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MOTIVATIONS OF PARTY ACTIVISTS IN UKRAINE

МОТИВАЦИИ ПАРТИЙНЫХ АКТИВИСТОВ В УКРАИНЕ

УКРАИНАДАҒЫ ПАРТИЯ БЕЛСЕНДІЛЕРІНІҢ УӘЖДЕМЕСІ

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Abstract

This paper aims to fill an important theoretical gap in the existing literature in the understanding of the motivations behind citizen participation in party activism. Party activism is especially intriguing in this era of *party in decline*.¹ While scholars differentiate several distinct types of motivations in party participation, the context for motivation largely remains to be understudied. This paper contributes to scholarly literature by showing that region, age and official membership have a strong effect on citizen participation in party activism.

Using new survey data collected through fieldwork in Ukraine, this study examines the motivations of party activists in Ukraine's 2019 parliamentary elections. Previous scholarly works have shown the vital contributions of party activists, who help mediate between parties and voters (Scarrow 1996). Running for election does not merely necessitate the acquisition of resources through activities like fundraising, it also requires the help of party activists who serve as a liaison between the candidate, the party, and the electorate. This paper builds on scholarly studies, which show that political party activists are driven by various motivations (Kirkpatrick 1976; Costantini and Valenty 1996). I further contribute to the existing scholarship by showing that context, such as region, age and party membership, may significantly affect the level of party activism.

The original survey data was collected in the three Ukrainian cities of Kiev (north/capital), Lviv (west), and Kharkiv (east), via a survey of 201 party activists representing such political parties as Servant of the People, Opposition Platform - For Life and European Solidarity. The survey was conducted over the course of two weeks from July 7 to July 19, right before the parliamentary elections took place on July 21, 2019. Since the

¹ It was David Broder, who first coined the phrase 'party decline' in his book "The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America" (1972), referring to the end of the party system in the United States.

subjects of this study are party ‘activists’ (not formal members with membership cards), it was crucial to conduct the survey when the party activists were visibly in action.

Though the data collected and used in this research project is not representative of the whole country, this original survey dataset illustrates that party activists in the western regions of Ukraine are more ideologically (purposive) motivated than party activists in the eastern regions of Ukraine. Moreover, party activists’ *age*, *income* and *official membership in parties* demonstrated a strong relationship with activists’ level of purposiveness, as findings were statistically significant. In other words, older party activists and those with official membership cards in parties are more likely to be purposively motivated than younger and non-member activists. While gender and the highest degree of formal education exhibit certain variations in their relationship with activists’ level of purposiveness, the findings were statistically insignificant.

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1. Introduction

Political participation is essential in the operation of a democratic system. Verba and Nie (1972, 3) put that “it is at the heart of democratic theory.” Also, Dalton (2008, 76) argued that in the absence of public involvement in the process, “democracy lacks both its legitimacy and its guiding force.” Citizen participation in politics allows citizens to express their beliefs, opinions, and objections and influence the process and outcomes of public policies. Political participation includes a variety of activities: voting in elections, protest, signing a petition, campaign volunteering, boycotting, donating money to political organizations or candidates, writing letters to elected officials. This study concerns about a form of political participation through organization, i.e. citizen involvement in political parties in Ukraine.

This research paper examines the motivations underlying party activism in Ukraine. I examine the effects of region, institutionalization, age, party membership, income, gender and education on party activism. I differentiate between the types of motivations, including self-enhancement, status and acquisition of business contacts (material rewards), social contact (for the fun of politics and spending time with friends or like-minded people), party loyalty (allegiance) or policy change (purposive). Moreover, I differentiate the types of motivations according to salient political issues in Ukraine, including (a) the relationships of Ukraine with Russian Federation and European Union, and (b) the status of the Russian language.

Ukraine held presidential elections in March 31 (the first round) and in April 21 (the second round) in 2019, while still experiencing long-standing conflicts and armed activities with Russia-occupied lands such as Luhansk and Donetsk including the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Due to regional differences regarding citizens’ preferences on foreign orientation (i.e. pro-European Union or pro-Russian) and the status of Ukrainian and Russian languages within Ukraine, it becomes interesting to examine whether party activists from western and

eastern parts of Ukraine differ or resemble each other in their policy orientations, i.e. issue attitudes.

Systematic empirical studies on party activism and citizen participation in election campaigning beyond Western democracies are rare. Voting in elections in post-Soviet countries has received much scholarly attention (Reisinger et al. 1995; Miller and Klobucar 2000; Fawn 2006; Golosov 2013 and many others). However, literature on citizen participation in politics other than voting in the context of Ukraine as well as other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries has mostly limited to descriptive studies with a handful exceptions (Wilson and Bilous 1993; Birch 1997; Kuzio 1998; Kuzio 2006; D'Anieri 2006; Bader 2010; Melnykovska et al. 2011; Ribiy 2013). In particular, campaigning participation and citizen engagement in party organizations have received relatively little attention in these countries. This is contrasted with the growth of scholarly interest in party membership and party activism in the Western world in recent decades.

Moreover, Ukraine's party system has been regarded as fluid and extremely fragmented for several reasons. For instance, constant changes in laws within the electoral system before the general elections largely contributed to such weak party system. Also, most political parties are not only formed around a charismatic leader, but also turn out to be window-dressing, hence, serve as temporal instruments of oligarchs and elites in Ukraine. The conventional wisdom emphasizes that in third-wave democracies people participate in parties not because they have clear political purposes and aim to influence certain policies (Mainwaring 1998, 30-32), but are merely hired by charismatic leaders that develop parties based on their own influence and status instead of establishing and promoting a specific ideology. Drawing from this conventional wisdom, it is a reasonable expectation that citizens involved in party activities in third-wave democracies are less likely to possess clear purposive motivations and lack concrete intentions to influence policy programs of their respected parties and/or party candidates (Kuzio 2014, 310). In such party systems, party

activists are expected to exercise very small leverage and sometimes are even seen as meaningless due to the absence of clear ideological orientations (Rybiy 2013, 416). In this regard, there would be little difference between party activists, for example, of 'Party A' from activists of 'Party B' in ideological views and attitudes towards key issues. Party activists in such a party system would primarily be interested in receiving various compensations such as positional, monetary and networking opportunities (Kubiček 1994, 436; Rose 1995, 554; Markowski 1997, 223; Lewis 2001, 556, 558).

This paper focuses on individuals, who are engaged in party activities during electoral campaigning period in Ukraine. This study draws on an original survey data, which was collected in the three Ukrainian cities of Kiev (north/capital), Lviv (west), and Kharkiv (east), via a survey of 201 party activists representing the political parties of Servant of the People (*Слуга Народу*), Opposition Platform - For Life (*Опозиційна платформа - За життя*), and European Solidarity (*Європейська солідарність*). The survey was conducted over the course of two weeks from July 7 to July 19, right before the parliamentary elections took place on July 21, 2019. One of the main goals of this paper was to examine whether party activists in Ukraine lack a clear ideological basis, namely, purposiveness in their motivation, as has been largely assumed in the literature on Third Wave democracies. The research findings reveal that party activists in Lviv across all three parties show much greater results in terms of their degree of purposiveness in comparison with their counterparts from Kiev and Kharkiv. Meanwhile, variables such as party activists' *age* and *official membership in parties* demonstrated a strong relationship with activists' level of purposiveness.

The contributions of this research are largely twofold. Firstly, I am contributing to the literature because studies on citizens' involvement in party, particularly, on Ukraine and other CIS states are rare. Thus, this work will broaden the regional scope, because party activism has mostly been studied in Western democracies. In general, the literature on party activism in the context of the 'third-wave' democracies is also understudied, since there are no extensive

research investigations and therefore we do not possess much knowledge about them (See more in *Appendix I*).

Also, I contribute to the party activism literature by delving into the understudied question about citizens' motivations in party activism and examining why some are purposive, whereas others are less purposive. There is a global phenomenon called *parties in decline*, which means that citizens are withdrawing their involvement in many orthodox forms of political participation, such as organizational activism through political parties (Clarke and Stewart 1998; Dalton 2000; Daalder 2002; Katz and Mair 2009; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Marien and Quintelier 2011). In this regard, parties attempt to stay connected with the civil society through “the activism of their supporters in local party activity” (Cross and Young 2008, 276). Regarding the question of what motivates one to participate in party activism, scholars have argued that individuals are driven by a variety of incentives, but, which motivation prevails over others and under which context has not been largely answered (Eldersveld 1964; Kirkpatrick 1976; Sullivan 1977, 644; Abramowitz et al. 1983; Miller & Jennings 1986, 41). In other words, it is known that “not all political activists are motivated by the same thing” (Costantini and Valenty 1996, 498). Hence, this study will theoretically contribute to this micro-level explanation of motivations underlying party activism.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Various Motivations Underlying Party Activism and Purposive Motivation

Party activists are generally treated as a liaison between parties and voters (Scarrow 1996). As political parties are indispensable institutions in modern democracies (Schattschneider 1942; Sartori 1968; Van Biezen 2004; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011), then, without party activism the legitimacy and the sustainability of democratic regime would lose and deteriorate, respectively.

Party activists tend to be purposive. However, party activists are not necessarily purposive-oriented, because they can also be solidary-oriented such as participating for social gratifications, interaction and the fun of politics (Garvin 1976, 369; Eldersveld 1983, 69). There is a scholarly agreement that multiple types of incentives exist for party activists, and different activists have different motivations. For example, in investigating the motivations for party activism in the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden and India, Eldersveld (1983) asserts that local party cadres work for parties and stay there for many reasons, which vary “by party and by system.” Moreover, Eldersveld (1964, 303) contends that party activists include “an agglomeration of people with a rich variety of motivations, drives and needs.” In their fundamental work, Clark and Wilson (1961) identify three main types of incentives, which are regarded as material (tangible rewards, career opportunities), solidary (for the sake of participation itself, social prestige, party loyalty, the fun of politics) and purposive (attaining certain public policy objectives).

Costantini and King (1984, 81), by arguing that the framework provided by Clark and Wilson is valuable, they also advocate for the addition of two more dimensions (factors), which are ‘allegiance’ and ‘personalist.’ Referring to Semel’s (1978, 72) analysis of Clark and Wilson’s typology, Costantini and King (1984, 86) insist that Clark and Wilson somewhat slightly conflate rewards related to ‘status’ under the solidary incentives, despite the fact that ‘status’ as an accolade tends to carry more of a material character.

The objectives and motivations of political party activists as well as leaders have been an ongoing interest of the students who extensively study political behavior. Scholars such as Schlesinger (1966) and Costantini and King (1984, 79) contend that “the desire for power and office-seeking goals” were the dominant reasons quite a while. However, Kirkpatrick (1976, 94) points out that there are numerous empirical studies that have consistently demonstrated both party activists and leaders engage in political activities to pursue a wide range of values.

In other words, there is no standardized or single main reason why individuals become party activists and what motivations drive them to serve to political parties.

In the context of Western democracies, empirical studies have repeatedly shown that purposive motivation, in comparison with other types of motivations, is prevalent among party activists (Conley and Smith 1983; Eldersveld 1983; Dalton 1985; McCulloch 1990; Costantini and Valenty 1996; Narud and Skare 1999; Bruter and Harrison 2009; Jackson 2012). For instance, Katz (2001, 290) argues that party activists, in comparison with the ordinary party members, tend to be more ideologically motivated. Hence, ideologically oriented activists take part in party activities with an aim to have an impact on the development of or change the existing public policies. Therefore, instead of merely concentrating on taking the upper hand in elections, party activists are more inclined to get motivated by shaping or influencing policies (Aldrich 1995, 182). Similarly, by looking at the evidence from a survey of 17,628 delegates attending twenty-two state party conventions, Abramowitz et al. (1983, 1008) assert that present-day party activists give priority to purposive incentives. Thus, activists now prefer “a political commitment based on issues and values” (Baer and Bositis 1988, 32).

Likewise, Goodwin (2010) reflects on the activism in extreme right parties such as the British National Party and the party activists’ motivations. He draws some interesting insights based on “qualitative life-history interviews with activists and analysis of internally-orientated party literature” (Goodwin 2010, 31). Particularly, Goodwin (2010, 31) highlights the significance of ideological motives and collective incentives, especially, “ethnic nationalist beliefs and a desire to defend the native in-group from perceived threats.” Interestingly, ethnic nationalist beliefs, especially in the western parts of Ukraine, may serve as a key motivation for citizens on this part of the country to campaign for parties. For instance, individuals on the west of Ukraine are known to hold nationalistic views, namely, by

prioritizing the significance of Ukrainian language as the sole state language and the means of inter-ethnic communication throughout Ukraine.

Studies in the context of non-Western democracies and authoritarian cases are uncommon, but there are nevertheless a few such works that focus on new and less established democracies. For instance, a study that was conducted by Hinnebusch (1983, 84) in two authoritarian regimes using data from questionnaires, provided to Ba'ath activists in Syria and Wafd activists in Egypt, stresses that people choose to participate in parties taking into account such crucial factors as class and ideology. In addition, Bob-Milliar (2012, 668) investigated the motivations of Ghanaians in joining such political parties as National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party through “face-to-face open-ended, long interviews with 200 party activists in four constituencies.” Consequently, Bob-Milliar (2012, 668) contends that party activists in Ghana join parties and become active therein due to strong “selective incentives and as a part of survival strategy.” A research study conducted in the context of young East Asian democracies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Mongolia, demonstrates that party activists are largely policy-driven, particularly, in small parties, and activists’ formal party membership enhances the likelihood of their intraparty commitment (Koo 2020).

2.2. The Importance of Electoral System

The reason why electoral system matters, is that it shapes the nature of political party organizations and the party system. For instance, SMDP leads to two-party system or less fragmented party system, whereas closed party PR leads to a multipolar system or more fragmented party system) (Duverger 1954, 239; Barker and McLeay 2000, 147; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001, 584). More importantly, frequent changes in electoral system would have detrimental effects on party institutionalization (PI) and party system institutionalization (PSI) by provoking changes in the number of parties and producing higher rates of electoral

volatility. Hence, such weak PI and PSI are expected to affect the nature and motivation of party activists of such parties because of an endless formation of new parties or cessation of existing ones that greatly induces an electoral volatility due to a lack of strong ideological bases, which further incites a temptation to pursue material benefits without any ideological attachment to a party. A comprehensive discussion of Ukraine's electoral system and its peculiarities will be provided after the next section.

2.3. The Ukraine Context

Whether it is due to a unique geographic location or uncertainties of politicians, but Ukraine since independence in 1991 has always been in between Russian and European Union regarding its foreign policy orientation. Huntington (1991, 12) describes the Third Wave democracies as the process that began “between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy.” Although Ukraine, as an example of such ‘transition to democracy’ states, held competitive elections, but “lacked basic institutions of the modern state” (Rose and Shin 2001, 332). In other words, new democracies such as Ukraine, especially its state officials sought to take power in order to redistribute the resources left from the earlier regime (Rose and Shin 2001, 341). Since most of the political parties in the context of new democracies go through various crises in their establishment (Rakner, Menocal and Fritz 2007, 32), this also implies that Ukraine's political parties are not only fluid and personalized with high electoral volatility rates, but also do not promote any specific party ideology.

The emergence of political parties in Ukraine took place in the 1990s at the break of the Soviet Union. Most importantly, there is a significant empirical gap on party activism in Ukraine, particularly, the motivations of party activists that drive them in assisting parties, for instance, via campaigning activities. There are some studies on voters, issue orientation,

attitudes as well as the development of Ukrainian party system, but there is almost no comprehensive study on party activists and their motivations in Ukraine.

In 2004, Ukraine had experienced the Orange Revolution, when people actively took part in mass protests and demonstrations because their trust got undermined due to a massive electoral fraud and other corruption-related activities involved during the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. The results of the first run-off were repealed and there was a second run-off under a close surveillance of both domestic and international observers, citizens succeeded to appoint the candidate they favored the most. Some scholars construe the Orange Revolution as the “triumph of civil society over Ukraine’s authoritarian regime” (Hrycak 2010, 155). Following the Orange Revolution in 2004, Ukraine’s democratic standing has been raised to “Free” for the first time in its history, based on Freedom House’s annual rankings as of 2006,² and it became the first among all the CIS states to attain such a robust democratic position.

However, Ukraine held its ‘Free’ status until 2009, when it was downgraded to ‘Partly Free’ and remains such up to day. Although the current levels of Ukraine’s civil liberties and political rights have been degraded to ‘Partly Free,’ nevertheless, its constant commitment to democracy stands Ukraine out in the post-Soviet context and provides an overall interest in its examination. Moreover, Ukraine remains the most democratized among the post-Soviet states, excluding the Baltic states such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The successor party of the Soviet Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, was constantly enjoying the status of majority in parliament from 1990, receiving the most seats in consecutive 1994 and 1998 elections, and only got replaced from its dominant leadership for the first time in 2002 by Bloc ‘Our Ukraine’ and had gradually finished only at the bottom in subsequent elections.

Whitmore (2014, 1) asserts that political parties in Ukraine mostly carried a national and democratic focus with a pattern of often dividing into many separate parties. In

² Freedom House Report - <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/ukraine>

comparison with other post-Soviet countries, Ukraine has gone through two significant outbreaks since its independence the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the relatively recent *Euromaidan* revolution in 2014. In his comparison of the youth political activism between Russian and Ukraine, Kuzio (2006, 67-68) argues that young people in Ukraine played a vital role in laying the foundation of “pro-democratic movements and encourage change that were finalized in anti-regime protests, elections, and revolution.”

2.3.1. An Electoral System in Ukraine.

The electoral system of Ukraine has been frequently changed. Table 1 displays the changes in the electoral system of Ukraine. For instance, the 1994 elections were based on a ‘full majoritarian’ system that included only single-member district plurality (SMDP), which later has changed to a mixed system – a combination of SMDP and closed party list proportional representation (PR) in 1998 and 2002. In 2006 and 2007, only the closed party list PR was adopted, which again was turned into a mixed electoral system in the latest 2012 and 2014 elections.

Table 1. Changes in the Electoral System of Ukraine

Year of Parliamentary Elections	Type of Electoral System
1994	Full Majoritarian (only single-member district plurality with a minimal turnout of 50% of voters plus one more vote)
1998, 2002	Mixed (50% of seats are allocated through single member district plurality; other 50% of seats are allocated through party lists)
2006, 2007	Full Proportional (only party lists with 3% threshold)
2012	Mixed (225 seats are allocated through single member district plurality; other 225 of seats are allocated through party lists)
2014	Mixed (198 seats are allocated through single member district plurality due to the annexation of Crimea; other 225 of seats are allocated through party lists)
2019	Mixed (167 seats are allocated through single member district plurality since parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions along with Crimea are not controlled by central power; other 225 of seats are allocated through party lists)

The most recent parliamentary elections in July 21, 2019 were held under a mixed electoral system. The Verkhovna Rada is a unicameral parliament, the 450 seats of which were shared in two ways. The exact half or 50% of the seats were allocated to parties that received 5 or more percent (threshold) of the votes and elected by a proportional party list system utilizing closed party lists. The other half of the 450 seats were elected via a SMDP or the first-past-the-post system (Kortukov 2019, 4).

2.3.2. Fragmentation and Electoral Volatility of the Party System in Ukraine

In this section, I will discuss about the fragmentation and electoral volatility of the party system in Ukraine by providing the parliamentary election outcomes from 2007, 2012,

2014 and 2019. The parliamentary election outcomes of Ukraine demonstrate the numbers of parties that exceed the 5% threshold³ and the types of parties that participate in one or another regular elections. In this regard, the following figures and their descriptions provide more detailed explanations.

Figure 1. Parliamentary Election Outcomes in Ukraine, 2007. Vote Share by Party

The *Figure 1* illustrates the percentages of the vote share (%) won by parties in the aftermath of the 2007 parliamentary elections, which was successful for Party of Regions, Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko, two other party Blocs, and Communist Party of Ukraine.






Figure 2. Parliamentary Election Outcomes in Ukraine, 2012. Vote Share by Party



³ The threshold for party representation in the Parliament in 2007 was 3%


The *Figure 2* demonstrates the percentages of the vote share (%) won by parties in the aftermath of the 2012 parliamentary elections, which was successful for Party of Regions, United Opposition Fatherland, UDAR, Communist Party of Ukraine and Freedom. In the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine, Party of Regions and United Opposition Fatherland were again the most well off in gaining seats in Parliament, but challenged by new parties such as UDAR and Freedom as well as the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Figure 3. Parliamentary Election Outcomes in Ukraine, 2014. Vote Share by Party



The *Figure 3* shows the percentages of the vote share (%) won by parties in the aftermath of the 2014 parliamentary elections, which was successful for National Front, Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, Self-Reliance, Opposition Bloc, Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, and Fatherland. Interestingly, parliamentary elections in Ukraine as of 2014 demonstrated quite different dynamics because almost all of the parties with the most amounts of seats including National Front, Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, and Self-Reliance neither enjoyed much leverage and popularity nor had members of parliament (MPs) in Supreme Rada in earlier 2012 parliamentary elections.

Figure 4. Parliamentary Election Outcomes in Ukraine, 2019. Vote Share by Party



The *Figure 4* illustrates the percentages of the vote share (%) won by parties in the aftermath of the latest 2019 parliamentary elections, which was fruitful for Servant of the People, Opposition Platform – For Life, Fatherland, European Solidarity, and Voice. Similarly to the previous elections, the snap parliamentary elections of 2019 in Ukraine provided provocative outcomes, when one of the dominant parties in terms of the number of seats in Parliament as of 2014, Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, was outnumbered by brand new parties such as Servant of the People and Opposition Platform – For Life, as well as Fatherland and new party of Voice. Such interesting electoral dynamics illustrate that the public support for political parties in Ukraine are is stable at all times and tends to produce radical transformations by eliminating strong parties with completely new parties.

Despite the promising trends towards better democratization, Ukrainian political parties are weak due to the permanent modifications in electoral system, as a number of scholars agree (Wilson and Bilous 1993, 695; D’Anieri 2006, 162; Bader 2010, 1101). Such an unsteady party system in the country is often viewed as a hindrance in democratic consolidation. Ukraine’s electoral volatility has been high as “new players are able to enter the competitive electoral process because of frequent changes to electoral preferences” (Ribiy

2013, 402). This pattern is commonly observed in countries with short electoral histories (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011).

2.3.3. Weak Institutionalization of Parties in Ukraine.

In addition, some scholars argue that if a party turns into a tool in the hands of a leader, then such ‘personalization’ of the party weakens party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006, 216). The latter statement is relevant to the Ukrainian party system, since most of the political parties are very personalized. For instance, the former incumbent president’s party Bloc of Petro Poroshenko – Solidarity, the Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, the UDAR or the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms of Vitaliy Klichko, the Opposition Bloc by Yuriy Boyko and the Batkivshina or Fatherland of Yulia Tymoshenko and many others clearly demonstrate that parties in Ukraine are highly personal and therefore are weakly institutionalized.

Table 2. Personalization of Parties

Party Name	Party Leader’s Name	Party Leader’s Initial Occupation
The Bloc of Petro Poroshenko - Solidarity	Petro Poroshenko	Entrepreneur; One of the richest oligarchs in Ukraine
UDAR or Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms by Vitaliy Klitschko	Vitaliy Klitschko	Professional boxer
The Opposition Bloc by Yuriy Boyko	Yuriy Boyko	Statesman and politician
Fatherland by Yulia Tymoshenko	Yulia Timoshenko	Statesman and politician; former Prime Minister
Voice by Svyatoslav Vakarchuk	Svyatoslav Vakarchuk	Ukrainian musician; public activist

Table 2 indicates that the party leaders’ names are attached to the titles of political parties and always come with the name of the party, whether in media or other instances. In

other words, political leaders in Ukraine to a large extent “consider their parties as a private belonging meant to serve for a personal use only” (Slomczynski et al., 2008). In addition, political parties sometimes include in their composition certain famous individuals outside the political realm such as the UDAR’s Vitaliy Klitschko, who was a former professional boxer, and appoint them as the leaders of parties to gain more popularity and eventually more electoral support.

Also, leaders of parties often change the name of the party and leave the bloc or party alliances and unite with others. For instance, the European Capital party was found in 2005 and had modified its name twice to New Country in 2009 and then to Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms, led by Klitschko, in 2010. In turn, the last name of Klitschko, a famous professional boxer, was attached to the party name in order to make it more popular. Relatively recently, the former Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, has changed the party under his leadership from Solidarity to European Solidarity to emphasize its political priority to keep aligned with European Union. Fedorenko et al. (2016, 610) succinctly conclude that the Ukrainian party system institutionalization is still backward and it will take quite a while to observe some positive changes in its dynamics of institutionalization.

Ribiy (2013, 402) insists that the electoral bases of parties in Ukraine are not stable mainly because of the weak party-voter links as well as fragile ideological bonds between parties and voters. In his comparison of political parties from Russia’s State Duma and Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada with regard to party discipline, Thames (2007) also pointed out that parties with low levels of institutionalization tend to lack party discipline. Furthermore, Birch (1997, 40) asserts that a chaotic situation in Ukraine’s economy has prompted an electoral clientelism, whereby “large sectors of the electorate are willing to have their votes bought by political machines.”

As it was mentioned earlier in this paper, the law on elections has always been modified and shifted from single-member district system to proportional and a mixed one and

vice versa, which jeopardizes the institutionalization process of the party system in Ukraine. Such frequent changes in electoral system inhibit parties to establish strong roots in society (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006).⁴

Although many scholars assert that the party system and its degree of institutionalization are considerably weak in Ukraine, nevertheless, a few works such as Miller and Klobucar (2000, 672) contend that regardless of the low levels of connection between the electorate and the parties in terms of the latter understanding and fulfilling the needs of the former, “Ukrainian partisans are likely to engage in political activities, such as voting or discussing politics with others.”

In sum, the frequent changes in electoral system contributed to the fragmentation of the party system and opportunistic acting of the parties. Such electoral changes also hampered the establishment of programmatic structuring in the party system and the development of parties as purposive organization presenting a set of policy alternatives towards voters at elections (Wilson and Bilous 1993, 695; Slomczynski et al. 2008; Bader 2010, 1101; Rybiy 2013, 410; Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015). Ukraine parties are regarded as personal vehicles of charismatic politicians in electoral contests. Rational voting (vote choice based on parties’ previous policies, past performance, and currently presented policies) is less likely, if a party system is fluid. Hence, the victory of Volodymyr Zelensky and his party ‘Servant of the People’ in the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively, has been viewed as alarming among political commentators and scholars.

2.4. Ukraine’s Domestic Tensions between the West and the East

Similar to other post-communist states, the cultural identity in Ukraine is constantly getting transformed through various media channels that convey messages, promoting both

⁴ On the one hand, some assert that changes in electoral law may take place to boost citizen political participation and make elections accessible and significant (Reynolds and Reilly 1997, 49). On the other hand, many scholars believe that the major parties are predominantly interested in the survival of their parties or obtaining more seats through electoral reforms (Rokkan 1970; Bawn 1993, 968; Benoit 2004, 363).

Russian cultural imperialism on side, and the newer Western influence, on the other (Dyczok 2009, 36). According to Melnykovska et al. (2011, 1055-1056), political parties serve as a significant instrument in 'identity building' and the people purposefully support a particular party via giving their votes during elections due to their link with identity issues that a party promotes. Kuzio (1998, 155) also agrees that Ukraine has inherited the complex of 'inferiority,' which was called as "little Russianism." In turn, terms such as 'little Russia' or 'little Russians' are usually utilized by Ukrainians to refer to people residing in a specific region of Ukraine, which had a long geographic existence within Russian empire, and people living in this area are allegedly regarded as being against the establishment of Ukrainian national statehood. Taken together, there are regional cleavages in voting that put barriers on parties' abilities to build support throughout the country, which, in turn, compelled parties to neglect the voters and count on non-transparent sources of financial backing (Kuzio 2014, 309).

In view of the foregoing, there are tensions between people from the Western and Eastern parts of the country. The existing controversies revolve around Ukraine's foreign policy and geopolitical orientation - its inclination to cooperate with either the European Union or the Russian Federation. In this regard, Wasyluk (1994, 44) argues that "controversies over relations with the Russian Federation were high on the political agenda." Moreover, there is an ongoing debate regarding the status of the Russian language in Ukraine and "disputes over group relations between Russians and Ukrainians" (Pammett and DeBardeleben, 1996, 373). Particularly, one side of the citizens that inhabit in Western Ukraine is totally against the provision of the 'official status' or the recognition of the Russian language at the state level.

As far as the civic national identity and foreign policy orientation are concerned, citizens of Ukraine living on the West have a strong civic and predominantly pro-Europe foreign policy orientation. In contrast, people in the east of Ukraine tend to have a weak civic

identity and pro-Russia foreign policy orientation, respectively (Melnykovska et al. 2011, 1059). Moreover, Melnykovska et al. (2011) demonstrate that citizens, who reside in the eastern parts of the Ukraine, tend to promote the idea that the Russian language must have equal standing as of Ukrainian. In addition, Ukrainian citizens in the West advocate for the integration with the European Union, tend to be pro-Ukrainian nationalistic and supportive of the native language ‘*mova*,’ which they refer to as the Ukrainian language. Moreover, Lviv, as a solid illustration of Ukraine’s west, has preserved “the true ‘Ukraineness’ since it is more ethnically Ukrainian and is treated as the heart of anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism” (Barrington and Herron 2004, 59). Whereas, people from the eastern parts of Ukraine, tend to advocate for better cooperation with Russia, since they “have close proximity to Russia and cross-border family ties that are common in eastern regions” (Melnykovska et al. 2011, 1059).

There are different preferences about the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. For instance, eastern regions of Ukraine are “heavily industrial, urban and Russified” (Barrington and Herron 2004, 57) and arguably “Russian-speaking Ukrainians tend to think similar to that of Russians in comparison with their Ukrainian-speaking members of ethnic community” (Craumer and Clem 1999). Similarly, Griffin (2014) also points out that “the primary dividing line in the ‘two Ukraines’ narrative is the status of the Russian language.”⁵ In addition, there is negative rhetoric in the Eastern Ukraine towards the whole country, which raises questions such as “what good has Ukraine done us?” except rampant corruption and long-lasting economic problems. The differences between citizens of Ukraine living in the West and East regarding civic identity and foreign orientation *still* exist in the present-day.

⁵ According to a poll conducted in 2012 by the sociological group “Rating,” a non-governmental and independent research organization in Ukraine, regions such as Donbas (75%), South (72%) and East (53%) demonstrated positive views on establishing Russian to become a second official state-language. In contrast, 70% of northern-central Ukraine and 90% of western Ukraine were *not* in favor (Griffin 2014).

Table 3. What do you consider to be your homeland? (%)

	Lviv (west)	Kiyv (north/capital)	Donetsk (east)
Ukraine	75.4	64.9	29.6
Russia	0.5	0.2	2.0
Region	8.0	20.4	20.4

Source: Taras Kuzio (1998, 84) "Ukraine. State and Nation Building."

The Table 3 produced by Kuzio (1998), presents the survey responses to the question asking citizens' attachment with one or another category listed in the Table, from the residents of four different cities (regions). The responses from Lviv (western) and Donetsk (eastern) cities demonstrate that the former considers 'Ukraine' to be their homeland, whereas the latter emphasizes its proximity with the USSR as well as the 'regional' distinctiveness that separates them from the rest of the country. Likewise, Barrington and Herron (2004, 78) similarly contend that "regional differences matter since they represent important underlying political and cultural divisions in the people of Ukraine." In addition, Griffin (2014) succinctly describes Ukraine's intra-state regional divisions as "an irreconcilable civilizational split between the 'pro-Russian east' and 'pro-European Union west,'" emphasizing the existence of regional differences in Ukraine. Hence, these findings are *still* relevant in the contemporary affairs of Ukraine.

Consequently, these internal divisions lead oneself to consider whether there exist possible differences regarding the motivations of party activists, who participate in political processes in various electoral regions/districts and for diverse political parties. Most importantly, there is an empirical gap in the literature that addresses the 'motives' of party activists in Ukraine in this era of *party in decline*. In addition, Pammett and DeBardeleben (1996, 378) stress that "for many Russians and Ukrainians, evaluation of the electoral institutions is closely linked to satisfaction with political/economic outcomes and outputs."

Interestingly, since the global financial crisis in 2008, the economic situation of Ukraine did not demonstrate any significant growth, but, instead, it shrank rapidly after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and war in Donbas region, accompanied by rampant domestic corruption. Therefore, it is also intriguing to study why individuals that are not pleased with the incumbent government help not the opposition party, but support other parties during elections and facilitate their campaigns, regardless of the poor economic outcomes by the government.

3. Research Design

In the literature review, I broadly underlined that third-wave democracies with poor party system institutionalization such as Ukraine are expected to have few purposive (ideological) party activists. One of the shared beliefs in the scholarly world emphasizes that in Third Wave democracies, individuals join and participate in political parties not because they have clear political purposes and aim to influence certain policies, but they are merely hired by charismatic leaders. In turn, such appealing leaders form and develop parties based on their own influence, image and status instead of establishing and promoting a specific ideology (Robinson 1985, 203; Madsen and Snow 1991; Daniela 2009, 13; Blondel and Thiébaud 2010, 44-47). In other words, a lack of an ideological environment in parties may drive individuals to assist and campaign for parties in order to receive a variety of short- and long-term tangible rewards like career opportunities, establishing close relationships with party leaders and/or members, as well as engaging in agitation for the sake of an hourly remunerated temporary job. In this regard, the scholarship regarding Ukraine's party system emphasizes that political parties in Ukraine are not institutionalized and have no profound roots in the society, therefore party activists should demonstrate no clear distinctions across different political parties.

In such weakly institutionalized party systems, party activists are expected to exercise very small leverage and be seen as ‘meaningless’ due to the absence of clear ideological orientations. Hence, it implies that there would be no drastic differences between party activists, for example, of ‘Party A’ from activists of ‘Party B’ in terms of ideological views and attitudes towards key issues, as they would, first and foremost, be interested in receiving monetary compensations. Also, given that party activists do not differ much across political parties, being a member of a party does not matter due to Ukraine’s party system. Hence, I want to examine whether such shared belief in the scholarship is appropriate because party activists may be different in their motivations including their level of purposiveness and policy preferences in Ukraine.

Then, I will identify whether and how the extent to which activists are purposive varies across regions and across parties. The following hypotheses will be tested.

Hypothesis 1: Party activists in western regions of Ukraine are more ideologically motivated (purposive) than party activists in eastern regions of Ukraine, regardless of their party affiliation. This is a regional variable that relies on an individual-level theory.

It is clear that human rights, as one of the major principles of democracy, constitutes the basis of democratic values and includes many vital and integral rights for human beings including the freedom of opinion and expression. The existence of liberty rights that embrace the civil and political rights of citizens is imperative because it guarantees individuals from any potential state violations. In this regard, citizens on the west of Ukraine differ from their eastern compatriots with their more adherence and appreciation of democratic values. For instance, scholars on Ukraine such as Kuzio (1994, 111) argue that while western Ukraine has been performing “a fundamental role in the political culture of independent Ukraine, the eastern Ukraine lacks democratic traditions.”

Moreover, according to the results of the joint research study, conducted by Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, held in 2013 throughout

Ukraine, it turned out that the residents of the western and central regions have the highest protest moods. Particularly, the research results reveal that “62% of residents in west, 28.5% of central Ukraine plan to participate in rallies and protests. Conversely, in the south and the east of country, such figures are much lower, constituting 15% and 12%, respectively” (Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, 2014). The findings also demonstrate that the “majority of citizens (94% in west, 83% in central, 41,2% in south and 55,3% in eastern regions of Ukraine) do not support the state punishment of the organizers and activists of Euromaidan,” that is, months-old mass protests in the center of Kiev regarding the failure of Ukrainian government to join the European Union (Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, 2014). Although the high percentage of respondents in West to participate in rallies is likely to be due to their pro-Euro attitudes, not to their adherence to democratic norms, the same study by Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center (2014) also points out that “77% of respondents from the western and only 35.9% of respondents from the eastern regions were in favor of democracy as the most desirable form of government.” In addition, about 20% of the respondents from southern and eastern parts of Ukraine marked that under certain circumstances, “authoritarian regime may be better than democracy” (Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Razumkov Center, 2014).

One of the reasons that accounts for such regional differences in the extent of democracy-preferring environment in Ukraine is the result of historical legacies, when the west of Ukraine was under the control of Austria in Galicia (the current three Ukrainian *oblasts* or regions such as Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil) with solid liberal traditions, while the east of Ukraine was dominated by an autocratic Tsarist Russian empire (Furman, 1995). Therefore, it is reasonable to postulate that such historical legacies formed the political culture of citizens. Thus, I expect to see more purposively (ideology) motivated party activists in the west of Ukraine in comparison with the activists on the east.

Hypothesis 2. Party-level variable. The older a party is from the time of its establishment, the more purposive party activists of that party will be, regardless of the region.

There are usually two indicators through which party institutionalization is estimated, which are the year of origin of a party and the index of electoral party dominance (EPD). In the context of Ukrainian legislative elections, I will look at the average age of the parties under examination, which obtained at least 3% of votes beginning from the first Ukrainian parliamentary elections in 1994 and subsequent regular elections.

Table 4. Party Age in Ukraine

Party name	Founded in...	1994	1998	2002	2006	2007	2012	2014	2019
Servant of the People	2016	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Opposition Platform – For Life	1999	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	21
European Solidarity	2001	-	-	1	-	-	-	13	18
				1	-	-	-	14.5	14

Table 4 indicates that out of three parties under study, Opposition Platform – For Life and European Solidarity have been present in Ukraine’s party system for 21 and 18 years, respectively. In contrast, Servant of the People party is only 3 years old and therefore quite new to Ukraine’s electoral politics in comparison with the other two parties. Hence, it can be claimed that party activists of Opposition Platform – For Life and European Solidarity are more likely to be purposive (ideological) than that of Servant of the People.

I selected the year of origin of a party as a more reliable indicator instead of the index of EPD is that the two out of three parties under study are brand new to Ukraine’s electoral politics, that is, Servant of the People and the unification of Opposition Platform with For

Life. Since these new two parties took part in 2019 snap parliamentary elections for the first time in their history, it would be infeasible to assess such electoral dimension via counting the proportion of the total votes and seats because there is no opportunity to compare new parties' electoral achievements in previous elections. Therefore, I decided to operationalize the average 'party age' in order to calculate party institutionalization.

Although there is no confirmed causal relationship between a political party's long history and activists' level of purposiveness, it is intuitive to postulate that activists from parties with a longer history are likely to be more purposive than activists from parties with a shorter history. The more a party exists in a multi-party system, the more chances it [party] has to define its ideology, establish strong roots in the society, and participate in parliamentary elections, which enable such a party to look appealing for potential activists with purposive motivations.

For instance, the current European Solidarity party was first found in 2001. In the parliamentary elections held in 2002, the Solidarity Party was under the Bloc of Our Ukraine party, where they have finished first with 70 mandates in Supreme Rada. Although the party was initially called as Solidarity Party, the party leadership has decided to rename it as the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko in 2014, who was the original leader of Solidarity Party. The 2014 elections were the most fruitful for the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, as they have gained the most seats in the Ukrainian Parliament. The ideology of the party revolved around civic nationalism, European unionism and liberal conservatism. Before the next parliamentary elections of Ukraine in 2014, there was a private congress of the party, the result of which was the decision to rebrand the party with a new title as European Solidarity in order to compete in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Since the leader of the party, Petro Poroshenko, lost in the 2019 presidential elections against Volodymyr Zelensky, the ratings of the European Solidarity decreased and therefore the party has gained only 8% of the total votes.

The winner party in the 2019 snap parliamentary elections, Servant of the People (SoP), was established in 2016 under a different name, called as Party of Decisive Changes. Subsequently, the latter was renamed into Servant of the People due to well-known Ukrainian political satire comedy television series with the same title as that of the party, wherein the current President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, has played the starring role. As far as the Servant of the People's party ideology is concerned, it posits itself as a catch-all party that aims to unite people with diverse visions and regardless of their ideological (e.g. left or right) differences.

Opposition Platform – For Life (OPFL) was originally known and registered as All-Ukrainian Association Center (AUAC) in 1999. However, from 2016 to 2018, the party name was modified into New Life, and then went through rebranding processes, which created a new name such as Opposition Platform – For Life. In 2002 parliamentary elections, AUAC has won only 0.16% of votes from the total share. Then, the party leadership of AUAC joined the Opposition Bloc in 2014, which they left two years later with a newly emerged party For Life. Afterwards, the party congress declared about labeling the party with a name title as the Opposition Platform – For Life. The ideology of the OPFL promotes social-democratic values, neutrality, Euro-skepticism and *Rusofilia* (preference towards Russia) in terms of diplomatic relations. In a Ukrainian society, OPFL is largely perceived as a party that holds pro-Russian views because of OPFL's labeling the war on the east of Ukraine as a “civil” and its attempts to raise issues of discrimination against Russophones.

Among these three parties, the activists of which I have surveyed, both the Opposition Platform – For Life and European Solidarity have a long history and a relatively solid electoral support as well as ideology in comparison with the newly constructed party, i.e. Servant of the People. Although OPFL has been established two years earlier than European Solidarity, the latter has obtained at least 3% of votes in three Ukrainian parliamentary elections (2002, 2014, 2019), that is, more than the former. Therefore, it is intuitive to predict

that the party activists of European Solidarity would be more purposive in their motivations than the activists from other two parties across all 4 items of purposive motivation. Also, I assume that, regardless of its joint activities with Opposition Blocs from time to time, Opposition Platform – For Life is widely recognized due to its party leaders and therefore potential activists that decide to join the party to campaign will be more purposive-oriented than that of the Servant of People. The SoP is expected to have a weak party-voter linkage and tenuous ideological stance as well as projected low ratings in public opinion surveys, which show that “the amount of people who would vote for the party [Servant of the People] did not exceed 9-10%” (Razumkov Center 2017; Rating 2018).

3.1. Dependent Variable

In order to test my hypotheses, I use an ordinal variable Purposive Motivation (*purp*), that is, the extent of purposive (ideological) motivation of party activists and their variations across parties in three different regions, using the items (*purp1*, *purp2*, *purp3*, *purp4*) that are in a series asking the respondents to indicate on a four-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much” the significance of each item, where 1=Not at all, 2=Very little, 3=Somewhat, and 4=Very much.

3.2. Independent Variables

There are two main independent variables in this study: (a) region, that is, regional differences between western and eastern regions of Ukraine regarding foreign policy orientation and status of the Russian language; (b) party institutionalization (operationalized by the year of origin of a party).

3.3. Control variables

Literature on the relationship between party activists’ age and the level of purposiveness is not widespread. For instance, some scholars such as Bruter and Harrison

(2009, 1264) argue that taking into account the moral incentives of young party members, it is expected them to “embrace the logic of the May law by viewing young activists more radical (or at least more ideological) than their leaders.” Hence, in the case of examining six European democracies, it was found that “policy-seeking objectives are the principal objective of most young party members in most of the countries included in the study” (Bruter and Harrison 2009, 1275). Similarly, a research study conducted by Enos and Hersh (2015, 9) also reveal that party activists, engaged in campaigning activities, generally tend to be young. Hence, I expect that younger party activists will be more purposive in comparison with their older colleagues.

Essentially, there are not many research studies on the relationship between the amount of income an activist earns and the level of his or her purposiveness. However, some works such as Enos and Hersh (2015) that examine the role of party activists as campaign workers in the context of the United States of America. They argue that campaign workers tend to “identify themselves as strong partisans and have higher income” (Enos and Hersh 2015, 9). On the other hand, some studies that focus on such countries as South Korea and Mongolia, disclosed that “policy motivation does not increase as income goes up” (Koo 2018, 12). Although scholarly findings are mixed, I believe that this work should base its postulation from empirical studies that have revealed specific findings from similar Third Wave democracies such as South Korea and Mongolia (Koo 2018). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that individuals with higher income levels are not necessarily more purposive than citizens with lower income levels.

Studies on the relationship between gender and degree of purposiveness have revealed mixed results. For instance, some studies show that “the most important incentive for seeking current party position, that is, purposiveness (issues and influence) is higher among female democrats (40.2) in comparison with male democrats (39.0), whereas among Republicans men (60.3) tend to be more purposive than women (57.6)” (Hulbary et al. 1998, 65). Also, a

study by Verba, Burns and Schlozman (1997, 1051) asserts that in comparison with men, “women are less politically interested, informed and efficacious.” Similarly, Thomas and Young (2006, 12) insist that there is a negative relationship between being female and political interest, that is, females have lower political interest than men.

There are findings that illustrate that “men were slightly more educated than women, although partisan differences were not straightforward” (Hulbary et al. 1998, 61). Conversely, another research study by Enos and Hersh (2015, 9) demonstrate that party activists participating in campaigning activities are “far more likely to be in college or college educated.” However, there is a lack of investigation on the relationship between one’s highest formal education and the level of purposiveness. I believe that citizens with higher education tend to be literate; hence, they are likely to comprehend the content of policies, proposed by parties, and better recognize how an adoption of a policy may shape the future of his or her socio-economic status. Therefore, I believe that individuals with higher education are more likely to be purposive than those with lower education levels.

It can be argued that the sole fact that party activists without any official party affiliation join parties and maintain their respective parties’ campaigning activities provides a room to believe that they are strongly motivated. However, certain studies such as Webb, Poletti and Bale (2017) specifically examine the differences between party members and non-party-members in the context of the United Kingdom with regard to the volume of work each group performs and a variety of motivations that drove them. Particularly, Webb, Poletti and Bale (2017, 20) reveal that “at the individual level, the more intensive an activity is in terms of time and effort involved, the greater the input of party members relative to non-member supporters.” Likewise, a study conducted by Ponce and Scarrow (2013) via using responses from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2010, also suggests that “non-member activists are (on average) less ideological” in comparison with member activists. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that party activists with official party membership cards tend to be

more purposive than their counterparts, who hold no membership cards in parties they support.

3.5. Data & Methods

Party activists cannot be studied properly when using general public opinion surveys. This is because they consist of a very small segment of the general public, as shown by cross-national comparative studies such as the World Value Surveys or International Social Survey Programs. Party activists, whom I target as study subjects, are not necessarily affiliated with specific political parties. They are usually visibly in action before impending parliamentary elections, thus, easily identifiable. It is important to mention that this study is an extension of the ‘Party Activist Survey in Asia Dataset,’ which has been conducted by Sejin Koo since 2012 in Taiwan (2016), South Korea (2012), and Mongolia (2012 & 2016).

There are no existing data that provide any evidence on the motivations of party activists in Ukraine. The “Wave 6 (2010-2014)” of World Values Survey provides data on Ukraine (*as of 2011; sample size: 1500; Universe: National Population; both sexes; 18 and more years*) that only include questions such as “how often do you vote during elections?” or “if the elections are held tomorrow, who would you vote for?” or “could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of a political party” and some other that ask questions regarding politics and parties from general population. However, there are no items in the questionnaire that specifically include party activists, in particular, their motivations. Therefore, there was a need to collect and analyze a novel data on party activists in Ukraine and their motivations on being active in an era of *party in decline*.

The fieldwork was conducted from July 7th to July 19th, 2019, that is, two weeks before the parliamentary snap elections begin in Ukraine. The previous parliamentary elections took place in 2014, and the next regular elections were supposed to be held on October 2019. However, the newly elected president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, issued

a decree №303/2019 on May 21, 2019, that enacts the following items: (1) the suspension of the 8th convocation of the Verkhovna Rada deputies, (2) the appointment of the snap parliamentary elections on July 21, 2019, (3) the financial provision by the Cabinet of Ministers to hold snap parliamentary elections, and (4) this decree obtains a legitimacy from the day of its publication. This decision was unexpected and became quite controversial among Ukrainian political community.

On the one hand, some politicians were debating that there was no sufficient time to properly organize the snap elections, on the other hand, a group of then acting national deputies of Verkhovna Rada wrote a petition to the Supreme Court of Ukraine, emphasizing that such a decision was “unconstitutional.” Afterwards, it was quite unclear whether the snap elections would be held on July 21, 2019, since the Supreme Court had to consider the petition they have received on the “illegitimacy” of the presidential decree and provide a final answer. There were many news sources predicting that the Supreme Court of Ukraine would not authorize the president’s new decree on holding snap elections, however, the decree was approved because there was no ruling coalition in the parliament as it should have been, according to Ukraine’s Constitution, and, also, there was a very little trust of the people on the work and effectiveness of the Verkhovna Rada deputies.

During my field studies, I have visited three Ukrainian cities such as Kiev (capital city/north), Lviv (west) and Kharkiv (east). Historically, Lviv has always been viewed as an authentic manifestation of Ukraine’s “western” region. Also, one might argue that Donetsk and Luhansk areas (states) border with the Russian Federation and are more “industrial, much more Russified and demographically more Russian than their neighbors to the east such as Kharkiv,” and therefore would be more suitable for examination (Hesli 1995; Barrington and Herron 2004, 57). However, Donetsk and Luhansk states have been undergoing an armed conflict since 2014 until now due to provocation of separatist sentiments and Russia’s

military aggression against Ukraine. With this in mind, I did not visit these two areas and survey party activists because it was (1) prohibited to enter those territories and (2) it was quite perilous to conduct a fieldwork, given such extraordinary situation. Hence, I decided to conduct a survey in Kharkiv, since the latter is the best available alternative, as it almost resembles many of the characteristics such as “industrialism, urbanism and heavy Russification of people, unique to the eastern parts of Ukraine” (Hesli 1995) (see more in *Appendix 2*).

Table 5. Surveyed Party Activists in Lviv (N=61)

REGION OF UKRAINE		WEST	
CITY		LVIV	
NAME OF A POLITICAL PARTY	SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE	OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE	EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	17	17	27

Table 5 shows the amount of respondents surveyed from each party under examination on the west of Ukraine, Lviv city.

Table 6. Surveyed Party Activists in Kharkiv (N=65)

REGION OF UKRAINE		EAST	
CITY		KHARKIV	
NAME OF A POLITICAL PARTY	SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE	OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE	EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	23	19	23

Table 6 shows the amount of respondents surveyed from each party under examination on the east of Ukraine, Kharkiv city.

Table 7. Surveyed Party Activists in Kiev (N=75)

REGION OF UKRAINE		NORTH/CAPITAL CITY	
CITY		KIEV	
NAME OF A POLITICAL PARTY	SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE	OPPOSITION PLATFORM - FOR LIFE	EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	27	27	21

Table 7 shows the amount of respondents surveyed from each party on the north of Ukraine, Kiev city.

In addition, I carefully selected districts in each city under question, which are relatively similar in terms of their economic standings, ethnic composition and resembling each other in many other aspects. For instance, in Kiev, I selected three districts such as Pecherskiy (relatively wealthy), Darnitskiy (relatively poor) and Obolonskiy (relatively poor), where I surveyed party activists. In Lviv, I have examined Halitskiy (relatively wealthy), Zaliznichniy (relatively poor) and Syhovskiy (relatively poor) districts, whereas in Kharkiv, I took into account Shevchenkovskiy (relatively wealthy), Holodnogorskiy (relatively poor) and Slobodskoi (relatively poor) districts. The main reason for such decision is that I intentionally minimized the selection bias and have a stronger basis to claim any possible similarities or differences between party activists in their motivations across diverse geographic regions, while controlling for important confounding factors. Approximately around 201 respondents (party activists) participated in the survey that campaigned for three of the largest political parties in Ukraine. Since the amount of political parties that exist in

Ukraine is close to 30, most of which are façade or window-dressing parties, I limited my research on considering only three large parties that have a strong electoral basis and a relatively strong party ideology (see more in *Appendix 3*).

Besides, factor analysis will be utilized to group several similar items in the questionnaire that have the same context into subgroups in order to examine the motivations of party activists. Because as Costantini and Valenty (1996, 519) emphasize: “many activists are motivated by more than one thing and activists can be both Power-seekers and Purposives.” This means that the utilization of factor-analytic method will be reliable in properly studying the motivations of party activists (Hofstetter 1973, 250; Kirkpatrick 1976, 563; Brown et al. 1980, 287; Roback 1980; Costantini and King 1984). After investigating the relationships between party activists’ motivations and some demographic, economic, attitudinal and behavioral attributes, regression results will be presented and discussed. In addition to the typology regarding the incentives of party activists and leaders, created by Clark and Wilson (1961), I will also add two more factors (dimensions), developed and utilized by Costantini & King (1984) and Costantini & Valenty (1996).

3.6. Data Analysis & Discussion

It is vital to point out that this work has relied on survey questionnaire and measurement of motivation, which were developed by Costantini and King (1984) and further elaborated by Koo (2018) in her ‘Party Activist Survey in Asia Dataset.’ Moreover, the survey questions utilized in the works of the aforementioned scholars have been adjusted in this research project in order to fit the context of Ukraine.

Firstly, I have analyzed the general distribution of purposive motivations on 4 items, which are all specifically related to purposive motivations based on the responses, provided by the surveyed party activists. The first item (*purpose 1*) asks about one’s desire to change

things in society, and the second item (*purpose 2*) determines one's sense of indignation over the current state of affairs. The third item (*purpose 3*) examines one's level of concern for public issues, whereas the fourth one (*purpose 4*) evaluates an activist's willingness to exchange views on the issues of the day and to help define the program of the party. In particular, I determined the mean values of purposive motivations across three parties such as Servant of the People, Opposition Platform – For Life, and European Solidarity in three cities of Ukraine.

The survey questionnaire regarding the motivations of activists asked the following question: “*The following are reasons given by political leaders for having first become involved in politics. How do they express your thoughts or feelings at the time, which you decided to join this election campaigning?*” The items are in a series asking the respondents to indicate on a four-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much” the significance of each item, where *1=Not at all, 2=Very little, 3=Somewhat, and 4=Very much*. The orders of histograms are as follows:

- A desire to change things in society (see *top left histogram*)
- A sense of indignation over the current state of affairs (see *top right histogram*)
- Concern for public issues (see *bottom left histogram*)
- To exchange views on the issues of the day and to help define the program of the party (see *bottom right histogram*)


First, I will provide the general distribution of purposive motivations for each item separately across parties and regions. Then, by unifying all 4 items of purposive motivation, I generated a new variable in Stata labeled as “*purposive*” in order to calculate the average mean scores of purposiveness as follows:

$$\text{generate } \textit{purposive} = (\textit{purpose1} + \textit{purpose2} + \textit{purpose3} + \textit{purpose4}) / 4$$

In Kiev, party activists that campaigned for Servant of the People were mainly motivated by a desire to change things in society (mean score=3.44) and concern for public

issues (mean score=3.11). Similarly, the average scores of party activists from Opposition Platform – For Life demonstrate that they are primarily motivated by an objective to make certain alterations in the society (mean score=3.07). But, the other three items on purposive motivations are clearly less important to them with average scores ranging between 2.51 and 2.81. Conversely, party activists from European Solidarity illustrate almost consistent high scores in every item of purposive motivation, in particular, concern for public issues (3.47), except the willingness to exchange views on the issues of the day and to help define the program of the party. Overall, unlike other two parties, European Solidarity’s activists are found to be more purposively motivated than their respective counterparts.

Figure 5. The General Distribution of Purposive Motivation. City: Kiev




Note: Figure 2 indicates the general distributions of purposive motivations among party activists across parties in Kiev.

Table 8. Linear Regression of Purposive Motivations in Kiev city

Number of obs.=75, $F(0, 74)=7.58$, Prob.>F=., R-squared=0.0000, Root MSE=.84025

purposive	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	2.97	.0970233	30.61	0.000	2.776677	3.163323

Overall, Table 8 provides the results of a linear regression on the average score of purposive motivations of all the activists in Kiev (north of Ukraine), which is equal to 2.97.

Figure 6. The General Distribution of Purposive Motivation. City: Lviv

Note: Figure 3 indicates the general distributions of purposive motivations among party activists across parties in Lviv.

Intriguingly, in Lviv, party activists from all three parties, namely, Servant of the People, Opposition Platform – For Life, and European Solidarity showed much greater results in terms of their purposiveness in comparison with their counterparts from Kiev and Kharkiv. Specifically, party activists from both Servant of the People and European Solidarity were largely motivated by a desire to change things in society (mean scores=3.64 and 3.66, respectively) and concern for public issues (mean scores=3.58 and 3.66, respectively). Although the average scores of party activists from Opposition Platform – For Life are similar to those of Servant of the People and European Solidarity, activists’ responses show that they are primarily motivated by an objective to make certain alterations in the society (mean score=3.41) and concern for public issues (mean score=3.17), being less purposive across all the items of purposive motivations. Moreover, party activists from European Solidarity exemplify consistently high scores in every item of purposive motivation, which implies that activists from this party are the most purposive in Lviv. Similar to the findings in Kiev city, European Solidarity’s party activists, unlike their counterparts from other two parties, are found to be much more purposively motivated.


Table 9. Linear Regression of Purposive Motivations in Lviv city

Number of obs.=61, F(0, 60)=7.58, Prob.>F=., R-squared=0.0000, Root MSE=.67212

purposive	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	3.29	.0860558	38.19	0.000	3.114748	3.459023

Overall, Table 9 provides the results of a linear regression on the average score of purposive motivations of all the activists in Lviv (west of Ukraine), which is equal to 3.29.

Figure 7. The General Distribution of Purposive Motivation. City: Kharkiv



Note: Figure 4 indicates the general distributions of purposive motivations among party activists across parties in Kharkiv.

In Kharkiv, a city on the west of Ukraine, party activists of the Opposition Platform – For Life turned out to be the most purposive across all four items of motivations as they illustrate high degrees of purposiveness. In particular, they demonstrate average scores of 3.73 and 3.68 for choosing to campaign due to a desire to change things in society and a sense of indignation over the current state of affairs, respectively, and the mean score of 3.84 due to their concern for public issues. Conversely, activists of Servant of the People turned out to be the least purposive across all purposive motivation items in Kharkiv. In turn, European

Solidarity, as their colleagues from Kiev and Lviv, demonstrate average scores between 3.34 and 3.60, despite having the lowest extent of purposiveness on a willingness to exchange views on the issues of the day and to help define the program of the party.

Table 10. Linear Regression of Purposive Motivations in Kharkiv city

Number of obs.=65, F(0, 64)=0.00, Prob.>F=., R-squared=0.0000, Root MSE=.70749

purposive	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	3.18	.0877532	36.29	0.000	3.009308	3.359923

Overall, Table 10 provides the results of a linear regression on the average score of purposive motivations of all the activists in Kharkiv (east of Ukraine), which is equal to 3.18.

Furthermore, the first hypothesis expected that party activists in western regions of Ukraine would be more purposive than their counterparts on the east of Ukraine, irrespective of their party affiliation. Importantly, on an aggregate regional level, party activists from Lviv (west) indeed illustrated the highest average score of purposive motivation (*purposive*=3.29) in comparison with activists from Kharkiv (*purposive*=3.18) as well as from Kiev (*purposive*=2.97), therefore, the evidence provided confirms *Hypothesis 1*.

As far as the party-level variable is concerned, I attempted to make an educated guess based on the party age indicator that the older a party is from the period of its establishment, the more purposive (ideological) activists of that party will be across all 4 items, regardless of parties' geographic settings. The assumption was that activists of European Solidarity party would display higher levels of purposiveness than their counterparts from both Opposition Platform – For Life and Servant of the People parties. Moreover, I expected OPFL's activists to have greater purposive motivation compared to those from the SoP. The activists of SoP are expected to be the least ideological due to its relatively new establishment as a party.

Based on the data inserted into Figures 2, 3 and 4, it can be argued that activists in the capital of Ukraine, Kiev, exhibit quite unanticipated results vis-à-vis *hypothesis 2* of this work. For instance, the mean scores of activists from European Solidarity are the highest on *Purp2* (sense of indignation over the current state of affairs=3.09) and *Purp3* (concern for public issues=3.47). However, activists from Servant of the People have the highest mean scores on *Purp1* (desire to change things in society=3.44) and *Purp4* (willingness to exchange views on the issues of the day and to help define the program of the party=2.59). In contrary to expectations, activists of Opposition Platform – For Life showed consistently lower mean scores throughout all 4 items of purposive motivation compared to activists from European Solidarity and Servant of the People.

According to the results of party activists from the western city of Ukraine, Lviv, one may observe much more disproportionate figures than that of in Kiev. For example, activists of European Solidarity indicate the highest mean scores across 3 out of 4 items, that is, enthusiasm to alter certain things in society (*purp1*=3.66), concern for community problems (*purp3*=3.66), and keenness to exchange observations on the topical problems of the day and to help outline the program of the party (*purp4*=3.29). Furthermore, activists of Servant of the People showed the highest mean score on being motivated by the sense of indignation over the current state of affairs (*purp2*=3.70). Unlike the aforementioned two parties, activists' responses from Opposition Platform – For Life party once again showed steadily lower mean scores across all 4 items in contrast to two other parties.

Lastly, the general distribution of purposive motivation on the east of Ukraine, Kharkiv, also portrays uneven figures, but with a supremacy of neither European Solidarity's nor Servant of the People's activists in terms of the levels of purposiveness. Interestingly, the party activists of Opposition Platform – For Life illustrated the highest mean scores across all 4 items (*purp1*=3.73, *purp2*=3.68, *purp3*=3.84, *purp4*=2.68) of purposive motivation. In

turn, the statistics of activists' responses by Servant of the People present relatively higher mean scores on such items as (*Purp1=3.60*) and (*Purp4=2.26*) than that of European Solidarity, whereas the activists of the latter indicate comparatively higher mean scores on (*Purp2=3.60*) and (*Purp3=3.34*) in comparison with Servant of the People.

Although the statistical analyses of this work provide some insightful findings by showing variations in the degree of party activists' purposive motivations across three parties in chosen regions, it is vital to point out that I acknowledge the confines of this research project. Particularly, scholars may fairly argue that a slight degree of difference does not necessarily prove my point, or, in other words, why a high degree measures 'purposeful' activism and why low degree does not. In fact, such remarks are somewhat germane, but the findings also reveal that despite being an exemplar of Third Wave democracy, Ukraine's party activists do care about ideology and some are driven by clear goals and purposive motivations in order to influence certain policies that they find important.

Next, I performed regression analyses on the relationship between such control variables as *age*, *income*, *gender*, *the highest degree of formal education* and *an official membership* in parties and *the level of purposiveness* of party activists. Also, I provided the descriptive statistics of control variables (Table 11).

Table 11. Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
age	201	3.328358	2.99527	0	10
gender	201	.4875622	.5010933	0	1
income	201	4.248756	2.089931	1	7
education	201	3.502488	1.010566	1	5
membership	201	.3333333	.4725816	0	1

First of all, I ran a multivariate regression to observe some general characteristics between the dependent variable ‘*purposive*’ and five control variables (Table 12). To do this, I created a summary measure of the purposive motivation (*see on page 33*) and used it as a dependent variable.

Table 12. Linear Regression of Dependent Variable and Control Variables

purposive	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
age	.0793071	.0157768	5.03	0.000	.0481919	.1104222
gender	-.0257696	.1037347	-0.25	0.804	-.2303556	.1788163
income	.0708294	.0269323	2.63	0.009	.0177135	.1239454
education	.0798304	.0466511	1.71	0.089	-.0121752	.1718359
membership	.3775824	.0942313	4.01	0.000	.191739	.5634257
_cons	2.177772	.2507043	8.69	0.000	1.683331	2.672212

Note: Number of obs=201, R-squared=0.1589

Then, in examining the effect of activists’ age on the level of purposiveness, I have grouped 10 items in the age variable into two broad age categories such as roughly ‘young’ and ‘old’ activists. The “young” category of age includes activists that fall between the range of ‘under 25’ and up to 39 years old ($ageCTG=0$, if $age<4$). Whereas, the second age category, “old,” consists of individuals, whose ages vary from 40 years old up to ‘65 and over’ ($ageCTG=1$, if $age>3$). The regression results demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between age and activists’ levels of purposiveness. The findings are statistically significant at 95% confidence interval with a p -value ($0.000\leq 0.05$), which illustrate that the older a party activist is, the more purposive her or his motivations are.

Moreover, another variable that might have an effect on party activists’ purposiveness is a variation in income. The respondents had to choose one out of seven income ranges from ‘under 3,000 hryvnas’ ($value=1$), 3,000-4,999 hryvnas ($value=2$), 5,000-6,999 hryvnas ($value=3$), 7,000-8,999 hryvnas ($value=4$), 9,000-10,999 hryvnas ($value=5$), 11,000-12,999 hryvnas ($value=6$) and ‘13,000 and more hryvnas’ ($value=7$) that asked to identify their

monthly household income. As a result, regression scores display that party activists with more household income tend to be more purposive than that of with lower income levels. However, the findings are statistically insignificant at 95% confidence interval with a p -value ($0.009 \leq 0.05$), which determine that income variable does not have a strong effect on the level of purposiveness among Ukrainian party activists.

Afterwards, in investigating the impact of gender on the level of purposiveness of party activists, I run a regression to reveal whether there is a variation between males ($value=1$) and females ($value=0$) with regard to their extent of purposive motivations. The regression results demonstrate that there is not any strong relationship between gender and activists' levels of purposiveness. Although females are more purposive than males, the findings are statistically insignificant at 95% confidence interval with a p -value ($0.804 \geq 0.05$), which imply that there is no substantial difference between men and women in the degrees of their purposiveness. In addition, I have also checked whether the level of one's education has an effect on the level of purposiveness of activists. The education category consists of five different items such as 'primary/kindergarten/no school' ($value=1$), 'middle school' ($value=2$), 'high school or vocational school' ($value=3$), 'college/university' ($value=4$) and 'graduate school' ($value=5$). The regression results show that the more educated individuals are, the more purposive they become, but the findings are not statistically significant at 95% confidence interval with a p -value ($0.089 \geq 0.05$), which implies that the level of education does not robustly influence the levels of purposiveness of party activists in Ukraine.

Also, it was also interesting to examine additionally whether party activists, who happen to hold official membership status in their respective parties are more purposive than those, who participated in parties' campaigning activities without having any formal affiliation to the parties. Therefore, I conducted a regression analysis to investigate whether there are variations between members ($value=1$) and non-members ($value=0$) with regard to

their purposiveness in assisting the parties. The statistical findings reveal that the official members of parties are indeed more purposive than non-members, and the results are statistically significant at 95% confidence interval with a p -value ($0.000 \leq 0.05$), which imply that membership does influence the level of purposiveness of party activists.

The regression coefficients in Table 12 demonstrate the results from all the respondents, regardless of their ‘party’ and ‘regional’ affiliations. Although the regression coefficients predominantly exhibit a positive correlation between each control variable (except for *gender*) and the dependent variable, I believed that the statistical analyses would be more accurate if the dependent variable is controlled holding other important variables such as *region* and *party* constant. Also, I performed a multivariate regression to examine the effect of the region on purposiveness, while holding control variables constant. For instance, Table 13 provides three separate regression results for Kiev, Lviv, and Kharkiv, respectively.

Table 13. Individual Level Correlates of the Purposive Motivation: Multivariate OLS

Regression

Variable	Kiev	Lviv	Kharkiv
DV: purposiveness			
age	.06546582*	.09472952***	.09294872**
gender	-.07559751	-.11150361	.21311681
income	.08854528	.14889817**	.04248006
education	.15946188	.05752725	-.07035064
membership	.85465279***	.21000222	-.02992182
_cons	1.6651405***	2.1068572***	2.8017218***
N	75	61	65
R-squared	.25891911	.2658952	.13663027
R-squared adjusted	.20521759	.1991584	.06346334
RMS Error	.74908419	.60147621	.68467136

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

For Kiev, an increase in the age category is associated with 0.065 points increase in the level of activist's purposiveness, holding other factors constant. The finding is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval. On average, males are 0.075 points less purposive than females, holding other factors constant. But, the findings are not statistically significant. Moreover, an increase in the category of income is associated with 0.088 points increase in the level of activist's purposiveness, but the finding is not statistically significant. The more educated an activist is, the more purposive he/she turns out to be (0.159 points increase), though the findings are not statistically significant. Also, members are proved to be more purposive (0.855 points increase) than that of non-members, and findings are statistically significant at 95% confidence interval. In other words, *age* and *membership* variables have implications on activists' degree of purposiveness in Kiev, holding other factors constant.

For Lviv, an increase in the age category is associated with 0.0947 points increase in the level of activist's purposiveness, holding other factors constant. The finding is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval. On average, males are 0.112 points less purposive than females, holding other factors constant. But, the findings are not statistically significant. Moreover, an increase in the category of income is associated with 0.149 points increase in the level of activist's purposiveness and the findings are statistically significant. Also, the more educated an activist is, the more purposive he/she turns out to be (0.575 points increase), though findings are not statistically significant. Moreover, members turned out to be more purposive (0.210 points increase) than that of non-members, but the findings are not statistically significant at 95% confidence interval. In sum, *age* and *income* variables have an impact on activists' level of purposiveness in Lviv, holding other factors constant.

The regression results for Kharkiv show that that the older an activist is, the more purposive he/she becomes with 0.093 points increase in the level of purposiveness and the

finding is statistically significant at 95% confidence interval, holding other factors constant. Moreover, males are more purposive with 0.213 points increase in the degree of purposiveness than females, holding other factors constant. However, the findings are not statistically significant. Moreover, an increase in the category of income is associated with 0.042 points increase in the level of activist's purposiveness, but the findings are not statistically significant. Interestingly, the more educated an activist is, the less purposive he/she turns out to be (0.0703 points decrease), though the findings are not statistically significant. Similarly, being a member of party implies that an activist is less purposive with 0.299 points decrease than that of non-members, however the findings are not statistically significant at 95% confidence interval. As a result, it can be argued that only the *age* variable has an impact on activists' level of purposiveness in Kharkiv, holding other factors constant. It is interesting to note that in Kharkiv, unlike in Kiev and Lviv, party activists' degree of purposiveness diminishes regardless of their membership in parties and higher levels of education.

Also, one of the independent variables is *party*, namely, activists of a given party to be either purposive or lack purposiveness at all, regardless of the region they reside in. In particular, it was expected that activists from European Solidarity and Opposition Platform – For Life parties would demonstrate *more* levels of purposiveness due to their parties' long existence and a relatively strong electoral support as well as ideology in comparison with the brand new party, Servant of the People. Moreover, as European Solidarity party had prior experience in winning seats in the Parliament as opposed to Opposition Platform – For Life, it was intuitively predicted that the party activists of European Solidarity would be the most purposive in their motivations than the activists from other two parties across all 4 items of purposive motivation. Next, due to Opposition Platform – For Life's wider recognition thanks to its party leaders, it was expected that its activists would be more purposive-oriented than

that of Servant of the People. Otherwise, activists from Servant of the People were anticipated to demonstrate *the least* purposiveness among these three parties.

Table 14. Activists' Levels of Purposiveness Across Regions. Party: European Solidarity

purposive Kiev (north)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	3.12	.1490237	20.93	0.000	2.80819	3.429906
purposive Lviv (west)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	3.49	.133761	26.10	0.000	3.215791	3.76569
purposive Kharkiv (east)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	3.17	.1478057	21.47	0.000	2.867383	3.480443

Table 15. Activists' Levels of Purposiveness Across Regions. Party: Opposition Platform – For Life

purposive Kiev (north)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	2.81	.1741551	16.11	0.000	2.447575	3.163537
purposive Lviv (west)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	2.97	.1529164	19.43	0.000	2.64642	3.294757
purposive Kharkiv (east)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	3.49	.1201146	29.03	0.000	3.234491	3.739194

Table 16. Activists' Levels of Purposiveness Across Regions. Party: Servant of the People

purposive Kiev (north)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	3.02	.1703262	17.72	0.000	2.668408	3.368629
purposive Lviv (west)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	3.28	.1403815	23.36	0.000	2.981816	3.577007
purposive Kharkiv (east)	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
_cons	2.95	.1602528	18.38	0.000	2.613308	3.277996

Tables 14, 15 and 16 demonstrate activists' levels of purposiveness across regions. In particular, activists from European Solidarity have consistently showed higher average rates of purposiveness across regions (Table 14). Interestingly, activists of the new party with no previous electoral experience, Servant of the People, who were expected to be the least purposive, actually revealed higher average degrees of purposiveness than that of Opposition Platform – For Life in Kiev and Lviv (Table 16). In turn, activists of Opposition Platform – For Life were only highly purposive in Kharkiv city only (Table 15), hence, showing on average lower levels of purposiveness in comparison with both European Solidarity and Servant of the People. Hence, my *hypothesis 2* was only partially confirmed.

4. Limitations

It is vital to mention that this work relies on a novel dataset, which was created in the aftermath of surveying party activists from Servant of the People, Opposition Platform – For Life and European Solidarity parties *only* in three cities such as Kiev, Lviv and Kharkiv. In other words, the survey data represents the responses of activists from only one city, each of

which fits relatively well within the general geographic and linguistic characteristics of the northern, western and eastern regions of Ukraine, respectively. Conducting surveys among party activists during busy and intense campaigning activities from major cities in all 27 regions of Ukraine would not be feasible, given the necessity for a vast amount of financial resources as well as time constraints. Therefore, it should not be viewed a representative survey of Ukraine in its entirety, which implies that a prospect of making hasty generalizations regarding any regional differences between activists' motivations is limited in scope.

5. Conclusion

This research project intended to fill an important theoretical gap in the existing literature in the understanding of the motivations behind citizen participation in party activism. In order to do so, this study examined party activists, who are viewed as ambassadors in the community that form and maintain a common thread between parties and electorate. The literature on Third Wave democracies that involve plentiful late democracies such as Ukraine stresses that individuals in such countries take part in the activities of political parties in order to seek diverse tangible rewards, instead of being driven by a particular ideology to shape certain policies. Hence, this study aimed to examine whether party activists in Ukraine lack a clear ideological basis or purposiveness in their motivation, as has been generally expected in the literature on Third Wave democracies. Using original survey data collected in the course of conducting fieldwork in the three Ukrainian cities of Kiev, Lviv, and Kharkiv from July 7 to July 19, this research work examined the motivations of party activists in Ukraine's 2019 snap parliamentary elections. The survey of 201 party activists, who are not necessarily formal members of parties with membership cards, representing such political parties as Servant of the People, Opposition Platform - For Life and European Solidarity, provided some interesting insights.

For instance, it was revealed that the general distributions of purposive motivations of party activists across three political parties, while controlling for regional differences of Ukraine that were discussed in the literature. The regional differences disclose that Ukrainian citizens residing in the west are inclined to associating their country with the European Union and treat Ukrainian language as the only state language, as opposed to citizens residing in the east, who largely hold pro-Russian attitudes and treat Russian language as an integral part of their lives in Ukraine.

After having analyzed the general distribution of purposive motivations on four items, which are all specifically related to purposive motivations, the original survey dataset demonstrates that party activists in the west of Ukraine (*Lviv*) are more purposively (ideological) motivated than party activists in the east (*Kharkiv*) and capital city (*Kiev*) of Ukraine. Moreover, regression results of some control variables such as party activists' *age*, *income* and *official membership in parties* revealed a robust relationship with activists' level of purposiveness and findings were statistically significant. That is, older party activists and those with official party membership cards in parties are more likely to be purposively motivated than younger and non-party-member activists. The rest of the control variables as *gender* and *the highest degree of formal education* exhibit certain variations in their relationship with activists' level of purposiveness, however, the findings were not statistically significant.

It must be noted that my survey dataset is not representative of entire Ukraine, since it covers only a few geographic regions of Ukraine, and, therefore, it would be more valuable to have examined party activists from all the other regions in order to generate more accurate and generalizable scientific results regarding motivations underlying their party activism. I believe there should be more research studies conducted on citizens' involvement in party because literature on citizen participation in politics other than voting in the context of Ukraine as well as other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries has mostly

been limited to descriptive studies. Moreover, it is vital to note that the appointment of Volodymyr Zelensky as the president of Ukraine in 2019 triggered mass movements in other post-Soviet states as Kazakhstan, wherein ordinary citizens were mobilized to demand more transparent and fair presidential elections and participated as independent election observers in unprecedented amounts in the history of Kazakhstan. Such activities in Kazakhstan, for instance, laid a cornerstone for mobilizing citizens in upcoming parliamentary elections, which will take place in 2021, and therefore, I consider studying (party) activists is important as they may bridge the gap between parties and the electorate.

6. Appendix

1. However, some exceptional works are done by Hinnebusch (1983) on party activists in Syria and Egypt, Bob-Milliar (2012) on individuals joining parties and becoming party activists in Ghana, Desrues and Kirhlani (2013) on young activists of various political organizations in a Moroccan city of Meknes, Koo (2018) on Korean and Mongolian local party activists, and Koo (2020) on party activists and their level of activism in three Asian young democracies as Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia.

2. Specifically, I visited the local offices of relevant political parties. By interacting with local party officials, I was able to obtain their understanding in advance of my fieldwork during the election period and get important information about likely candidates (including parties), who would run in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Furthermore, as an important part of my research partially includes party activists' attitudes towards various salient issues in the society, it was of critical importance to meet party officials and potential candidates and identify the list of salient issues in Ukraine politics.

Besides, I have visited the research sites a few days before the beginning of the field studies for several reasons. Firstly, becoming familiar with a community and choosing of a field site in advance was vital, since it would not only save much time and energy during the actual survey, but also gave a decent idea of the peculiarities of electoral districts that would be ultimately investigated. Secondly, understanding of a community from immersion prior to the actual research provided new insights that required certain adjustments to the original objectives, procedures and the survey questionnaire of my thesis project. Thirdly, there was a need to develop a sense of mutual trust and have informal consultations with people, who have experience or knowledge of the area.

Moreover, the so-called “gatekeepers,” i.e. those who are personally knowledgeable about the community such as long-standing party members and political technologists from such parties as *Samopomish* (Self-Reliance), assisted in facilitating the research process and led to the establishment of key contacts not only in Kiev, but also in Lviv and Kharkiv, that were necessary for a thorough accomplishment of the field work. More importantly, it was necessary to estimate the time commitments and the cost of travel between various districts in terms of means of transportation and the amount of time needed to move from one site to another. In other words, visiting the research sites ahead of time provided a great opportunity to examine the question under study, as the party activists will be *visibly in action* during the official period of campaigning.

Moreover, I collected the survey data from three relatively large cities from various geographic regions of the country that share relatively the same socio-economic characteristics and ethnic heterogeneity. The surveys were conducted in the cities of Kiev, Lviv and Kharkiv. Therefore, while the survey data were collected from the north, west and east of the country, they are not from a random sample, thus, we should be cautious in generalization of the findings to the entire country. The survey questionnaire included 30 simple questions that asked one’s socio-economic status, some demographic questions, attitudes to political issues, self-placed ideology, general political participation, political efficacy, party activism as well as (purposive) motivations of party activism, which is the main dependent variable of this research study.

3. It is important to mention that I visited the place, where local election campaigning by party activists was occurring and the appointments were made with participants directly; I acquired some cooperation of the parties and candidates. Moreover, I visited election camp offices of a party after their permission via phone/e-mail, using publicly available contact information. Moreover, it was of crucial importance that I explained to party members and

party activists that the surveys were to be conducted for further understanding of party activists in Ukraine, especially aiming to examine their motivation, ideology, and political attitudes. During conversation with party activists in person, I made it clear that if they find any question uncomfortable, they did not need to answer them. Also, the participants have been informed that they could quit or withdraw their participation at any time, even after they completed and returned the survey questionnaire form to the researcher. In this case, I would have given it back to the participants or destroy it, if necessary.

More importantly, an informed consent document was attached as the front page of the survey instrument and translated into Russian and Ukrainian, as is the entire survey document. The survey questions took only about 10 minutes to complete, which means that they could take a quick look at it and decide whether to participate or not before they provide answers to the survey questions. To further ensure informed consent, I briefly explained the purpose of this survey research and told the expected time to complete this survey. Then, I let them decide whether or not to participate in it. All the questions in the survey were no more sensitive than those questions frequently used for cross-country public opinion surveys such as the World Value Surveys, which have been conducted in both authoritarian and democratic countries.

In addition, the survey questions were first written in English, then, translated into both Ukrainian and Russian languages. The respondents, especially in the Western city of Ukraine such as Lviv that tend to be more nationalist and supportive of their native language, preferred the survey to be completed in Ukrainian rather than Russian. The west of Ukraine is usually inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians. The same logic applied to the party activists that reside in the eastern cities of Ukraine such as Kharkiv, who preferred Russian in both filling out the survey and a means of communication instead of Ukrainian. The party activists in the capital city, Kiev, did not have a robust preference towards the language of the survey and

were willing to respond in either Russian or Ukrainian. Then, the acquired data were coded in Excel file, while personal identifiers were neither collected nor recorded. The coded data will be analyzed using such statistical software as “Stata.”

7. References

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