turnout (Prainsack & Vodanovic, 2013; Pickard, 2015). Prainsack and Vodanovic (2013) went even further by conducting surveys on youth voting incentives, highlighting, among other things, the fulfilment of “civic duty”,

then opportunities to “vote for young candidates”, and finally, policies aimed at “youth in matters of economic growth and unemployment”. Lowering the voting age for youth under 16 played a significant role in Austria in 2008. The turnout of young first-time voters increased in line with the turnout of the general electorate. Two institutes – the Austrian Institute for Social Research and Consultation and the Institute for Strategic Analysis pointed out the bold role of lowering the age of youth and, therefore, involving them in politics. However, institutions indicated that youth were self-critical enough to question their knowledge of politics and demonstrate a need for even more information. In other words, young people sought information other than keywords or party slogans. In general, young people express high confidence in the political institution of the European Parliament but note low satisfaction with political parties and deputies. Not only does lowering the voting age affect youth interest in politics, but youth wings also help political parties define and agitate policies and, in some cases, implement policies despite the opposition of some political parties. The youth wing is an attractive entry point for young people into politics. The task of the youth wing is to promote the emergence of new ideas and talents while guaranteeing youth representation in politics. The youth wing is seen as a bridge between parties and young voters, helping the former reach out to the latter, engaging young people in political debate, and developing skills and connections for future careers.

Prainsack and Vodanovic (2013) argue that parties with strong youth wings soon have significant advantages. As most Russian studies argue, young people aged 18–24 years and 25–34 years (69% and 56%) are highly interested in change according to a sociological survey conducted in 2019 (Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2014-2019; Levada Center, 2019). Youth demands for change are clearly demonstrated in the implementation of the “idea of social justice”, which increased by ten sub-items between 2014 and 2018. Also, Russian youth supports “the idea of democracy, human rights and freedom of personal expression”, which has also grown by 12 points from 2014 to 2018. However, the most desired change among young people is “the idea of rapprochement with developed countries (the West) and joining a common European home”, which showed a two-fold increase from 14% to 29% between 2014–2018 (Petukhov, 2020). Radaev (2019)

states that between 2011-2013, youth were apathetic and ignored “ballot protests”, but by 2019, the situation changed towards activating young people in protest actions. According to the authors, the reasons for the activation of youth are considered to be a change in the demographic composition of youth, where Generation Y or millennials born between (1982–2000) were supplanted by centennials or Generation Z, born in 2000 (Radaev, 2019). As noted above, generation Z’s ideological attitudes and behavioural practices were noticeably different. The situation among youth has been further aggravated by the long-term economic crisis, which modern youth, unlike the “tempered” older generation, have not previously encountered. The leading positions in politics, entrepreneurship and other areas were firmly occupied by the seventies generation that was not even 50 years old and was not inclined to “give way to the young”. Youth who have received a higher education diploma and realized that a diploma does not yet mean employment find themselves in a difficult situation. According to WCIOM data from 2020, a high proportion of young people (between 18–24 and 25–34) lost their jobs or believed they would lose their jobs soon, which amounted to 54% and 57%. Therefore, the relevance of democratic discourse is considered the most optimal model and is accepted by most youth in Russia, in contrast to the authoritarian method of using security forces, which was not supported by 70% of young people. On the one hand, young people are dissatisfied with the curtailment of rights and freedoms, expressed in the right to disseminate information, and express their views. On the other hand, youth are dissatisfied with the underrepresentation of their interests in politics, with 48% saying that “politicians are not interested in their opinions”. In comparison, 66% of youth believe that “young people should have more opportunities to express themselves in politics”.

A literature review comparing Kazakhstani youth with Russian youth indicates a similar division between Generation Y, millennials born in 1980–1990, and Generation Z, born in 2000 and above (Laruelle and Royce, 2019). However, unlike Russian youth, Kazakhstani youth are more individualistic, prefer a market economy, less support for the reduction of social inequality and less prefer the public policy of protection against social inequality. Even though Generation Y and Z, or the so-called Nazarbayev generation independent Kazakhstan, is economically liberal, it does not

mean it is disposed towards a democratic regime. Studies suggest that Kazakhstani youth is not supportive of democracy (Burkhanov et al., 2019; Sharipova, 2019). The views of Kazakhstani youth largely converge on issues of language and differ on issues of Kazakh identity. According to a 2005 survey, young people identified themselves from an ethnic point of view - Kazakhs, while in 2016 surveys, youth views changed to a civic identity - Kazakhstan (Burkhanov et al., 2019). Regarding language, Kazakhs (87%) and Russians (55.6%) agree with the statement that “every citizen should speak the Kazakh language”, which indicates Russian recognition of the need to learn the Kazakh language (Burkhanov et al., 2019). Sharipova (2019) conducts a youth survey and supports it with qualitative research, in which the concept “Kazakhstani” is defined by youth as having Kazakh citizenship, birth and living more time in the homeland, knowledge of the Kazakh language, respect for laws and political institutions, knowledge of history and being a patriot. Despite the high percentage of youth responses that vary between 73% and 95%, youth often confuse civic identity - respect for laws and political institutions of power with nativist identity, i.e., being born in the homeland (Sharipova, 2019).

Therefore, the nation is understood at the level of ethnicity as the old ideology of the Soviet Union, while throughout the world, the nation is understood at the level of citizenship. Kazakhstanis are not only ethnic Kazakhs, but they are also every citizen, including those of another ethnicity living in Kazakhstan.

Youth aged 18–29 in Kazakhstan are socialized into politics by presidential authoritarianism and patronage policies (Junisbai et.al., 2017), they are less altruistic and less involved in civic initiatives (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung survey, 2015), they are not particularly fascinated by “Western values”, only 5% of youth consider America a good model of development, 13% of youth prefer European model, 22% adhere to Russian model of development and 43% of youth speak out about a unique development path for Kazakhstan (Council for youth policy under the President of Kazakhstan, 2014).

Lacking any previous experience of Soviet rule, Nazarbayev's generation (from the early 2000s) grew up in a period of economic growth, where oil revenues increased GDP per capita from

1,130 USD in 1999 to 12,400 USD in 2012, and authoritarian consolidation. This left an imprint on young people's economic, social, and political attitudes because they were not faced with an alternative to the candidacy of then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Its premise is that of a privatized system where most public goods were monetized, and a socialist welfare state was a thing of the past, where expectations for providing a wide range of public services from the government were modest. The political views of young people coincide with Nazarbayev regime, where the acceptance of nepotism and the promotion of private interests through a personal group or clan (natives of the same region, university classmates or friends) is considered the generally accepted norm, although generally not approved by society. Personalistic and clientelist ties extend from the highest echelon of political power to the lowest, characteristic of the authoritarian regime of Kazakhstan. The youth did not have the opportunity to compare and evaluate political system to others as they grew up within it.

According to Junisbai et.al. (2017), institutional context plays an important role; democratic theory argues that a competitive environment instils in youth a political culture of pluralism towards competitive elections, political parties, participation in civic associations, rallies, and protests. Where there is no competitive environment and only one leader dominates, the Nazarbayev generation hard to learn the virtues of pluralism. Preventing ideas and opinions from being challenged is done in the name of stability. Therefore, political pluralism and political stability are compared as opponents, where political stability is considered healthy and harmonious, in contrast to political pluralism that is considered a threat. Since Nazarbayev's generation grew up in conditions of political stability, it is unlikely that they will be inclined to question the government. At the same time, they will be less likely to develop a culture of political competition, as democratic theory assumes.

Considering the differences between Russian and Kazakh youth, the legacy of the Soviet Union is gradually giving way to a new paradigm in which many younger generations gradually began to renew public administration, but not positions in political parties. According to the Agency of Public Administration in Kazakhstan, as of the end of 2021, the total number of civil servants is 88,409 people, of which 49,031 or 55.5% are women and 39,378 or 44.5% are men. Youth under 29

accounted for 19,107 people or 21.6%. 10,223 youth work in central government bodies, and 8,884 youth work in local executive bodies. The total number of youths occupying various leadership positions in civil service (heads of division, deputy directors of departments, directors of departments) is 1,752. Of these, 667 are in leadership positions in central government positions, and 1,085 are in local executive bodies. In contrast, there is only 1 young deputy in Mazhilis of Parliament under 29, and the total number of young deputies in Maslikhat is 264 people, of which 180 are men and 84 are women. It is important to note that while youth may be involved in implementing public administration tasks and functions of the state, they are not responsible for making public policy or accepting political decisions.

The youth wing “Zhas Otan” was first created on January 4, 2000, at a meeting of the Bureau Political Council of the “Otan” party (later renamed to the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” under Amanat party). The youth wing aims to create conditions for comprehensive youth development in social, economic, and political spheres, building up intellectual and physical potential. The youth wing “Zhas Otan” is the only politicized youth organization that shares and supports the ideas “Otan” parties. The youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” is considered a young public association by Western standards (De Roon, 2020). It has a scattered network of youth wing branches throughout republic: Abay regional branch, Akmola regional branch, Aktobe regional branch, Almaty regional branch, Atyrau regional branch, East Kazakhstan regional branch, Zhambyl regional branch, Zhetisu regional branch, West Kazakhstan regional branch, Karaganda regional branch, Kostanay regional branch, Kyzylorda regional branch, Mangistau regional branch, Pavlodar regional branch, North Kazakhstan regional branch, Turkestan regional branch, Ulytau regional branch, Astana city branch, Almaty city branch, and Shymkent city branch. The youth wing branches operate in 17 regions and 3 cities, including a central office in Astana. To achieve the goals of the youth wing to build the intellectual youth potential, develop an anti-corruption culture, and promote a healthy lifestyle, youth are involved in cultural, scientific, sports and educational events. The tasks presented in program documents for the Amanat party are explained to the youth, and they are actively involved in attracting youth to its ranks and supporting its goals and objectives. The youth wing interacts with regional and city branches of

the Amanat party, authorized government bodies, the Committee for Youth and Family Affairs under the Ministry of Information and Social Development of Kazakhstan, with vice-rectors and deans for educational work of structural divisions of various universities and colleges, law enforcement agencies, employment departments and social protection.

Congress is the highest governing body of the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” that is held at least once every four years. The conference is the highest governing body of the branches’ youth wing; the decision council holds a conference at least once every two years. In turn, the Central Council is considered the governing body of the youth wing, convened by the chairman of the youth wing.

In 2008, the 1st Congress youth wing “Zhas Otan” was held, at which it was awarded the status of republican public association, and the Charter and Strategy until 2011 were adopted. Four years later, the youth wing held its 2nd Congress, at which a wide range of people were presented, including leader of the Nur-Otan parties, then-president Nursultan Nazarbayev. The youth wing implemented ideas leader Nur-Otan party. For example, at the 2nd Congress youth wing, then-president Nursultan Nazarbayev noted that the action “Zhastar-Otanga!” he initiated laid the foundation for good deeds and other initiatives such as “With a diploma to rural”, within the framework of which more than 20 thousand youth returned to rural areas after graduating from universities (Akorda, 2012).

These initiatives encouraged the youth wing to expand and intensify work with students. They emphasized its role in associations with the most active youth, in the political coordination of youth, in forming a broad coalition of students, young scholars and workers, and in contributing to the mobilization of supporters in presidential and parliamentary elections. At subsequent Congresses 3, 4 and 5, the role of youth in implementing strategic and government programs was discussed. Topics control over the construction of hostels for youth, the creation of digitalization centres and healthy lifestyle activities were touched upon. At the 5th Congress, “Zhastar-Otanga!” program was adopted until 2025; its peculiarity lies in Roadmaps (Roadmap, 2019). The program contains 3,000 proposals from various youth groups throughout the country, where regional, city and district road maps have been developed for effective program implementation. A roadmap for implementing the “Zhastar-Otanga!” program is divided into five areas: civic engagement, quality education, employment,

support for young families and affordable housing, personal development, and leisure. For example, roadmap for Astana city in direction of civic engagement contains various activities such as increasing the share of participation of representatives of youth organizations as election observers to 30%, expanding youth participation in internal party primaries (about 150 youth), promoting volunteer activities through the creation special projects covering 50,000 people over 5 years, increasing youth in “Ardagerlerdi Ardaktayik” project in order to form continuity and respect for older generation among young people, in organizing work youth and military-patriotic movements “Zhas Sarbaz”, “Zhas Kyran” and “Zhas Ulan” with coverage 35,000 youth over 5 years, participation of youth in project office “Astana-Adaldyq Alany”, implementation “New Wave” youth award to encourage youth for active work in field of youth policy with coverage 5,000 people for 5 years, encouragement and support of volunteer initiatives in “Year Volunteer” project with participation of 1,000 youth over 5 years, the work of youth council under *akimat* Astana city, the participation of youth in Public Council in Astana city and others.

To implement the roadmap “Zhastar-Otanga!” program, the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy”, as first half 2023s, is conducting a joint project with the Ministry of labor and Social Protection population to employ university graduates and unemployed youth in the implementation of the project “Zhastarga Zhumys” with the participation 3,500 organizations, 18,600 youth were employed, mass involvement of youth in entrepreneurship through consultations 30,000 people on government programs within the framework “Zhastarga Kenes” consulting centers (Report on activities of youth wing, 2023). In addition, the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” initiated projects such as “TazaLike” to develop environmental thinking; 950 environmental actions were carried out to organize cleanup days, plant trees, plogging, and solve other environmental problems. The project “Menin Elim – Menin Tilim” is aimed at popularizing and involving youth in learning the Kazakh language, within the framework of which speaking clubs “Soyle” operate in 12 regions (mainly northern, western, and central regions of the country), in which 504 lessons (756 hours) were held with 18 teachers. The “Beine” project aims to promote youth hard work through video and photo stories; social networks highlight representatives of various subcultures (athletes, artists, workers) who instill a love of hard


work. The youth wing has initiated several other projects aimed at maintaining a healthy lifestyle such as “Zhuldyzdy Liga”, promoting folk art and instilling patriotism in the “Domyra party”, preventing and combating narcomania in “Esirtkige zhol zhok”. “Qaisar” project was launched in 2022 on behalf of President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev at the 22nd Extraordinary Congress Amanat party to eradicate the trend of evasion from military service, in which 120 youths selected from 3,000 people took part in regional selections.


There is the Republican Council for Youth Support aimed at implementing and monitoring the election program “Halykpen Birge!”. The Chairman of the Council for youth support is deputy Mazhilis of Parliament Nartai Sarsengaliev. In the first half of 2023, three meetings were held on topics of mass distribution of electronic cigarettes and vapes among youth, narcotic and synthetic drugs, bullying and cyberbullying, suicide prevention, and a comprehensive plan for the protection of children from violence was discussed, as a result of which 57 recommendations were made. By the end of 2023, the youth wing plans to hold four more meetings on the quality of education in technical and vocational institutions, including quality training and employment, housing, gambling addiction, gambling, the work of bookmakers and unemployment. The total number of members of the Republican Youth Support Council is 24 people (Report on the activities of the youth wing, 2023).

In pre-election campaigning during the elections of deputies Mazhilis of Parliament and Maslikhats of all levels on March 19, 2023, 10,000 activists - agitators from all regions of the country were involved. The youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” carried out various “Door to Door” campaigns, which covered more than 100,000 apartments and houses throughout the republic, the “Menin tandauym AMANAT” (my choice Amanat party) campaign, which involved the hanging of more than 3,500 flags by activists, members and supporters of youth wing windows of buildings and houses, the mass performance of anthems in crowded places with the participation of more than 3,000 activists youth wing, the holding speedcubing championship “AMANAT №1”, as well as “Bir tolkynda” concerts, at which election campaigning was held with participation of parliamentary candidates from parties and proxies, various challenges covering about 40,000 people “Rukhtarstarmen Birge”, “AMANAT-ka dauys ber”, “Bir tolkynda”.

Similar to the Levada Center survey 2005, we checked how many youths living in different regions of Kazakhstan know about the youth wing or have heard about the activities of the youth wing, which aims to understand the youth wing’s penetration into society. It turned out that 652 people, or 38.9% do not know about youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy”. However, only 1,023 people or 61.08%, either know “a little”, know “some extent” or know “very much”. The predominant answer is “Yes, a little”, which amounted to 38.5%. Regarding the hear about the activities of youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” among students, only 326 respondents or 20.72% “Never hear”, 599 people or 38.1% “Rarely hear”, contrary to 357 people or 22.7% “Very often hear” and 291 people or 18.5% “Always hear” (Figure – 11).

Figure – 11. Youth on knowledge and hear of activities of youth wing (March 2023).





Source: compiled by the author according to second wave survey, conducted in March 2023.

Therefore, youth from universities and colleges who know the youth wing are outnumbered by those who need to be made aware. Whereas most youth either “rarely” or “never” hear about the activities of the youth wing, in contrast to youth hearing about the activities of the youth wing “Very often” and “Always”. This indicates that although the youth wing has penetrated into society because young people know about the youth wing, apparently, young people are less heard about the activities of the youth wing aimed at the socialization of youth, and the recruitment of young members. The activities of the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” correspond to the connections described in the literature between a political party and youth wing expressed in “dual membership», similar ideology and financial support” (Hooghe, et. al., 2004; Liow, 2011; Malafia, 2018).

4.1.3. Youth quota: application experience in foreign states and Kazakhstan.

The Amanat party recognizes the important role that youth play in driving political and economic change. As such, the Amanat party in addition to creation of the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy”, initiated the creation of youth quotas for the first time in Kazakhstan in 2020. Youth quotas refer to “the percentage of P that has the function of restricting access to P slots within the system, so that elements with the property of citation can occupy these slots”; in other words, the percentage of seats in political parties held by young parliamentary candidates (Belschner, 2021; Belschner et al.,

2021; Conrad, 1976; Tremmel et al., 2015). This helps to ensure that youth have a voice in the political process. Foreign literature shows that the introduction of youth quotas at the constitutional level in Tunisia and Morocco was prompted by public uprisings of youth and championed by a new cohort of political leaders such as Paul Kagame, Ali Bongo, and King Mohammed VI (Asseburg & Wimmen, 2016; Belschner, 2021; De Paredes & Desrues, 2021). It is worth noting that out of eight countries that implemented youth quotas, seven were African states with authoritarian or semi-democratic regimes, such as Kenya, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Uganda. Interestingly, Arab Gulf countries, Libya, Syria, and Jordan did not introduce youth quotas despite similar uprisings in 2011 (Belschner, 2021; Dobbs, 2022). It is important to mention that youth quotas are not distributed equally across all African countries. In Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, the mandatory reserved seats for youth are much smaller than those for women. Additionally, youth quotas are shared with workers and disabled people in upper parliaments (Belschner & Garcia de Paredes, 2021; Dobbs, 2022).

Separately, the literature discusses the application of youth quotas in the context of political parties. For example, the ruling party National Resistance Movement in Uganda has been criticized for dominating youth quotas (Murias & Wang, 2012; Murias et al., 2013). The study also examines the relationship between quota systems and concepts of egalitarianism and meritocracy. While quota systems can offer moral compensation to historically disadvantaged groups, quota systems can also have “discriminatory side effects” by admitting students with low scores and special needs, affecting the quality of universities (Conrad, 1976; Tremmel et al., 2015). Quotas between women and men can also be beneficial in some cases, such as the selection of candidates for political positions that have an impact on party logic (Childs & Hughes, 2018). However, research shows that minority men are favored over women (Belschner & Garcia de Paredes, 2021; Black, 2000). The aforementioned literature suggests that youth quotas and quotas for marginalized ethnic groups were adopted alongside gender quotas (Belschner, 2021; Belschner & Garcia de Paredes, 2021). While there are numerous studies on the underrepresentation of women in parliament (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Norris, 2009; Tripp & Kang, 2008), research on youth quotas is also gaining attention (Stockemer & Sundström, 2018; 2019; 2022; Youth Participation in National Parliaments, 2018; Youth

Participation in National Parliaments, 2021). Women's and youth quotas are often referred to as pair quotas, which are divided into “double” and “nested” quotas. “Double pair” quotas are independent of each other, while “nested pair” quotas are complementary and reciprocal (Belschner & Garcia de Paredes, 2021). Youth quotas can be categorized into three types: 1) reservation schemes, 2) statutory quota provisions, and 3) voluntary party quotas (Stockemer & Sundström, 2018; 2019). The main difference between these quotas is that the first two are mandatory and legally required, whereas the third one is voluntary. Reservation schemes and statutory quota provisions require political parties to allocate a specific number or share of seats for young people in the legislative body. On the other hand, voluntary party quotas give parties the freedom to decide independently on the threshold and implementation of youth quotas (Stockemer & Sundström, 2018, 2019).

A survey conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union between 2015 and 2017 revealed a significant gender and age imbalance in 146 parliaments. The survey found that middle-aged and older deputies are more represented than young male and young female deputies. Proportional and mixed electoral systems are more likely to favor young women's chances of becoming parliamentary candidates compared to majoritarian systems (Belschner & Garcia de Paredes, 2021 Joshi, 2013). According to Stockemer & Sundström (2018), the proportional system is more suitable for lowering the age of members of parliament than the majoritarian system. The reasons are that the proportional system offers: 1) incentives to diversify the pool of elected candidates for political office. In a majoritarian system, each district is a separate election, and parties try to nominate a candidate who can receive more votes. The parties are confident that this profile includes male candidates of middle and older age, with a dominant nationality and a higher education. In such a situation, young candidates are at a disadvantage because they lack connections and electoral capital. On the other hand, the proportional system contains other incentives in the form of diversity of party lists to reach a more comprehensive number of voters, including young people; 2). The mechanical effects of proportional and majoritarian systems differ in various ways. Proportional systems are party focused, leading to multiparty systems, while majoritarian systems are candidate-oriented and tend to be single-party systems. Barriers to representation are lower in multiparty systems, where party

leadership typically proposes certain types of candidates. For example, in countries such as Germany and the Nordic countries, the Green Party is popular among young voters, and thus, political parties are more likely to nominate young candidates who represent the new generation of representatives. Additionally, these young candidates are more likely to support policies aimed at youth (Joshi, 2013; Stockemer & Sundström, 2018; 2019; 2021); 3). The “contagion effect” of a proportional system is more significant than a majoritarian system. This means that if parties more nominate young candidates, then other parties are likely to follow suit. The proportional system, both nationally and regionally is more powerful because it does not require incumbent representatives to resign. This is because party lists have enough room for additional nominations of young candidates. In majoritarian systems, even if several candidates are nominated, they will only be visible in small constituencies (Joshi, 2013; Stockemer & Sundström, 2018; 2019).

Some countries with high birth rates and young population have introduced youth quotas to gain support. However, the percentage of quota thresholds for youth is generally low. According to the IPU (2018; 2021), the range for youth quota thresholds is between 3–15%. Some countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, have reserved seats for youth aged 35 and 30 respectively, at 3.4 and 1.3%. Meanwhile, Rwanda and Morocco have implemented legally mandated youth quotas that are under 7.7. and 7.6%, respectively. Kyrgyzstan has the highest quotas for youth, at 15% (Youth Participation in National Parliaments, 2018). Other countries have implemented combined quotas for youth, women, and minorities. Voluntary party quotas have been used in over 15 countries, including Angola, Croatia, Cyprus, Mexico, El Salvador, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, and others. In these countries, at least one party used youth quotas, though it is not necessary that the quota was used in the lower house of parliament. For example, in Mexico, a youth quota was used for seats in the Senate (Youth Participation in National Parliaments, 2018).

The minimum age for standing as a candidate in parliament is an essential factor to consider because high age limits legally established for young people prevent them from accessing politics (Krook et al., 2018). The age limit for candidates varies from country to country. For instance, in Austria and Germany, the age limit is 18 years, while in Tajikistan, it is 35 years. Age restrictions

tend to send signals that participation in electoral processes is not possible for young people. On the other hand, legally established rules make access to politics difficult. The minimum age requirement serves as an institutional factor that warns that although youth are allowed to vote, they cannot be elected, ultimately excluding them from full participation in political citizenship. Empirical evidence suggests that minimum age requirements for standing as candidates promote youth representation (Krook et al., 2018). In other words, the lower the age threshold, for example, 18 years, the higher the percentage of young deputies. Vice versa, the higher the minimum age limit, for instance, 25 and 30 years, the lower the number of young candidates in parliament (Krook et al., 2018).

Studies have examined the relationship between youth and their preference for voting for young leaders. One cross-national analysis of 51 states found a weak link between the two (Sevi, 2021). Another study found that a politician's age did not play a significant role in their evaluation by voters (Dobbs, 2020). In states without youth quotas, a multilevel regression model found that youth are less likely to vote with statistical significance at a 1% level ($P\text{-value}=0.000$) (Dobbs, 2022). In states without youth quotas, youth are also 9% less likely to believe that Parliament listens to them, compared to those in states with quotas. This difference was statistically significant at 0.05 level. However, logit regression models suggest that youth quotas did not significantly improve the mobilization of young people to the polls (Dobbs, 2022). Stockemer & Sundström (2022) also found that the minimum age for election to political office and the proportional system have statistically significant results at levels $P\text{-value} < 0.01$ and $P\text{-value} < 0.05$.

Dahlerup (2007) discovered that an increase in quotas is associated with higher levels of democracy. However, research suggests the opposite, hybrid regimes tend to have more quota mechanisms than democratic regimes (Muriaas & Wang, 2012; Tripp & Kang, 2008). This is due to the decline in living conditions caused by the "third wave of democratization". For example, after the collapse of the Soviet regime in Kyrgyzstan, and the participation of youth in mass protests (De Paredes & Desrues, 2021). The socio-political changes that occurred on the continents were part of a structural adjustment program. States introduced programs for the privatization of enterprises and cuts in government spending, which were supposed to improve economic development but instead

led to a sharp reduction in jobs. This, in turn, influenced the growth of social inequality, allowing elites to remain in power (De Paredes & Desrues, 2021; Riddell, 1992). However, with positive demographic change and a new generation of leaders, policy discourse towards youth changed (Muriaas et al., 2013). Semi-structured interviews conducted in non-democratic regimes indicated that the establishment of youth quotas was preceded by the demands of partisan youth, and negotiations between leaders of the youth wing such as PJD with 20,000 members, PI members unknown and PPS with 7,000 members and the regime at the parliamentary level in Morocco (De Paredes & Desrues, 2021).

There is a widely accepted idea that having youth quotas in politics is important to maintain fairness between generations. However, some people argue that this approach can cause “essentialist effects” which means that people will only vote for young candidates, leading to more division between generations. Critics argue that this goes against the principle of democracy and equality since youth can only access politics due to their age, not their merit (Conrad, 1976; Stockemer & Sundström, 2018, 2019). Instead, some have proposed alternative solutions, such as setting long-term goals for developing youth leadership and creating virtual youth movements online that do not have geographical boundaries (Conrad, 1976). These solutions would help youth acquire the necessary leadership skills without causing discord between generations.

Youth quota in Kazakhstan. In 2020, Kazakhstan introduced a unified quota of 30% for youth and women aged up to 29 years. This legislative, policy measure was put in place to encourage political parties to involve young people and women in electoral processes and to promote their participation in public and political life, as well as to increase their access to political positions (Assylgozhina et al., 2023). Several studies have highlighted the positive impact of youth quotas, such as promoting the formation of political party lists that include previously marginalized categories, giving these groups a chance to win seats in political parties. The introduction of youth and women’s quotas can also lead to changes in election programs of political parties, as they take into account the interests of these groups and promote the development of youth wings among political parties (Assylgozhina & Kalenova, 2021; Ionova, 2021; Dukeev, 2015).

In the 2021 parliamentary elections in Mazhilis and Maslikhats Parliament of Kazakhstan, the youth quota was used for the first time. However, 30% of youth and women's quotas were not followed as the decision was left to the political parties to distribute deputy mandates. The party leaders decided on the ratio of youth and women on the party lists. There are several reasons why young people have not been able to become political nominees in Kazakhstan, in accordance with opinion of interview participants. These include the insufficient maturity of young people, the lack of professional experience in carrying out legislative activities, and insufficient awareness of the full depth of problems discussed and the outcomes of decisions made. A study on youth quotas showed that only ten countries (Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Philippines, Rwanda, Uganda) out of 188 states represented in the Inter-Parliamentary Union had established youth quotas, accounting for 5.3% (IPU, 2023). The United States has the highest average age with 58 years in the lower House (House of Representatives) and 64 years in the upper House (Senate). Japan follows, with an average age of 56 years in the lower House, and 57 years in the upper House. Canada has the top three oldest parliamentarians with an average age of 52 years in the lower House and 66 years in the upper House (IPU, 2023). Armenia, Ethiopia, and Gambia have the youngest parliamentarians with an average age of 40, 41, and 43, respectively (IPU, 2023).

Kazakhstan's parliament does not fall into the category of either a gerontocracy or a young parliamentarian group, with the average age of deputies in the Mazhilis being 49 years and in the Senate being 55 years (IPU, 2023). Despite this, the percentage of young parliamentarians in the Mazhilis who 30 years are old or younger is only 4%, with 26% being 40 years old or younger, and 40% being 45 years old or younger. In comparison to other Central Asian states and the Russian Federation, this is a reasonably high percentage compared to Russia (2%, 15% and 27%), Tajikistan (0%, 6% and 16%), and Turkmenistan (0%). However, it is a moderately low compared to Uzbekistan (5%, 29% and 48%) and Kyrgyzstan (1%, 28% and 49%). Therefore, the percentage of young parliamentarians in the Mazhilis aged 40 years and younger in Kazakhstan is moderately low, but higher than in other post-Soviet states (according to data from IPU, 2023).

We have gathered data on the young deputies in the Mazhilis Parliament of Kazakhstan, classified by their age as of September 19, 2023. Our findings reveal that gender parity has not always been maintained in the country. The number of male deputies is significantly higher than that of female deputies, as shown in (Table -3). However, the number of young women parliamentarians in the Mazhilis has gradually increased from 26 to 29 between the 2012 and 2021 elections. Unfortunately, the number sharply decreased to 18 women in the 2023 parliamentary elections. The representation of young women aged 18 - 20 and 21-30 in the Mazhilis is almost non-existent, except for one young woman in the 2023 elections. Moreover, the representation of young women aged 31-35 has gradually declined from 5 women to 0 since the 2016 elections. Therefore, the representation of young women in parliament declined, while the representation of young men steadily increases.

On the other hand, the situation for young male deputies in the age group of 31–35 years is positive. Their representation in the Mazhilis has gradually increased from 3 people in the 2016 elections to 5 and 7 people in subsequent elections.

Table – 3. Number of deputies in the Mazhilis Parliament of Kazakhstan.

Date of election	total number of deputies		including those aged 18–20 years		including those aged 21–30 years		including those aged 31–35 years	
	male	female	male	female	male	female	male	female
December 9, 1995	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
October 10, 1999	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
September 19, 2004	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
August 18, 2007	90	17	-	-	-	-	-	-
January 15, 2012	81	26	-	-	-	-	-	-
March 20, 2016	78	29	0	0	1	0	3	5
January 10, 2021	78	29	0	0	2	0	5	1
March 19, 2023	80	18	0	0	2	1	7	0

Source: Central Election Committee of Kazakhstan.

Additionally, we compared the aforementioned data with data from parliamentarians aged 18–40 years in the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2023).

Table – 4. Number of deputies in the lower chamber Parliament of Kazakhstan.

Date of election	total number of deputies		including those aged 21–30 years		including those aged 31–35 years		including those aged 36–40 years		Youth
	male	female	male	female	male	female	male	female	
January 15, 2012	81	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
March 20, 2016	78	29	1	0	3	5	3	0	12
January 10, 2021	78	29	2	0	5	1	4	8	20
March 19, 2023	80	18	2	1	7	0	11	2	23

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union.

There has been a notable increase in the number of young Members of Parliament (MPs) in recent elections. In 2016, only 12 young MPs were elected, while in 2023, that number rose to 23, according to the International Parliamentary Union in 2023. However, the data also highlights that the number of young men taking up parliamentary seats has grown more than the number of young women.

According to the IPU table, half of the ten young deputies nominated in the last elections were under 35 years of age. These MPs include Adambekov Tlektas, Amanatay Zharkynbek, Mukaev Daulet, Sarsengaliev Nartai, Shatalov Nikita, who took parliamentary seats in Mazhilis, either nominated on party lists or as self-nominated candidates for the Amanat party. The remaining young deputies were elected from other parties, including Zeinullin Ayan from the Auyl party, Naumova Dinara from the Respublica party, Beisenbaev Yerzhan from the Akzhol party, Sailaubay Nauryz from the NSDP party and Sunkar Islam from the People's Party of Kazakhstan. The data suggests that prior to the implementation of youth quotas, only 12 young deputies were elected to Parliament. The introduction of youth quotas in the 2021 election resulted in an increase in the number of young MPs to 20 within age category 21-40.

During an interview, one of the participants shared their thoughts on the application of quotas in political parties. They expressed their satisfaction with the youth quota, as they believed it was a positive step towards the development of political parties in Kazakhstan, citing the example of Baurzhan Baibek, the former Chairman of the Nur-Otan party. They also noted that the Amanat party

has a 30% quota for women and youth that was introduced in the national elections of 2021. The Amanat party had previously held primaries, which were viewed as a closed club with open windows since the entire population watched the internal party selection but could not vote; only party members could vote.


In previous elections, the process of selecting candidates for the Mazhilis and Maslikhats was different. The lists were nominated by the party's central office with input from the regions. However, in 2020, the Amanat party held internal elections to determine who would be nominated for national elections. The party had mini elections in each region, in which the 48,000 Amanat residents in Kyzylorda region voted for their preferred candidates. There was a 30% quota for women and youth, but it was abolished, which is unfortunate. As a result, there is no longer a youth quota, and the 30% quota is only observed at the stage of nomination throughout the region. Many young businessmen, scholars and women joined the party in 2020, which significantly increased the number of young people in the party's ranks. However, this 30% quota is not observed at the stage of mandate distribution, which means that after the nominations, the 30% quota still needs to be met (interview, 2023).


Secondly, the under-representation of young women in Mazhilis is a matter of concern. Participants in interviews were unanimous in their views that the 30% quota for youth and women was being undermined. They suggested that the quotas be reinstated in their original 2020 format, with separate quotas for youth and women. Participants lamented that only the Amanat party was implementing these quotas, while other parties remained indifferent. Moreover, in the past, 30% of regional Maslikhats were reserved for young people, but this is no longer the case. Participants recommended that the entire Republic, all districts, and city Maslikhats should be 30% reserved for youth and women. In total, 21 mandates, or 30% of the 69 mandates in Mazhilis, should be allocated to youth and women, considering the reduction in the number of deputies from 107 to 98 in the 2023 elections. Currently, only 18 women serve in the Mazhilis Parliament, with ages ranging from 26 to 63 years old. According to the election results of March 19, 2023, the Amanat party won 53.90% of the votes and 40 out of 69 mandates via the party list. In Mazhilis, the Amanat party has a total of 8

female deputies (20%), 4 youth deputies under the age of 35 (10%), and 1 deputy with disabilities (2.5%), amounting to a total of 32.5%. Furthermore, the Amanat party won 22 out of 29 single-mandate territorial constituencies.

Thirdly, youth is underrepresented in the Mazhilis Parliament. Out of the 98 mandates presented, only 10 relate to young people, or 10.2%. This is because legislative norms initially did not provide for mandatory quotas when distributing deputy mandates. The low representation of youth in Parliament may also be due to the lack of awareness (Figure - 12). In a second-wave survey conducted as part of our research, young respondents were asked about their attitudes towards the 30% youth quotas before the upcoming 2023 parliamentary elections. The results showed that only 2.8% of youth were aware of the youth quota, 8.5% had some knowledge, 26.3% knew a little, and 62.4% did not know about them at all. Therefore, there is a need to raise awareness among youth, especially those living in the regions of Kazakhstan, about the youth quotas.

Figures – 12. Youth on knowledge and hear of activities of the youth quota (March 2023).





Source: compiled by the author according to second wave survey, conducted March 2023.

During a survey, we wanted to know how frequently young people hear about youth quotas. The results of the survey show that most respondents either rarely (37.4 percent) or never (36.5 percent) hear about youth quotas, while only 12.1 percent hear about it always and 13.9 percent hear about youth quota very often. This indicates that young people might not be aware of the policy measure introduced regarding youth quota.

One participant in a semi-structured interview mentioned that quotas for youth, women, and currently disabled persons are applied in general. Previously, the quota was extended to only women and youth, and now disabled persons have been included in 2023. Essentially, this means that the quota has been reduced. Self-nominated candidates are not affected by quotas. The provision of mandates is open to everyone, but when mandates are issued, 30% are considered according to party lists. The interviewee also mentioned that independent self-nominated candidates are not subject to any quotas at all. With the new electoral system, an increase was observed in self-nominated candidates from political parties, but this was not beneficial for the interviewee as a self-nominated candidate. This is because self-nominated members from the party receive different support, which makes it a disadvantage for independent self-nominated candidates.

Candidates who are at least 25 years old and have been residing in Kazakhstan for the last ten years can be nominated for the position of deputies in Mazhilis. Similarly, persons who are 20 years

old and above may become deputies of Maslikhats. However, those who are incapacitated or serving prison sentences are not eligible to become deputies (Law on Election, 1995).

Under the majoritarian electoral system, 29 out of 98 seats in the Mazhilis Parliament were allocated based on this system. This includes 2 mandates each in Astana and Shymkent cities, the Almaty region, the Zhambyl region, and the Karaganda region, 3 mandates each in Almaty city and the Turkestan region, and 1 mandate in other regions of Kazakhstan. In the 2023 parliamentary elections, two types of self-nominated candidates participated: independent self-nominated candidates and self-nominated candidates from political parties.

Low youth representation in Maslikhats can be attributed to the mutually beneficial relationship between deputies and the head of *Akimat*. Only established business representatives and influential figures become deputies (Dukeev, 2015). They often prioritize their personal interests, such as protecting their businesses and lobbying for their interests over the public interest. This leads to cooperation between Akimat and Maslikhat deputies, where deputies approve budgets without complaints in exchange for protection from inspections and government orders from Akimat. This arrangement benefits both parties but fails to address local population problems. To address this issue, the participation of youth in regional representative elections through youth quotas needs to be increased.

In the electoral process, young self-nominated candidates and young self-nominated candidates from political parties must go through three stages: application and registration, financing, and campaigning. To become a Maslikhat's deputy, the candidate must complete the first stage, which involves submitting a copy of their ID and filling out an application and CV at the regional election commission. Their data will be checked for reliability. To receive a certificate as a candidate for deputy, in addition to the previous steps, the youth must pay a fee and submit a tax declaration for №250 on property and financial accounts. This form will also be checked for accuracy. The election commission removed opposition-minded youth from elections due to discrepancies in data in the declaration or unreliable data in applications (Dukeev, 2015). The discrepancy sum was often small, reaching only 500 tenges or 10 tenges.

The election fee for young self-nominated candidate for Maslikhat deputy positions is 5 times the minimum wage or 350,000 tenge. For candidates running for Mazhilis deputy positions, the fee is 15 times the minimum wage or 1,050,000 tenge (as of October 2023). If the candidates for either Maslikhats or Mazhilis win or gain at least 5% of votes, or die, the amount is refunded to them. Young people, which include students and young professionals, receive the minimum wage, and require financial support to sustain themselves, making it challenging to nominate themselves for elections (Dukeev, 2015). However, there is a group of youth who are passionate about politics and usually pursue social and humanitarian studies, public administration, public policy, and international relations. They actively participate in university self-governance but face difficulties finding jobs after graduation. This leads to them losing interest in politics and staying in the sidelines.

According to Law “on election” (2021), a candidate running for the position of Maslikhat deputy can spend up to 550,000 tenge from the Republican budget on March 19, 2023. Candidates can also appear on a TV or radio program, publish two articles in print media at the cost of 350,000 tenges, produce campaign materials at the cost of 130,000 tenges, and spend 70,000 tenges on transportation costs. The total amount of state support for a candidate running for Mazhilis deputy is 950,000 tenge, which is distributed as follows; 450,000 tenge for media distribution, 300,000 tenge to produce campaign materials, and 200,000 tenge for transportation costs. Although this amount may seem significant, it is still less than the actual cost of many campaign activities. For instance, publishing an article in online media costs between 300,000 to 500,000 tenge, an interview or photo report on TV ranges from 700,000 to 1,000,000 tenge, a one-minute video on television costs between 200,000 to 300,000 tenge, and a YouTube interview could cost around 3,000,000 tenge. Similarly, publishing an advertisement on a billboard or screen in the city can cost between 100,000 to 200,000 tenge. These costs reflect only one service unit, and running a campaign for an entire month would require significant financial resources to avoid being overshadowed by other candidates in the election campaign.

It is worth noting that budget money for campaigns is not simply handed out. It can be difficult to receive money from service providers, so personal funds and donations are often allowed.

However, the process of transferring or replenishing these funds can be complicated as it requires offline account replenishments, which can only be done through a specific account opened in Halyk Bank. Additionally, mobile banking cannot be connected to this account. Since any unused personal funds located in a special account will be returned to the state budget at the end of the campaign, it is best to deposit funds at the time of payment transactions. However, this can lead to long queues at the cash desk and with the manager to pay for services, and bank commissions for the service are also charged. Therefore, the maximum size of election funds for campaigning should not exceed 700 monthly salaries, which is equivalent to 49,000,000 tenge.

There are also some specific details that need to be considered during the campaigning process. Firstly, only registered media companies that have applied for registration in advance are allowed to distribute propaganda materials. If this rule is violated, the service provider will be held responsible, and the nominee will be disqualified. Secondly, media companies must use original contracts and accounting documents in their work, and they are usually located in Almaty city. Thirdly, proof of payment for services from budget funds is required, which can be in the form of links to videos or finished publications. However, most service providers require prepayment or payment within 3-5 days, and the transfer of budget funds is often delayed indefinitely. As a result, it can be difficult or even impossible to spend budget funds. Fourthly, it is not allowed to offer campaign activities as a service, such as providing free consultations. Fifth, government bodies and organizations are not allowed to participate in campaign events, even if the candidate works there. Semi-structured interview participants noted that there were 29 self-nominated candidates in the elections, out of which 22 won. These were self-nominated Amanat members who had strong support for financing their program. The interview participants argued that it was not easy for an ordinary person like them to compete with the same party, which endlessly launches commercials on television. The cost of lighting the campaign is enormous and it is much easier to be a party's self-nominated candidate as there are no such prohibitions for a party to advertise their candidate. One of the participants also mentioned that she did not prepare the budget in advance, nor did she do the work to present something during the election race. She incurred minimal costs and roughly

calculated that with subsidies from the state and everything else, it comes out to about 40-50 million tenge, which is the average price of an average program.

In conclusion, several research has been conducted on the issue surrounding youth wings. This has highlighted the increased importance of these wings, particularly in light of the communist and post-communist past (Janusauskiene, 2002). The older and younger generations have differing values regarding socialization, economics, and public policy. The existence of a Youth Communist Union, or *Komsomol*, in the older generation Soviet regime, including Kazakhstan, is not a new concept. Nowadays, young people are more open to change and adapt more quickly because millennials or (Generation Z) due to their superior information processing skills. However, retaining young people is challenging, given the formation of their views and values as they grow older. Therefore, according to Hooghe et.al. (2004), creating a youth wing is highly effective in providing recruits with a platform to grow, recruit new personnel, and carry out activities aimed at mobilizing youth. These activities include representing youth issues in Parliament and negotiating on their behalf. Literature on youth wings emphasizes youth mobilization through outreach work that highlights their activities and those of political parties in general (Liow, 2011). An example of this can be seen in Malaysia, where the youth wing of the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party mobilizes young people, dividing them into Muslim and non-Muslims. For Muslim groups, political negotiations take place through the creation of discussion groups and special camps. These groups identify potential leaders who are typically recruited for political positions. Meanwhile, the youth wing of PAS focuses on other means of mobilization for non-Muslim groups, such as cultural and sporting events or social media, in close collaboration with the Department of Culture, Arts, and Sport. This highlights that to mobilize youth into politics, it is not enough to simply rely on youth grievances; youth wing leaders must also create motives, resources, and opportunities for collective action (Liow, 2011).

The youth wing plays an essential role in representing the issues faced by the youth in the legislative body. Usually, the youth wing gathers different proposals regarding youth problems and tries to influence the decisions made by representatives of affiliated political parties or young deputies elected to Parliament under a youth quota. In this way, youth wings act as lobby groups. According

to Mycock and Tonge (2012), young people consider the UK's political parties to be immature and often controversial in their approach to debate, policymaking, and messaging to young people. This prevailing attitude has led to a divide between young people and political parties, as indicated by low levels of party identification and reluctance to join and campaign for a political party. This divide is further reinforced by political parties' use of negative propaganda that is contrary to the interests of young people or ignores their voices. Political parties' discourses usually put young people in the future tense and are infrequently consultative or interpret young people's needs from an adult perspective (Mycock and Tonge, 2012). In Kazakhstan, the youth wing plays an important role in implementing and monitoring election programs. They negotiate various topics related to child violence, health, education and employment and sign joint projects with government agencies such as program called "Zhastar Otanga!".

In parliamentary elections, young self-nominated candidates have fewer chances compared to young self-nominated candidates from political parties, due to the lack of quotas for youth and other groups. The majoritarian electoral system used for electing self-nominated candidates from parties does not legally provide for such quotas as it is based on individual representation of citizens who receive a majority of votes. Furthermore, self-nominated candidates who received significant administrative and financial support from the Amanat party took most mandates. Secondly, when we compare independent self-nominated candidates and candidates from political parties using the proportional system, we find that the latter has advantages for young people as it contains youth quotas. However, there are some peculiarities. In the 2021 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, the fully proportional system had 98 seats and a more comprehensive number of quota mandates, although the legislation did not mandate their distribution at that time. Later the electoral system changed to a mixed electoral system, with 69 seats under the proportional system and 29 under the majoritarian system, resulting in a reduction in the allocated quotas to 21 seats from the previous 29.4 seats. Thirdly, quotas were reduced because of the inclusion of youth, women, and disabled people. One interviewee said that the quota is being followed and the legislator does not limit the 30% spread to just these categories. For example, if a woman is disabled, the parties can classify her as 30%

women or 30% disabled or they can take all disabled people and meet the quota. In other words, the quota is unlimited at 10%, 10%, 10% or 20%, 5%, 5% as long as the total reaches 30% for all categories of citizens. This means that parties added disabled people but did not increase the overall quota.

Therefore, the youth wing and youth quota are both products of the ruling Amanat party. They were created at different times. The youth wing was introduced in 2000, while the youth quota was introduced in 2020. The youth wing has a broad range of institutional tasks and functions and works closely with the ruling party. The youth quota, on the other hand, is only used during parliamentary elections and depends on political parties' use of quotas. As the number of young people in Kazakhstan grows, their demographic structure and birth rate are beginning to affect the electoral success of political parties. This is because the views of older and younger voters differ. In this regard, the electoral base of political parties is either strengthened due to the lack of changes in voter preferences and demographic growth or weakened due to high mortality rates or changes in voter preferences. Changes in the preferences of the electorate and its size can alter the structure of interparty competition. As a result, a new cross-polar dynamic competition is emerging between traditional and new political parties, shifting the party system's structure, as happened in the last elections of 2023 in Kazakhstan. The analysis of the party system of Kazakhstan was carried out based on data from the Central Election Commission using dynamic and static measurements. However, it is still being determined what the impact of the abovementioned measure is. In subsequent chapters, we evaluate how the youth wing, and the youth quota can affect the stability of the party system since the Amanat party remained in power for several decades.

Chapter 5. Theoretical and conceptual framework.

5.1. Introduction

Party system stability was first noted in research on consolidated or institutionalized party systems. Conceptually, the institutionalization and the stability of party systems are closely related to another (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Sartori, 1976). Stable party systems involve political actors who have clear expectations about the fundamental contours and rules of party competition that will prevail soon (Huntington, 1968). The literature on party system institutionalization identifies several approaches to measuring it. There are stability of patterns interparty competition, strong roots in society, and legitimacy of political parties (Casal Bertoa & Bourne, 2017; Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Tavits, 2005). Each approach is aimed at determining the degree of stability of party system in specific parliamentary elections. Firstly, we consider all three approaches of measurement the party system institutionalization. Secondly, we present theoretical basis that explain voting for the ruling party. Finally, we explain theoretical model of assessment quality of youth wing and youth quota.

5.1.1. Party system stability concept and measurement.

The stability of interparty competition models can be measured by comparing the electoral volatility of political parties. According to Pedersen, (1979) and Bartolini and Mair, (1990), electoral volatility is calculated by determining the percentage share of votes of each political party in one election and comparing it to another. The result is then divided by two, making it the simplest method to measure party system institutionalization systematically (Mainwaring, 1998). However, Huntington (1968) in his «Political Order in changing societies» and then Panebianco (1988) in his «Political Parties: organization and power» provide a very different discussion of whether and when an organization, including a political party, is institutionalized. Electoral volatility has been used in various studies, such as the impact of foreign aid, the role of government funding and structural adjustment in African and Latin American countries (Birbir, 2005; Booth & Robbins, 2010; Kuenzi et al., 2021), ideological concentration of votes, proportional electoral system and the difference between democratic and semi-democratic countries (Horowitz & Browne, 2005; Lago & Torcal,

2020; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). Additionally, it has been used to explore theories of electoral coordination and structures of social cleavage (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2019; Kuenzi et al., 2021). Bartolini and Mair (1990) divided volatility into within bloc and between blocs. Only between blocs refers to party system change because it indicates the weakening of the cleavage structure on which the party system is built. However, Katz (2001) disagree, who noted that to assess the resilience of the cleavage structure properly, we need to use micro-level, individual data, instead of aggregate electoral returns. Despite the insightful observations of Katz (2001) recent studies have continued to rely on aggregate electoral returns and have discovered new or different types of volatility compared to what Pedersen (1979) and later Bartolini and Mair (1990) had envisioned. For instance, Powell and Tucker (2014) argue that electoral volatility can be divided into two types: extra-system electoral volatility (type A) when new parties enter or leave the political system, and intra-system electoral volatility (type B) when voters choose between existing parties.

A low level of overall volatility indicates party system stability and, when repeated over time informs about institutionalization of party system (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2019). However, high electoral volatility indicates instability, but does not necessarily indicate de-institutionalization. Although electoral volatility can cause shifts in voting among established parties (type B) it does not impact the structure of inter-party competition. As a result, both type A and type B volatility can signal a change in the cleavage structure and, therefore, the party system change. Institutionalization is characterized by predictability, which refers to the presence of a stable set of party alternatives despite changes in electoral strength. Conversely, unpredictability arises when new parties emerge, or old ones disappear – a phenomenon referred to as party system regeneration. However, measuring party system stability using Pedersen's volatility index (1979) poses a challenge because it accounts for change within the system solely based on party strength. This approach is insufficient as electoral change alone does not necessarily produce party system change (Casal Bertoa & Bourne, 2017; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005; Pedersen, 1979). Notably, party system change only occurs when electoral change happens, but not all electoral change results in party system change. Given the limitations of using volatility to capture the party system stability, scholars such as Casal Bertoa and

Enyedi (2016), Pelizzo and Nwokora (2016; 2018) suggest other methodological solutions to better capture party system change. One of these is the fluidity index, which is essentially a dynamic change in party system, as it reflects changes in models of inter-party competition, which in turn contributes to reclassification of party system from one model to another (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2018). In the previous chapter, we calculated and identified systemic changes in the party system of Kazakhstan.

The stability of party system largely depends on its strong roots in society that determine the ideological and programmatic preferences of voters. This viewpoint has been explored by various scholars, including Berglund et al. (1997), Budge (1994), Cox (1990), Katz and Crotty (2006), Macdonald & Rabinowitz (1991). Budge (1994) conducted a study on party decision-making regarding election programs under conditions of uncertainty in multiple countries including the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, France, and Austria. The study results revealed that parties tend to remain within their ideological zone and if there are any significant changes, then ideologically similar parties are affected. The study identified five ideological models - the “stay in place” model that involves maintaining the same policy priorities across multiple elections, the “rotation model”, which assumes that a party's policy priorities change in different directions from one election to another and the “past performance” model which looks at past left-right movements to determine whether votes were raised or lowered and in which direction to move.

According to Downs (1957), political parties tend to propose similar policies to appeal to the median voter, as outlined in the median voter theorem. This is based on the economic consensus surrounding equilibrium theory. Down's theory suggests that political competition involves a process of convergence and divergence as parties introduce policies that either succeed or fail. Other scholars have built upon Downs' equilibrium theorem, including Palfrey (1984), who argued that existing parties pursue diverse policies to discourage third-party infiltration. This may involve appealing to voters as activist, directional, or expressive and following through on promises made to voters (Rabinowitz and McDonald, 1989; Brennan and Hamlin, 1998; Grofman, 1985). The “rational expectations” model relies on the expectations of parties and whether competitive party elections align with the ideology of the centre, while non-competitive parties move left or right. Meanwhile,

the “marker batch” model aims to maintain the difference between batches in long-term competition. In simpler terms, a party attempts to outmanoeuvre another party occupying an ideological position at the centre, either on the left or right. These models were tested across 20 countries using 1,000 programs in different policy categories, and the results were subjected to statistical analysis through percentages of preferred policies. Communist parties followed the models of past ideological programs and marker parties. Social Democrats, Labour, Liberals and Communists preferred rotation and past performance models, while religious parties adhered to the rational expectations model. Each party is characterized by different decision-making regarding specific ideological programs; for example, the UK relies on past results of ideological installations, while Ireland and Australia prefer alternating policies. According to the theory of policy formation during periods of uncertainty, a party’s ideological position remains in stable equilibrium during elections. However, the limitation of having strong roots in society is that not all countries support programmatic and ideological voting. In competitive regimes after 1978, ideological voting weakened because countries had less institutionalized or increasingly more de-institutionalized party systems.

The legitimacy of political parties is measured by their personalistic and leadership characteristics in society, through surveys and content analysis. This is called an empirical test of the concept of personalization and leadership. When voters make non-ideological and non-programmatic connections, it indicates that they vote based on personal sympathy for the candidate’s qualities. There is a difference between voters’ assessment of party leaders, which contain programmatic and ideological party components and are considered stable systems, and voter’s assessments of party leaders that do not contain party and ideological components, which are considered unstable party systems. In stable party systems, voters identify themselves with a party because parties dominate in the recruitment of candidates. Conversely, in unstable party systems, the candidate’s personal qualities prevail in the choice of voters. Today, there is populism and anti-politics among individuals who influence election campaigns. Personalism can be measured by calculating the percentage of mentions of party leaders in print media and television (Kaase, 1994). This method can be used to compare presidential candidates in election campaigns. However, as the elections draw closer,

candidates receive equal media attention. Media content analysis alone cannot establish a cause-and-effect relationship between media influence and the electorate's voting behaviour. Therefore, surveys are necessary to check respondents' perceptions of leaders. Respondents are asked to rate leaders on a scale of +5 to -5. During elections, the questions are presented in a way that compares two candidates to determine who is considered the most preferable. Some studies correlate assessment of political leadership and ideologies on a left-right scale. A weak correlation indicates low stability of the party system; a strong correlation indicates the opposite. This type of strong correlation is typically observed in advanced industrial democracies (King, 2002; Luna & Zechmeister, 2005). However, this method may overlook the importance of personalistic voting and should be considered when comparing industrialized democracies and fluid party systems.

A comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the abovementioned approaches to measuring party system stability indicates that the interparty competition model, i.e., electoral volatility is considered the most convenient measure, according to Kuenzi & Lambright (2001) and Mainwaring & Torcal (2005). We use electoral volatility to compare past and future voting for political parties among young people.

5.1.2. Theoretical bases.

There are several theoretical bases presented in the literature to explain the phenomenon of voting for the ruling party. The question on how society becomes involved into politics has occupied much of the theoretical perspective on voting for political parties, the overview of which is presented below.

Theory of voter loyalty. The theoretical basis (framework) presented in the literature on political party voting is based on the theory of customer loyalty. In political marketing, loyalty theory refers to "the behavioral impulses that drive repeat customer purchases; to create customer loyalty, political parties need to engage in a repeated process of positive voting over an extended period of time" (Massy et al., 1968). The regularity or irregularity of voting determines loyalty or disloyalty to voting, which is measured by voting in at least two elections within a specified time interval. There

are differences between satisfaction theory, which focuses on the attitude of voters in ensuring their satisfaction, and loyalty theory, which looks at customer behavior.

Loyalty theory, as proposed by Albert Hirschman (1970) in his book “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States”, suggests that consumers and organizational members have two options: to “exit”, or to leave the organization when faced with a decline in product quality; and to use their “voice”, i.e., express their dissatisfaction and vote for the other party (Hirschman, 1970). Loyalty can help prevent customers from leaving an organization and provide a platform for them to express their views on problem-solving. Loyal customers can help organizations improve product quality and prevent deterioration (Hirschman, 1970; Kelly, 2020). In the context of politics, the loyalty of voters is measured by the number of voters, their participation in election meetings, and their electoral recommendations for choosing a political party (Kaur & Sohal, 2019). Political parties implement various strategies, such as improving the quality of services and creating youth wing or quotas, to reach loyalty of voters (Baker, 2000; Kaur & Sohal, 2019; Kelly, 2020). Establishing the relationship between voter satisfaction and loyalty is difficult, and it is recommended to collect quantitative data to determine the strength of voter satisfaction and loyalty (Magin et al., 2003). Hirschman (1970) categorized customers into three groups – loyal voters who always vote for the same party, critical voters who express their opinions about the chosen party and as a result, vote for other parties, and voters who do not take part in politics. Hirschman also differentiated between a stable party electorate or “iron electorate” and the less stable or critical electorate. The theoretical model of loyalty represents the functioning of loyalty as an exit and voice in the relationship between voters and parties (Hirschman, 1970; Matuszewski, 2015). The empirical evidence supports this model, indicating that loyalty decreases as ideological distance increases. Conversely, loyalty increases when there is no disagreement in the distance (Matuszewski, 2015). Case studies of the Senegalese Democratic Party show that the ability of political actors to defect or remain loyal depends on factors such as the ruling party's control over resources, the achievement of citizens’ personal goals, local relationships, and the sense of honour of the political elite (Kelly, 2020). Much of the loyalty within the Senegalese Democratic Party comes from the historical legacy

of prominent members' attachment to the party and its leader Wade, and the ability to express opinions within the party (Kelly, 2020).

Mobilization theory. An alternative theory that explains why people vote for the ruling party is the mobilization theory. This theory suggests that political parties play a significant role in integrating people into the existing political system (Birgitta, 1987). The integration of people can happen either horizontally or vertically. Vertical mobilization or the top-down model, the relationship between parties and people is built according to the mobilization activities of parties as subjects in relation to citizens as objects to create emotional loyalty and motivate citizens to participate in institutional channels of political voting. They do this by translating society's problems into party ideology and training people to participate in political institutions (Birgitta, 1987; Cameron, 1974; Przeworski, 1975). On the other hand, horizontal mobilization assumes that citizens and parties are self-oriented and have a weakened relationship. According to mobilization theory, number of votes for the party may depend on “the availability of resources, especially personnel and organizational means” (Jenkins, 1983). Mobilization research has mostly focused on election events and political recruitment and these events were typically organized either directly by parties or through their youth wings (Grabarek, 2011; Green & Schwam-Baird, 2016; Sebestyén, 2020). Studies have shown a positive relationship between youth wing mobilization and student voting, with party membership, participation in party events and youth wings being significant factors in increasing activity among young voters by more than six times, in contrast to those who were excluded from the mobilization process (Sebestyén, 2020), or phone calls and interpersonal meetings with campaign representatives (Green & Schwam-Baird, 2016). Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980) seminal book «Who votes?» emphasizes the importance of interpersonal relationships in motivate voting, including conversations with friends and family. Other studies suggest that class differences play a role in voting behavior, with citizens who have low incomes and low levels of education being less likely to participate in voting activities and contact candidates (Green & Schwam-Baird, 2016; Sebestyén, 2020).

Another mobilization theory perspective relates to microtargeting, which involves tailoring specific messages to voters (Gerber et al., 2003; Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008; Gerber et al., 2010;

Green & Schwam-Baird, 2016). This strategic mobilization technique typically targets those regions or nations that are highly contested to gain more votes. For example, in the United States, African Americans or conservative Christians are often considered strategic groups because they have strong preferences and are perceived as more profitable voters for the party than Asians, whose preferences are less pronounced. To mobilize voters, campaign strategists focus on civic, religious, or labor leaders whose extensive networks can help mobilize a wide range of people. Additionally, voter data allows politicians to encourage voting among individuals who may not have otherwise voted. Numerous empirical tests of mobilization theory have been conducted through regression analyses, which have indicated a significant correlation between mobilization and participation (Gerber et al., 2008; Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2010; Gerber, Green, Kaplan, et al., 2010). However, some researchers have criticized this correlation because it is difficult to compare individuals who did and did not participate in mobilization activities. They argue that a high salience of mobilization can occur when the probability of voting is already high, which is consistent with the microtargeting thesis.

Moreover, even in the absence of a microtargeting strategy, the correlation may be considered unreliable because individuals with more accessible work schedules for voting are more likely to vote than less accessible colleagues. Thus, the contact of the party, youth wing or young parliamentary candidate included in party lists for elections under youth quota may be considered a marker of unmeasured qualities that may not be relevant to mobilization (Gerber et al., 2008; Gerber & Green, 2000). In addition, the questions in survey research about measuring contacts with voters are not explicitly written. For example, the question reads like this: “you know that political parties try to talk to a huge number of people, has anyone called or talked to you about the election campaign from a political party?”. Similarly, for interpersonal mobilization, questions are written indirectly. For instance, about the duration of social activity, church attendance, or employment (Green & Schwam-Baird, 2016). In other words, the questions did not include the time and frequency of contact between agitators and respondents. Other researchers have used experiments examining political party campaigning, such as commercial telephone calls and email campaigns (Gerber & Green, 2000). Experimental results showed that pre-election voter mobilization activities increased turnout (Green

et al., 2003). However, there have been counter-results in which out-of-vote letters or calls to voters had little effect on party voting, even when the mailings were received by previously loyal party voters (Gerber et al., 2003; Nickerson, 2007; Panagopoulos, 2011; Shaw et al., 2012). It is important to note that the theoretical explanation between voting and mobilization is complex and goes beyond the claims of Steven Rosenstone & Mark Hansen (1993).

We will need an intermediate explanation before we understand the extent to which political party mobilizations influence voting. One promising approach considers voter satisfaction as an intervening endogenous variable (Kaur & Sohal, 2019).

The theory of customer satisfaction involves “the level of feelings customers (voters) has after comparing the characteristics of a product with their expectations” (Suaib et al., 2017). If the outcome meets their expectations, customer satisfaction will be high and vice versa. Similarly, satisfaction of citizens with their government is directly related to their expectations. When the quality of life is good and unemployment is low, citizen satisfaction will be high (Oliver, 1980; Suaib et al., 2017). In the context of politics, voters satisfaction refers to satisfaction with political parties or leaders. In society, political parties play a critical role, and voters are either producers or consumers of political parties. Voter satisfaction with political parties is based on comparisons between results and expectations. In other words, how well the parties meet their results. As per Kotler & Keller’s (2012) statement, citizen satisfaction with parties increases as the quality of life improves. Studies have tested satisfaction theory as a mediating variable between political part image, brand, and voter loyalty (Kaur & Sohal, 2019; Magin et al., 2003; Roustasekehravani et al., 2015; Su & Tong, 2016; Suaib et al., 2017).

The theory of customer satisfaction has been tested using various statistical models, including SEM, LISREL, and GSCA. The findings reveal the positive significance of voter satisfaction as an indirect factor affecting political party loyalty (Suaib et al., 2017). According to marketing theory, the theoretical model follows a sequence of party brand, image, customer satisfaction, and loyalty, where voters are akin to customers of goods and services, and political parties are akin to product brands (Magin et al., 2003). It is important to note that the brands of political parties are made up of

associative human characteristics of voters to political parties on the basis of the level of personal trust and advertising (Ansolabehere & Simon, 1999; Rajagopal, 2006; Smith, 2009). Voters who need more confidence in the implementation of policies by political candidates may reduce their trust based on their assessment of a candidate's or political party's personal qualities. In other words, a candidate's personality, like the image of a political party, plays a significant role in motivating or demotivating potential voters to vote. Political parties are often judged by their commitment to social welfare, poverty alleviation, and empowerment of citizens (Baker, 2000; Suaib et al., 2017). They often use terms "populist economics" to attract support from the lower strata of society, promising free healthcare, education others (Baker, 2000; Rajagopal, 2006). During election periods, vulnerable sections of society are more willing to tolerate such assistance, as they tend to vote for pragmatic candidates who promise help. For voters, it is not important whether such policies are implemented after the election or not; what matters is that they receive help, which reinforces their positive attitude towards the phenomenon of satisfaction and loyalty (Dal Bó, 2007; Gallego, 2015). The greater the support for health services or poverty alleviation, the more interest there will be in the political party's candidate leading to greater satisfaction of voters (Gallego, 2015). Political party advertising plays a significant role in promoting effective communication with voters and building the image of the political party. According to Ansolabehere & Simon (1999) and Rajagopal (2006), advertising that contains information about fulfilling people's interests or promises can help improve the party's image. Party advertising is generally done by broadcasting party elections or announcements, and it helps to distinguish and form preferences among voters based on brands and images of political parties. Therefore, short information or personal characteristics of the parties are essential in making voters differentiate and pick a party that aligns with their values.

The responsible party model is a political theory that combines voter preference and party unity. It suggests that parties serve as a solution to collective action problems (Patterson, 1999). Party unity encourages voters to support the party in power and implement the policies promised during the election campaign. Party unity also functions as a brand for voters, indicating what candidates running under party auspices will do (André et al., 2015; Cox & McCubbins, 1993). The responsible

party model explains the reasons for the (in)consistency of political opinions among voters. According to this model, voters choose parties based on policies that align with their views. If there is a match, then the party can expect to receive votes. The responsibility party model also asserts the existence of political alternatives. With disagreement between parties about policy alternatives, voters can choose and influence policies (Lesschaeve, 2017).

Various studies suggest that it is important for political candidates and voters to agree on general preferences regarding public policy (Schmitt & Van Der Eijk, 2010; Warwick, 2015). For instance, the use of left-right ideological labels semantics can help voters understand party strategy. Studies indicate that clear party messages aid voters in listening to parties (Nasr, 2020). However, voters may need to update their perceptions when parties adjust their manifestos. Moreover, voters who vote for a party based on similar ideological orientations might not necessarily share the party's policy preferences on some issues, leading to misinterpretation and wrong voting (Dahlberg & Harteveld, 2016). The responsibility party model has been explored in selecting and training leadership candidates (Lesschaeve, 2017; Lesschaeve et al., 2018; Schmitt & Binder, 1999). According to this model, party leaders select parliamentary candidates that reflect the preferences of candidates with the party line. Alternatively, potential candidates are trained during the election campaign and adopt the views of the party, i.e., politically socialized. Some scholars believe that the responsibility party model is confirmed if voters have higher education because educated voters have more information about politics, are aware of party positions, and are better at analyzing media information (Grönlund & Milner, 2006; Hillygus, 2005; Lau et al., 2008).

Loyalty theory suggests that the ruling party has a higher control over resources such as finance and administration, which creates a certain degree of stability between the ruling party and the electorate. The responsible party model predicts stable voting due to clear party manifestos, the selection and training of candidates with similar party ideology, and adopting that ideology through political socialization, which explains the consistency of party unity. Satisfying voter expectations can be a significant incentive for loyalty, even though reasons for voting may vary. Mobilization theory suggests that integrating people occurs through pre-election promotion of the program by party

candidates under quotas or youth wings, participation in various party events, and party membership. By joining the party, voters can gain more complete information about the processes of party activities.

5.1.3. Theoretical framework of assessment quality of youth wing and youth quota.

The core for analysing the qualities of the youth wing and youth quota is the theoretical model assessment of the qualities of democracy developed by Morlino, Dressel and Pelizzo (Morlino et al., 2011).

Assessing the qualities of democracy has been repeatedly studied by scholars such as Altman and Perez-Linan (2002), Diamond and Morlino (2004; 2009), Levine and Molina (2011), Geissel et.al., (2016), Morlino et.al. (2011), Pelizzo et.al., (2018) and others. The developed theoretical framework for assessing the quality of democracy measures the relationship of democratic qualities with one another in regional aspects: Asia-Pacific countries such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and others (Morlino et al., 2011), in a study of the relationship between the quality of democracy and changes in party system in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius Tanzania and Zambia) (Pelizzo et al., 2018), in Latin America (Levine & Molina, 2011). Also, Morlino's theoretical framework is often applied to test democratic regimes, especially when studying a single country such as Thailand or Cambodia (Ferrara, 2011; Un, 2011).

Morlino uses an industrial or marketing approach to evaluate the quality of the democracy model, based on the concept of "quality" product (Morlino, 2004; Morlino et al., 2011). Similarly, many other studies also adopt a political marketing model, focusing on aspects such as party brand, image, advertising, voter satisfaction, and loyalty (Kaur & Sohal, 2019; Magin et al., 2003; Suaib et al., 2017). The difference between the two is that Morlino is able to recognize and assess a "good" democracy. For Morlino et.al., (2011), assessing "good" democracy is a complex task that involves defining the concept of "quality". According to Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012), Diamond & Morlino (2004), Levine & Molina (2011), the "quality" of democracy consists of different meanings.

Procedural aspect of the "quality" of democracy refers to "the system of procedures and methods that ensure standard and high-quality products". In other words, it focuses on the list of

procedures applied by the democratic regime (Morlino, 2004; Pelizzo and Staphurst, 2012). The procedural aspect of assessing the “quality” of democracy contains the rule of law, which means equality of law, absence of corruption in the judicial and political system, public access to justice and the possibility of filing civil and administrative claims (Table-5). Another procedural aspect of assessing the “quality” of democracy is accountability. This includes electoral and inter-institutional accountability, which is expressed in political parties’ acceptance of responsibility for decisions made. Fair political competition and power distribution are essential for actual electoral choices in terms of vertical accountability. Negative accountability indicators can arise when the ruling party dominates the number of seats in parliament or when the opposition party interferes with effective decision-making. In terms of horizontal accountability, the actors are equal because they have the power to control through independent media, a developed network of active and knowledgeable organizations, and trade unions (Morlino, 2004).

Content or output aspect of the “quality” of democracy refers to the structural characteristics of a product, including its design, materials from which it is made and functionality. In the context of a democratic regime, the product is freedom and equality as explained by scholars Morlino (2004) and Pelizzo and Staphurst (2012). These two substantive aspects are further divided into civil liberties such as ensuring personal freedom, privacy, free expression, and press freedom; political rights such as the right to elect the head of state directly or to elect candidates in internal party elections and social rights such as the right to health and physical well-being (Table-5).

According to Morlino (2004), the result or outcome aspect of the “quality” of democracy is determined by its ability to meet the needs of consumers. In the case of government actions, this means satisfying the interests of voters. This satisfaction is achieved when the government is aware of the needs of citizens and takes actions that align with their interests. The degree to which government actions are in line with voters’ interests is used to assess the quality of government responsiveness. Responsive government is considered legitimate when citizens perceive democratic institutions as the guarantors of freedom and equality. Favorable attitudes and approval of democratic institutions indicate satisfaction and a sense of responsiveness. On the other hand, a dissatisfied

democracy is characterized by growing discontent and alienation of citizens from political parties, leading to anti-party sentiments. In such a situation, political actors do not act in the interests of citizens, resulting in a decrease in responsiveness. Morlino (2004) argues that there is a reciprocal relationship between accountability and responsiveness, where proper accountability leads to improvements in the legal system, ultimately leading to solid responsiveness (Table-5). The concept of “quality” democracy is defined as “a stable institutional structure that ensures the freedom and equality of citizens through the legitimate functioning of its institutions” (Morlino, 2004; Morlino et al., 2011). The core idea of the theoretical framework suggests that “good things go hand in hand”; in other words, there is a relationship between the procedural and the content qualities of democracy, and both determine the result aspect of the quality of democracy (Morlino et al., 2011). This framework distinguishes between “good” and “bad” democracies, which may vary between regions due to different factors.

The basis for the analysis of the qualities of the youth wing and youth quota is a theoretical model assessment of the qualities of democracy developed by Morlino, Dressel and Pelizzo (2011). We are not testing democratic regimes but rather using Morlino’s model to construct our theoretical model. Since the quality of democracy is based on the marketing term “quality” of a product and is evaluated on the procedural, content, and result aspects of the product’s quality. In other words, similar to (Morlino, 2004, 2009; Morlino et al., 2011; Pelizzo et al., 2018), our theoretical model is built on three domains - procedure, content/output, and outcome/result in order to test four hypotheses. The theoretical model for assessing the quality of democracy and our adapted theoretical model for assessing the quality of youth wing and youth quotas are presented below in Tables 5 and 6 (Morlino et al., 2011; Pelizzo et al., 2018).

Table - 5. Quality of Democracy: domains and dimensions.

Domain	Dimension
Procedure	Rule of Law Electoral accountability Inter-institutional accountability Political participation Political competition
Content/output	Freedom Equality
Outcome/result	Responsiveness

Model developed by Morlino, Dressel and Pelizzo (2011).

Table - 6. Theoretical model of assessment quality of youth wing/quotas.

Domain	Dimension
Procedure (online survey study)	<i>Perceived activities:</i> ability to mobilize youth. sign and negotiate on behalf of youth. make Parliament pay attention what youth think.
Content/output	<i>Satisfaction</i>
Outcome/result	<i>Past Vote for Amanat party</i>

Adapted by author from the theoretical model developed by Morlino, Dressel and Pelizzo (2011)

In conclusion, the quality of a political party's product can be assessed based on three aspects: procedure, content, and result. Regarding the procedure aspect, we evaluate the perceived activities of the youth wing and youth quota, which includes the ability to mobilize, sign and negotiate on behalf of youth and make Parliament pay attention what youth think. In other words, we consider the perception of youths towards the youth wing and youth quota's activities in the online survey study. Regarding content aspect, we assess the quality of youth wing or youth quota based on the level of youth satisfaction with their creation. Finally, the result aspect is assessed based on past voting for the Amanat party in Mazhilis or Maslikhat according to voter loyalty theory. That is, if the perceived activities of the youth wing are high, then youth are more likely to vote for the Amanat party. Therefore, we propose hypothesis - 1: All other things being equal, the Amanat party is well prepared for youth voting due to the perceived activities of the youth wing than other political parties. If the

perceived activities of the youth quota are high, then youth are more likely to vote for Amanat party. We propose further hypotheses – 2: All other things being equal, the Amanat party is well prepared for youth voting due to the perceived activities of young candidates of deputies, included in party lists under a 30% youth quota than other political parties.

According to customer satisfaction theory in political marketing, Olivier (1980) and Suaib et.al., (2017) suggest that voters will be satisfied if the quality of services provided by political parties meets or exceeds their expectations. In the case of creating a youth wing or youth quota, voters will form judgements based on the activities of the youth wing and youth quotas. This means that the perceived activities of the youth wing play a significant role in satisfaction with its creation, and satisfaction with the creation of a youth wing will contribute to voting for the Amanat party (loyalty to the ruling party). We expect that satisfaction with the creation of a youth wing will be a mediator between the perceived activities of the youth wing and vote for the Amanat party. Therefore, we propose a further hypothesis – 1a: All other things being equal, the perceived activities of the youth wing such as a) the ability to mobilize youth; b) signing and negotiate on behalf of youth; c) making Parliament pay attention what youth think, will have a positive impact on voting for Amanat party, through youth satisfaction with the creation of a youth wing. Likewise, satisfaction with the creation of a youth quota will be mediated between the perceived activities of youth quota and vote for Amanat party (loyalty to ruling party). We propose the further hypothesis – 2a: All other things being equal, the perceived activities of young candidates of deputies included in party lists under a 30% youth quota such as a) ability to mobilize youth; b) sign and negotiate on behalf of youth; c) make Parliament pay attention what youth think, will have a positive impact on voting for Amanat party, through youth satisfaction with the creation of youth quota.

The above-mentioned highlights that the present study is unique in two respects. Firstly, we propose a theoretical framework that identifies three areas for assessment the quality of youth wing and youth quota, along with their dimensions. Secondly, we conduct empirical tests to determine the extent to which dimensions of youth wing and youth quota are interrelated.

Chapter 6. Data and methodology (research design)

6.1. Introduction.

Mixed method research is a useful design to achieve the aim and objectives of a study. According to several authors such as Bryman (2016), Creswell et.al. (2003) Ivankova et al. (2006) Marcus Weaver-Hightower (2014) and Hossler and Vesper (1993), combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods helps to comprehend complex phenomena such as party system stability, youth wing, youth quota. By analyzing a vast amount of data at the republican level through the quantitative method of research and interpreting contextual factors through the qualitative research method, a better understanding of research problems can be gained. Our research is divided into three sub-chapters. Firstly, we explain the application of mixed method research with sequential explanatory design, and we also elaborate on the compliance with ethical obligations. Secondly, we describe the data and variables of the online survey study, the statistical methodology, and the reasons for selecting SEM. Finally, we describe the design and data analysis of a semi-structured interview.

6.1.1. Mixed method research application.


Quantitative data was used to estimate voting patterns for the Amanat party, taking into account factors such as the perceived activities of the youth wing and youth quota. The data was obtained from an online survey of higher education students in 17 regions and 3 cities of republican significance. The online survey was conducted twice, between December 2022 and January 2023 (first wave) and on March 2023 (second wave) in an absolutely impersonal form in accordance with ethical requirements of Nazarbayev University.

To dig deeper into the quantitative results, semi-structured interviews were conducted with public and political figures to explore their perspectives on young people voting for the Amanat party. This qualitative research method allowed for a more thorough examination of the reasons behind young people's political party preferences, and the role of the youth wing and youth quota in voting for the Amanat party. The purpose of utilizing both quantitative and qualitative research methods was to first examine a large sample of variables through the quantitative approach before diving into specific case studies with the qualitative method. This research design is called a sequential

explanatory design, where quantitative data is given priority. Figure - 13 illustrates the steps involved in a sequential explanatory design (Creswell et.al., 2003).

The benefit of this design is that if unexpected results arise from a quantitative study, qualitative study can be used to explore those results in detail. The strength of this design lies in its simplicity, as each stage is implemented according to Figure-13. Furthermore, the researcher can easily describe and report the findings. However, the main disadvantage of this design is the time it takes to collect data, as it took us approximately 5 to 7 months to complete two separate phases.

Figure – 13. Sequential explanatory design.



The choice of quantitative research method, specifically an online survey study, is closely related to the aim of study and research questions. This method is confident in identifying possible relationships between a wide range of variables. The randomized nature of online survey respondents is used to develop the results of the quantitative research method through closed questions that are specifically designed to reveal the issue of electoral volatility amongst youth.

By using a quantitative research method (online survey study), the aim of the study can be achieved and the relationships between independent, intermediate and dependent variables can be determined. The independent variables of this study are the perceived activities of youth wing and youth quota. The intermediate variables are the youth’s satisfaction with the creation of the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” and youth quota. Finally, the dependent variables for the online survey study are presented as past voting for the Amanat party in the 2021 parliamentary election for Maslikhat and Mazhilis. In particular, we hypothesize that a high extent of perceived activities of youth wing is associated with greater satisfaction level of creation youth wing among youth, which in turn increases the likelihood of voting for the Amanat party. We will use the intermediate variable satisfaction to

answer the question of the bivariate relationship between the procedural aspect of the quality of youth wing and youth quota and result aspect of past voting for the Amanat party.

The choice of a quantitative research method is mainly due to its cost-effectiveness and time efficiency. Since this study involves a large sample of respondents from different regions of Kazakhstan, it can be challenging and expensive to conduct face-to-face interviews. Therefore, using an online questionnaire distributed through the Qualtrics program is a faster and more cost-effective way to collect data. Additionally, administering questionnaires eliminates the influence of interviewers on participants, which can lead to social desirability bias, especially with young people.

To complement the quantitative study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with political and public officials or so called elites, who have professional experience in politics and public service. The qualitative method of semi-structured interviews allows for a deeper exploration and understanding of the context of the study, particularly the importance of voting among youths, the role of youth wing and youth quota. We chose semi-structured interviews because they allow for open-ended questions, flexibility in conducting interviews, and the establishment of trust with participants through providing complete information about the research being carried out. Creating a convenient and comfortable environment for participants to express their views, construct and explain meanings will facilitate self-disclosure, leading to a more comprehensive understanding of their perceptions and individual constructivist meanings. Therefore, interviews are the most appropriate way to delve into these issues.

The literature describes different definitions and types of interviews, which are widely used as a qualitative research method. In sociological research, interviews are used to explore “the diversity of human experience” (Kvale, 2006). “An interview is a tool for providing the interviewer with descriptions, narratives, and texts that the researcher then interprets and reports according to his or her research interests” (Kvale, 2006; Bryman, 2016). Most of these definitions emphasize the element of human experience. According to Bryman (2016), the interviews create opportunities for competing stories and encourage interviewees to take different perspectives on the research topic. A semi-structured interview is one of the qualitative research methods that helps to understand the

respondents' attitudes towards a specific problem, creating a competing view formed based on a conversation with the interviewee. The analysis of the literature review on the semi-structured interview reveals the following characteristics: the construction of open-ended questions, alternation from the researcher's questions to the participant's answers, ensuring anonymity and confidentiality, a short duration of the interview with the elite, about 1 hour, receiving feedback and comments from the interviewee to identify potentially overlooked issues or areas of research. Therefore, the semi-structured interview is a desirable empirical research method to understand issues related to youth wing and youth quota based on professional constructions of meaning.

6.1.2. Ethical obligations.

To ensure the protection of confidentiality and anonymity during the study, certain measures were taken. Before starting the online survey study and semi-structured interview sessions, each respondent, including participant, was requested to confirm their consent. The informed consent letter and an invitation to participate specified the voluntary and confidential nature of the study. In addition, to ensure the protection of identity and the free exchange of views among respondents and participants, guarantees of the most significant possible anonymity and confidentiality were promised to all participants. Respondents and interview participants were informed that they had the right to ask questions and request additional research information.

The informed consent form provided the necessary contact information for the respondent's needs. The form also stated that audio recordings would be made for further analysis, and that any comments made during the sessions would not be repeated outside of the research session. Additionally, the researcher has taken measures to protect the confidentiality of the participants and their data to ensure their safety. These measures include the collection of data by one researcher, when transcribing an audio recording of an interview, de-identification of the interview and survey participants by removing all direct identifiers and storing transcription file data and codes in a secure location with reliable computer password protection. Furthermore, the researcher has deleted all audio recordings of the interview sessions to prevent any accidental disclosure or illegal access to data.

These measures are necessary to prevent secondary identification, which may lead to economic or psychological risks that can affect the participant's employment, financial well-being,

and overall mental health. The risks are manageable through appropriate measures to protect the privacy, anonymity of survey respondents and confidentiality of the interview participants.

6.2.1. Quantitative research of online survey study (variables and description of data).

Our research draws upon data collected from a youth survey conducted in Kazakhstan, which explores the attitudes of young people towards political parties. Specifically, we analyzed the first and second waves of an online survey conducted between December 2022 and January 2023, as well as during the parliamentary elections held in March 2023. This online survey contains individual-level data on various sociodemographic characteristics, as well as perceived activities of youth wing and youth quota, vote for political parties, and youth satisfaction. We focus on students in higher education aged 18 years and older. We adapted the theoretical model of Morlino, Dressel and Pelizzo (2011) to assess the quality of youth wing and youth quota. Our analysis of the first and second waves included approximately 4,000 observations. Subjective voting indicators for political parties, collected in an online survey, form the basis of research. In order to better understand the behavior of young voters, we created voting variables for political parties in Mazhilis and Maslikhat based on self-reports of young voters respectively.

The study uses an online survey to estimate the quality of youth wing and youth quota through a theoretical model (Table-6), which is assessed using structural equation model. The next chapter explains statistical logit regression model as well as structural equation model.

The dependent variables:

1). *Past voting for political parties in Mazhilis and Maslikhat* is measured using binary code: 1 = if respondents answer to vote for the Amanat party in the past and 0 = if respondents answer to vote for other parties in the past.

1). *Future voting for political parties in Mazhilis and Maslikhat* is measured using binary code: 1 = if respondents answer to vote for the Amanat party in the future and 0 = if respondents answer to vote for other parties in the future.

Independent variable's procedural qualities are presented in several sub-dimensions:

1). *Youth mobilization*, ranges from 4= if respondents answer to a large extent youth wing can mobilize youth and 1 = if respondents answer to no extent youth wing can mobilize youth.

2). *Sign and negotiate on behalf of youth*. The indicators range from a maximum of 4 = if respondents answer to a large extent that the youth wing has the ability to sign and negotiate on behalf of youth to 1 = if respondents answer to no extent that the youth wing has the ability to sign and negotiate.

3). *Make Parliament pay attention to what youth think*, takes the value 4 = if, to a large extent, the youth wing makes Parliament pay attention and 1 = if, to no extent, the youth wing makes Parliament pay attention to what youth think.

Additionally, intermediate variable or content aspect assessment quality – *satisfaction with the creation of the youth wing and satisfaction with the creation of youth quota* are recoded and measured using a 2-point scale. A variable with a value of 0 = means that respondents are not satisfied, and 1 = means that respondents are satisfied.

Control variables have been introduced to ensure the robustness of the study. These indicators include socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, ethnicity, specialty, and children. Gender, ethnicity, specialty, and children have been presented as binary variables. The dummy variable is coded as 0 = Male and 1 = Female, 1=Kazakh and 0=others, 0 = natural science and 1 = social science and age as a continuous variable for the age of students. Additionally, other control variables have been included such as the reasons that prompted youth to vote, including unemployment, electoral reforms, strong party leader, social media and hearing about the youth wing and youth quota. All of them have been measured using a 4-point scale, where categorical variables are coded as 1 = for no extent, 2= for little extent, 3 = for some extent and 4 = for large extent. According to the adapted theoretical framework, a high degree of the procedure aspect of the youth wing and youth quota will lead to the convergence of youth, which will have a positive impact on their satisfaction and voting for the Amanat party.

6.2.2 Statistical methodology (logit regression model and SEM)

The following is the formalized logit regression function that determines the probability of youth voting for the Amanat party:

$$P(\text{vote Amanat party})_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 W_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 Y_i + \beta_4 Z_i = \frac{e^{x_i \beta}}{1 + e^{x_i \beta}} \quad (1).$$

Here $P(\text{vote Amanat party})_i$ represents the probability of voting for the Amanat party i , W - is the vector that represents satisfaction with creation of the youth wing and youth quota respectively, X - is the vector of the variable perceived activities, which includes the ability to mobilize youth, sign and negotiate on behalf of youth, and make Parliament pay attention what youth think). Y - is the vector of control variables that includes gender, age, ethnicity, specialty, and children. Z - is the vector of additional control variables that includes unemployment, electoral reforms, strong leader political party, social media and hearing about youth wing and youth quota. To study the influence of the youth wing and youth quota on voting for the Amanat party, a structural equation modeling (hereinafter-SEM) is used with the STATA program. This model is described in various studies, including Byun et al., (2018), Gopalakrishna-Remani et al., (2016), Swimberghe & Wooldridge, (2014).

SEM is a statistical technique that is commonly used to analyze empirical data obtained from online survey studies (MacKinnon et al., 2007; Picón-Berjoyo et al., 2016; Ullman & Bentler, 2012). SEM can analyze highly complex models and complex data structures that have many variables, making it a very general and flexible framework. In contrast to OLS regression, SEM has more flexibility in complex data structures or models, as it can specify all complex relationships in a single model, including mediation effect, direct, indirect, and total effects. One of the main advantages of SEM is that it corrects measurement errors when a study uses latent variables in the model. SEM corrects random measurement errors, which allows for the receipt of less biased estimates of regression. By contrast, standard OLS regression is limited to a set of independent variables and one dependent variable and cannot correct measurement errors. In this way, SEM can estimate the reliability of each observed variable by estimating the measurement error of variance, the reliability coefficient, and R^2 , and then checking whether the measures are reasonable. Moreover, SEM allows measurement errors to be corrected to receive regression coefficients and correlations less biased than

using observed variables in the analysis. Finally, SEM allows the conduct of rigorous test theories or rigorous tests of models since it tests model fit (for example, chi-square model fit), which permits the testing of causal hypotheses when it confirms and rejects the model when assumptions are incorrect. In other words, SEM has an overall test of a theoretical model that informs whether this model fits the data.


6.2.3. Analysis and data collection online survey study.

An online survey study was conducted over a period of approximately four months. The survey was aimed at young respondents aged 18+ with different educational levels and specialities, including bachelor's, master's, and Ph.D. programs from universities and colleges. The survey was available in three languages: Kazakh, Russian, and English and was conducted using the Qualtrics program. Respondents were given the opportunity to fill out the questionnaire independently and anonymously. To ensure national representativeness, a stratified sample was used, divided by region and city. Data was collected in 17 regions such as Abay oblast, Akmola oblast, Aktobe oblast, Almaty oblast, Atyrau oblast, East Kazakhstan oblast, Zhambyl oblast, Zhetysu oblast, West Kazakhstan oblast, Karagandy oblast, Kostanay oblast, Kyzylorda oblast, Mangystau oblast, Pavlodar oblast, North Kazakhstan oblast, Turkestan oblast and Ulytau oblast and 3 cities of Kazakhstan such as Astana, Almaty and Shymkent. To organize data collection, we prepared two official letters in three languages and sent to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan for ref. № 21–38/84 dated November 30, 2022, as well as all rectors of higher educational institutions of Kazakhstan for ref.№ 21–38/81 dated November 29, 2022, to assist in distributing the questionnaire among students (iv. Appendices). The sample of respondents in universities was chosen randomly. The informed consent form details all aspects of the online survey study, such as procedures, risks, benefits, compensation, confidentiality, and voluntary nature of participation. It is indicated that no financial compensation is provided to students, and research is voluntary, which allows respondents to withdraw answers at any stage (iv. Appendices).

The study used a stratified data sample and analyzed it by using university-level standard errors to correct for correlation in errors among students attending the same university. In addition,

to ensure the accuracy and quality of the online survey study at least 1,900 students from different regions of Kazakhstan were covered, with at least, 100 students from each region and city of republican significance (iv. Appendices). Respondent responses were stored in Qualtrics and then recoded in STATA for data analysis. The model for assessing the quality of the youth wing and youth quota for online survey study is presented below in Figure - 14.

Figure -14. The model for assessment quality of the youth wing and youth quota.



6.3.1. Qualitative research of semi-structured interviews with political elites.

As part of the research on youth wing and youth quota issues, semi-structured interviews were conducted with political elites and government officials. This qualitative research method complemented the quantitative research method. Semi-structured interviews aimed to gain insights into the participants' past experiences and knowledge on the subject matter (Deakin & Wakefield, 2014; Harvey, 2011; Kvale, 2006; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). To select the interview participants, the snowball sampling strategy was used, which is non-random method. According to Kvale (2006), this method is often used to select participants. Purposive sampling is used in a minority of cases (Harvey, 2011). The Institutional Research Ethics Committee of Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University approved the study in mid-November 2022. Two official letters were then sent to the Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament for ref. № 21–38/83 on November 30, 2022, and the Chairman of the Mazhilis of the Parliament for ref.№. 21–38/82 on November 30, 2022, requesting their assistance in ensuring the participation of political elites in the semi-structured interviews (iv. Appendices).

In order to ensure high-quality research, the study included 12 interview participants. We sent out informed consent forms to potential interviewees, outlining the procedures, risks, benefits, compensation, confidentiality, and voluntary nature of the study. Only those who agreed to participate in the interview gave written consent. Due to various reasons, some potential participants were unable to meet with the researcher. Primary data was collected from the 12 interviews that were conducted. Conducting semi-structured interviews with the political elites provided the researcher with invaluable practical experience. The use of semi-structured sessions ensured effective time management, improved communication skills, moral and psychological readiness and maintained maximum mutual understanding with the participants. Semi-structured sessions were conducted in participants' offices or online at a convenient time. Since the state administrative institutions are located in the capital of Kazakhstan, most participants were from Astana city, while the others participated online from other regions. The interviewees were carefully chosen based on their

experience and specific opinions on the research issue. They included individuals working directly in the Office of the regional branches of the Amanat party, the Republic party, current deputies of the seventh and eighth convocations of regional Maslikhats of the Amanat party, the Chairman of the regional branch of the Amanat party, a deputy of the Senate and the Mazhilis of Parliament, the Chairman of the youth wing and the Head of Department of the Ministry of Information and Social Development. The snowball sampling method was used to select the following individuals for the interviews: 1). Experts who determine youth policy; 2). Deputies, former deputies of various parties, deputies of Maslikhats, Mazhilis and Senate Parliament and leader of youth wing; 3). Candidates of deputies participated in parliamentary elections, and Head of research institutes. The reason of including these category of people lies in their direct involvement on the public policy issues. They deal with youth issues on a daily basis, make decisions, participate in analytical and evaluation activities, and implement policies. The interview with the participants lasted for about an hour, during which we briefly explained the aim of the study. We asked several critical questions including:

1. What is the biggest challenge you face in your work every day? This introductory question allowed the participants to talk about their work and express themselves freely.

2. What are some significant goals for the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy”? This question helped us understand whether the participants were aware of the youth wing, and if not, the reason for their lack of knowledge.

3. Do you think the youth wing is effective in mobilizing young voters to vote? If yes, why? If not, why not? This question helped us compare the quantitative data with the interview participants’ answers and assess the effectiveness of the youth wing from their point of view.

4. In your opinion, which political parties such as the Amanat party, Respublika party, Akzhol party and others will young people vote for the most, and why? This question helped us understand the reasons behind the participants’ choice of political parties and compare them with the quantitative data.

5. Do you think that age, gender, and employment play a role in the preferences of young voters? This question helped us understand the socio-demographic or other characteristics of youth voting.

6. Do you think the youth wing is popular among youths? If so, why? This question helped us assess the satisfaction of youth with the youth wing.

7. Do you think that the youth wing accurately represents the interests of the majority of youth? This question will help us understand how responsible the youth wing is to the concerns of youths.

8. In what ways do you think the youth wing reflects the interests of the majority young people? This question will help us understand the specific activities or initiatives that the youth wing engages in address the concerns of youth.

9. Could you tell me major aims of youth quotas? This question will help us understand whether the participants knowledgeable about youth quotas and its aim.

10. In your opinion, are youth quota an effective measure for providing access to Parliament? This question will help us understand the participants' views on the effectiveness of recently introduced legislative policy.


11. What is your opinion on youth quotas? Do you believe that there is a need for readjustment? This question will help us evaluate the participants' satisfaction with youth quota. If the participants offer suggestions for readjustment, they may be unsatisfied with the current measure, but knowledgeable about it. On the other hand, if they have little to say or express satisfaction with youth quota, it may indicate that they are satisfied, or have limited knowledge about quotas, or want to avoid talking.

The semi-structured interview questions were designed to explore the opinions of the participants regarding the youth wing and youth quota. They were asked if these measures align with the interests and views of young people, if they encourage young people to participate in politics, and whether they believe the work being done is satisfactory. The objective of this research is to formulate recommendations that can enhance the interaction between policy measures and youth. Each semi-structured interview was recorded using a voice recorder and online in the Teams program for further transcription and data analysis. The results from the qualitative research method will be combined with those from an online survey study.

6.3.2. Analysis and data collection of semi-structured interviews.

Over a period of several months, political elites were interviewed through 12 semi-structured interviews. They were asked to express their opinions the youth wing and youth quota as well as to answer other research questions. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in Kazakh and Russian languages and were recorded. Later, they were transcribed verbatim to be analyzed. However, since the NVivo program does not support Kazakh or Russian languages, the recordings were translated into English. NVivo program is a CAQDAS product that is designed specifically for the MS Windows operating system. We created a separate Microsoft Word coding document to assign identification codes to interview participants. The transcripts of each interview were compiled in Microsoft Word, and political elites' responses were coded in columns and themes were categorized and coded. We used a combination of multiple coding methods to analyze semi-structured interview transcripts, as suggested by Saldaña (2010) and Caulley (2008). The analysis of primary data from the semi-structured interviews can be found in Figure-15 below.

Figure -15. Analysis of primary data from the semi-structured interviews.



compiled by the author, 2023

For the first cycle of qualitative coding in NVivo, we used descriptive coding. In the second cycle of qualitative coding, we used pattern coding. Both these methods were used to analyze the primary data, which helped us create detailed notes and codes. The codes were created based on repeated actions, which helped us identify the main categories and themes. We developed themes

through repeated readings of transcripts and the use of coding techniques. We also re-analyzed the participants' semi-structured interview transcripts to verify the codes and categories.

In conclusion, we have presented a research design that utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods. Our study is sequential explanatory design and the benefits of conducting a mixed-method study were explained. In detail, we have described the tools and techniques we will use to achieve the aim and the objectives of the study. The quantitative research method will enable us to test the perception of the youth wing activities and youth quota by the youth, while the qualitative research method will help us understand when and how these policy measures interact with young people in different regions of Kazakhstan. We will also examine the consequences of the introduction of the youth wing and youth quota from the professional point of view of deputies and experts of the Apparatus of the Amanat party that will ultimately provide policy recommendations and implications. The results of both the quantitative and qualitative studies will be presented in chapter 7.

Chapter 7. Results of research

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter, we have conducted several analyzes to assess the quality of youth wing and youth quota. Firstly, we have presented descriptive statistics from online survey studies and results of cross-tabulation analyzes of youth electoral volatility between past and future voting for the Amanat party and other parties. Secondly, we have presented the results of logit models of youth wing and youth quota. Thirdly, we have assessed the quality of youth wing and youth quota using structural equation models. The study finds that socio-demographic and other factors influence the vote for the Amanat party.

This study confirms that perceived activities of the youth wing and youth quota have a statistically significant impact on the past vote for the Amanat party. Our study, in many ways, confirms the conclusions conducted by Junisbai and Junisbai (2020), Schatz (2002), Norén-Nilsson, (2021) Sharipova, (2019) in ways that the “Nazarbayev” generation is politically apathetic and grew up in the absence of political pluralism and inter-party competition.

A more detailed conclusion is described in the next chapter 8. Conclusion, and its subchapters – 8.1.1., 8.2.1., 8.3.1., and 8.4.1. These subchapters include the findings analysis, discussions, policy implications, recommendations, limitations, future study implications and concluding comments.

7.1.1. Descriptive statistics, youth micro-level electoral volatility results, logit models result.

Table-7 presents the descriptive statistics of an online survey study. The table shows that 58.13% of the young respondents were women, while men accounted for 41.87% of the respondents. The average age of young respondents who participated in this survey was 19.5 years. As expected, 84.57% of the respondents were Kazakhs, whereas the remaining 15.43%, belonged to other nationalities such as Russians, Dungans, Uighurs and others. Furthermore, the majority of the respondents 91.75% were studying social sciences while 8.25% of respondents were studying natural sciences. In fact, 94% of the youth who completed the online questionnaire did not have children, while the remaining respondents had one, two, three, or more children. The study also revealed that 37% of the respondents had heard about youth wing, which is considered an insignificant proportion,

while more than 79% had heard about youth quota. This implies that young people were more aware of youth quota than youth wing. Apart from socio-demographic characteristics, other reasons that motivated young people to vote were included in the survey such as unemployment, reforms in the electoral system, a strong party leader, and social media. All these factors accounted for a significant percentage 69% or more.

It is worth noting that a significant number of young people voted for the Amanat party in the 2021 parliamentary elections. According to the survey, 78% of young voters chose the Amanat party in Mazhilis, while the remaining 22% of young people preferred other parties. Similarly, in Maslikhat, 76% of young voters opted for the Amanat party, while the remaining 24% voted for other parties.

According to the online survey of first and second waves, 77.7% of youth believe that the youth wing is “to a large and to some extent able to mobilize youth”, while 22.3% of respondents said that there is “little and no mobilization”. However, the online survey revealed that 75.3% of young people have a positive view of the youth wing’s ability to sign and negotiate on behalf of young people. In contrast, 24.7% of respondents believe that the youth wing does not have the right to do so. Additionally, 76.1% of young people think that the youth wing can make Parliament pay attention to youth issues, while the remaining 23.9% do not support this view. When it comes to youth quota, the survey found that 78% of young people believe that deputies included in party lists for elections, according to a 30% youth quota, can “to a large extent and to some extent” mobilize. Only 22% of young people believe that such deputies can “little and no extent” mobilize. Moreover, the online survey showed that 76.6% of respondents think that young deputies nominated under a 30% youth quota can negotiate on behalf of young people to a large extent and some extent, while 24% believe that they can do so to a little or to no extent. Most respondents 77% believe that young deputies can make Parliament pay attention to youth issues, while the remaining 23% do not support this view. Overall, the online survey results indicate that young people have a predominantly positive attitude towards the activities of youth wing and deputies included in party lists according to 30% youth quota. The content aspect of the assessment the quality of youth wing and youth quota is the recognition of young people on the creation of youth organization and a youth quota. Essentially, a high percentage

of satisfaction among the youth indicates the high legitimacy of institution, while a low percentage means the opposite. In case of the youth wing, 62.2% of young people were satisfied, while 37.8% were dissatisfied. Additionally, young people were generally satisfied with the creation of a youth quota in parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, with a satisfaction rate of 67.8%. This suggests that these two policy measures are generally well-received among the youth.

Table-7. Descriptive statistics online survey study.

Variables	Description of variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev	Min.	Max.
<i>Dependent variables (Result aspect):</i>						
Vote for Amanat party in Mazhilis (coded as past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis21)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = respondent answers vote for other parties, and 1 = respondent answers vote for Amanat party.	1, 175	0.7778723	0.4158535	0	1
Vote for Amanat party in Maslikhat (coded as past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh21)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = respondent answers vote for other parties, and 1 = respondent answers vote for Amanat party.	1, 142	0.762697	0.4256159	0	1
<i>Independent variables (Procedure aspect, perceived activities):</i>						
Youth mobilization by youth wing (coded as mobilization_)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	2, 410	3.070539	0.9265263	1	4
Sign and negotiate on behalf of youth. (coded as sign_negotiate_youth_behalf)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	2, 265	2.973068	0.9331349	1	4
Make Parliament pay attention to what youth think. (coded as Parliament_pay_youth_attention)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent,	2, 288	3.013986	0.9151956	1	4

	2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent					
Deputies according to 30% quota have ability to mobilize youth. (coded as cand_deput_YQ_mobilize)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	2, 338	3.056886	0.9081559	1	4
Deputies according to 30% quota have ability negotiate on youth behalf. (coded as cand_deputYQ_negotiate_)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	2, 231	2.985208	0.9236581	1	4
Deputies according to 30% quota have ability make Parliament pay youth attention. (coded as Parliament_pay_attent_deputYQ)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	2, 219	3.024335	0.9203358	1	4

Intermediate variables (Content aspect):

Satisfaction with YW (coded as satisfaction_youth)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = if respondent answers not satisfied, and 1 = if respondent answers satisfied.	2, 184	0.6217949	0.4850502	0	1
Satisfaction with YQ (coded as satisfaction_YQ_)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = if respondent answers not satisfied, and 1 = if respondent answers satisfied.	2, 137	0.6775854	0.4675101	0	1

socio-demographic variables:

gender (coded as gender_female)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = Male and 1 = Female	4, 005	0.5812734	0.493412	0	1
age (coded as _age)	age of students in years	3, 999	19.49812	3.036205	18	50
ethnicity (coded as ethnicity_kazakh_)	Dummy variable coded	4, 025	0.8457143	0.3612673	0	1

	as 0 = others and 1 = kazakh					
speciality (coded as social_science)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = natural science and 1 = social science	3, 602	0.9175458	0.2750936	0	1
children (coded as no_child)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = do have children and 1 = don't have child	3, 960	0.9363636	0.2441349	0	1
hear about adopted youth wing. (coded as hear_YW_)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = do not hear and 1 = hear about youth wing	3, 109	0.3650692	0.481527	0	1
hear about adopted youth quota. (coded as hear_YQ_)	Dummy variable coded as 0 = do not hear and 1 = hear about youth quota	3, 094	0.7934712	0.4048798	0	1
youth unemployment cause to vote. (coded as unemployment_)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	1, 835	2.885559	1.130032	1	4
electoral reforms cause to vote. (coded as electoral_reforms_)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	1, 804	2.891353	1.1144296	1	4
strong leader political party cause to vote. (coded as strong_leader_)	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	1, 809	2.925926	1.155038	1	4
social media cause to vote. social_media_	Categorical variable coded as 1 = no extent, 2 = little extent, 3 = some extent and 4 = large extent	1, 886	2.919936	1.157815	1	4

Source: online surveys wave 1 and wave 2. (The study merged data due to insufficient statistical power to generate meaningful results, which is evidenced by the Table-8 presented below on electoral volatility of first wave).

Overall, the results of the study indicate that youth participation in voting is somewhat passive. The majority of young people are paternalistic towards the youth wing and youth quota. Young people believe that the youth wing and young deputies nominated by 30% of the youth quota are able to mobilize, negotiate on their behalf and draw the attention of legislature to youth issues.

The study compared two periods of data sets before and during parliamentary elections of 2023 (December-January 2023 and March 2023) of general distribution. Regarding youth participation in voting, somewhat passive is confirmed by data of first wave and second wave Figures – 16 and 17.



A survey conducted in December - January 2023 indicates that it appears that the majority of young respondents did not vote in the 2021 parliamentary elections. 49.3%, 9.1% and 4.7% of youth report that they “didn't vote”, or “thought about voting this time, but didn't”, or “I usually vote, but didn't this time”. Only 17.6% were “sure they voted”. Those who are “not eligible to vote” due to age under 18 or not a citizen of Kazakhstan are 13.7%. When asked which political party from this list did, they vote for in the 2021 parliamentary election for Mazhilis and Maslikhat, 61.5% and 62.2% of young respondents voted for the political party Amanat (Nur-Otan). Voting for other political parties (Akzhol party, Auyl party, Communist People's party) was a low percentage approximately 4.42%, 4.65% and 3.54%.

According to the online survey conducted during the parliamentary elections in March 2023, there was a decrease in voter turnout. The survey revealed that 38.8% of respondents “did not vote” in the Mazhilis, while 42.8% did not vote in the Maslikhat. The online survey had a total of 2,556 respondents in December- January 2023, and 1,296 respondents in March 2023. The number of respondents who did not vote in the March election decreased significantly, as did the number of respondents who were not eligible to vote due to age or citizenship, which amounted to 6.40% and 4.90% respectively. In terms of party support, the Amanat party received a high share of support among young electorate in March 2023, amounting to 34.9% in the Mazhilis and 33.2% in the Maslikhat. The percentage of votes for the Akzhol, Auyl, Communist People's Party was 1.89%, 4.86% and 0.85% in the Mazhilis and 2.88%, 4.67% and 1.09% in the Maslikhat, which is a high

number given the total number of respondents. For example, in January 2023, only 452 respondents voted for political parties, while in March 2023, it was 596.



The column for voting for “other parties” remains interesting. In January 2023, 11 respondents out of 355 noted that they would vote for other parties without indicating which party. In March 2023, 21 respondents out of 596 respondents would vote for the other party. Upon analyzing the open questions of these 21 respondents, it was found that about 18 people were ready to vote for the Republic party, while 3 young respondents preferred the Baytak party.

Figures - 16. Survey of youth on participation and voting for political parties (January 2023).



compiled by the author, 2023.

Figures - 17. Survey of youth on participation and voting for political parties (March 2023).



compiled by the author, 2023.

First of all, our research findings suggest that during the parliamentary elections in 2023, the number of young people who do not want to vote for political parties is decreasing. Secondly, the Amanat party remains the frontrunner in terms of the share of votes received, regardless of the time period of the survey conducted. Thirdly, the Republic party, despite being a new entrant in the political arena, has gained more votes and has become increasingly popular among young people.

The Republic party was created on January 18, 2023. Our research survey also shows that young people are highly satisfied with the creation of youth wing and youth quota.

Moreover, we analyzed the micro-level electoral volatility in past and future voting for political parties using cross-tabulation analysis. Results indicate that there is a high level of electoral volatility among young respondents, both in their past experience of voting for political parties and in their intention to vote for political parties in the future (Table-8). These results were based on the first wave of survey conducted between December 2022 and January 2023.

Out of the 44 respondents who voted for the Amanat party previously, only 3 respondents are willing to vote for it again in future at national level. Similarly, out of 43 respondents, only 1 respondent would be willing to vote for the same party at the regional level. The majority of respondents expressed their desire to vote for other parties such as the Akzhol party (8 votes), Auyl party (1 vote), Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan (2 votes), National Social Democratic Party (1 vote), or other parties (5 votes). A significant number of respondents (22) indicated that they do not want to vote for any party. A similar trend was observed for the Akzhol party, where only 1 and 3 respondents out of 15 and 17 respondents who previously voted for the party, respectively, will be ready to cast their votes. For the Auyl party, Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan, and National Social Democratic Party, almost none of the respondents will be loyal to these parties in the future, despite their past voting records.

In addition, micro-level electoral volatility results indicate that even though young respondents previously voted for political parties, many of them will be willing to vote for other parties in the future. For example, out of the 44 and 43 people who voted for the Amanat party at the national and regional levels, respectively, only a small number of them (5 and 6) will be ready to cast their votes for other parties. On the other hand, 22 and 24 of them will not vote for any political party. Similarly, 15 and 17 people who voted for Akzhol party in the past, 10 and 9 people will be willing to vote for other party.

Table - 8. Micro-level electoral volatility of young respondents first wave.

Future vote for political parties 2023	Past vote for political parties 2021											
	Amanat		Akzhol		Auyl		Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan		National Social Democratic Party		Other	
	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh
Amanat	3 (6.81)	1 (2.33)	0	0	0	1 (9.1)	1 (9.1)	0	0	0	1 (14.3)	2 (40.0)
Akzhol	8 (18.2)	8 (18.6)	1 (8.3)	3 (23.1)	4 (66.7)	7 (63.6)	1 (9.1)	0	0	0	0	0
Auyl	3 (6.82)	1 (2.33)	0	0	0	0	7 (63.6)	10 (83.3)	0	0	0	0
Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan	2 (4.55)	2 (4.65)	0	0	1 (16.7)	2 (18.2)	0	1 (8.3)	0	1 (33.3)	2 (28.6)	1 (20.0)
National Social Democratic Party	1 (2.27)	1 (2.33)	1 (8.3)	1 (8.0)	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 (28.6)	2 (40.0)
Other	5 (11.4)	6 (14.0)	10 (83.3)	9 (69.2)	1 (16.7)	1 (9.1)	2 (18.2)	1 (8.3)	0	2 (66.7)	2 (28.6)	0
No party to vote	22 (50.0)	24 (55.8)	3 (20.0)	4 (23.5)	1 (14.3)	1 (8.33)	1 (8.33)	0	0	0	0	1 (16.7)
total	44	43	15	17	7	12	12	12	12	0	3	7

Source: online survey wave 1, conducted between December 2022 and January 2023.

Therefore, according to the online survey conducted between December 2022 and January 2023, young respondents showed high electoral instability and a desire to vote for other political parties or not to vote for any political party.

The reason why micro-level electoral volatility in first wave of online survey was probably high is due to (1) a high attrition rate. We were losing many samples toward the end of online survey and thus, we had insufficient statistical power to generate meaningful results. High attrition rate occurred potentially because, firstly, the online survey was too long and secondly, had no incentive (financial) or enforcement mechanism to finish survey; (2) the survey was not fielded during the election time. The fielding during election time leads to the salience of political issues is higher among public, thus effect could be larger in online survey study; (3) there were no variations in dependent variable values (future and past vote for political parties). Only 1-3 respondents in each choosing the Amanat party. Even 44 – 43 respondents who voted for the Amanat party is very small values.

Given these reasons, we conducted a second wave of online survey during the parliamentary election in March 2023, with a shortened questionnaire to improve methodology.

Table-9. Micro-level electoral volatility of young respondents second wave.

Future vote for political parties 2023	Past vote for political parties 2021													
	Amanat		Akzhol		Auyl		Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan		National Social Democratic Party		Other		I didn't vote	
	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh	Mazhilis	Maslikh
Amanat	645 (92.3)	633 (94.8)	8 (25.0)	16 (34.8)	16 (19.8)	15 (19.2)	5 (31.3)	6 (30.0)	4 (44.4)	3 (70.8)	8 (25.0)	6 (20.0)	193 (34.0)	211 (34.1)
Akzhol	5 (0.72)	3 (0.45)	15 (46.9)	17 (36.9)	2 (2.47)	2 (2.56)	0	3 (15.0)	0	0	0	0	13 (2.26)	12 (1.94)
Auyl	15 (2.15)	11 (1.65)	1 (3.13)	6 (13.0)	56 (69.1)	53 (67.9)	2 (12.5)	1 (5.00)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	1 (3.13)	0	24 (4.18)	25 (4.04)
Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan	6 (0.86)	4 (0.60)	0	1 (2.17)	2 (2.47)	2 (2.56)	5 (31.3)	6 (30.0)	0	0	0	0	7 (1.22)	6 (0.97)
National Social Democratic Party	0	0	1 (3.13)	0	0	1 (1.28)	1 (6.25)	0	3 (33.3)	3 (37.5)	0	0	2 (0.35)	3 (0.48)
Other	8 (1.14)	6 (0.90)	5 (15.6)	3 (6.52)	3 (3.70)	3 (3.85)	2 (12.5)	3 (15.0)	0	0	18 (56.3)	19 (63.3)	39 (6.79)	38 (6.14)
No party to vote	20 (2.86)	11 (1.65)	2 (6.25)	3 (6.52)	2 (2.47)	2 (2.56)	1 (6.25)	1 (5.00)	1 (11.1)	1 (12.5)	5 (15.6)	5 (16.7)	296 (51.6)	324 (52.3)
Total	699	668	32	46	81	78	16	20	9	8	32	30	574	619

Source: online survey wave-2, conducted in March 2023.

According to the results of the second wave of online survey conducted during the parliamentary elections in March 2023, there is low micro-level electoral volatility (Table-9). This is confirmed by the fact that out of 699 respondents who voted for Amanat party in the past at the national level (Mazhilis), 645 respondents or 92% are still loyal to the Amanat party. Similarly at the regional level (Maslikhat), out of 668 respondents who voted for the Amanat party, 633 respondents are ready to vote for the same party. Despite the Amanat party's significant vote, the same voters in the future are ready to vote for other parties as well. 15 votes at the national and 11 votes at the regional level for the Auyl party, 5 and 3 votes each for the Akzhol party, 6 and 4 votes for the Communist People's Party of Kazakhstan, 8 and 6 votes for other parties, while 20 and 11 votes respectively did not choose any party or said, "I didn't vote". In this case, the reluctance to vote for parties in the future amounts to an insignificant percentage of 2.9% and 1.7%.

The Auyl party is the second most popular party among young people, with 81 and 78 young people having voted for it in the past. More than half of those voters will still be loyal to the same party in the future, with percentages of 69% and 68%.

The third most preferred political party is the “other party”. In other words, 18 or 56% and 19 or 63% of youth are ready to vote for other political party in the future, compared to 32 and 30 votes cast in the past.

The analysis of micro-level electoral volatility among young voters revealed that young respondents were less loyal to political parties such as Akzhol, Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan, National Social Democratic Party, with less than 50% of them showing future voting loyalty to these parties. This means that although young voters have supported these parties in the past, they are unlikely to do so in the future.

Furthermore, a significant number of young people chose not to vote for any party, with 574 and 619 youth abstaining from voting. Of those who did not vote for any party, approximately 34% of youth in the national and regional elections indicated their willingness to vote for the Amanat party in the future. On the other hand, 51.6% and 52.3% of young people who did not vote for any party said they would no longer vote for any party.

Therefore, results of micro-level electoral volatility conducted during the parliamentary elections on March 19, 2023, exhibit low electoral volatility. Firstly, young people are more likely to vote for the Amanat party, both in the past and in the future. Secondly, additionally, young voters are open to other parties such as the Auyl and the Republic party. Finally, a significant number of young people choose not to vote for any party at all.

Results of logit models for youth wing. To explore the impact of independent variables of youth wing (mobilization_, sign_negotiate_youth_behalf, Parliament_pay_youth_attention) and satisfaction_youth on past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis21 and past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh21, we run four logistic regressions. Table-10 below shows the estimations of means explanatory variables in the marginal effects of the logit models using data from both waves. The marginal effects of the four logit models are considered to be the partial derivative, which represent the change in probability of up or down voting for the Amanat party associated with a unit change in independent variables. The table includes the estimates of the probability of voting for the Amanat party, categorized by voting at the national and regional levels.

Table-10. Logit models results of youth wing in national and regional level.

	<i>past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21</i>		<i>past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis21</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
gender_female	0.1099605 (0.187355)	0.1580574 (0.2298473)	0.3689092 (0.1994629)	0.4888266* (0.2433471)
_age	0.0522364 (0.0447641)	-0.0060916 (0.0584535)	0.0608625 (0.0503551)	0.0256913 (0.0625662)
ethnicity_kazakh_	0.59826* (0.2715423)	0.5106205 (0.3473984)	0.3344133 (0.2929879)	0.1707307 (0.379201)
social_science	0.4103921 (0.4975867)	0.2269614 (0.7117203)	0.4985504 (0.5336548)	0.1974028 (0.7076474)
no_child	-0.6917613 (0.4742152)	-0.401979 (0.5530793)	-0.8424742 (0.562792)	-0.4340606 (0.5975299)
hear_YW_	0.4690242* (0.1911405)	0.4834962* (0.2335395)	0.4820083* (0.2001188)	0.515996* (0.2413255)
unemployment_	-0.0989238 (0.1092292)	-0.1336285 (0.1367726)	-0.0666953 (0.1180978)	-0.0882825 (0.1415065)
electoral_reforms_	0.3033298* (0.1289745)	0.3923756* (0.1680056)	0.0036841 (0.1396875)	0.0988136 (0.1782789)
strong_leader_	0.2285837* (0.1161857)	0.2468155 (0.143222)	0.3662072** (0.1237471)	0.3376859* (0.1502021)
social_media_	-0.0814718 (0.121898)	-0.1176753 (0.1536206)	-0.0439632 (0.1290375)	-0.1164999 (0.1610806)
mobilization_		0.3290629 (0.2103197)		0.4229131 (0.2170575)
sign_negotiate_youth_ behalf		-0.2104222 (0.2148193)		-0.3727258 (0.2277289)
Parliament_pay_youth _attention		0.04542 (0.2248206)		0.091984 (0.2352009)
satisfaction_youth		0.6263483** (0.2252248)		0.8067019*** (0.2286564)
<i>Cons_</i>	-1.429887 (1.358111)	-1.315254 (1.703313)	-0.9633363 (1.526121)	-1.119041 (1.81259)
<i>Number of obs</i>	729	572	731	577
<i>Pseudo R2</i>	0.0478	0.0820	0.0450	0.0840

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

In the logit model results above, it can be observed that the number of observations decreases from around 729 to 572. This decrease is not unexpected as the online survey was conducted in

compliance with the ethical requirements of the NU GSPP commission, which mandates that the survey must be voluntary. As a result, our online survey required an enforcement mechanism to encourage respondents to complete the survey. Respondents took part voluntarily in answering the questionnaire and were free to complete it at their convenience. Additionally, we did not provide any financial incentives. Therefore, one of the drawbacks of online surveys is the high rate of attrition among respondents who either do not complete the survey or do not respond to the questions.

All models, including columns (1), (2), (3), and (4), show that the variables “strong leader party”, “satisfaction_youth”, and “hear about youth wing” have statistically significant and positive coefficients. The dummy variable “hear_YW” indicates that, all other things being equal, youth who frequently hear about youth wings are more likely to vote for the Amanat party by approximately 0.5% in regional and national parliamentary elections. The categorical variable, a “strong party leader” also has a significant and positive effect on voting for the Amanat party of approximately 0.2% at the regional level and 0.3% and 0.4% at the national level.

The youth satisfaction and its influence on voting for the Amanat party is exciting. The results confirm that respondents who are satisfied with the youth wing are more likely to vote for the Amanat party at both regional 0.6% and national levels 0.8%, when compared with those who are dissatisfied with the youth wing. Youth who are satisfied with the creation of the youth wing have a greater probability of voting for the Amanat party by approximately 0.7% in the regional and 0.9% in the national vote.

Additionally, other variables such as reforms in the electoral system have a positive and significant effect on voting for the Amanat party at the regional level 0.3%. Belonging to Kazakh nationality shows a statistically significant effect of 0.6% on the regional election voting. Gender (female) also shows a statistically significant effect of 0.5% on voting for the Amanat party.

Results of logit models for youth quotas, show that factors such as satisfaction with the creation of youth quota, the electoral reforms, and a strong party leader have positive and significant impacts on voting for the Amanat party. The information is presented in Table-11.

According to the data, youth who are satisfied with the creation of youth quota are more likely to vote for the Amanat party by approximately 0.5% in regional and 1% in national parliamentary elections. A strong party leader also has a significant and positive effect on voting, about 0.3% at the regional level and 0.4% at the national level. Additionally, electoral reforms have a statistically significant effect on voting only at the regional level of 0.3%, while female are more likely to vote for the Amanat party about 0.6% in Mazhilis election.

Table-11. Logit models results of youth quota in national and regional level.

	<i>past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21</i>		<i>past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis21</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
gender_female	0.07942 (0.18466664)	0.1967972 (0.2362791)	0.36499 (0.1975047)	0.5501076* (0.2563819)
_age	0.010686 (0.0379621)	0.0812218 (0.0791262)	0.0142855 (0.0417449)	0.1082683 (0.0846889)
ethnicity_kazakh_	0.6425793* (0.2630938)	0.5599308 (0.3458517)	0.359834 (0.2854227)	-0.0045441 (0.4099192)
social_science	0.35717 (0.4997656)	0.7545018 (0.694461)	0.5834541 (0.502142)	0.4799397 (0.6984833)
no_child	-0.6697386 (0.4626504)	-0.3057554 (0.5416089)	-0.7884293 (0.538067)	-0.1123059 (0.5884271)
hear_YQ_	-0.154249 (0.1967311)	-0.2885028 (0.2472479)	-0.1290025 (0.2075126)	-0.4345702 (0.2629024)
unemployment_	-0.0815108 (0.1073404)	-0.2379853 (0.1471354)	-0.0221804 (0.1154727)	-0.0746036 (0.1527387)
electoral_reforms_	0.279204* (0.126781)	0.3544856* (0.1711022)	0.0216486 (0.1370519)	0.1366312 (0.1894108)
strong_leader_	0.2146256 (0.1138464)	0.3178808* (0.1466873)	0.3499285** (0.1204542)	0.4221098** (0.1558192)
social_media_	-0.0657433 (0.1189293)	-0.0661464 (0.1533116)	-0.0492058 (0.1263246)	-0.0423093 (0.1653132)
cand_deput_YQ_mobilize.		-0.344273 (0.2228235)		-0.3414644 (0.2355884)
cand_deputYQ_negotiate_		0.1715958 (0.2181015)		-0.0495502 (0.2385486)
Parliament_pay_attention_ deputYQ.		0.2907611 (0.2304365)		0.2276476 (0.246381)
satisfaction_YQ		0.4705829* (0.2318483)		1.015209*** (0.2415281)

<i>Cons_</i>	-0.3036187 (1.266092)	-2.847894 (2.041006)	-0.0442581 (1.405061)	-2.306087 (2.170003)
<i>Number of obs</i>	731	548	735	556
<i>Pseudo R2</i>	0.0329	0.0687	0.0325	0.0834

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Moreover, in order to check the validity of past voting for Amanat party results, we conducted logit model for future voting Amanat party. Below, we present results for youth wing and youth quota (Table-12).

Table-12. Logit models results of youth wing and quota in national and regional level (future vote).

	<i>future_youth_vote_Amanat_</i> Youth_wing (1)	<i>future_youth_vote_Amanat_</i> Youth_quota (3)
gender_female	-.1496153 (0.2078673)	-.1533679 (.2129439)
_age	-.0049567 (0.0640046)	.0423986 (.0799044)
ethnicity_kazakh_	0.1812906 (0.3311514)	.2588819 (.3268984)
social_science	2.25984 (1.191556)	2.691581* (1.150606)
no_child	-.9051037 (0.5971668)	-1.048842 (.6312152)
hear_YQ_	.8307368** (.3201869)	.5434327 (.3338588)
unemployment_	-.0858568 (.1244983)	-.0892924 (0.1334101)
electoral_reforms_	-.0970503 (.1556299)	-.054102 (.16093)
strong_leader_	.3074585* (.1346056)	.3055717* (.1343594)
social_media_	-.0661033 (.1417789)	.0643597 (.1430803)
mobilization_YW_YQ	.4195103* (.1828378)	.0120102 (.2067093)
sign_negotiate_youth_behalf	-.1693775 (.1930577)	-.24002614 (.2358526)

Parliament_pay_attention_deput	.4632602* (.1965906)	.5723974* (.2217471)
satisfaction_YQ_YW	.6418048** (.2066392)	.6280939** (.2141614)
<i>Number of obs</i>	671	625
<i>Pseudo R2</i>	0.11	0.08

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Two logit model results show that satisfaction with creation of youth wing and youth quota have statistically significant and positive effect on future voting for Amanat party at (P-value < 0.01). This means that youth who are satisfied with the youth wing are more likely in future to vote for Amanat party at 0.6% compared to dissatisfied youth. Similarly, youth who are satisfied with the youth quota are more likely in future to vote for Amanat party at 0.6%.

Moreover, ability of youth wing and youth quota to pay attention on youth issues in Parliament also have positive and statistically significant coefficients. The statistical interpretation is that an increase of 1 standard deviation in Parliament_pay_attention_YW leads to a 0.5 standard deviation increase in future votes for Amanat party in Maslikhat and Mazhilis. Moreover, an increase of 1 standard deviation in Parliament_pay_attention_YQ leads to a 0.6 standard deviation increase in future votes for Amanat party in Maslikhat and Mazhilis.

Statistically significant coefficient at (P-Value<0.05) only seen in mobilization activity of youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy”. The result confirms that youth mobilized by youth wing are more likely to vote in the future for Amanat party at regional and national levels 0.4%. Strong leader shows similar statistically positive and significant coefficients. This means that youth are more likely to vote in the future for Amanat party at 0.3% due to strong leader of party. Finally, social scientists and youth hear about youth wing are more likely to vote in the future for Amanat party at 2% and 0.8%.

7.2.1. Results of assessment the quality of youth wing.


We used a structural equation model (hereinafter - SEM) to assess the quality of youth wing and youth quota (Hoyle, 2000; Acock, 2013). The importance of SEMs is that it can provide information about “interdependencies or cause-and-effect relationships between variables”, testing the theoretical model of quality assessment of youth wing and youth quotas with a mediator variable


(Byun et al., 2018; Gopalakrishna-Remani et al., 2016; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1982). In other words, SEM allows simultaneously assess direct, indirect, and total effects.

In SEM, indirect effects refer to the representation of a mediating variable between the dependent and independent variable. The *satisfaction_youth* and *satisfaction_YQ* variables served as a mediating variable in our analysis. Most literature on youth wing has focused on direct effects, such as the positive relationship between youth wing membership and mother party membership, or the positive relationship between mother party and youth wing election results and others (de Roon, 2020). Parties that are unable to either aggregate or read voter preferences reduce the capacity for partisan responsiveness (Belchior et al., 2023; Guntermann & Persson, 2023; Pickard, 2019; Tsimonis, 2018). Pickard (2019) identified several youth wing roles. The youth wing of a political party plays a crucial role in mobilizing young people, representing them in negotiations, and bringing their concerns to the attention of Parliament. When the youth wing fails to perform these activities, youth participation in politics decline, causing them to become disengaged from the political process and less likely to vote for party (Kryshtanovskaya & Lavrov, 2022; Tsimonis, 2018). We hypothesize that the youth wing's direct effect on voting for the Amanat party is represented by - path A. However, it is not enough to assume that the perceived activities of the youth wing will automatically result in positive voting for the ruling party. Instead, it is more likely that the youth wing's ability to mobilize young people, represent them in negotiations and raise their issues in Parliament will increase their satisfaction with the youth wing. Higher satisfaction levels, in turn, will lead to greater support for the Amanat party. Our theoretical model for assessing the quality of the youth wing and youth quota suggests that the indirect effect is tested via paths B and C (Morlino et al., 2011; Pelizzo et al., 2018). In other words, the relationship between procedure domains and result domain is mediated by the content domain that is either satisfaction with creation of youth wing or satisfaction with the creation of youth quotas. This theoretical model was developed by Morlino et al., (2011). Mediation effects have been discussed in detail in previous studies (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2003; MacKinnon et al., 2007; Picón-Berjoyo et al., 2016; Ullman & Bentler, 2012).

Structural Equation Models are created using the maximum likelihood estimation method on the STATA SEM Builder. They are used to test theoretical statements as explained by Acock (2013) and Ullman & Bentler (2012). There are two endogenous variables called `past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21`, and `past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis211`, which represent the number of youth votes in the parliamentary election 2021 for the Amanat party in Maslikhat and Mazhilis. `Satisfaction_youth` measures the perception of young people towards satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the youth wing. The exogenous variables are `mobilization_`, `sign_negotiate_youth_behalf`, `Parliament_pay_youth_attention`. In SEM, solid lines represent statistically significant paths of study as shown in Figures 18 and 19.


Figure - 18. SEMs for youth wing and `past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21`.






compiled by the author, 2023.

Figure - 19. SEMs for youth wing and past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis211.





compiled by the author, 2023.

Table – 13 presents estimate of perceived activities and satisfaction regarding past votes for the Amanat party in the 2021 parliamentary election for Maslikhat and Mazhilis. Columns (1) and (2) show the results at the regional level, while columns (3) and (4) show the results at the national level. The online survey conducted indicates that the mobilization_ variable has a significant and positive direct effect on past votes for the Amanat party at both the regional and national levels.

Furthermore, the study found an indirect effect of Parliament’s attention to youth issues on voting for the Amanat party at the regional level, but not at the national level.

Moreover, the satisfaction_ and mobilization_ variables had positive and statistically significant direct effects on past_vote_Amanat_party at both the regional and national levels. However, the study did not find any direct or indirect effects of signing and negotiating on behalf of youth on satisfaction and voting for the Amanat party.

Table - 13. SEMs results for youth wing in national and regional level.

	<i>past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21</i>			<i>past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis21</i>		
	(1) Direct effect	(2) Indirect effects:		(3) Direct effect	(4) Indirect effects:	
	<i>Past vote Amanat</i>	<i>satisfaction_youth</i>	<i>Past vote Amanat</i>	<i>Past vote Amanat</i>	<i>satisfaction_youth</i>	<i>Past vote Amanat</i>
Direct effects:						
<i>mobilization_</i>	0.0923128**	-0.051826	0.0779328**	0.0756385**	-0.040151	0.0767771**

	(0.0266951)	(0.0343612)	(0.0282112)	(0.0251867)	(0.0330561)	(0.0264175)
<i>sign_negotiate_youth_</i> <i>behalf</i>	-0.005887 (0.0269967)	-0.0041891 (0.0339081)	-0.0055416 (0.0277945)	-0.0272911 (0.0257328)	0.0309237 (0.0333058)	-0.0420808 (0.0266057)
<i>Parliament_pay_youth_att</i> <i>ention.</i>	0.0229991 (0.0285909)	0.0919172* (0.0363097)	0.0277806 (0.0298981)	0.0369462 (0.0268603)	0.0658428 (0.0348201)	0.0376128 (0.0278679)
<i>satisfaction_youth</i>	-	-	0.1108537*** (0.0309153)		-	0.1243252*** (0.0298358)
Indirect effects:						
<i>mobilization_</i>	(no path)	-	-0.0057451 (0.0041323)	(no path)	-	-0.0049918 (0.0042807)
<i>sign_negotiate_youth_</i> <i>behalf</i>	(no path)	-	-0.0004644 (0.0037611)	(no path)	-	0.0038446 (0.0042423)
<i>Parliament_pay_youth_att</i> <i>ention.</i>	(no path)	-	0.0101894* (0.0049271)	(no path)	-	0.0081859 (0.0047539)
Total effects:						
<i>mobilization_</i>	0.0923128** (0.0266951)	-0.051826 (0.0343612)	0.0721877** (0.028422)	0.0756385** (0.0251867)	-0.040151 (0.0330561)	0.0717853** (0.0267084)
<i>sign_negotiate_youth_</i> <i>behalf</i>	-0.005887 (0.0269967)	-0.0041891 (0.0339081)	-0.006006 (0.0280472)	-0.0272911 (0.0257328)	0.0309237 (0.0333058)	-0.0382362 (0.0269101)
<i>Parliament_pay_youth_att</i> <i>ention.</i>	0.0229991 (0.0285909)	0.0919172* (0.0363097)	0.0379699 (0.0300337)	0.0369462 (0.0268603)	0.0658428 (0.0348201)	0.0457987 (0.0281337)
<i>satisfaction_youth</i>	-	-	0.1108537*** (0.0309153)	-	-	0.1243252*** (0.0298358)
<i>Number of obs</i>	765	703		773		716

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001


According to the statistical interpretation of parameters' indirect effects of SEMs, 1 standard deviation increase in the attention given to youth by Parliament leads to a raise of 0.09 standard deviation in youth satisfaction with youth wing and 0.11 standard deviation in votes for the Amanat party. This estimation is calculated by multiplying the coefficients of Parliament_pay_youth_attention to satisfaction_youth (0.092) and coefficients satisfaction_youth to past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21 (0.11), which results in $0.092 \times 0.1108 = 0.01019$. The direct effect is simply the coefficient from Parliament_pay_youth_attention to past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21 that is (0.022). The total effect is the sum of coefficients from direct and indirect effects, which is $0.010 + 0.022 = 0.03$. Additionally, an increase of 1 standard deviation in youth mobilization leads to a concurrent increase of 0.09 standard deviation in votes for the Amanat party in Mazhilis and 0.08


standard deviation in Maslikhat. Finally, an increase in satisfaction with the youth wing by 1 standard deviation leads to a concurrent increase of 0.11 standard deviation in votes for the Amanat party in Mazhilis and 0.12 standard deviation in Maslikhat.

7.2.2. Results of assessment the quality of youth quota.

To assess the quality of youth quota, we use the same SEMs as we did for assessing the quality of the youth wing. In SEMs, there are endogenous variables and exogenous variables. The endogenous variables are `past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21`, `past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis211` and `Satisfaction_YQ`. `Satisfaction_YQ` is the perception of young people regarding their satisfaction with creating a youth quota. The exogenous variables are as follows: the perception of youth towards young candidates of deputies, included in party lists in elections according to 30% youth quotas that can mobilize youth (`cand_deput_YQ_mobilize`), sign and negotiate on behalf of youth (`cand_deputYQ_negotiate_`) and make Parliament pay attention to what youth think (`Parliament_pay_attention_deputYQ`). In SEMs, solid lines represent statistically significant study paths. Figures 20 and 21 provide more details on these study paths.


Figure - 20. SEMs for youth quotas and `past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21`.






compiled by the author, 2023.

Figure - 21. SEMs for youth quotas and past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis21.





compiled by the author, 2023.

Table -14 displays the estimated activities of young deputy candidates included in party lists for the election according to 30% youth quota. The table also shows their satisfaction with the creation of youth quota and past votes for the Amanat party in Maslikhat in columns (1) and (2). Additionally, past votes for the Amanat party in Mazhilis in columns (3) and (4). The results of an online survey study that that in full models' columns (2) and (4), whether at regional or national levels, satisfaction with the creation youth quota has a significant and positive effect on past votes for the Amanat party. However, columns (1) and (3) that present the perceived activities of youth quotas do not have any statistical significance, except direct effect of young deputies included in party lists according to 30% quota. Their inclusion makes Parliament pay attention to the thoughts and opinions of youth.

Table - 14. SEMs results for youth quotas in national and regional level.

	<i>past_vote_Amanat_Maslikh_21</i>			<i>past_vote_Amanat_Mazhilis21</i>		
	(1) Direct effect	(2) Indirect effects:		(3) Direct effect	(4) Indirect effects:	
	<i>Past vote Amanat</i>	<i>satisfaction_youth</i>	<i>Past vote Amanat</i>	<i>Past vote Amanat</i>	<i>satisfaction_youth</i>	<i>Past vote Amanat</i>
Direct effects:						
<i>cand_deput_YQ_mobilize.</i>	0.0009159 (0.0297718)	0.0463387 (0.0377628)	-0.0125791 (0.0318889)	-0.0398789 (0.0279736)	0.0168583 (0.0366752)	-0.0335149 (0.029921)
<i>cand_deputYQ_negotiate_</i>	0.0228794 (0.0288787)	-0.0467547 (0.0353031)	0.0309264 (0.0298172)	0.0266462 (0.0280452)	-0.0263876 (0.0352974)	0.026327 (0.0288042)

<i>Parliament_pay_attention_deputYQ.</i>	0.0642911* (0.0310548)	0.0108259 (0.0389795)	0.0571782 (0.032882)	0.0503393 (0.0300429)	0.0292906 (0.0383806)	0.0416791 (0.0313207)
<i>satisfaction_YQ</i>	-	-	0.0665239* (0.0323001)	-	-	0.109888*** (0.0309864)
Indirect effects:						
<i>cand_deput_YQ_mobilize.</i>	(no path)	-	0.0030826 (0.0029242)	(no path)	-	0.0018525 (0.0040639)
<i>cand_deputYQ_negotiate_</i>	(no path)	-	-0.0031103 (0.0027922)	(no path)	-	-0.0028997 (0.003964)
<i>Parliament_pay_attention_deputYQ.</i>	(no path)	-	0.0007202 (0.0026165)	(no path)	-	0.0032187 (0.0043141)
Total effects:						
<i>cand_deput_YQ_mobilize.</i>	0.0009159 (0.0297718)	0.0463387 (0.0377628)	-0.0094965 (0.0319526)	-0.0398789 (0.0279736)	0.0168583 (0.0366752)	-0.0316623 (0.0301867)
<i>cand_deputYQ_negotiate_</i>	0.0228794 (0.0288787)	-0.0467547 (0.0353031)	0.027816 (0.0298714)	0.0266462 (0.0280452)	-0.0263876 (0.0352974)	0.0234273 (0.0290526)
<i>Parliament_pay_attention_deputYQ.</i>	0.0642911* (0.0310548)	0.0108259 (0.0389795)	0.0578983 (0.0329822)	0.0503393 (0.0300429)	0.0292906 (0.0383806)	0.0448978 (0.0315903)
<i>satisfaction_YQ</i>	-	-	0.0665239* (0.0323001)	-	-	0.109888*** (0.0309864)
<i>Number of obs</i>	744	682		754		693

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

According to the statistical interpretation of SEM parameters, an increase of 1 standard deviation in *Parliament_pay_attention_deputYQ* leads to a 0.06 standard deviation increase in past votes for the Amanat party in Maslikhat. Moreover, an increase of 1 standard deviation in satisfaction with the creation of youth quota results in a 0.06 standard deviation increase in votes for the Amanat party in Maslikhat (P-value < 0.05) and a 0.11 standard deviation increase in votes for the party in Mazhilis (P-value < 0.001).

The results of SEMs indicate that youth satisfaction with the creation of a youth wing and a youth quota explains the relationship between the presented exogenous variable and voting for the ruling party. This variable includes *Parliament_pay_youth_attention*.

According to researchers Birgitta (1987), Green & Schwam-Baird (2016), Jenkins (1983), Przeworski (1975) and Sebestyén (2020), the success of political parties in elections can be attributed to their ability to mobilize voters. Our study confirms that the success of ruling party is due to the

high mobilization power of their youth wing. This is achieved by actively involving teenagers in the formation of political ideals and participation in activities of the youth wing. Thus, ensuring their satisfaction with the youth organization. When combined, these factors double the likelihood of young people voting for the Amanat party. Moreover, other factors that influence young people's decision to vote for the Amanat party include a strong party leader, electoral reforms, female, nationality, and frequent hearing about youth wings.

Our study supports the theoretical model that youth satisfaction plays a crucial role in mediating the relationship between youth wing activities, i.e., Parliament pays attention youth opinions and voting for the ruling party. In other words, whether or not young people are satisfied with the activities of the youth wing can influence their decision to vote for the Amanat party. Finally, satisfaction with the youth quota system also explains why young people tend to vote for the Amanat party.

7.3.1. Results of semi-structured interviews with political elites.

This chapter presents the results of a qualitative research method, which involved conducted semi-structured interviews, according to the main themes and categories.

The importance of interaction between the Amanat party and voters.

There is national empirical evidence in political literature reflects the importance of party system stability for states. A significant number of participants in the semi-structured interviews emphasized the importance of the Amanat party as a public organization, and one of the most powerful in the region of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Several Maslikhat deputies also highlighted the importance of the Amanat party's activities, particularly in terms of how it establishes contact with the public, and the time and methods used to reach out to voters. The interviewees drew from their professional experiences to provide examples of the importance of the Amanat party. However, one interview participant expressed that the trust in the Amanat party was undermined during its time as a Nur-Otan party and in the leaders who held political positions in the past.

Most of the interviewees recognized the relevance and importance of this study. They believed that it could raise awareness and help in the development of recommendations for policy

developments. The participants included chairpersons of regional branches of Amanat party, deputies of regional Maslikhats, heads of political work and head of Apparatus of other political parties. They all provided an analysis of the issue of the importance of the Amanat party from different perspectives, as shown from quotes in Table – 15.

Table – 15. The importance of interaction between Amanat party and voters.

<p>Important</p>	<p>«Relationship with voters is a very, very good experience under Amanat party; I just think that this is a necessary good experience - this is when we have personal meetings with voters on Amanat platform».</p> <p>«We work by phone, we work in the public reception party, Amanat works with visits to districts when meeting with voters, and we also respond to social networks».</p> <p>«When requests come in, then we also begin to establish contacts with these people, and it will either be a telephone conversation, or a meeting, or a visit to the site regarding the issue».</p> <p>«It was a public reception of citizens, that is, who comes to me if this problem is very urgent and needs to be solved, naturally, I tried to solve them as well».</p> <p>«It turns out so that children can cross unhindered. It was on September 1, 2023, that I went to check again, because before that there was a police department, a transport inspectorate and nothing had been done yet. That is, cars are flying everywhere, and children cannot cross the road to school and, accordingly, I began to raise this issue again».</p> <p>«We interact with voters on an ongoing basis; in principle, there are telephones, cell phones and work phones, they are not hidden anywhere, and it is published on social networks when reception is taking place and where it is taking place. In principle, at the public reception, we also declare on account of city branch of Amanat party</p>
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	<p>of all deputies, we declare there on September 12 there will be a reception in city district, or let's say there in a cultural center or in a public reception, or in a regional branch».</p> <p>«The thematic reception is questions about housing and communal services, that is, not a single deputy or some leader of one invite and receives. «We invite a whole galaxy there, all interested parties, that is, city housing and communal services, the regional energy department, the utility company, lawyers, notaries who make notarial inscriptions there on debts to housing and communal services, that is, we cover everything and then more people come, whole teams».</p> <p>“If official, then through receptions of citizens, there is a specific work schedule; they sign up there and come with specifically prepared questions. We will answer in writing if the issues cannot be resolved here and now. We usually take three days, so what if there are issues that can be resolved now? Call any organization, find out, or immediately get a consultation; usually, lawyers, assistants, and employees of various departments under the akimat work with me on the team, and then we immediately give answers and solve the problem. There is also a format for meetings and communicating with the population and voters - these are social networks through social networks. Social networks work well; they usually write a direct message with their question, and if it is during working hours, I answer immediately. Alternatively, they write to WhatsApp if they have questions. We also have a working WhatsApp phone number, so we advise and solve. This is how we interact”.</p>
Less important	<p>«In isolated cases of receptions of citizens, receptions of voters, it does not always give an effect, because the contingent that comes to Amanat party is practically the same - these are our hero mothers».</p> <p>«It's rare that people come to us with systemic questions».</p> <p>«These are mostly episodic, their own questions. I can't get my child into school, unemployment, lack of land, that is, isolated cases, and such episodic ones».</p>

	<p>«In order to carry it out effectively, the Amanat party was approached with systemic issues that can be solved not only specifically for this person, but by solving this issue, we could solve the entire system, that is, looking at the root, we are doing thematic techniques».</p> <p>«But there are issues that are within my competence, and there are issues that are not my competence, so if I can, well, let's say a woman says, my mother wants to be buried in place next to my father, there is a place, but we have a place there a ban is acceptable, yes, but I can't decide that».</p> <p>«But what I want to say is that this system doesn't work very effectively for us, even you know what we mean by the system of processing deputy requests and appeals».</p>
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compiled by the author, 2023.

Existing qualitative study have demonstrated the importance of the Amanat party's interaction with voters, especially for a wide range of stakeholders, since the deputy is responsible to voters. Participants have confirmed the positive impact of activities at public reception centers. However, they have also noted that the questions raised are mostly personal in nature and not representative of society as a whole. The issues raised are only partially related to the activities of Maslikhat deputies. Furthermore, the system for processing deputy requests is not always effective, with formal replies being a problem at both regional and republican levels. One participant suggested that parliamentary requests be jointly worked out with administrators (deputies of Mazhilis) to resolve issues more efficiently. Overall, the semi-structured interviews showed that the engagement of the Amanat party with voters is of great importance. Participants emphasized the critical role of communication between voters and deputies.

Consequences of Amanat party's interaction with voters.

During a semi-structured interview, the positive and negative consequences of the Amanat party's interactions with voters were highlighted. In this regard, some interview participants had a good understanding of the interaction between the Amanat party and voters. One deputy noted that having face-to-face conversations with people and recording their requests is a positive experience.

Some deputies prioritize resolving issues based on their essence, while others prefer resolving them point-by-point or comprehensively. For instance, if the issue pertains to preparing for school, emphasis is placed not only on the heating season but also on the access roads to school. Since there are no pedestrian markings for the unimpeded passage of children. The issue requires the involvement of multiple departments, including police and transport inspectorate.

Most participants agreed that the primary outcome of the Amanat party’s interaction with voters is the meeting of program administrators, where all statement is processed under meeting minutes, and as stated, government bodies are “caught by the tail”. In other words, government bodies are held accountable. Another positive consequence of this interaction is the development of communication skills and communication methods. Social networks are used to cover daily routines and work plans. However, the interaction between the Amanat party and voters also has some negative consequences, such as creating a “dependent” attitude of voters towards the party, a negative image of deputies, and a lack of the interaction of program administrators and the work of Maslikhats with Mazhilis and Senate of Parliament. Table – 16 presents quotes of consequences of Amanat’s party interaction with voters.

Table – 16. Consequences of Amanat party’s interaction with voters.

Dependent attitude	<p>«The fact is that we receive such calls when they ask us to literally take out garbage for us. That is, we have full landfills here, you deputies do nothing here, for example, neglected roads, come and take out the garbage for us».</p> <p>«That is, you know, let’s sit on our necks and dangle our legs and let them do it for us. You deputies are initially to blame for everything, for all my troubles».</p> <p>«They look and don’t understand that they have to do something about it».</p>
Negative image of deputies	<p>«This image that was created on television in the networks does not play into our hands and this image has been formed for many years and it is very difficult to somehow change it».</p>

	<p>«It was the akimat’s fault that it rained, and the snow fell, the deputies, well, that’s it».</p>
<p>Lack of clear interaction with government bodies, Maslikhats, Mazhilis and Senate of Parliament</p>	<p>«On our street, for 40 years, an unauthorized landfill was stored in the private sector, and neither the police, nor the participants themselves, nor the city transport, which is essentially responsible for landfills, was responsible, so we had to solve it comprehensively».</p> <p>«In every issue that we solved, when some tangle of problems arises, there is no interaction between organizations, there is no clear interaction, for example, the police and the environmental department, there is no interaction between the city trans committee and the police, there is no interaction between the city trans committee and the contractor, which is not responsible for bulky waste».</p> <p>«For some reason they always tried to answer clearly only for their work, but we lack precisely this connection».</p> <p>«I suggested that if there are any questions, if this concerns the level of the regions, and besides, I have this somewhere else in different areas, then this means that we can go with this issue to Senate or Mazhilis and it turns out there work this way».</p> <p>«So, Mazhilis looks, if let’s say such a problem exists, and they found solutions, they say, we had such a problem, now we have found solutions».</p> <p>«If they see that, conditionally, there is such a problem in 4 regions, and when they start poking around, and it exists in all other regions, they begin to address this problem and change it at the legislative level».</p>

compiled by the author, 2023.

During a discussion, it was mentioned that the Amanat party’s interaction with voters may be a result of voters’ distrust of deputies. Although this has not been frequently discussed, it is a known consequence of the party’s interaction with voters, which has been widely covered in the literature

on political parties. The interview participants noted that the consequences of interaction could be a dependent attitude towards the party, a negative image of the party, and lack of interaction.

Factors that determine voting for a ruling party.

A qualitative analysis was conducted to determine the factors that lead to voting for the Amanat party among semi-structured interview participants. Several themes and their categories were identified. The analysis groups these categories into main themes such as socio-demographic characteristics, youth leaders and activities on social networks, reflecting the interests of most young people.

Socio-demographic characteristics.

According to the interviews' results, the Amanat party has identified categories of voters, such as nationality, age, tribalism, and objective youth.

The party has made efforts to ensure that its lists of candidates cover all categories of people with regard to age, gender, employment, and nationality. The composition of these lists varies depending on the region. For instance, in the southern regions where Kazakhs make up the majority of the population (97%), the Amanat party maintains a similar ratio in the list of candidates, i.e., 97% Kazakhs and a few individuals from other diasporas. Regarding age, party lists comprise representatives from all age groups. Since different factors influence voters, they have their own preferences regarding age, gender, language proficiency, knowledge, and appearance. According to a party official, older voters tend to have a preference for tribalism, where they vote for people from the same family or fellow citizens. The Table-17 includes quotes from interview participants sharing their views on voting for the Amanat party.

Table – 17. Socio-demographic characteristics.

Nationality	<p>«Well, firstly, Amanat party, when they form a party list, it tries to cover all of these, well, at least in Kyzylorda, you know? Yes, we basically have a titular nation of 97% Kazakhs».</p> <p>«When we form a party list, in any case, we make a list of candidates for the Amanat party, the list we try to maintain this ratio, that is, 97%</p>
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	<p>of it should consist of Kazakhs, and several people there should be from other diasporas».</p> <p>«In my opinion, the nationality decides, because you know, again, region differs from region to region».</p> <p>«In our Abay region, most of the population is of Islamic or Kazakh nationality. In Ust-Kamenogorsk, Pavlodar region there is more Slavic nationality, on the contrary, there are about 70 percent Slavic nationality».</p>
Age	<p>«We are trying everyone to make it happen. This is how many 30 people there are, so that there are representatives of all ages, all social groups».</p> <p>«As for age, I already voiced before that, as for gender or profession, or so on».</p> <p>«You know, it all depends on mentality, on intelligence, a lot of things depend on it, why? Because people who are reasonable and conscientious, they set some priorities in their lives, people who, led by them, tell them who to vote for».</p> <p>«I believe that everything always influences, everyone has their own preferences by age, gender, language area, knowledge, and for whatever reason, they will even look at your appearance and say I don't like you».</p>
Tribalism	<p>«They are more mature; in Kyzylorda, tribalism is more developed. People from the same family, fellow countrymen, this prevails among us».</p> <p>«In the majoritarian system, there are a lot of risks, especially in our southern regions, where they are very strong, there is an institution of tribalism, family and clan affiliation, support for everything else, when we have random people, such people pass through in pursuit of hype».</p>

Objective youth	<p>«I think when they choose (vote). They look at cases. When I propose people for whom both young people and non-young people will vote tomorrow on the party list. In general, the entire electorate of the region who have achievements».</p> <p>«When I form a list of young people, I put young people who are successful businessmen, to hell with it, let it be their parents' business that they continued. But these are the guys who understand at least something about this, who make products».</p> <p>«Who have experience in charity and have solved some problems».</p> <p>«They vote for him because he has real steps, real achievements. Young people love successful people who have at least some efficiency».</p>
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compiled by the author, 2023.

In general, the interview participants had different opinions about voting for the Amanat party, depending on their demographic categories.

The interviewees also noted the importance of continuity between generations in formal settings with predictable nature of policy development. One of the participants stated that removing deputies from previous convocations and demanding their replacement is a big mistake because these deputies are true professionals who have gained experience in their fields. There are some quotes: “These are professionals in different fields, and it is very disappointing when young people demand that they enter something new without gaining experience”. “We had a very competent chairman of Maslikhat, and thanks to the fact that we absorbed knowledge from him, we easily got into this channel, and now the time is such that there is no time for swinging”. Another participant gave an example of son of a labor worker, whose father imbued him with altruistic qualities. Magzhan, the son, is driven by the same ideals of altruism as his father deputy, and when people vote for him, they vote for him due to his qualities, not his gender because the whole region knows about his father.

Youth leaders, activities on social networks, banal activities.

During interviews, participants highlighted that youth leaders and activities on social networks play a crucial role in determining votes for the Amanat party. Participants believe that youth leaders

who support the party can influence a significant portion of their peers in every university, school, or college. The party deputies acknowledged that they may not be viewed as authorities by young people due to their age, making youth leaders even more important. To increase the number of like-minded people, the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” will need to search for active individuals who can invite others to follow them and conduct surveys among them. The interviewees emphasized that if youth are involved in the party’s activities, such as participating in events, gathering, communicating, and integrating into the system, they will remain with the party. Social media is essential in raising awareness among the youth about the party and politics in general. However, there are mixed opinions on how social networks contribute to the coverage of daily routines and events. Some party officials believe that 80% of youth wing employees join other organizations (trade unions, volunteer groups and youth associations), take beautiful shots, and add their activities to their social media accounts, while others think social networks can help cover daily events.

Table – 18. Quotes about leadership, social networks, banal activities.

Youth leaders	<p>«In youth circles, they are conditionally leaders of opinion. Because age is age; for example, I don’t understand TikTok. Now they’ll start telling me something about it, I’ll just stand there smiling and silent».</p> <p>«I won’t talk to them about TikTok, because it’s not my thing, but on other topics at career guidance, we can find a common language with them. Some other topics».</p> <p>«This is all in parts, but in order to lead a youth organization, a certain number of people must be leaders of their age».</p> <p>“If, for example, a deputy comes to a meeting with young people, then for them I am not a very big authority for them, because there are different age categories.”</p>
Social networks and youth wing of «Zhastar Rukhy»	<p>«If you look at their account, yes, now is the age of social networks, and that is, by your social account you can judge your activity and the effectiveness of your work».</p> <p>«They take pictures with one or other, that is, no projects, no youth initiative from the regions».</p>

	<p>«The youth wing joins others, takes beautiful pictures and adds them to their accounts».</p> <p>“Youth will be involved in this orbit, they will participate, go somewhere, gather, communicate, hold events, this is how they will integrate into the system, then they (youth) will be with us.”</p>
Banal activities	<p>«Very bad labor discipline, they can come to work at 11.00am, I can't do anything, because they report only to the center from there, they release some kind of work plan in the republic, how to say».</p> <p>«How should I put it, the event is so banal, having neither ideological nor social impact».</p>
Mercantile and duty contingent	<p>«The guys from the youth wing Zhastar Rukhy are overly mercantile. That is, they have a financial interest».</p> <p>«If you say clearly what they are doing, that is, to take some money from some young deputy, buy some nonsense gifts for this, for example, 20 balls and distribute them at some regular competition».</p> <p>«That is, what the center orders them to do is just that. I can back it up with a specific example; in our region they are absolutely incapable of finding pressing problems».</p> <p>«The participants are the same, that is, some 30–40 people are on duty». «That is, in general, young people in the region do not participate there».</p> <p>«Anyone or youth organization is involved in the whole youth of region, students, universities, colleges. Their youth trade unions, youth associations, volunteer groups, there are some who, within the framework of some paid projects, are simply driven by sheer enthusiasm, but not youth wing of Zhastar Rukhy».</p> <p>«Youth wing of Zhastar Rukhy today is a hardware structure, which consists of appointed people and their duty contingent of 25, there are 30 people».</p>

	«I can say this with confidence, they do not work with specific focus groups of youth, that is, they do not work with working youth».
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compiled by the author, 2023.

As noted by a participant in a semi-structured interview, the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” needs to identify current problems faced by young people in different regions and support their argument with specific examples from their practice. The participant of interview has worked in domestic politics for about 20 years and dealt with social tensions. One issue that has been raised is regarding children’s travel. According to the Maslikhat’s decision, public transport travel for children under 17 is charged at 40 tenge. However, due to a misinterpretation, children under 17 must have a school certificate. This has led to the exclusion of college students who entered college after 9th grade and could not provide a certificate from school because they were college students. Therefore, according to the Maslikhat’s decision, they also had to pay 40 tenges, but only by presenting a birth certificate.

Another example concerns the creation of a project for a unified student clinic. The question revolves around the placement and service of young people in the clinic. As per the law, they must be assigned to a local clinic, and for this, they must have a residence permit in the city. However, most young people are unaware of this. They believe that if they are registered in a rural area, then they will not be assigned to a clinic in the city where they are studying, or they will be assigned in absentia. A monthly capitation payment of 1,980 tenges is paid for each person, but no one serves them. They are simply on the list. There was a case of a student who was imprisoned in a settlement colony for three years. While in prison, the student underwent magnetic resonance imaging three times and two computed tomography scans. In other words, the clinic charged for these medical services, but the student did not receive any treatment.

The participant recommends that the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” should undertake the above-mentioned projects. In this context, the institution of mentoring emphasizes that the work of the youth wing is evaluated based on simply one-time actions. To address this issue, the proposal is

to establish the institution of mentoring and legally assign the responsibility of interaction to the heads of regional political departments. This may also encourage youth to vote for the Amanat party.

Binary perspective.

During the semi-structured interviews, participants shared their views on the youth wing issues. They found that comparing people's past and present views was useful in gaining an informative understanding of the topic. This comparison of data, practice, and opinion has been combined into a binary, which will be discussed further.

Komsomol against the youth wing «Zhastar Rukhy».

The binary in question is the comparison between the Komsomol and the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy”. Participants compared the youth wing's current practices and voting system with those that existed during Soviet times. Some participants expressed that their Soviet experience of being Komsomol members and pioneers was better than what young people experience nowadays, as they were left to themselves.

Others emphasized the importance of ideology, merit, and strict hierarchy. According one of the participants, in Soviet times, ideology was the driving force behind children and youth wanting to join Komsomol and pioneers. There were certain requirements that needed to be fulfilled, such as passing an interview and proving oneself in Komsomol and Pioneer to receive a pioneer tie and recommendation. During the interview, participation in school activities was necessary, such as joining school councils of squads where young people worked together to collect wastepaper or scrap metal. All of this was done through live communication between young people. Another participant mentioned that becoming a Komsomol member was not an immediate process. First, one had to become an October schoolboy or schoolgirl, then a Pioneer and finally a Komsomol member. Only activists and excellent students were accepted into the Komsomol, which made wearing the flag a great honour since only a few were accepted. This was a gradual process, and the ideology was built over 70 years.

Table – 19. Binary perspective quotes.

<p>Komsomol against youth wing</p>	<p>«At the same time, they seem to be doing well, but I don't know how our shift would be. As the party used to be - komsomol, something in this format, but of course in a modern manner».</p> <p>«We also saw Soviet Union, we saw pioneer ties, komsomol badges. I will say that there was absolutely nothing wrong with it, there was absolutely nothing wrong with it. But guys weren't like that, they were completely different and partly now they are left to their own devices, and why hide it, they make money».</p> <p>«Ideology. There was grain there, well, they walked in step there, they wanted to get there, it was difficult to get there, they had to go through an interview».</p> <p>«There you had to get a recommendation to get into pioneer tie, you had to prove yourself in order to get into komsomol».</p> <p>«I will also add that you couldn't just jump into komsomol; you had to first be <i>october</i>, then <i>pioneer</i>, and only then <i>komsomol</i> member».</p> <p>«You had to learn charter; they joined komsomol in turns, and this line was excellent students, activists; for example, I was the chairman of Seryozha Tyulenin's council».</p> <p>«It was a terrible shame if an activist was expelled from <i>pioneers</i> or from <i>octobrists</i> or from <i>komsomol</i>. It was a very honor to be in the <i>komsomol</i> and <i>pioneers</i>».</p> <p>«We have people, youth wing «Zhastar Rukhy» should be identified among young people, yes, we have active ones, so at one time I was the chairman of a squad, a detachment there, a <i>komsomol</i> member, a <i>pioneer</i>».</p> <p>«When powerful party structures and systemic propaganda are created, then young people are convinced of the advantages of a particular system. In all parties, starting with the CPSU and now Amanat, the Republic Party, they all say that the youth will do this</p>
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	<p>and that. And whoever has more, has covered. Amanat has more opportunities and, if not for that, but for more progressive youth. Youth is for the Republic, so I, too, together with the youth, are for the Republic party. I see promise in them because they are more modern. They understand the current era. And in Amanat party there is a certain amount. Even a priori, there are those who are accustomed to using the scheme that was in the era of Nazarbayev's stagnation, I think so».</p> <p>«Well, it all depends on who their (youth wing's) mentors are, I think. They saw when the union fell apart. I lived half my life, conscious, creative work in Soviet times for 31 or 32 years and the same amount of time after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Those Komsomol leaders who led the youth and shouted <i>URA!!!</i> for the Soviet system in general, they probably adapted faster, you understand».</p>
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compiled by the author, 2023.

Some participants believed that each time has its unique characteristics, while others disagreed and compared the Soviet period to the current one, noting that everything was different and not necessarily good or bad. The qualities of today's youth were emphasized, including their knowledge, multilingualism, and increased opportunities. Participants expressed a desire for the youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy" to identify and recognize active members, similar to the Soviet Union's practice of selecting a Chairman of the Squad, Detachment, Komsomol member, and Pioneer. The participants suggested establishing a procedure for choosing these individuals through an open vote for the Chairman of the detachment council, Squad council, the Komsomol, and the Pioneer in the front ranks. Some participants compared the Soviet period of Komsomol with the successive changes in the generation of the deputy corps.

Youth quota in Kazakhstan.

During meetings with interview participants, the usage of the youth quota in elections was a common topic of discussion. Participants discussed various aspects related to youth quota, such as their comparison with other electoral systems, procedures followed by youth quota, effectiveness of youth quota, popularity, and disadvantages.

Usage of the youth quota in parliamentary elections.

In the parliamentary elections, the Amanat party first used the youth quota during the 2020 primaries. In Kazakhstan, two sets of quotas were introduced – 30% for women and 30% for youth, which was seen as a positive step towards incentivizing young people. Participants noted that the youth quota worked well in 2020 as the Amanat party genuinely looked for youth and leaders. The youth quota was retained throughout the distribution of mandates. However, the positive perception of the youth quota was later negated when the quotas were combined into one for women, youth, and people with disabilities in the 2023 parliamentary elections. This meant that the youth quota was merged and usurped into a single 30%. This move was criticized by some participants who felt it was a step backwards instead of development.

During the discussion, participants also compared the proportional and majoritarian systems. They noted that the majoritarian system mainly nominates rich people or children of rich people. Whereas activists are nominated mainly on party lists. One of the participants added that under a majoritarian system, it is difficult to revoke a mandate. Some participants felt that the introduction of a majoritarian system and a reduction in the percentage of youth quota was a “somersault backwards” instead of a step forward. During an interview, one participant noted the inability to recruit women or youth under the quota. She emphasized that the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” should educate young leaders from whom future candidates will be selected. However, in the southern regions, they were unable to find 30% of women to participate. For example, if there are 15 seats in district Maslikhats, then 5 seats should have been occupied by women. Unfortunately, they could not find 5 women, heroes of social work to fill those seats, and some in the region were not interested in participating due to the Southern mentality.

Several interview participants stated that youth and women were selected in internal party primaries. One participant characterized this as a closed club with open windows, noting that it was a significant step forward in party development and the application of German quota experience. In other words, while the entire population could observe the internal party selection process, only party members could vote and be nominated for the party list before national elections. Baurzhan Baibek,

former first deputy Chairman of the Nur-Otan party introduced a quota system after studying under Bolashak scholarship program in Germany. This was the first experience of its application. In 2020, many people wanted to join the Amanat party list, including bloggers and entrepreneurs. However, primaries and quota system were abolished. Later, the Amanat party, under the decision of its chairman, introduced a quota for youth under 35 years of age, which was inconsistent with previous legislation that defined youth as being between 14 and 29 years old. After the experience of the 2021 parliamentary elections, the age limit was raised to 35 years at the legislative level.

Table – 20. Quotes about youth quota.

<p>Usurpation of youth quota</p>	<p>«At the very beginning of 2020, the youth quota did very well».</p> <p>«Yeah, we were really looking for young people, really leaders; quotas actually remained, both at the stage of nomination and at the stage of election, already when mandates were distributed».</p> <p>«Last year and in 2023, firstly, these quotas were combined, now there is no separate women's and youth quota, there is one quota, I call them for women, for goldfinches and for the disabled».</p> <p>«In general, to be honest, I was upset».</p> <p>«That is, before it was 30% for youth, 30% for women and 30% for the disabled. And now it's all in one place, there were no disabled people».</p> <p>«This year it was all usurped to nothing, practically reduced. We made 30% for women, for youth and for persons with limited responsibility».</p> <p>«To be honest, I was very unhappy with this. Because it was the work of Amanat party, and they took it and usurped it like that».</p> <p>«When in 2020 it appeared in our ranks, it was significantly replenished with young people, young businessmen, young scholars, just young people and women, everyone».</p>
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	<p>«I cannot say it now, but even now, I am not so sure that this country will turn around and vote for the youth. Then we approved this issue from the legal side because we wanted to have a person in this legislative body who raises the issue of youth and women. After this, the thought may arise that only women and youth will sit in the 30 percent quota, and everyone else should be men. I wonder how much the 30% quota will amount to with the law, then the idea that we should be men may be left behind. This quota may be cancelled because people cannot be divided according to quotas. You shouldn't come just because of your privileges. He shouldn't come just because he's young. Since this legislative body is a large and complex process, educated, experienced reformers and such citizens must come. It does not matter whether you are a woman or a man, young or not. This is how it should be in the future».</p>
<p>Personnel problem</p>	<p>«We couldn't recruit 30% women. For example, if there are 15 seats in district Maslikhats, then five of them should have been women».</p> <p>«In Zhanakorgan district, this is a completely southern region, because we couldn't find 5 women». «There were women like Salima Dzhumabekovna who drove a combine harvester without a leg».</p> <p>«Women are hero of social work, now there are such mothers with many children, and these are editorials, well, they do not want to come forward because of southern mentality. The feeling of shame does not let me in».</p> <p>«There is no need to solder young leaders to parties or youth wing of «Zhastar Rukhy», that is, this child is already active, we need to look for them from school».</p> <p>«But I scold my own people, I say why do not you educate leaders».</p> <p>«We have practically no leaders».</p> <p>«We need to cultivate talented young people from an early age, from school».</p>

<p>«Closed club with open windows», internal party primaries</p>	<p>«In 2020 there was a primaries - this was an internal party selection from each self-nominated candidate through party. Only party members were nominated for party list, that is, party had to do it in six months».</p> <p>«Then it was about six months, that is, in 4 months national elections were supposed to take place. Amanat party prepared and made elections within party, where only party members can vote and be nominated. There was 30% quota for women, a 30% quota for youth».</p> <p>«Last year, yes, for example, a conference was held, and they already put up lists to Mazhilis in Maslikhats, just a bunch of people in a closed office decided who to nominate where. All parties do this».</p> <p>«They are now given a quota according to the party list. It is not known whether he will become a deputy or not. That side is unknown; we have not legalized it, and the parties will decide it themselves. Rivals between parties, whether the primaries will pass or not, we did not establish that aspect by law; we left that aspect to the parties themselves. It is still unknown. Whether the 30% quota will come to Maslikhats and Mazhilis with that number is yet to be unknown».</p>
<p>Changing the age limit for youth</p>	<p>«No at all, there is also such a division here; according to the legislation of Republic of Kazakhstan, youth was the population from 14 to 29 years old. By decision of party chairman, Amanat introduced its youth quota to 35 years old».</p> <p>«After this experience, at the legislative level, it means they changed the age limit, and now they have raised it».</p> <p>«Previously it was up to 29 years, but then Amanat’s party decided up to 35 years. Well, with ours, such a young man under 29 years old would not have done anything special. This was discussed somewhere in a «closed club with open windows», which everyone watches like in an aquarium, but cannot take part in».</p>

compiled by the author, 2023.

One of the interview participants noted that comparing public service with political service, one must be a «consummate patriot» or «altruist» to achieve any achievements. Regardless of whether you work or not, you will receive a salary. Similarly, at the Amanat party, employees receive a salary whether they work on projects or not. They proposed introducing project management, where a problem is identified and its solution is proposed and defended. The usefulness of introducing project management for youth wing employees lies in setting specific indicators to reduce the problem by half or eradicate it. Unlike government programs, projects are not obligatory, and there is room for adjustment during implementation. By introducing project offices in youth wing or the Amanat party, specific models for solving problems such as providing drinking water to boarding schools in southern regions can be developed, and this experience can be shared with other regions. The project office would serve as a methodological centre.

In general, the youth quota, introduced legislatively in 2020, together with the primaries, has contributed to the active participation of a wide range of young people in elections. However, during its implementation, interviewees noted the problem of personnel of youth and young leaders, which should be nurtured by the youth wing.

Final comments.

A semi-structured interview was conducted by researcher. All interview participants were able to discuss the agenda items. During most interviews, participants were willing to share their views, practices and propose solutions. The interviewees shared their professional and personal experiences, and each participant had the opportunity to listen, clarify, agree, or object. Additionally, recruiting participants from different regions such as Astana and Shymkent cities, Abay, Karaganda and Kyzylorda regions stimulated to disclose more informations. In this regard, the semi-structured interviews perfectly complemented the online survey study results by identifying additional factors, reasons and consequences of voting. The semi-structured interviews helped to understand the role of youth quota, youth wing and other factors in voting for the Amanat party. Based on the professional suggestions from the semi-structured interview participants, policy recommendations were made, which are discussed in the next chapter: policy recommendations and implications.

Chapter 8. Conclusion.

8.1.1. Findings and discussions of mixed method research.

The study involved an online survey of young people and semi-structured interviews with political elites. It aimed to bring clarity to the extent perceived activities of youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” and youth quota influence loyalty among youth voters. The study provides essential evidence of the significance of the youth wing and youth quota for both young people individually and for political party in general. The qualitative research method findings indicate that most participants recognized the importance of having youth wing. They stressed the need to address youth problems by creating project offices, searching for youth leadership, and developing mentoring institutions. During the semi-structured interviews, participants also highlighted the positive impact of youth quota on the involvement of young people in political party. They emphasized the need to increase the number of like-minded people, conduct events with ideological or social impacts, and work with specific focus-groups of youth to achieve better results.

The online survey study provided insights into socio-demographic factors that influence young people’s voting for the Amanat party. The online survey was conducted twice. The findings show that Kazakhstan differs significantly from other countries in terms of young people’s political party preferences (Doyon, 2020, 2023; Norén-Nilsson, 2021).

It was found that most young people aged between 18–24, 25–29, and 30–34 (82%, 64%, 72%) did not vote in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Only a few young people confirmed that they voted. Among those who voted, a significant majority of them voted for the Amanat party as compared to other political parties. This trend was also observed in the Maslikhat elections, where the youngest people voted for the Amanat party (76%, 82%, 80%) and in the Mazhilis elections, where the majority of young people voted for the Amanat party (78%, 88%, 83%). In other words, this is a larger, not small, or smaller voting than for other political parties.

The voting pattern for the Amanat party varied according to socio-demographic data. From a gender perspective, there is a difference in voting participation between men and women. The percentage of men (84%) who did not vote was higher than women. In the Mazhilis elections, the

percentage of women and men who voted for the Amanat party was the same. However, in the Maslikhat elections, the percentage of women (78%) who voted for the Amanat party was higher than the percentage of men.

When it came to ethnicity, it was observed that most Kazakhs (306 people voted in the elections versus 1,273 people who did not vote) did (not) vote in the 2021 parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the Amanat party received the highest number of votes from Kazakhs, followed by Russians.

The findings of a study conducted by Junisbai and Junisbai (2020), Boban (2017), Schatz (2002) reveal that the political views of Nazarbayev's generation are not inclined towards multi-party system. It is not surprising that most young people vote for the Amanat party, as they have grown up during post-Soviet policies that support a market economy. The party system in Kazakhstan has been shrinking, and for the past decades, only one party has dominated the political scene. This party is led by then-president Nursultan Nazarbayev and has not yet faced any serious competition for power (Boban, 2017). Nazarbayev's generation is politically indifferent, and they question government decisions less while trusting state institutions more (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2020). They find political nepotism and clan-family rule more acceptable than the Soviet generation, who believe that leaders should not support family interests and loyalist groups (Junisbai and Junisbai, 2020). As a result, young people are less interested in engaging in political pluralism and competition, which is consistent with Inglehart's observations from cross-national analyses (Inglehart, 2009). Tables -1 and 2, along with Figure – 2, provide a visual representation of these trends.

The online survey study results have confirmed that the satisfaction of youth plays a crucial role in the relationship between the activities of youth wing and voting for the Amanat party. Essentially, the satisfaction of youth with the youth wing can either be positive or negative, depending on the activities carried out by the wing. This satisfaction, along with the involvement of Parliament in youth issues, explains why youth tend to vote for the Amanat party. These findings are consistent with those of a study conducted by Junisbai and Junisbai (2020), who argue that Kazakhstani youth have high trust in state institutions. On the one hand, this trust may indicate a healthy connection

between political officials and citizens, which ultimately leads to a more responsible political party. On the other hand, it may signal a more paternalistic role of political institutions, where the youth protected from criticism, and political institutions make decisions without consulting with voters. Political institutions may believe that they know what is best for the youth and, as a result, make unilateral decisions. In other words, political parties know better how to govern without citizen interference.

Moreover, our research has found that youth who are satisfied with the creation of youth quota are more likely to vote for the Amanat party. This positive relationship is supported by structural equation models. Our findings are consistent with those of Junisbai and Junisbai (2020), who suggested that youth perceive their relationship with state institutions as paternalistic. In fact, semi-structured interviews have confirmed paternalism, as it was revealed that the introduction of the youth quota was decided by the then-leader of the Nur-Otan party, Baurzhan Baibek. Moreover, this contributed by existing political, economic, and social situations, where youth quotas often act not as tools to fight for projects to improve the situation of youth, but as a fight for places on the lists of political parties. In addition, the quota system is used as a control tool that provides leaders with legitimacy and stability of the status quo, and again as a tool for the struggle of vulnerable groups that might not otherwise participate and influence decision-making processes.

Our next findings confirmed mobilization theory. In other words, the electoral success of ruling party is achieved, among other things by the mobilization of youth wing «Zhastar Rukhy». These findings align with those of other researchers such as Norén-Nilsson (2021) and Sharipova (2019) who suggest that the ability of youth wing to mobilize young people acts as a tool to suppress political competition in countries like Cambodia or contributes to the natural reproduction of political elite like Komsomol (Communist Youth League) which had an extensive, highly centralized organizational structure in all regions. If the mobilization capacity of youth wing remains intact as Nazarbayev's generation grows up, we can expect it to continue to influence voting patterns and limit opposition mobilization efforts. Sharipova (2019) argues that Nazarbayev's generation is likely to reproduce the same patterns as the older generation.

The following are some of the reasons why young people voted for the ruling party: strong party leader, the implementation of electoral reforms, hearing about the youth wing, female and nationality.

The study's results showed that a strong party leader significantly influences youth voting for the Amanat party. This finding is consistent with the results of a previous survey by Junisbai and Junisbai (2020), which reported that younger Kazakhs are more tolerant of nepotism and family rule than older generations. Most high-ranking officials are allies of the Head of state, resulting in infrequent change in the political elite. Therefore, young people have developed expectations and attitudes towards elected officials, which have become taken for granted.

The study also found that youth voting rates for the Amanat party increase as electoral reforms are implemented. This result is somewhat surprising given the results of a previous survey by Junisbai and Junisbai (2020), which found that young people identify less with democracy that is often accompanied by fair political competition and power distribution (Morlino, 2004) than the generation that came of age during the Glasnost. However, this may be related to the “January events” that occurred in 2022 after an increase in autogas prices in the West Kazakhstan region. The event almost led to a revolution (Udartsev, 2022). Apparently, the dual power structure established between the existing President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev after the transfer of presidency in 2019, where the levers of power (lifelong chairmanship of Security Council, Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, ruling Nur-Otan party) remained with the first president, contributed to the inaction of listed bodies during moments of mass unrest.

Demographic factors play a significant role in determining the voting patterns for the Amanat party. Research has shown that, all other things being equal, women are more likely to vote for the Amanat party than men. In addition, Kazakhs are more likely to vote for the Amanat party than other ethnic groups. The results of a semi-structured interviews also support these conclusions. During the interview, one participant explained that the Amanat party tries to ensure that their candidate lists are representative of the population. For example, since 97% of Kazakhs live predominantly in the Kyzylorda region, the party aims to maintain this ratio in their candidate lists.

Qualitative research has also revealed some of the reasons why voters may be reluctant to vote for the Amanat party. The main themes that emerged during the semi-structured interviews were related to the party's approach to interacting with voters. Participants felt that single receptions with voters were not effective and suggested that thematic receptions involving a broader range of responsible persons (program administrators) would be more helpful. This would help to ensure that deputy requests are processed more efficiently. Participants also noted that people who come to the reception to resolve occasional issues form a narrow contingent, and most of the same people come to the reception, which does not have the desired effect. Additionally, people turn to deputies with questions that are not within their competence to resolve.

The Amanat party tends to receive fewer votes due to various reasons. These include government bodies not submitting letters, lack of interaction local deputies with Mazhilis deputies, and the negative image created during the Nur-Otan party's tenure. Additionally, the Amanat party has been perceived as a party of "fathers and sons". On the other hand, semi-structured interviews revealed that processing voters requests on record is an effective measure as it assigns responsible persons and sets specific deadlines. Social networks were highlighted as playing a positive role in covering the daily routine and work plans of elected deputies, despite quantitative research indicating otherwise. While social media's influence lacks statistical significance it was still often discussed in conversations with political elites.

In conclusion, in our mixed-method study, we found that the youth wing and youth quota are necessary policy measures that contribute to understanding young people's voting patterns. We determined that young people's support for the Amanat party is influenced by the perceived activities of the youth wing, youth quota and socio demographic factors. We used online surveys to identify factors from youth perspectives and semi-structured interviews to identify a range of factors from professional perspective. Study shows that the perceived activities of the youth wing have a positive impact on young people's past voting for the Amanat party, as well as their satisfaction with the creation of the youth wing and youth quota. However, during the interviews, we also identified concerns about the ability of the youth wing to reach focus groups regionally. We found that the

failure to create project offices that address the actualization of youth problems in regions and the lack of mentoring institutions may explain the low youth participation in elections. Our mixed-method research has important policy implications, which we discuss in next subchapter below.

The results of our quantitative study partially confirm our hypotheses. Firstly, all other things being equal, we determined that the Amanat party is well prepared for youth voting due to the perceived activities of the youth wing than other political parties. Secondly, we confirmed that satisfaction with the creation of the youth wing, explain the positive relationship between the perceived activities of the youth wing and voting for the Amanat party. Thirdly, we found that all other things being equal, youth satisfaction with the creation of youth quota alone has a significant positive impact on voting for the Amanat party. Finally, hypotheses - 2 states that the Amanat party is well prepared for youth voting due to the perceived activities of young candidates of deputies, included in party lists under a 30% youth quota. However, this hypothesis has not been confirmed as all other political parties may also have similar preparations for the youth vote.

8.2.1. Policy implications, recommendations, and scenarios.

The study's main policy implication is that the activities and the success of the youth wing are instrumental in securing voter loyalty and votes for the Amanat party. The implication is that if the ruling Amanat party wants to remain in power, they must invest more resources in ensuring the success of the youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy". The study is highly relevant as it highlights the importance of developing youth leadership potential, addressing pressing issues faced by the youth, and actively engaging youth to participate in elections under the youth quota, even if they have no prior experience in such matters.

The responses of the participants in the semi-structured interviews have several implications that need to be considered in relation to youth wing and youth quota. These implications include the need to create mentoring institutions and build the potential of youth leadership, establish age restrictions for employee of the youth wing, expand the percentage of youth quotas, including *the structural policy implication* – change the focus of activities of the youth wing "Zhastar Rukhy". This can be achieved by creating competitions for rural and urban youth, establishing prize funds, and

posting photo portraits of youth who have been recognized as the worthiest. While *the process policy implication* – the youth wing’s activities should also be on the needs of youth by matching the content of their activities to the requests of various youth focus-groups, increasing public awareness and youth participation.

During the interviews with regional deputies and employees of the Amanat party office, it was unanimously agreed that mentoring is an essential aspect that should be developed in all regions where branches of the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” are present. Mentoring is seen as a crucial prerequisite for the young employees of the youth wing to gain experience and make constructive decisions throughout their political careers. The participants emphasized that mentoring should be carried out under the guidance of an experienced the Amanat party apparatus employee, who can help the young employees discover their personal and professional abilities and further develop independently. The semi-structured interview participants emphasized that the functional responsibilities of leadership should be clearly defined, and that mentoring should not be nominal. In other words, mentoring should be accompanied in accordance with the normatively established provisions. The mentor should have the authority to influence appointments and hold disciplinary responsibility. In this way, the youth wing can be held accountable to the center (regional branches of the Amanat party). Mentoring should involve a specific group of people whose decisions are significant to the consequences of mentoring.

Another significant policy implication of this study is the necessity of developing the potential of political youth leadership under the youth wing. One of the suggested measures for developing political youth leadership is to identify potential leaders in schools, universities, and colleges, particularly among urban-educated youth. The study also noted that potential leaders living in rural areas were also involved in early political activities. In addition to identifying talented leaders from rural and urban areas, the interviewees suggested several strategies to facilitate the search for young leaders.

One of the implications made by the interview participants had *a structural policy implication*. This involves holding a competition to identify young leaders, setting age requirements, establishing

prize funds, and posting photo portraits of young people who have been recognized as the most deserving. The interviewees also suggested initiating essay competitions to identify “thinking” youth who can competently express their thoughts on paper. In their opinion, high school students could be encouraged to nurture talented youth. Additionally, there was discussion about prize funds for young people. Prizes in the form of MacBooks, headphones, and other digital gadgets can be offered to stimulate young people from rural, regional, and urban regions to participate in essay competitions. Finally, posting photo portraits of talented youth on the information portal or on stands of the office youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” and the Amanat party can positively impact the self-esteem and sense of dignity of youth and parents. Ideally there should be a youth pool of leaders consisting of around 30 people, from which several individuals can be promoted to regional, city and district Maslikhats. However, in reality, this is not always the case, as there are mandates in the Amanat party that need to be filled, and sometimes, the ideal and reality do not align.

During the interviews, participants suggested several *procedural implications* to align the activities of the youth wing Zhastar Rukhy with the needs of young people. They proposed matching the content of the youth wing’s activities with the requests of various youth focus groups, increasing public awareness about the youth wing’s initiatives, and involving more young people.

The main idea behind these implications is that the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” should cater to the needs of various youth focus-groups. As per the suggestions of the interviewees, this could be achieved by identifying the present-day problems of youth in regions, cities and rural by conducting surveys or creating public reception and project offices. Some interviewees pointed out that the Amanat party has the resources to establish public receptions for the youth where they can raise their concerns and get assistance. Based on the feedback received and surveys conducted among a wide range of young people, the Institute of Public Policy could create strategic plans for working with youth in different areas. The strategic planning would involve expanding and breaking down the focus groups of youth based on their specific needs such as disabled people, unemployment youth, rural, urban and others, and establishing specific indicators. In addition to public receptions, interview participants suggested the importance of creating project offices as well. The advantage of a project

office is that it can be adjusted during its implementation unlike a state program. The youth wing of the Amanat party is creating regional project offices to address specific issues, which will serve as a model for other regions to follow. For example, one of the issues discussed was the provision of drinking water to boarding schools in the southern regions.

Another important implication is to increase awareness among the public and young people about short-term and long-term trends in the youth wing Zhastar Rukhy, the total number of members in the youth wing, opportunities for political growth and the results of campaigns, events, and activities. The youth wing will act as coordinators of activities with educational institutions, governmental bodies, akimats, and other interested parties.

There were a number of recommendations put in place to address issues related to the appointment of young candidates and age restrictions for admission to the youth wing. These recommendations included restrictions on family ties, which were intended to prevent the nomination of candidates based solely on their age and family connections. The aim of these was to prevent the party from becoming dominated by a few families, which would damage its image. It was felt that too many family members of party workers and deputies or “golden youth” were being given mandates, and that there was a lack of personnel rotation, which led to nepotism and a low corporate culture. Another important implication was to limit the age of employees in the youth wing, which was felt to be necessary to ensure that the youth wing was staffed by young people who were still in school or who had recently graduated. Participants in interviews were of the opinion that the youth wing should be staffed by young high school students, students and seniors, and young people who had graduated from college or university no more than five years ago. They felt that older people who were only interested in their own careers should not be appointed to the youth wing. It was also felt that the salary paid to employees in the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy” was very good from the regional perspective about 1,000 US, and that it was not justified by their performance.

In addition, the interview participants discussed the implementation of youth quotas in the Amanat party during the 2021 parliamentary election. They concluded that the youth quota was a significant political measure that had a positive image in its first year of application. However, the

quota was usurped due to the unification of three categories of people: women, disabled people, and youth. The participants proposed separating these three categories into “30% for youth, 30% for women and 30% for the disabled”. Particular attention is paid to the recommendations of participants regarding youth quota. They recommended making changes to legislation to ensure compliance with the youth quota during the distribution of mandates. This is necessary to provide tangible support for young individuals in politics, business, and academia. Additionally, they emphasized the need to expand the 30% youth quota separately for district, city and regional Maslikhats, rather than applying it to the entire country.

Considering the results of quantitative data confirming higher chances of voting for Amanat party due to the ability of youth wing to mobilize youth, the ability to draw the attention of Parliament to youth issues, as well as overall youth satisfaction with the creation of youth wing and youth satisfaction with the creation of youth quota in 2021 parliamentary elections.

The following analysis confirms that young people are loyal to the Amanat party but are also open to voting for the Republic party. This was determined through youth electoral volatility conducted in March 2023. The results of an online survey conducted among young people were compared to the nationwide parliamentary election results of March 2023, which showed that the Amanat party and Auyl party received the majority of votes while the Republic party took a convincing third place in the number of votes despite the fact that it was registered only in January 2023. In semi-structured interviews, participants unanimously agreed that the Republic party performed well in the 2023 parliamentary elections. Young people had high hopes for the Republic party because it was a new party, its members were relatively young, and it had a strong marketing-electoral campaign on social media that highlighted specific assistance to ordinary people, charity and other business and social projects.

Based on the abovementioned and owing to estimation of party system according to the fluidity index, ENP, fractionalization index and volatility index between 1990 - 2023, there were changes in the party system from hegemonic to hegemonic-predominant type of party system in the

parliamentary elections 2023. This indicates that there may be further changes in the party system during the next parliamentary elections.

Therefore, based on the study results, several policy recommendations were proposed to improve the voting for the Amanat party. The improvement of the vote for the Amanat party requires the combined efforts of the political party, youth wing, deputies, youth, program administrators, educational institutions, akimats, governmental bodies, and other stakeholders. The youth wing must focus on providing relevant policy knowledge and skills to the youth. To achieve this, among other things, the youth wing should include study programs on youth leadership, enhance the quality of teaching, and collaborate with educational institutions such as the Academy of Public Management under the Amanat party or the Graduate School of Public Policy at Nazarbayev University. The creation of the study program should determine the cooperation with employees of the Amanat party's Apparatus and deputies to align with the requirements of deputy mandates and consider the outcome of the study program regarding ethical behaviour, knowledge, and public performance skills. This recommendation requires promoting talented youth from rural and urban areas, university students, and higher school students. Efforts are required to ensure that universities actively participate in developing a youth leadership program. Memorandums of cooperation should be signed between the youth wing under the Amanat party and universities. Another policy recommendation to preserve loyalty among the youth is the active participation of deputies. Deputies should engage in a dialogue with educational and other institutions, participate in the joint development of programs with the youth wing, teach, if possible, provide information about social issues in the regions and ways to solution, create favourable conditions for young people who want to undergo internship in the Amanat party. Additionally, providing open information about vacancies, requirements for candidates of deputies and candidates to the positions in political party and youth wing, as well provide salary levels for political employees will allow young people to have a realistic expectation about political party work. It is important to note that having sufficient financial recourses plays a crucial role in consolidating the popularity and electoral appeal of the Amanat party.

In conclusion, we have proposed some possible positive and negative scenarios based on the previous discussion. Firstly, the Amanat party should invest more resources to ensure the continuous activity of their youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy”, rather than focusing solely on one-time campaigning and activation stages during election periods. If the Amanat party does not lose votes and remains the largest party in the country, then the party system does not change. Secondly, there is a possibility of merger between the Amanat party and the Republic party to retain the votes of the young electorate. This is because the Republic party is known to be popular among young people and has an “essentialist effect”. Young candidates tend to receive more votes. Such a merger could have a positive impact on transformation of activities of the youth wing “Zhastar Rukhy”, leading to more young people following the political initiatives of the Amanat-Republic party. It is crucial to retain the youth votes in Kazakhstan because it is considered a demographic dividend that includes various subgroups such as rural youth, urban youth, business youth, working youth, disabled people, unemployed youth, and others (UN General Assembly Resolution 50/81, 1995).

One of the unfavorable scenarios is the possibility of the Republic Party gaining high popularity and votes among the young electorate in the next parliamentary elections. This could result in a loss of loyalty among the young electorate who previously voted for the Amanat party. Additionally, if the Republic party merges with the Auyl party due to their similar programmatic and ideological ties in supporting agricultural producers, then they could become a significant opponent to the ruling Amanat party in the next parliamentary election.

8.3.1. Limitations of research and future study implications.

Previously, we highlighted the positive side of using quantitative methods to distribute questionnaire in large quantities among respondents through the Qualtrics program. The lack of influence from the interviewer and others was one benefit. However, we faced some limitations during our online survey due to the high attrition rate. The online survey was too lengthy, had no financial incentives, and lacked any enforcement mechanisms. These limitations made it challenging to empirically analyze the data from the first wave. In response, we conducted a second online survey

during the parliamentary elections in March 2023. Combining the data from both surveys gave us sufficient statistical power to produce meaningful results.

It is worth noting that the indicators of voting for political parties used in our analysis only account for those who participated in parliamentary elections. Online survey does not include those who considered voting but ultimately did not, or those who usually vote but did not this time. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that individuals who typically vote and consider voting are more likely to vote for political parties.

Secondly, indicators of youth wing, youth quotas and voting for political parties covered only young people studying at universities and colleges from all regions. As a result, the attitudes of employed and unemployed youth are not reflected in the data. The conclusion that can be drawn is that employed youth are more likely to increase voting for political parties as opposed to unemployed youth.

Thirdly, limitations in the data collection process were identified, including those indicators of the youth wing and youth quota only contained perceived activities. Due to the online survey needing to be shorter in the first wave, we could not cover the information on the number of members or volunteers in the youth wing or youth participating in election as candidate for deputies through youth quota in the second wave. As a result, young respondents who are members or volunteers of the youth wing are likely to increase the likelihood of perceived activities of the youth wing and voting. Similarly, those who participate in the election according to youth quota are more likely to increase the probability of voting for the Amanat party.

The above limitations suggest the following directions for future research. This concerns the fact that future research could overcome the above-mentioned limitations by the availability of financial incentives and forced mechanisms in the online survey. Regarding the first limitation, we could overcome it by asking youth additional questions on their voting behavior and preferences. For example, “if youth thought about voting or usually voting, then which party would they vote for?”. In addition, according to the second limitation, it would be beneficial to conduct online surveys among employed and unemployed youth and compare their attitudes to the activities of the youth

wing and youth quota, as well as in general to voting for political parties in the past and future elections. Finally, complement structural equation models by inputs such as members or volunteers of the youth wing, and its influence on perceived activities of youth wing, satisfaction, and vote for political parties. Furthermore, to enhance the structural equation models for youth quota, we can consider adding inputs such as youth participating in elections as candidates for deputies of Maslikhat or Mazhilis, either through the youth quota or outside of it. Additionally, we can compare their attitudes towards satisfaction levels with the creation of the youth quota and their inclination to vote for the Amanat party.

8.4.1. Concluding comments.

The results of mixed method research contributed to the fact that we could answer research question, for the most part, confirming almost all hypotheses we identified at the beginning of study. Then, voting for Amanat party was determined in accordance with socio-demographic characteristics of young people, and other reasons contributing to voting among young people. It is important to emphasize that the online survey study identified individual-level determinants. In contrast, the semi-structured interview identified various factors related to youth wing and youth quota that may contribute to a decrease loyalty among young people. In addition, the study results proved the positive impact of perceived activities of youth wing on voting for the Amanat party. During the semi-structured interviews, we revealed participants' concerns about the youth wing's ability to develop youth leadership potential, reflect youth focus-group issues, expand the percentage of youth quotas, and others, reflect other factors that may explain the decline in youth loyalty. Both research methods are considered policy relevant.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on party systems, youth wing, youth quota, which is considered the first study conducted in Kazakhstan using a youth survey in all 17 regions and 3 cities of country. In addition, this study is considered unique from a methodological point of view because it employs a sequential explanatory research design, which allowed us to examine the research question comprehensively. Both research methods indicate that the youth wing and the youth quota are significant and contain important policy implications.

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iv. Appendices.

Online survey study informed consent

Good afternoon, Dear respondent!

Introduction. My name is Assel Bekenova. I am 3rd year PhD student at the Graduate School of Public Policy of Nazarbayev University. You are invited to participate in a research study entitled: «Party systems and demographic change in the Republic of Kazakhstan». The purpose of study is to identify the attitudes of students about the relationship between youth and politics in Kazakhstan.

Procedures. University conducts online questionnaire students of higher educational institutions, colleges, and schools over 18 years old. The online questionnaire will take approximately 15 minutes. Opinions expressed during the survey will only be used in aggregated form after computer processing. Your sincere and accurate answers will help to estimate the level of young voters. Questions in online questionnaire will be closed, where you can choose one of the proposed answers.

Risks. The study does not contain any potential risks as each respondent will be assigned a coded number to maintain your confidentiality.

Benefits. The results of the study will be sent to public institutions dealing with youth policy, political parties, and non-governmental organizations in order to improve the effectiveness of work with youth and remove barriers to youth access in politics.

Compensation. The study does not contain any tangible compensation. A copy of research results will be available at conclusion of study. On the official website of Nazarbayev University you can read the dissertation and download the electronic version.

Confidentiality and Privacy. Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal information in research record confidential.

Voluntary Nature of the Study. Participation in this study is strictly voluntary and even after your consent, you can always withdraw your survey, which will not bring you any damage.

Points of Contact. If you have any questions or comments regarding this project, you can contact the principal investigator, PhD student Assel Bekenova, +7 701 233 62 07, email. *assel.bekenova@nu.edu.kz*. Any other questions or concerns may be addressed to the Nazarbayev University Institutional Research Ethics Committee, *rethics@nu.edu.kz*.

Statement of Consent. By clicking «I agree» below you are indicating that you are at least 18 years old, have read and understood this consent form and agree to participate in this research study.

- I agree

- I disagree



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**Қазақстан Республикасы
облыстарының және Республикалық
маңызы бар қалаларының жоғары оқу
орындары мен колледждерінің
ректорларына**

“Назарбаев Университеті” дербес білім беру ұйымының Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебінің “Мемлекеттік саясат саласындағы докторантура” бағдарламасының студент-докторанты Бекенова Әсел “Қазақстан Республикасындағы партиялық жүйе және демографиялық өзгерістер” атты тақырыпқа зерттеу жұмысын жүргізуде.

Зерттеудің мақсаты – студенттердің Қазақстандағы жастар мен саясат арасындағы қарым-қатынасқа деген көзқарасын анықтау.

Зерттеу нәтижелері мемлекеттік жастар саясат институттарына, саяси партияларға, үкіметтік емес ұйымдарға және басқа да мүдделі тараптарға жастармен жұмыстың тиімділігін арттыруға және жастардың саясатқа қол жеткізуіндегі кедергілерді жоюға мүмкіндік беретін ұсынымдар әзірлеу үшін пайдаланылатын болады.

Бұл зерттеу барлық мамандықтағы студенттерден сауалнама жүргізу арқылы деректер жинауды қамтиды. Зерттеудің дәлдігі мен сапасына Қазақстанның түрлі өңірлерінен 2000-нан астам студенттерді қамту арқылы қол жеткізілетін болады (әр облыстан және Республикалық маңызы бар қаладан кемінде 100 студент).

Осыған байланысты, Сізден осы зерттеуге өз аймағыңыздағы университеттер мен колледждер студенттерінің кеңінен қатысуын қамтамасыз етуге көмек көрсетулеріңізді сұраймыз.

Бұл ретте сауалнама анонимді түрде жүргізілетініне және алынған деректер тек академиялық мен ғылыми мақсаттарда пайдаланылатынына сендіреміз. Бұған дейін осындай хат Қазақстан Республикасы Ғылым және жоғары білім министрлігіне жіберілген болатын.

Сауалнама сілтемесі:

https://nukz.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_a5nfcw9JGcJhdoW?O_Language=KAZ

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Туындаған сұрақтар бойынша келесі байланыс нөмірі бойынша хабарласуды сұраймыз: 3 курс Phd студент Бекенова Әсел Гибратқызы, тел.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekenova@nu.edu.kz

Қосымша: ЖОО тізімі 6 бет

Құрметпен,

Декан



Венг Тат Хуэй

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Тізім бойынша

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		<p>Электронная почта: kazsport@inbox.ru</p> <p>Академия логистики и транспорта Электронная почта: info@kazatk.kz</p> <p>Казахский университет международных отношений и мировых языков имени Абылай хана Электронный адрес: kazumo@ablaikhan.kz, ablaikhan@list.ru</p> <p>Университет Нархоз Email: narhoz@narhoz.kz</p> <p>Казахстанско-Британский технический университет Электронная почта: kense@kbtu.kz</p> <p>Международная образовательная корпорация Электронная почта: info@mok.kz</p> <p>Международный университет информационных технологий электр.почта: info@iitu.kz</p> <p>Университет «КИМЭП» Электронная почта: astnedop@kimep.kz, erayeva@kimep.kz</p> <p>Алматинская академия экономики и статистики Электронная почта: aesa2005@mail.ru</p> <p>Евразийский технический университет Электронная почта: info@etu.edu.kz</p> <p>Алматы менеджмент университет Электронная почта: info@almau.edu.kz kanc@almau.edu.kz</p> <p>Евразийская юридическая академия имени Д.Кунаева Электронная почта: vuzkunaeva@vuzkunaeva.kz</p> <p>Египетский университет Исламской культуры «Нур-Мубарак» Электронная почта: nur-mubarak2001@mail.ru</p> <p>Казахская автомобильно-дорожная академия имени Л.Гончарова Электронная почта: kazadi@kazadi.kz</p> <p>Казахская академия труда и социальных отношений Электронная почта: kaz_atso@mail.ru</p> <p>Казахский университет путей сообщений Электронная почта: etu.edu.kz</p> <p>Казахстанский инженерно-технологический университет Электронная почта: info@kazetu.kz</p> <p>Казахстанско-Немецкий университет</p>
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		<p>Электронная почта: info@dku.kz</p> <p>Казахстанско-Российский медицинский университет Электронная почта: nuo_kmu@mail.ru</p> <p>Каспийский общественный университет Электронная почта: cu@cu.edu.kz</p> <p>Университет «Кайнар» Электронная почта: kainar@kazuniver.kz</p> <p>Университет «Туран» Электронная почта: info@turand-edu.kz</p> <p>Университет «Алматы» Электронная почта: info@almaty-university.kz, info@symbat.kz</p> <p>Университет иностранных языков и деловой карьеры Электронная почта: ydu2006@mail.ru</p> <p>Университет международного бизнеса Электронная почта: uib@uib.kz</p> <p>Центрально-Азиатский университет Электронная почта: info@cau.kz, it415@mail.ru</p> <p>Казахский медицинский университет непрерывного образования Электронная почта: info@kazmuno.kz</p> <p>Казахстанский медицинский университет «ВШОЗ» Электронная почта: ksph@ksph.kz</p>
20.	г.Шымкент	<p>Южно-Казахстанская медицинская академия Электронная почта: medacadem@rambler.ru</p> <p>Южно-Казахстанский государственный педагогический институт Электронная почта: okmpi@mail.ru</p> <p>Южно-Казахстанский университет имени М. Ауэзова Электронная почта: canselyarya@mail.ru</p> <p>Казахстанский университет дружбы народов имени А.Куатбекова Электронная почта: info@kipudn.kz</p> <p>Международный гуманитарно-технический университет Электронная почта: mgtu-shymkent@mail.ru</p> <p>Университет «Мирас» Электронная почта: info@miras.edu.kz</p>

	<p>Шымкентский университет Факс приемная:8 (72-52) 55-58-61 г.Шымкент,ул.Жібек жолы ,131</p> <p>Институт им. М. Сапарбаева Электронная почта: ukgi2002@mail.ru</p> <p>Международный университет Silkway Электронная почта: ukpu_kaz@mail.ru</p>
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**Rectors of higher
educational institutions and
colleges of oblasts and cities
of republican significance of
the Republic of Kazakhstan**

Phd student of the Phd in Public Policy program of the Graduate School of Public Policy of the Autonomous Organization of Education “Nazarbayev University” conduct research on the topic “Party systems and demographic change in the Republic of Kazakhstan”.

The purpose of the research is to identify the attitudes of students about the relationship between youth and politics in Kazakhstan. The results of the study will be used to develop recommendations to enable state youth policy institutions, political parties, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders to improve the effectiveness of youth work and remove barriers to youth access to politics.

This research involves collecting data by surveying students of all specialties. The accuracy and quality of the research will be achieved by covering at least 2,000 students from different regions of Kazakhstan (at least 100 students from each region and city of republican significance).

In this regard, we ask you to assist in ensuring the extensive participation of students universities and colleges in your region in this research.

At the same time, we assure that the survey will be conducted anonymously, and the data obtained will be used exclusively for academic purposes. Earlier, a similar letter was sent to the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Link to the questionnaire:

https://nukz.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_a5nfcw9JGcJhdoW?Q_Language=EN

If you have any questions, please contact 3rd year Phd student Assel Bekenova, tel.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekenova@nu.edu.kz.

Dean

Weng Tat Hui

**Ректорам высших
учебных заведений и
колледжей областей и
городов республиканского
значения Республики
Казахстан**

Студент-докторант программы «Докторантура государственной политики» Высшей школы государственной политики Автономной организации образования «Назарбаев Университет» проводит исследовательскую работу на тему «Партийная система и демографические сдвиги в Республике Казахстан».

Целью исследования является выявить отношение студентов к взаимоотношению между молодежью и политикой в Казахстане.

Результаты исследования будут использованы для выработки рекомендаций, позволяющих государственным учреждениям, занимающиеся вопросами молодежной политики, политическим партиям, неправительственным организациям и другим заинтересованным лицам совершенствовать эффективность работы с молодежью и устранить барьеры доступа молодежи в политику.

Данное исследование предполагает сбор данных путем опроса студентов всех специальностей. Точность и качество исследования будет достигнута при охвате не менее 2000 студентов из разных регионов Казахстана (не менее 100 студентов с каждой области и города республиканского значения).

В этой связи просим Вас оказать содействие в обеспечении обширного участия студентов университетов и колледжей Вашего региона в данном исследовании.

При этом заверяем, что опрос будет проводиться анонимно, полученные данные будут использоваться исключительно в научных и академических целях. Ранее аналогичное письмо было направлено в Министерство науки и высшего образования Республики Казахстан.

Ссылка на опросник:

https://nukz.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_a5nfcw9JGcJhd0W?Q_Language=RU

По возникшим вопросам просим связаться по контакту: 3 курс Phd студент Бекенова Асель Гибратовна, тел.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekenova@nu.edu.kz.

С уважением,

Декан

Венг Тат Хуэй



NAZARBAYEV
UNIVERSITY



«Назарбаев Университеті» Дербес білім беру ұйымы
Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебі
010000, Қазақстан Республикасы, Нұр-Сұлтан қаласы,
Қабанбай батыр даңғылы, 53
Телефон: +7 (7172) 70 92 83
e-mail: nugspp@nu.edu.kz

The Autonomous Organization of Education Nazarbayev University
Graduate School of Public Policy
010000, Republic of Kazakhstan, Nur-Sultan city,
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Tel: +7 (7172) 70 92 83
e-mail: nugspp@nu.edu.kz

« 30 » 11 20 22

№ 21-38/84

Қазақстан Республикасы
Ғылым және жоғары білім министрі
С. Нұрбекке

Құрметті Саясат Нұрбек!

Сізге және өзіңіз басқарып отырған Министрлік қызметкерлеріне “Назарбаев Университеті” дербес білім беру ұйымының Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебі атынан білім және ғылым саласын дамыту жолында атқарып келе жатқан зор еңбектеріңізге шынайы құрметіміз бен алғысымызды білдіреміз.

Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебінің “Мемлекеттік саясат саласындағы докторантура” бағдарламасының студент-докторанты Бекенова Әсел “Қазақстан Республикасындағы партиялық жүйе және демографиялық өзгерістер” атты тақырыпқа зерттеу жұмысын жүргізуде.

Зерттеудің мақсаты – студенттердің Қазақстандағы жастар мен саясат арасындағы қарым-қатынасқа деген көзқарасын анықтау.

Зерттеу нәтижелері мемлекеттік жастар саясат институттарына, саяси партияларға, үкіметтік емес ұйымдарға және басқа да мүдделі тараптарға жастармен жұмыстың тиімділігін арттыруға және жастардың саясатқа қол жеткізуіндегі кедергілерді жоюға мүмкіндік беретін ұсынымдар әзірлеу үшін пайдаланылатын болады.

Бұл зерттеу барлық мамандықтағы студенттерден сауалнама жүргізу арқылы деректер жинауды қамтиды. Зерттеудің дәлдігі мен сапасына Қазақстанның түрлі өңірлерінен 2000-нан астам студенттерді қамту арқылы қол жеткізілетін болады (әр облыстан және Республикалық маңызы бар қалалардан кемінде 100 студент).

Осыған байланысты, сіздерден осы зерттеуге өз аймағыңыздағы университеттер мен колледждер студенттерінің кеңінен қатысуын қамтамасыз етуге көмек көрсетуіңізді сұраймыз.

Бұл ретте сауалнама анонимді түрде жүргізілетініне, алынған деректер тек ғылыми және академиялық мақсаттарда пайдаланылатынын сендіреміз.

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Сауалнама сұрақтары ЖМСМ Назарбаев Университеті Этикалық комитетінде тексерілді және саяси жүйенің тұрақтылығын бұзуды мақсат етпейді.

Сауалнама сілтемесі:

https://nukz.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_a5nfcw9JGcJhdoW?O_Language=KAZ

Туындаған сұрақтар бойынша келесі байланыс нөмірі бойынша хабарласуды сұраймыз: 3 курс PhD студент Бекенова Әсел Гибратқызы, тел.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekenova@nu.edu.kz

Құрметпен,

Декан



Венг Тат Хуэй

Орынд.: Н. Туебаева
Тел.: 709283
nurgul.tuebayeva@nu.edu.kz

**Министру науки и высшего
образования Республики Казахстан
Нурбек С.**

Уважаемый Саясат Нурбек!

Позвольте выразить Вам и сотрудникам Министерства, которым Вы руководите, искреннее уважение и благодарность от имени Высшей школы государственной политики, Назарбаев Университет за Ваш большой труд в развитии сферы образования и науки.

Студент-докторант программы «Докторантура государственной политики» Бекенова Асель проводит исследовательскую работу на тему: «Партийная система и демографические сдвиги в Республике Казахстан».

Целью исследования является выявить отношение студентов к взаимоотношению между молодежью и политикой в Казахстане.

Результаты исследования будут использованы для выработки рекомендаций, позволяющих государственным учреждениям, занимающиеся вопросами молодежной политики, политическим партиям, неправительственным организациям и другим заинтересованным лицам совершенствовать эффективность работы с молодежью и устранить барьеры доступа молодежи в политику.

Данное исследование предполагает сбор данных путем опроса студентов всех специальностей. Точность и качество исследования будет достигнута при охвате не менее 2000 студентов из разных регионов Казахстана (не менее 100 студентов с каждой области и города республиканского значения).

В этой связи просим Вас оказать содействие в обеспечении обширного участия студентов университетов и колледжей в данном исследовании.

При этом заверяем, что опрос проводится анонимно, полученные данные будут использоваться исключительно в научных и академических целях. Вопросы-опроса прошли проверку Этического Комитета ВШГП Назарбаев Университета и не преследует цели нарушения стабильности политической системы.

Ссылка на опросник:

https://nukz.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_a5nfcw9JGcJhd0W?Q_Language=RU

По возникшим вопросам просим связаться по контакту: 3 курс PhD студент Бекенова Асель Гибратовна, тел.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekanova@nu.edu.kz

С уважением,

Декан

Венг Тат Хуэй

Исп.: Н. Туебаева
Тел.: 709283
nurgul.tuebayeva@nu.edu.kz

**Minister of Science and Higher Education
of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Nurbek S.**

Dear Sayasat Nurbek,

Let me express our sincere respect and gratitude to you and the staff of the Ministry on behalf of the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University for your great work in the development of the field of education and science.

Assel Bekenova, PhD student of the PhD in Public Policy program conduct research on the topic “Party systems and demographic change in the Republic of Kazakhstan”.

The purpose of the research is to identify the attitudes of students about the relationship between youth and politics in Kazakhstan. The results of the study will be used to develop recommendations to enable state youth policy institutions, political parties, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders to improve the effectiveness of youth work and remove barriers to youth access to politics.

This research involves collecting data by surveying students of all specialties. The accuracy and quality of the research will be achieved by covering at least 2,000 students from different regions of Kazakhstan (at least 100 students from each region and city of republican significance).

In this regard, we ask you to assist in ensuring the extensive participation of students of universities and colleges in your region in this research.

At the same time, we assure that the survey is conducted anonymously, the data obtained will be used exclusively for scientific and academic purposes. The survey questions have been tested by the Ethics Committee GSPP Nazarbayev University and do not aim to disturb the stability of the political system.

Link to the questionnaire:

https://nukz.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_a5nfcw9JGcJhdoW?Q_Language=EN

If you have any questions, please contact 3rd year PhD student Assel Bekenova, tel.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekenova@nu.edu.kz.

Yours sincerely,

Dean

Weng Tat Hui



NAZARBAYEV
UNIVERSITY



«Назарбаев Университеті» Дербес білім беру ұйымы
Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебі
010000, Қазақстан Республикасы, Нұр-Сұлтан қаласы,
Қабанбай батыр даңғылы, 53
Телефон: +7 (7172) 70 92 83
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The Autonomous Organization of Education Nazarbayev University
Graduate School of Public Policy
010000, Republic of Kazakhstan, Nur-Sultan city,
53, Kabanbay batyr Ave.,
Tel: +7 (7172) 70 92 83
e-mail: nugspp@nu.edu.kz

« 30 » 11 20 22
№ 21-38/83

**Қазақстан Республикасы
Парламенті Сенатының
Төрағасы
М.С. Әшімбаевқа**

Құрметті Мәулен Сағатханұлы!

Сізге “Назарбаев Университеті” дербес білім беру ұйымының Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебі атынан шынайы құрметіміз бен алғысымызды білдіреміз.

Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебінің “Мемлекеттік саясат саласындағы докторантура” бағдарламасының студент-докторанты Бекенова Әсел “Қазақстан Республикасындағы партиялық жүйе және демографиялық өзгерістер” атты тақырыпқа зерттеу жұмысын жүргізуде.

Зерттеудің мақсаты – «Жастар рухы» жастар қанаты мен жастар квотасы туралы саяси элитаның пікірін анықтау. Зерттеудің маңыздылығы - мемлекеттік жастар саясаты институттарына, саяси партияларға, үкіметтік емес ұйымдарға және басқа да мүдделі тараптарға жастармен жұмыстың тиімділігін арттыруға, әрі жастардың саясатқа қол жеткізуіндегі кедергілерді жоюға мүмкіндік беретін ұсынымдар әзірлеу.

Бұл зерттеу «Жастар рухы» жастар қанатының қызметімен және жастар квотасымен таныс жоғары және орта буын мемлекеттік қызметкерлерімен, депутаттармен және экс-депутаттармен оффлайн (бетпе бет) сұхбат арқылы деректер жинауды қамтиды. Зерттеудің сапасы кемінде **12 қатысушы** қамтылған жағдайда қол жеткізіледі. Өңгімелесудің соңғы мерзімі ағымдағы жылдың 28 желтоқсанға дейін көзделген.

Аталған тақырып ауқымын ескере отырып, мемлекет қайраткерлері, Мәжіліс мүшелерінің сұхбатқа қатысуын қамтамасыз етуге көмек көрсетуіңізді сұраймыз.

Бұл ретте сұхбаттың құпия түрде өтетініне, алынған деректер тек ғылыми және академиялық мақсаттарда пайдаланылатынына сендіреміз. Сұхбат сұрақтары ЖМСМ Назарбаев Университеті Этикалық комитетінде тексерілді және саяси жүйенің тұрақтылығын бұзуды мақсат етпейді.

000170

Туындаған сұрақтар бойынша келесі байланыс нөмірі бойынша хабарласуды сұраймыз: 3 курс Phd студент Бекенова Әсел Гибратқызы, тел.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekenova@nu.edu.kz

Құрметпен,

Декан



Венг Тат Хуэй

Орынд.: Тусбаева Н.Е.
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**Председателю Сената
Парламента Республики
Казахстан
Ашимбаеву М.С.**

Уважаемый Маулен Сагатханулы!

Позвольте выразить Вам искреннее уважение и благодарность от имени Высшей школы государственной политики, Назарбаев Университет.

Студент-докторант программы «Докторантура государственной политики» Бекенова Асель проводит исследовательскую работу на тему: «Партийная система и демографические сдвиги в Республике Казахстан».

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По возникшим вопросам просим связаться по контакту: 3 курс Phd студент Бекенова Асель Гибратовна, тел.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekanova@nu.edu.kz

С уважением,

Декан

Исп.: Тусбаева Н.Е.
тел. 709283
nurgul.tusbayeva@nu.edu.kz

Венг Тат Хуэй

**Chairman of the Senate of
the Parliament of the
Republic of Kazakhstan
M. Ashimbayev**

Dear Mr. Maulen Ashimbayev,

Let me express our sincere respect and gratitude to you on behalf of the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University.

Assel Bekenova, PhD student of the PhD in Public Policy program conduct research on the topic “Party systems and demographic change in the Republic of Kazakhstan”.

The purpose of the study is to reveal the opinion of the political elite about the youth wing of Zhastar Rukhy and the youth quota. The importance of the study lies in the development of recommendations that allow state youth policy bodies, political parties, public organizations and other interested parties to increase the effectiveness of work with youth and remove barriers to youth access to politics.

This study involves data collection through offline (face-to-face) interviews with senior and middle-level civil servants, MPs and ex-MPs who are familiar with the activities of the youth wing of youth wing and the youth quota. The quality of the research is achieved if at least **12 participants** are included. The deadline for the interview is December 28 of this year.

Taking into account the scale of the topic, we ask you to assist in ensuring the participation of government figures and members of the Majilis in the interviews.

At the same time, we assure that the interview will be conducted confidentially, the data obtained will be used exclusively for scientific and academic purposes. The interview questions have been tested by the Ethics Committee GSPP Nazarbayev University and do not aim to disturb the stability of the political system.

If you have any questions, please contact 3rd year Phd student Assel Bekenova, tel.: +7(701) 233 62 07, email: assel.bekenova@nu.edu.kz.

Yours sincerely,

Dean

Weng Tat Hui

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тел. 709283
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NAZARBAYEV
UNIVERSITY



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Қабанбай батыр даңғылы, 53
Телефон: +7 (7172) 70 92 83
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e-mail: nugspp@nu.edu.kz

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№ 22-38/82

**Қазақстан Республикасы
Парламенті Мәжілісінің
Төрағасы
Е.Ж.Қошановқа**

Құрметті Ерлан Жақанұлы!

Сізге «Назарбаев Университеті» дербес білім беру ұйымының Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебі атынан шынайы құрметіміз бен алғысымызды білдіреміз.

Жоғары мемлекеттік саясат мектебінің «Мемлекеттік саясат саласындағы докторантура» бағдарламасының студент-докторанты Бекенова Әсел «Қазақстан Республикасындағы партиялық жүйе және демографиялық өзгерістер» атты тақырыпқа зерттеу жұмысын жүргізуде.

Зерттеудің мақсаты – «Жастар рухы» жастар қанаты мен жастар квотасы туралы саяси элитаның пікірін анықтау. Зерттеудің маңыздылығы - мемлекеттік жастар саясаты институттарына, саяси партияларға, үкіметтік емес ұйымдарға және басқа да мүдделі тараптарға жастармен жұмыстың тиімділігін арттыруға, әрі жастардың саясатқа қол жеткізуіндегі кедергілерді жоюға мүмкіндік беретін ұсынымдар әзірлеу.

Бұл зерттеу «Жастар рухы» жастар қанатының қызметімен және жастар квотасымен таныс жоғары және орта буын мемлекеттік қызметкерлерімен, депутаттармен және экс-депутаттармен оффлайн (бетпе бет) сұхбат арқылы деректер жинауды қамтиды. Зерттеудің сапасы кемінде **12 қатысушы** қамтылған жағдайда қол жеткізіледі. Әңгімелесудің соңғы мерзімі ағымдағы жылдың 28 желтоқсанға дейін көзделген.

Аталған тақырып ауқымын ескере отырып, мемлекет қайраткерлері, Мәжіліс мүшелерінің сұхбатқа қатысуын қамтамасыз етуге көмек көрсетуіңізді сұраймыз.

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000171

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Құрметпен,

Декан



Венг Тат Хуэй

Орынд.: Туебаева Н.Е.
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nurgul.tuebayeva@nu.edu.kz

**Председателю Мажилиса
Парламента Республики
Казахстан
Кошанову Е.Ж.**

Уважаемый Ерлан Жаканович!

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С уважением,

Декан

Венг Тат Хуэй

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**Chairman of the Majilis of
the Parliament of the
Republic of Kazakhstan
E. Koshanov**

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