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CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION A NECESSARY CONDITION IN
RALLYING THE PUBLIC IN PAKISTAN

ПОКИСТАНДАҒЫ ХАЛЫҚТЫҚ МИТИНГТЕ ҚАЗІР ШАРТ

ГРАЖДАНСКО-ВОЕННАЯ КООРДИНАЦИЯ - НЕОБХОДИМОЕ УСЛОВИЕ
СПОСОБНОСТИ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОСТИ В ПАКИСТАНЕ

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Abstract

This thesis aims to study the condition(s) that influenced the rally around the flag effect in Pakistan's crises with the US and India between 2011 and 2019. The motivation to study these crises is threefold. First, the elected civilian government completed its term in 2013 for the first time since the independence of Pakistan in 1947 from the British empire, which could signify the shift towards the democratic institutions and crisis decision-making through these institutions as well as a reduced role of the military. Second, the decisions taken by Pakistan during these international crises with India and the US were different in each of these crises despite having similar crisis triggers. This difference in crisis responses by Pakistan provided an opportunity to study which of these responses rallied the public in support and whether there was any common condition in the behavior of Pakistan's civilian and military leadership that could have resulted in the rally effect. Third, conventional wisdom suggests that the rally effect is observed in democratic countries because the public can punish the elected leadership through institutions. On the other hand, there is growing literature that suggests that the rally effect is also observed in non-democracies. The four crises discussed in this thesis provide an opportunity to address these empirical and theoretical puzzles. In the absence of leadership public surveys in Pakistan that have been used in the literature as an indicator of the rally effect, an indirect measure, namely a change in anger, was used to collect evidence of the rally effect. The sentiment analysis of the editorials of two English daily newspapers, Dawn and The Nation, suggests that the public rallied in support of the decisions taken in Salala Attack Crisis and Indian Airstrike Crisis. The analysis of press releases issued by Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs representing the civilian government and Pakistan's Inter Services Public Relations representing the military suggests that the civilian-military coordination was present in the crises that had the rally effect.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The term “rally around the flag” was introduced by Mueller (1973) and he argued that an international crisis could result in increased support for the head of a state. Since then, this area has gained traction and several trajectories of this phenomena have been explored such as who rallies and the duration of it (Baum 2002), specificity of incidents (Mueller 1970), the reasons for different types of rallies in different crises (Oneal et al. 1996) to name a few. However, the focus of the rally research has mostly been democracies and non-democracies have not been studied as much. Whether the leadership of non-democracies can generate a rally and what factors influence it is a question that needs further exploration. The rationale behind this question stems from the argument that in democracies the heads of the states are responsible to their electorate for their foreign policy, but the reasons for the leadership of non-democracies to generate a rally might not be as obvious in democracies. Recent research has shown that the leadership of non-democracies is also able to rally their citizens (Gibler 2010; Hale 2018). Non-democratic countries have different domestic political setups and that is the reason that a different approach is needed to study the rally phenomenon in them.

Pakistan provides a good case study in this regard to find the crises in which the public rallied around the government’s decision and what influenced the rally. In the context of Pakistan’s political system, the military plays an important role in politics. Civilian governments had never been able to complete their five-year term until 2008 when the first government was elected that completed its first term in 2013. Earlier, the elected governments were dissolved or toppled by the military. The period after 2008 and the crises in that provides an opportunity to study how rally phenomenon works in an environment where institutions of decision-making and power sharing could be in the process of reshaping. Despite the transition towards decision-

making through political institutions, the military still interferes in matters that are considered in the elected government's domain in democratic countries. The influence of military in areas that are under civilian jurisdiction does not only signify the hybrid nature of Pakistan's political system but also an independent actor in the decision-making process. This also influences the crisis decision making and the rally phenomenon under study happens during an international crisis. An international crisis occurs when states cannot resolve their disputes according to international norms and there is a danger of violence (Brecher 2017, 21).

From 2011 to 2019, Pakistan went through four different crises with the US and India. The first two crises in 2011 are with the US that used to be an ally of Pakistan against the war on terror and the other two in 2016 and 2019 are with India with which Pakistan has been through recurrent crises and have border disputes since the partition in 1947. Crises between Pakistan and the US happened in the same year of 2011 with a gap of seven months. In May 2011, the US conducted an operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and killed Osama Bin Laden. This operation was carried out using helicopters which entered Pakistani airspace without the knowledge of Pakistani authorities, and it resulted in a crisis between Pakistan and the USA. The second crisis involved targeting of a Pakistan military check post on the Pak-Afghan border and it resulted in the death of twenty-four Pakistani military personnel. This crisis was severe in its intensity because of the casualties involved. Later, Pakistan took multiple steps in the wake of this incident such as suspending the NATO supply route to Afghanistan through Pakistan, US evacuation from an airbase in Baluchistan province of Pakistan, and boycott of Bonn conference on Afghanistan that was scheduled on December 5, 2011. On the other hand, the earlier crisis had not seen similar responses from the Pakistani government. On the contrary, the messages sent by the authorities were mixed. First, the civilian government issued a press release of

congratulation on the killing of Osama bin Laden in an operation conducted by the US. Later, they objected the way the operation was conducted and, in the end, passed a resolution that any future action of this kind will result in the review of relationships with the US and cutting of the NATO's logistic supply line.

Similarly, the crises with India involve different decisions of the Pakistani government. In 2016, when India claimed that they have conducted a surgical strike targeting terrorists in a hideout in Kashmir, Pakistan just denied any surgical strike conducted by India. In the other crisis with India, along with denying that India targeted a terrorist hideout in Pakistan, an airstrike to show resolve was also conducted by Pakistan. All these four crises involved similar trigger events by the external opponents of Pakistan but the responses by Pakistan were different including passing resolutions of condemnation, denial, diplomatic actions, and the use of force. On the domestic politics side, in these four crises there were three different governments in Pakistan. During the first two crises, the government was led by Pakistan Peoples Party, in the first crisis with India it was Pakistan Muslim League-N's government and in the Indian Airstrike Crisis with India the government was led by Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (Pakistan's Justice Movement). The diversity of political parties and their relationship with the military could also be a factor in the rally phenomenon since the military plays an important role during crisis decision-making. This puzzle offers an opportunity to investigate behind which of these actions Pakistan's public rallied and what was the common factor in all those instances of rallies and leads to the research question of this thesis:

What factor(s) influenced the rally phenomenon in Pakistan's crisis with the US and India in 2011, 2016, and 2019?

In this thesis I try to answer this question. Chapter 2 highlights different explanations which the latent literature offers in terms of the rally phenomenon and the signaling literature sheds light on how governments signal their resolve during an international crisis. It also talks about how the explanations offered might not be suitable in the context of Pakistan. Chapter 3 builds the theoretical framework from the latent literature that could explain the instances of international crisis in which the public rallied in support of the government and based on these foundations it presents a hypothesis. Chapter 4 discusses the research design in measuring the dependent variable, the rally phenomenon, and the independent variable. First, it starts with the dimensions of the four crises covered in this thesis and compares different aspects of the four cases with the framework of international crises and whether these cases fit the criteria of an international crises. Second, it also covers crisis start and end dates along with different phases of crisis and triggers and responses during these. Third, it contains the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables and the sources of data. This chapter also covers methodology used to analyze the data. Chapter 5 discusses results from the analysis of data and how it answers the research questions and discusses whether the hypothesis finds support from the analysis of the data. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings and provides a conclusion, the limitations of this thesis and the methods used in the study of variables. It also mentions the contribution of this thesis to the literature, and the policy implications of its findings.

Chapter 2. Literature Review: Public Support During an International Crisis: Rally Around the Flag Phenomenon

This chapter draws on the latent literature to find the factors that influence a rally around the flag phenomenon to see whether any of those explanations can provide answers for the factors that can influence the rally phenomenon in the context of Pakistan.

What is a Rally?

Mueller coined the term rally around the flag when he stated that there are certain events that boost a president's popularity rating by shaping the public opinion (Mueller 1970, 21). He called this phenomenon the rally around the flag. He also presented the criteria for such events which consists of three features; 1) an international event, 2) it involves the president and the USA directly, and 3) it is "specific, dramatic, and sharp" (Mueller 1970, 21-25). Afterwards, scholars found out that the rally effect is a complex phenomenon, and it is not as linear as Mueller argued. Further research related to the rally effect after Mueller can be categorized into institutional, individual and context environment-based subcategories.

Rally characterizes the support of public for the leadership of a country, and it is expressed through public polls, and surveys. The indicator used for the rally is relative increase in support of the leadership during or right after the crisis as compared to before the crisis. However, not all countries in the world have regular surveys or opinion polls, and it poses a challenge in measuring the rally effect. The instances of unavailability of the direct measure of rally require indirect approaches to measure the rally effect. The same is true for Pakistan that it does not have regular survey data for leadership popularity and this study relies on an indirect approach, detailed in the operationalization of the dependent variable, to measure the rally effect in the four crises of this thesis.

Institutional Approach

According to the institutional approach, the effect of rally and its use depend on the type of institutions where this phenomenon occurs. The difference in accountability of public office holders results in different foreign policy outcomes during international crises and the interaction of accountability institutions and crisis decisions shape the rally phenomenon. For instance, public rallies because in their opinion they support the chief of the state in a threatening situation because he or she will protect them from the harm posed by the threat of violence by another state (Hetherington and Nelson 2003, 37-42). Based on this notion of trust, in democracies the public delegates the foreign policy decisions to the leaders and the public have the means of analyzing those policies post hoc (Colaresi 2007, 101). According to this approach, rallies in democracies will be easier to generate because of the institutions that give the public an opportunity to assess crisis decisions. That is why Colaresi (2007) argues that when the public can verify the details of an event after the crisis is over, the rally in that event is bigger.

Similarly, in the historical study conducted by Sobek (2007, 43), oligarchies in Italy were more prone to initiating a war based on the rally effect generated. The leaders of those regimes used these wars to hold on to power (Sobek 2007, 31). The findings of Sobek's study are counter to the institutional accountability hypothesis and highlight the need of looking beyond the opportunity of accountability to the public as a necessary condition for the rally phenomenon. On the other hand, the effect of the rally is different even in different types of democracies and the type of "institutions, policy networks, and societal structures resulted in different policy outcomes (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Resultantly, similar international crises in different democratic states sometimes resulted in the rally effect and sometimes not. Furthermore, the reliance on either elites (top-down) or masses (bottom-up) approach in foreign policy is not sufficient to

address the rally phenomenon and the type of institutions explains it better (Risse-Kappen 1991, 481).

The institutional approach highlights two opposite aspects of the rally phenomenon, first, the accountability of elected government heads in democratic systems is the driving force behind the rally. Public rallies behind a leader in good faith because they have the means, elections, to punish a leader who does not represent them in a crisis how they want to be represented. On the other hand, Sobek (2007) argues that Italian oligarchies, not an accountable system of governance, used the rally phenomenon to stay in power by waging wars. This approach does not provide an answer to the rally phenomenon happening in political systems that do not have instruments of accountability available to the public.

Public Opinion Approach

This approach highlights the interaction of available information or the lack of it during a potential rally opportunity. Sometimes the lack of information contributes to the rally phenomenon in an international crisis because, initially, they lack the information related to a crisis and president's actions taken in it (Lee 1977, 253). He argues that the president becomes the focus of attention and this increased popularity based on previous held beliefs results in public rallying behind the president (Lee 1977, 253). The lack of information as an independent variable for the rally phenomenon ignores certain structural conditions. For instance, public in any country does not behave as a single entity and the previously held beliefs also differ across subsections of the society. Baum studied these differences in public and he argues that the rally phenomenon depends on the economic condition and the information level of a country (Baum 2002, 265). In addition, the diversity of the public such as race and gender results in different types of rallies because different communities have different levels of trust in the government

based on socio-political and economic conditions (Perrin & Smolek, 2009). In the cross-societal study Perrin & Smolek (2009) argue that in the USA race plays an important part and white population is more likely to rally in pro-war foreign policy situations than the African- American population. This literature argues that the public should not be seen as a unitary actor and the rally phenomenon is influenced by factors such as the awareness levels of the public, economic conditions to gender and race.

Rally is not a homogenous phenomenon and even those communities that are more prone to rally in an international, those individuals are more prone to rally who support a president, but their support is indifferent (Edwards and Swenson 1997, 208). Due to their indifference, these are the people who are the least critical of the president (Edwards & Swenson, 1997). According to this argument, that segment of the society rallies behind a leader that does not actively support or criticize political initiatives but becomes charged when there is an international crisis and a threatening situation. Another aspect of public beliefs contributing to the rally stems from the type of actions a president takes, and the sentiments involved during an international crisis. Oneal et al. (1996) argue that public rallies if the presidents are involved in a crisis in which they are taking actions against an aggressor. Public's belief of rallying behind the just cause drives the rally in this situation based on the sentiments involved. Similarly, Lambert et al. (2011) argue that the rally is based on the anger of the individual, and when public want to punish, they support the crisis decisions of the leadership. However, anger is not the only emotion which arises during a threatening situation and Lambert et al. argue that anxiety also plays a part in the rally phenomenon. In threatening situations when there is a risk of strong retaliation by a crisis opponent, anxiety is invoked instead of anger. The situation of anxiety is detrimental to offensive

foreign policy action and cancels the effects of anger if the crises in which anger was invoked and the crises in which anxiety was invoked are studied together (Lambert et al. 2011).

Another aspect of the public opinion approach relates to the in-group and out-group mechanisms. In some crises, the sub-national divisions such as regional sentiments, partisanship, and socio-economic conditions play an important role in addition to the external threat. For example, the supporters ignored the corruption charges leveled against the South Korean president in because they believed that it was a conspiracy by external rivals to remove a savior who would protect them from an external threat (Chang and Park 2020). In this instance, the sentiment of the supporters developed from the past experiences and the presence of a rival neighbor. Furthermore, in-group and out-group dynamics are also seen when liberals transition towards conservative foreign policy options and bridge the gap they have with conservatives because of their liberal ideology (Porat et al., 2019). They argue that when a group faces an existential threat, the liberals also transition to pro-war foreign policy and rally behind the leadership.

The public opinion approach focuses on the complexities of a society in which the crisis happens. This approach provides different explanatory variables related to the rally phenomenon such as the interaction of available information and prior beliefs, public not behaving as a unitary actor, the opposite role of anger and anxiety, and in-group and out-group factors.

Communication Oriented Approach

Research has shown that the context in which an international crisis occurs affects the size of the rally because in some international crises the size of the rally remains small while in the others it results in a bigger rally. Oneal et al (1996) found different variables that affect the size of a rally and include, whether the involvement is in an ongoing war, media coverage,

efforts of the administration, Soviet involvement etc. (Oneal et al., 1996). Similarly, the handling of the crisis and efforts to harbor support from the opposition also matters. This is because a president wields more power and access to information than any other politician and the people with limited information can only offer guarded criticism or support (Baker and Oneal 2001). Therefore, the handling of a crisis is significant in generating the rally effect. However, the handling of a crisis is not limited to band wagoning opposition into support, but it also includes the quality of statements issued by the president. The context management also highlights that the patriotism explanation in which the citizens rally in an international crisis does not hold ground, otherwise, there would have been similar effects in each international crisis irrespective of the administration and the president. Another research conducted by Chatagnier (2012) leads to the same conclusion by presenting that the rally effect was also dependent on the level of trust in the government.

Media coverage is central to the rally effect and almost every analyzed study highlighted this notion. It is understandable that to achieve the rally effect, public needs to be informed through media. However, this importance on media can take away the attention from the leadership of a country and the public to another actor, media, as an explanatory variable. Different studies have shown how elites use media to influence public opinion, but Groeling and Baum (2008) argue that media also acts strategically, and the media coverage of an international crisis does not only depend on the political elites' directives. They argue that the coverage depends on the incentives, journalistic traditions, and the preference of the journalists (Groeling and Baum 2008). Similarly, in the later research Potter and Baum (2010) showed that the media is a strategic actor, and it affects public opinion and the foreign policy. Media should be seen as a different variable than being the mouthpiece of the political elite. Apart from this, the media

coverage of soft international threats has also resulted in rallies which further highlights the extent of media's influence on the rally effect (Hatuel-Radoshitzky and Yarchi 2020).

There is a consensus that it is an ephemeral phenomenon and the popularity ratings of the president change once the international crisis episode is over. Similarly, there is also a consensus about the importance of media in the rally effect phenomenon and it has different dimensions that include top-down model, bottom-up model and the media as a strategic independent variable affecting the rally effect. Apart from this, the research also brings to light the individuals involved such as the public and the president and the changes on the rally effect by nuances in the character of these individuals. Similarly, context-based approach focuses on the environment in which the rally effect occurs and variables like patriotism, the type of opponent in the international crisis, and media come into play in explaining this effect. On the other hand, the institutional approach focuses on different trajectories which a rally phenomenon takes based on the regimes and institutions of the place where it is initiated.

Rally Phenomenon in Non-Democracies

The contingent dynamics of events in non-democracies make it harder for the rally to be studied systematically (Hale, 2018). For instance, territorial disputes have been found to provoke a rally effect in authoritarian states (Gibler 2010; Hale 2018). Gibler (2010) argues that such territorial disputes are twofold; they not only cause a rally, but also more centralization of power because the opposition supports the leaders in these salient disputes and the leaders consolidate their power by removing institutional hurdles. Similarly, Hale (2018) argues that territorial disputes such as annexation of Crimea resulted in a rally in which that portion of population rallied which does not consume state affiliated media because of the patriotic sentiment. The existing research provides a foundation for the research of the rally effect phenomenon

happening in the hybrid regimes. However, it requires further steps such as conceptualization and operationalization of important variables according to the regime type. For example, if in a hybrid regime the foreign policy is completely in control of the military then whether the prime minister of Pakistan initiates the rally, or it comes from the military institute and if a president rallies the public for his or her popularity why do hybrid regimes do this. In addition, other variables such as trust in government also affected the rally, who needs to be trusted in a hybrid regime to rally around a flag or is it just a matter of replacing the president with the chief of army staff and instead of trust in the government it needs to be the trust in the military in a security state. On the other hand, the media in a hybrid regime enjoys partial freedom. There are no-go areas created by the security apparatus of the country and venturing into those areas can lead the media into trouble. The military-media scandals of the past show that the media cannot say whatever it wishes and there are ramifications if it does so. In these conditions how is the central role of the media in the rally effect changes? These are the questions that can be addressed by future research.

The literature on the rally around the flag effect leads to certain puzzles. First, according to the institutional approach, the rally phenomenon happens due to public's ability to punish the leader in democracies if they fail to devise such policies during an international crisis that are according to the wishes of their public (Hetherington and Nelson 2003; Colaresi 2011). On the other hand, there is also evidence that non-democratic regimes also rally their public during international crises (Sobek 2007, Gibler 2010; Hale 2018). What factors, then, contribute to the rally phenomenon in political systems where the instruments of accountability are not available? Second, the literature on the rally effect also highlights that the public does not behave as a unitary actor during an international crisis. This requires the need to look for the salient factors

based on the context in which the rally phenomenon is studied. Third, the literature suggests the role of media as an independent actor, but it can also vary across political systems. The independence of media as an actor is dependent on the freedom it enjoys in a political context, and the type of audience. In democracies, media plays more important role as an independent actor as compared to non-democracies due to the freedom of expression that helps frame an issue according to its own deliberation. In non-democracies, media is more prone to censorship by the government and itself that curtail its independence. The independence of media is strengthened by the diversity of its audience even in non-democracies, the presence of a vibrant civil-society, presence of diaspora that send remittances, or an educated class, affect the independence of media positively even in non-democracies. This independence gives media the opportunity to criticize or frame an issue differently than the official narrative in its coverage.

The lack of explanatory variables related to hybrid regimes and the unavailability of reliable data require the use of tailored approaches to study rally phenomenon in such regimes. The aim of this thesis is to study the rally phenomenon in a hybrid regime and the literature review provides the foundation about the role of institutions in rallying the public. However, the lack of accountability requires a different approach to explaining the factors that can influence the rally phenomenon. For this purpose, this thesis builds on the bureaucratic politics model and elite polarization and public opinion to conceptualize the independent variable. For the dependent variable, the sentiment framework is used to measure the rally around the flag phenomenon. The relationship of these two variables is discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3. Theory and Hypothesis

A rally phenomenon happens both in democracies and non-democracies (Gibler 2010; Hale, 2018). However, the literature on the rally around the flag during an international crisis is mostly skewed towards political systems which have institutions for accountability. The factors influencing rally in a non-democracy can be different than democracies such as centralization of power due to lack of opposition criticism (Gibler, 2010) and support from those segments of society who are not normally the consumers of state media news (Hale 2018). In hybrid regimes, power could also be distributed among different types of elites such as oligarchs, military, or religious heads apart from the elected leaders. Non-elected elites also wield power from the public and their support during an international crisis can affect the rally. These distinctions highlight that in non-democracies different variables might affect a rally during an international crisis than the factors that influence the rally phenomenon in democracies. This chapter leads towards the factors that affect a rally in a hybrid regime and formulates the relationship between them in Pakistan's international crisis with the US and India. First, this chapter delves into those dimensions of hybrid regimes that are relevant to Pakistan and how Pakistan's political setup can be viewed according to those dimensions. Second, this chapter draws on bureaucratic political model of decision making and elite polarization on public opinion literature to argue how these two can be applicable in the context of Pakistan in explaining the rally phenomenon during an international crisis.

Conceptualization of a Hybrid Regime

Two popular approaches in the conceptualization of hybrid regimes focus on using the democratic or authoritarian lens to juxtapose hybrid regimes on the spectrum of political systems (Levitsky and Way 2002; Collier and Levitsky 1997). Due to the volatile nature of political systems in hybrid regimes, they were also considered a transitional phase towards

democratization. History has taught that this might not be the case and these regimes have their own existence that require a multi-dimensional approach towards their conceptualization and acceptance as political systems (Cassani 2014, 543; Mufti 2018, 112). Morlino (2009, 281) argues that one common aspect of the hybrid regimes could be traced to the past authoritarian experiences of these regimes and their gradual transition towards becoming more open in accepting democratic norms. Despite accommodating democratic practices, the essence of hybrid regimes lies in the influence of non-democratic actors, such as religious leaders, military, and oligarchies, in certain policy making domains (Morlino 2009, 277-278). Gilbert and Mohseni (2011, 272) call it “tutelary interference” and they use competitiveness and civil liberties along with it to define hybrid regimes. The aspect of hybrid regimes crucial for this thesis is the influence of military in the crisis decision making and how this can affect the rally around the flag phenomenon. To understand the role of the military in political and social fabric of Pakistan’s society is important to understand how the rally phenomenon is affected.

Pakistan as a Hybrid Regime

Pakistan has not been able to consolidate democracy since its creation in 1947 from the British Empire (Staniland 2008, 323). The current state of Pakistan’s political culture is highlighted by civilian struggle for supremacy in government vis-a-vis the army can be traced back to its independence. First, some leaders of Pakistan movement that contributed to the formation of Pakistan after Britain left were not fond of democracy because Indian Muslims were a minority as compared to Hindus and they had the realization that based on numeric value they will not be represented in politics (Barany et al. 2012, 250). Furthermore, Pakistan faced the security syndrome from the beginning when after a year of its creation it had a war with India, India refusing to pay and distribute the resources according to the settlement of partition

(Staniland 2008, 347). Also, the geographical distance between East (Bangladesh) and West Pakistan created a sense of insecurity among the ruling elites of the newly created state (Barany et al. 2012, 255). The lack of belief in democracy and the sense of insecurity can explain why the political elites of Pakistan leaned towards undemocratic means of gaining political power since its inception. Gibler (2007, 514) argues that states with border disputes build strong militaries to protect what they have and in doing so tunnel the resources from building the economy, institutions, thus, democracy. The strong militaries and the sense of insecurity makes the security apparatus deluded in considering strong institutions or strengthening of democracy as a threat to their power because they face the risk of losing the decision-making to civilian government whom they do not trust. Moreover, Pakistan inherited its army from the British Indian Army and as compared to their civilian counterparts, the military was better educated and trained in organizing and management of different state functions (Barany et al. 2012, 255). Military's help was sought in different matters by politicians and this slowly led to their role of being a stakeholder in Pakistani politics.

The lack of democratic institutions for conflict resolution among political elites and military's notion of regarding themselves as the custodians of Pakistani state resulted in the first military takeover in 1958 and since then there has been a struggle by civilians to govern Pakistan without military establishment's influence. Whenever this tug-of-war shifted the balance to the civilian's side or whenever they transgressed from their mandate, there have been periods of direct military rule, and, during other periods, civilian governments were ousted before the completion of their term.

It was only in 2013 that the first civilian government completed its five-year term for the first time. Despite the completion of term by the elected governments in 2008 onwards, Pakistan

is far from becoming a consolidated democracy. Adeney (2017) classified Pakistan as a hybrid regime based on “competitiveness, “civil liberties”, and “reserved domains” dimensions and Pakistan’s military plays a significant role in the politics and its personnel head different non-military organizations of influence.

In terms of non-military influence, Pakistan’s military maintains its presence through the appointment of serving and retired military officials in different organizations from appointment as governors of provinces to companies and corporations such as construction and housing, banks, food, petrol stations, education, and media etc. Staniland et al. (2020) found that more than 60% of retired corps commanders work for the government or head different military corporations. However, none of the corps commander under the said study joined electoral politics. On the other hand, Pakistan’s military maintains a rapport for quality due to its professionalism, but at the same time being politicized (Staniland et al. 2020). Similarly, most of the defense analysts and think tanks consist of retired military personnel and they appear on prime television channels to analyze crises. Pakistan military’s ability to manage personnel during service and after retirement is central to its power (Staniland et al. 2020).

The formal and informal influence that Pakistan’s military exercises, the direct rule of the military spanned over decades after the creation of Pakistan, and the public relations and rapport it maintains through official channels and through its retired and serving personnel and their families are some of the factors that contribute to the public support the military receives. All of this makes the military of Pakistan a strong contender influencing the international crisis decision-making and the rally phenomenon due to the public support it receives from some segments of the society. But it is not the only actor, albeit the most influential in foreign policy and national security, that matters because since 2008 the political parties have also successfully

completed their tenured terms and they also receive support from the Pakistan's public. To understand the relationship of two actors in foreign policy decision-making, the theoretical foundation comes from the bureaucratic politics model and elite polarization on public opinion.

Influence of Bureaucratic Politics on Foreign Policy

According to the bureaucratic politics model, foreign policy is not the result of elected leadership of the country only. This model does not consider states a unitary actor and distinguishes between the legislative and executive branch and proposes that the policy is the outcome of the deliberation and compromise of these actors because not all actors have the same policy preferences (Rosati 1981, 236-238). Allison and Halperin (1972, 43) argues that different players who participate in foreign policy decision-making have different interests based on their organizational affiliations and the ideas about national security. Also, the players, based on their position, have different level playing fields and in the case of the US, it is the president who has the shares the disproportionate power (Allison and Halperin 1972, 47). In a hybrid regime, the military is a strong candidate in exercising the disproportionate power due to the reserved nature of international crisis in the security domain.

In tracing the source of the decision behind Obama's troops surge in Afghanistan, Marsh (2014, 285) argues that the Congress was divided about this issue and the ultimate decision to send more troops was made due to the pressure of the "military and other pro-surge advocates had pressured him to do". Allison (1969, 691) argues that the foreign policy might appear to be devised by the elected governments, but this view can impede the role of "semi-independent organizations". In the case of China where the Chinese Communist Party has the most influence, Qingmin (2016, 22) argues that a modified version of bureaucratic politics is required because the politics does not happen within the government and bureaucracy, but it happens within the

party between different interest groups. This attention to the modification of bureaucratic politics in different political systems is also salient in the context of Pakistan because in contrast with democracy where civilians have the upper hand in foreign policy decision-making, at least in theory, in Pakistan's foreign policy military plays a crucial role.

Influence of Elite Polarization on Public Opinion

Those situations require further attention when civilian and military leadership in Pakistan have different interests and how this conflict could affect public opinion and support for foreign policy decisions. The literature related to the effects of elite polarization on public opinion also helps in this regard, although it is mostly based on American politics it is also applicable to the hybrid regime of Pakistan. Mullinix (2016) argues that party position taking becomes salient when there is partisan polarization, and the citizens support a policy that comes from their own party. Public's tendency to support their own party after receiving polarizing cues based on partisanship has been tested by multiple empirical and experimental studies and it was found that elite partisan polarization accentuates the partisanship (Slothuus and de Vreese 2010; Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). The effect of elite polarization on public support is not limited to domestic politics, and it also affects foreign policy. Cavari (2013, 17-18) argues that the support for Israel among the American public used to be beyond partisanship, but with increased polarization this support is based on the party cues.

The hybrid regimes literature, background of Pakistani politics, bureaucratic politics model, and effect of elite polarization on public opinion highlights three aspects for the rally around the flag phenomenon in an international crisis. First, Pakistan's military is a strong contender in the national security and foreign policy matters and civilian governments alone cannot decide on these issues. Second, if bureaucracies can influence foreign policy decisions in

democracies, it is highly likely that they can do the same in hybrid regimes and this notion strengthens the first point about Pakistan's military exercising influence in foreign policy matters. Third, elites having different stances motivates the public to pick those sides with which they align themselves. This means that civilian governments have an added disadvantage during an international crisis because if they take a position contrary to Pakistan's military, they not only lose the support of that segment of the society that supports the military, but it also loses the support from the civilian opposition because it gives the opposition an opportunity to settle scores with the ruling party. On the other hand, the opposition will not want to be the only one opposing a decision that resulted from the coordination of civilian government and the military. That is why it is imperative for the civilian government to coordinate with the military and take a decision according to the aspirations of military. This premise leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: The coordination between the civilian government and military of Pakistan is a necessary condition for the rally around the flag phenomenon in a crisis with India and the USA.

Chapter 4. Research Design

Crisis Dimensions of Cases

Four cases of international crisis involving Pakistan are selected for this thesis, and in the first two the contesting party with Pakistan is the USA in 2011 and the other two are related to India in 2016 and 2019. International crisis results from the disruptions in the international system which serves as a structure for power and governs different processes between states through norms (Brecher 2017, 19). An international crisis ensues when states resort to means which are contrary to the norms of international system such as use of violence, issuing of threats, environmental changes etc. (Brecher 2017, 21). Furthermore, Brecher argues that most of the times an international crisis is initiated with a foreign policy crisis when a state faces a threat to basic values, has limited time to react, and there is an increased chance of hostilities between states (2017, 21). Also, due to the different threat perception and the position in international system sometimes only one state is involved in the foreign policy crisis even though the trigger comes from another state. Hewitt and Wilkenfeld (1999) identified 109 such crises in which one state faced the crisis out of 325 crises in the ICB dataset. These indications from the existing studies suggest that even though the USA has a powerful position in the international system, another state such as Pakistan which does not have the equal power status as the USA can go into a crisis with it. The dynamics of such crises involving one state being in crisis or power discrepancy can be different than other crises in which there are more actors to the crisis, or the contesting parties have equal power status (Wilkenfeld 1991). These existing studies of international crisis by Brecher and Wilkenfeld are the guiding principles of the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset and the first place to look for in terms of determining the crisis details regarding start and end dates as well as triggers and responses by the contesting states.

International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset is updated until 2016, but it does not contain the crises between Pakistan and the USA. On the other hand, it contains three more cases with Iran, India, and Afghanistan, the first two happened in 2014 and the third in 2016, respectively. Similarly, the crisis summary of Surgical Strike Crisis with India does not contain any reference to the claim of surgical strike made by the Indian government. These anomalies between the ICB dataset require further explanation for the rationale of selecting four cases for this thesis. First, if the same criteria used by ICB dataset for the crisis with Afghanistan and Iran is applied to the crisis between Pakistan and the USA, it applies to Pakistani crises with the USA. For example, the ICB crisis with Iran and Afghanistan involved border skirmishes and less stress on Pakistani decision makers than the crises with the USA because they did not issue any threats to either Iran or Afghanistan. These three crises of border skirmishes are not included in this thesis because they lack salience in terms of public interest in them. For example, the query search on google trends does not bring any results due to insufficient data for these crises as compared to the cases of this thesis in which the decision makers of contesting states had several threatening exchanges during the crisis and the public searched the details of those crises due to their salience. That is why the three excluded cases with India, Iran, and Afghanistan might not influence the change in public opinion in measuring the rally around the flag effect. The details of each Pakistani crisis with the USA and India are discussed in the following paragraphs and different dimensions such as the phases of crisis, end and start dates, and triggers and responses are highlighted.

The phases of an international crisis can be categorized into four different phases: Onset, escalation, de-escalation, and impact (Brecher 2017). A crisis is set into onset phase when one state triggers another state through a “hostile act, disruptive event, or an environmental change” (Brecher 2017, 55). The onset phase is also categorized by the stress on the decision makers of a

state that receives the trigger and this stress stems from the threat to basic values perceived by the decision makers. The second phase of an international crisis is escalation that happens when the more acute threat to basic values is perceived by decision makers than during the onset phase such as increased hostilities, movement of troops etc. (Brecher 2017, 62). Third phase of an international crisis: de-escalation is marked by the easing of tensions and the process of accommodation between contesting states. The easing of stress happens through decrease in the value threats and the contesting states adoption of non-crisis norms as a behavior choice during the crisis (Brecher 2017, 67). Brecher argues that the de-escalation and the termination of an international crisis does not mark the end of it, but it has impact on the world politics and the international system Brecher 2017, 71). However, the impact phase is not as visible as the other three phases in terms of quick changes in the international system and sometimes the timeframe to observe these impacts can be in years (Brecher 2017, 72). Brecher's criteria of crisis' phases is used in the cases of Pakistani cases to operationalize crises start and end dates. Lastly, for the outcome of the crises the criteria used in ICB dataset version 13 is used here which codes the outcome in five different types: Victory (basic goal achievement), compromise (partial achievement of basic goal), stalemate (no change in the basic goal), defeat (non-achievement of basic goal), and other.

OBL Crisis, May 2011

In 2011, the onset of the crisis between Pakistan and the USA was triggered with the killing of Osama Bin Laden in a raid by US forces inside Pakistan on May 2. This raid was contrary to the "red lines" conveyed by Pakistani government to the USA in terms of not allowing foreign troops to conduct operations in Pakistan and resulted in a crisis (Unauthorised raid must not serve as precedent, US told 2011). It is important to understand the nature of

interactions between Pakistan and the USA in the context of red lines conveyed by Pakistan to the USA. Since 2004, the USA had been conducting drone strikes inside Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) to target leaders of terrorist organizations and Pakistan had given its airbase to conduct such drone strikes.¹ In terms of basic values, the Pakistani decision makers did not consider the use of drone strikes in FATA as a threat to basic values such as territorial integrity, however, these targeted killing of wanted terrorists were only related to unmanned aerial vehicles. The freedom to operate and target terrorists in FATA could have created this norm perception among the US decision makers that they can operate in Pakistan in pursuit of terrorists. However, the killing of Osama outside FATA by Navy Seals was considered a threat to basic values considered by the decision makers of Pakistan because it was conducted outside FATA and it resulted in the onset of crisis between Pakistan and the USA. As a result of this, on May 13 after the adoption of a unanimous resolution by the parliament that demanded the review of security and foreign policies, condemned the raid conducted by the US forces, and with the threat that the NATO supply would be cut off if a similar event is triggered again by the USA (Unanimous resolution 2011). This verbal threat marks the escalation phase of this crisis, however, the USA responded by coping and the crisis was aborted by the coping mechanism of stress alleviation during the escalation phase. According to these trigger response transitions, the first crisis of 2011 lasted from May 2 to May 13 of 2011 since no further trigger and response transitions happened after this date. The outcome of the crisis is a stalemate because there was no

¹ FATA was a semi-autonomous region under the administration of Pakistan with until 2018 when it was merged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan and, until then, they had a parallel system of governance through jirgas and Pakistan appointed political agents to liaise between the government of Pakistan and local tribal leaders. The status of FATA as a self-governing region had been in existence since the British times.

clear indication of a norm change in terms of US operating in Pakistan in pursuit of terrorists (FATA only according to Pakistan and anywhere according to the USA).

Salala Attack Crisis, November 2011

The pre-crisis to the second crisis in 2011 with the USA involves Memogate scandal in which the ambassador of Pakistan to the USA sought help from Admiral Mike Mullen in tightening the noose on the Pakistan army to ensure civilian supremacy in Pakistan (A sceptic's guide to memogate 2011). This resulted in a rift between the civilian and military establishment in Pakistan and days later the ambassador to the USA who allegedly sent the memo was sacked from his post. Due to this reason the start date of the 2011 crisis is proposed to be November 17, 2011, the date on which the scandal went public, because if this period is included in measuring the public opinion before the onset of crisis, it might not show the right picture of public opinion in Pakistan. On November 26, 2011 the US forces conducted an attack on two Pakistani positions near the Afghan border in which 25 soldiers were killed that triggered the crisis to the escalation phase (Mohmand 2011). Within hours, Pakistan responded with cutting off the NATO supply and gave fifteen days to the USA to vacate Shamsi airbase in Pakistan which was in use by the C.I.A for drone operations (Khan 2011). The USA responded by vacating the airbase and it was vacated on the due date (Khan 2011). Before the airbase vacation on December 11, 2011, diplomatic disruptions such as the boycott of Bonn conference for Afghanistan's future by the government of Pakistan, troops at the border were given permission to hit back the NATO/US forces in case of any future skirmishes, and air defense weapons were deployed at the Afghan border to tackle any air intrusion to the Pakistani territory (Cabinet endorses DCC decisions on Shamsi base, Nato supplies: Pakistan to boycott Bonn conference 2011; Troops free to hit back in future: Kayani 2011; Khan 2011). The period until the de-escalation on December 11

involves diplomatic disruptions, deployment of troops, and threats to violence as proposed by Brecher in the model of crisis escalation. The crisis lasted from November 17 to December 11 of 2011. The crisis ended with a stalemate because despite vacating the airbase, USA did not forego its position on the attacks that it was by mistake and Pakistan also held its stance that the attack was pre-planned and deliberate, and the NATO supply will not be resumed until the new terms of engagement with the USA are agreed (Nato stoppage may last several weeks: Gilani 2011). The impact of this crisis can also be seen through the merger of FATA in Pakistan and making it a part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in 2018 and fencing the border with Afghanistan to demarcate the Durand line (the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan).

Surgical Strike Crisis, September 2016

The Surgical Strike Crisis between Pakistan and India entered the pre-crisis phase with the attack on Indian forces in the Indian held Kashmir in which Indian soldiers were killed on September 18, 2016. Right after the attack India blamed Pakistan which resulted in high level meetings of national security apparatus in Pakistan and border skirmishes around the Line of Control between Indian and Pakistani held Kashmir (Syed 2016). This crisis reached the escalation phase on September 29, 2016 when India claimed that they conducted a surgical operation inside Pakistan held Kashmir and targeted the terrorists' hideouts by sending special forces in a cross-border operation. Pakistani military rejected any extraordinary activity around the line of control and the cabinet of Pakistan rejected India's claims of such surgical strike on October 1, 2016 (Ghumman 2016). This denial by the Pakistani government highlights that they did not consider the Indian claim of the surgical strike as detrimental to the basic values. This shows that the surgical strike did not cross the threshold of a threat to basic values and the inability to independently verify the magnitude of this surgical strike makes it difficult to assess

whether it could be termed as a surgical strike and not a border skirmish. Due to this reason, the crisis did not escalate further. Since the focus of this thesis is rally around the flag phenomenon and not the crisis behavior, the reasons of Pakistan coping with Indian claim of surgical strike are beyond its scope. On the other hand, the salience of this crisis makes it a suitable case for studying the rally phenomenon when a state backs down during the escalation phase. The outcome of this crisis is coded as a stalemate because none of the contesting sides achieved any change in basic values or new norms in their interactions. This will make the Surgical Strike Crisis duration from September 18 to October 1 of 2016. However, the impact of this crisis can be depicted through the 2019 Pakistan and India crisis when India tried to change the norm as a consequence of a terrorist attack in Kashmir by targeting inside Pakistan.

Indian Airstrike Crisis, February 2019

The pre-crisis period of Indian Airstrike Crisis between Pakistan and India started on February 14, 2019 when a convoy of Indian soldiers was attacked by a suicide bomber. The threats of punishment to Pakistan were issued based on the allegation of involvement in the attack in Kashmir and Pakistan demanded evidence for such involvement. The crisis entered the escalation phase on February 26 when Indian fighter planes entered Pakistan and India claimed to have targeted a terrorist hideout. This event on February 26 signifies the escalation of the crisis and a trigger to Pakistan to which Pakistan threatened reciprocal behavior. On February 27, Pakistani fighter planes entered India and after the face off with the Indian fighter planes, Pakistan claimed the downing of two Indian fighter planes and capturing one Indian pilot (Two Indian fighter jets downed, pilot captured 2019). These trigger and response conclude the escalation phase of this crisis because right after the Pakistani response, the Prime Minister of Pakistan appealed to India to resume the negotiations while addressing the Pakistani nation in a

live broadcast (Raza 2019). This could be considered the first step towards de-escalation and the calls of restraint from the USA, Russia, UAE, and Saudi and the second step was freeing the captured Indian pilot on March 1, 2019 after one day of captivity (Raza 2019). Until March 3, the skirmishes along the line of control between Pakistan and India continued and the calls for the involvement of the international community by Pakistani foreign minister to ensure peace. By March 4, the closed airports started opening in Pakistan and Indian PM also criticized the opposition for not buying Rafale fighter planes earlier which could have prevented the capture of Indian pilot as compared to the MiG 21 fighter plane. The easing of security risk related tensions in Pakistan by opening of the airports for normal flights and the shifting focus of the Indian PM from Pakistan to the opposition could be construed as the de-escalation phase of the Indian Airstrike Crisis. This crisis lasted from February 14 to March 3 of 2019. The crisis resulted in a stalemate because both parties did not achieve their goals. India could not create a new norm of targeting inside Pakistan and Pakistan did not conduct any airstrike in India as a reciprocal response to India.

Table 1 Crisis Dimensions Across Four Cases

| Crisis | Opponent | Trigger | Response | Outcome | Duration (Days) |
|--|-----------------|---|--|----------------|----------------------------|
| OBL Crisis | US | Raid in Pakistan | Verbal Threat | Stalemate | 12 |
| Salala Attack Crisis | US | Attack on Pakistani border posts | Diplomatic boycott and cutting off NATO supply | Stalemate | 25 |
| Surgical Strike Crisis | India | Surgical Strike | Rejection of Surgical Strike | Stalemate | 14 |
| Indian Airstrike Crisis | India | Airspace intrusion with Fighter Jets | Airspace intrusion with Fighter Jets | Stalemate | 19 |

Operationalization of The Dependent Variable

Change in anger directed at either the crisis opponent or Pakistani leadership is used as a measure in this thesis to measure the rally phenomenon. Latent studies highlight the role of anger in the rally around the flag phenomenon both in experimental settings and through observational studies. Porat et al. (2019, 488) conducted an experiment on the effect of anger when there is an existential threat and they found evidence that even liberal feel the “collective angst” and rally behind the leadership. Similarly, another experiment focused on the effects of anger and anxiety by showing footage of planes hitting the towers and they also found that the participants’ attitude

to rally was driven by anger as opposed to anxiety (Lambert et al. 2010, 889). Anger emergence is also attributed to emotion towards outgroup. Sociological theories suggest that emotion as a nation towards the other plays the defining role in generating a rally (Feinstein 2020) and anger not only affects the attitudes during an international crisis but also drives populist attitudes during domestic crises like economic crisis (Rico, Guinjoan, and Anduiza 2017). The reliance on anger, measuring during and before the crisis change in anger from newspaper editorials, and its direction results from the lack of survey data that could depict the support for Pakistani leadership before and during the crisis. The literature mostly highlights the role of anger in generating a rally in those crises in which a rally was generated, but in this thesis, it is used to see whether there was a rally or not. That is why this thesis looks at anger direction: the target of anger to see the rally around the flag phenomenon.

Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) is used in this thesis to measure anger because it gives numeric values which are used to compare anger values for two periods: before and during the crisis. Existing literature has extensively used LIWC for measuring emotions from texts that range from political debates, social media, political communication in videos, and discourses of protestors (Rheault et al. 2016; Matsumoto, Hwang, and Frank 2014; Tay 2021). More importantly, LIWC has been used to measure anger from pager texts sent after the 9/11 attacks which is a crisis that involves a high rally generation for the US president (Back et al. 2010, 2011). The use of LIWC in measuring emotions specially anger from texts and the task of this thesis to analyze 1969 editorials of two English language daily newspapers: Dawn and The Nation make it a suitable tool for measuring the dependent variable: rally around the flag.

LIWC uses dictionaries to measure the sentiment in a given text by using the percentage of different emotion words related to a category in the text and comparing it with the dictionary

in the LIWC software and then it returns a rate for different categories (Pennebaker et al. 2015). In the construction and testing of this software the scholars used LIWC to analyze different genres of writing ranging from blog posts to NY Times. The analysis of NY Times is used in this thesis to compare anger in Pakistani editorials during and before the crisis. For example, the analysis of over 26 million words from NY Times shows that the anger rate was 0.47 (Pennebaker et al. 2015, 9). In this thesis this will be the first criteria to see whether anger during the crisis crosses this threshold or not. The second criteria to see whether there was a rally during the crises or not is to see the direction of changes in the percentage for the anger category, so if anger increased for both Pakistani leadership and the crisis opponent which of these two has a bigger rate of anger.

For the first criteria in measuring the level of anger before and during the crisis, the editorials related to each crisis are run through LIWC in two ways; analysis of editorials of both newspapers before and after and analysis of editorials of Dawn and The Nation separately to see the level of anger and change, if any. The second criteria are to see the direction of anger in the crises if there is a change in anger. To do this, the software: Contextualizer developed by one of the co-developers of LIWC is used in this to parse out those segments of the editorials in which Pakistani leadership and the crisis opponents are mentioned. The first step in the realization of this task was to create batteries for Pakistani leadership and the crisis opponents. Since Pakistani leadership was the same for both crises of 2011, one Pakistani battery was used for obtaining the editorial context for the first two crises. For the remaining two crises two different batteries were used in 2016 and 2019 along with four different batteries for crises opponents. Batteries for Pakistan include prime minister, president, foreign and interior ministers, chief of army staff and director general of Inter Services Public Relations of Pakistan during the crisis. Batteries for

crisis opponents include president/prime minister, foreign minister, army chiefs, military organizations which were involved in the crisis such as NATO/ISAF in 2011 and Indian Air force in Indian Airstrike Crisis and the heads of such organizations, and the name of the crisis opponent country. The batteries are shown below:

Table 2 Batteries used for the Contextual Analysis in Each Crisis

| Batteries | | | |
|---|---|--|--|
| OBL Crisis | Salala Attack Crisis | Surgical Strike Crisis | Indian Airstrike Crisis |
| Civilian Rehman Malik, Khar Gillani, Gilani Zardari | Civilian Rehman Malik, Khar Gillani, Gilani Zardari | Civilian Chaudhry Nisar Sartaj Aziz, Nawaz Sharif, Mamnoon Hussain | Civilian Sheryar Afridi, Imran Khan, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Arif Alvi |
| Military Kayani, Athar Abbas army | Military Kayani, Athar Abbas army | Military Raheel Sharif, Raheel Shareef, Bajwa | Military Bajwa Ghafoor |
| USA Gates, Mullen Petraeus, Allen ISAF, NATO USA, Obama Clinton | USA Gates, Mullen Petraeus, Allen ISAF, NATO USA, Obama Clinton | India Modi, India, Swaraj, Suhag | India Modi, India, BJP, Swaraj, rawat, IAF, Indian Army |

For each term, Contextualizer searches the editorials and then gives the result in an excel sheet that contains the words used before and after each term. To have meaningful sentences that can include different parts of speech, fifteen words were selected to be before and after each term. The fifteen words context left of the term, the term itself, and the context on the right are given in different columns, however, LIWC analyzes one column at a time. To have a bigger denominator for the calculation of means after processing through LIWC, the column on the left was copied and pasted below the context on the right and the analysis of the context was done in

one column in LIWC. This process of finding the context was done on both newspapers and then on individual newspaper and anger was measure through LIWC before calculating the means in R.

Data for The Dependent Variable:

The task of this thesis is to study the rally around the flag phenomenon which can be demonstrated though the public support expressed through public opinion during an international crisis. To measure the rally effect in Pakistan during an international crisis, I analyze the data drawn from editorials of two major English daily newspapers: Dawn and The Nation. Two factors contributed towards the choice of newspapers for this thesis. First, since the sample size is close to two thousand and the analysis is at a word level, those newspapers were looked at that contain the editorials on their websites in the form of words and not pictures. Dawn and The Nation both have easily accessible editorials on their websites and cover the duration of all four crises. The second factor was the circulation and ideology of newspapers so that it covers the aspects of idea dissemination and contains both conservative and liberal newspapers. In short, the rationale behind the choice of the newspapers is twofold: first, availability or accessibility; and second, representativeness of the population in the study.

Latent studies suggest that public opinion in Pakistan does not differ from the opinion held by political and information elite who write in these two English language daily newspapers (Fair and Hamza 2016). According to Fair and Hamza (2016), majority of Pakistani population does not consume English language daily newspapers. However, they also found out that despite the lack of reliance of Pakistani public on English language newspapers, the opinions held by Pakistani public are not different than opinions expressed in the editorials of Pakistani English language newspapers. The study attributes this to the fact that the people who write editorials in

English dailies also host Urdu tv programs and disseminate the same opinion through tv channels which is one of the biggest sources of information in Pakistan (Fair and Hamza 2016). In terms of credibility and circulation, Dawn and The Nation are one of the oldest newspapers in Pakistan and only Dawn attracted ten million views in a month (Fair and Hamza 2016). Existing literature focusing on Pakistani English newspapers have analyzed Dawn and The Nation for identity construction, analyzing right and left-wing ideologies in editorials, the analysis of reporting during general elections, a combination of Dawn and the Urdu newspaper of The Nation for media's narrative on war on terror, depiction of USA-Pakistan relationship, and image of USA after 9/11 to name a few studies (Qazi and Shah 2018; Bilal et al. 2012; Tabassum, Shah, and Bilal 2013; Ahmed and Hussain 2016; Hussain and Munawar 2017; Ayoub and Ahmed 2013; Khan and Safder 2010; Jabeen and Ahmad 2018). These studies used Dawn and the Nation for their circulation, representativeness of the spectrum of ideologies, and the prestige of these two newspapers since they are two of the oldest newspapers in Pakistan.

The choice of collecting editorials from Dawn and The Nation is also important because these two newspapers are ideologically distinct; Dawn being left of center and The Nation leaning towards the right (Fair and Hamza 2016). Also, relying on English language newspapers for assessing public opinion in Pakistan is also useful because the support for the civilian government and army might not be as strong as in the Urdu daily newspaper. This effect is due to the difference in the readership of these English language newspapers and the readers of these newspapers can access information from other international sources in the times of a crisis which makes the newspapers to offer a moderated opinion due to the fear of loss of readership. However, in the case of Urdu newspaper readers, their only source is Urdu newspapers or television if they do not speak any other language and considering the low literacy rate that

seems plausible. Lastly, as Fair and Hamza (2016) argue that the level of censorship is high in Urdu newspapers, English newspapers enjoy better freedom of expression and can support stances on merit instead of popular opinion.

Based on the crisis dimensions mentioned in chapter: crisis dimension, editorials were collected from Dawn and The Nation for the dates during the crisis lasted and for the same number of days prior to each crisis. It was attempted to have similar number of editorials for each newspaper before and after the crisis because sometimes the content was missing. Since it was not possible to increase or decrease the number of editorials during the crisis because of the crisis duration, the change, even though it was not substantial, was adjusted from prior to crisis data. The details of these adjustments are mentioned with each crisis' number of editorials.

Table 3 Details of Collected Editorials

| Period | Dates | Dawn | The Nation | Days | Empty Links/Missing Days |
|------------------------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------|---|
| Pre-OBL Crisis | April 20 - May 1 | 99 | 81 | 12 | 3 Empty links in The Nation |
| OBL Crisis | May 2 - May 13 | 102 | 83 | 12 | 1 Empty link in The Nation |
| Pre-Salala Attack Crisis | Oct 22 - Nov 16 | 203 | 162 | 26 | 2 Days were missing in both newspapers |
| Salala Attack Crisis | Nov 17 - Dec 11 | 202 | 163 | 25 | 7 empty and one day missing in The Nation |
| Pre-Surgical Strike Crisis | Sep 2 - Sep 17 | 98 | 96 | 16 | 1 Empty link in The Nation, 2 days missing in both newspapers |
| Surgical Strike Crisis | Sep 18 - Oct 1 | 97 | 98 | 14 | N/A |
| Pre-Indian Airstrike Crisis | Jan 27 - Feb 13 | 126 | 126 | 18 | N/A |
| Indian Airstrike Crisis | Feb 14 - Mar 3 | 127 | 106 | 18 | 1 column in picture format not copiable in The Nation |

In total, 1969 editorials were collected from both newspapers related to pre and during the crisis periods as shown in table 3. Apart from both periods in 2016 and pre-Indian Airstrike Crisis period, Dawn has more editorials in each period as compared to The Nation newspaper. This difference is stark in both pre and during the crisis period of Salala Attack Crisis when the difference is 41 and 39, respectively. Due to these significant differences, one extra day for the pre-2011 and two extra days for pre-2016 periods were added to maintain the balance in the quantity of data point. On average, there is one editorial more in Dawn than The Nation across all the editorials collected.

Data and Operationalization of The Independent Variable:

Inter-agency coordination in this thesis relates to two aspects of crisis, triggers, and responses. First, coordination implies that the crisis triggers, and responses are evaluated the same way at the beginning of the crisis and at the end of the crisis by the civilian government or the military. For instance, if an act is characterized as a sign of victory by any agency, then, if they later characterize it as the violation of sovereignty, it is a sign of non-coordination. Alternatively, a trigger if characterized as an indicator of violation of any norms remains the same until the crisis is over signifies the presence of coordination within the agency. Second, the same characterization applies to the separate stances of the civilian government and the military. Coordination entails the same characterization by both the civilian government and the military.

Data for the independent variable: inter-agency coordination is obtained from two source, the press releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan (MOFA) and the Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan (ISPR) except for Indian Airstrike Crisis when both agencies communicated through press briefings and only one press release was issued. That is why the transcription of those briefings is used as data for Indian Airstrike Crisis with one press release

issued by MOFA Pakistan. MOFA represents the civilian government, and the press releases involve the stances of the prime minister, the foreign minister (or advisers since there was no foreign minister in Surgical Strike crisis), and committees on national security headed by the civilians. ISPR represents the military, their stances on triggers and responses of international crises, and the briefs of corps commander meetings. Press releases collected from each source are considered the stance of that source either the civilian government or the military to assess coordination from these press releases. For coordination, the content of these press releases is analyzed.

Those press releases are collected for each crisis that were issued during the crisis period and if they were related to the crisis triggers or responses. In the case of OBL crisis, two of the press releases about the crisis action issued after the end date of the crisis are also included in the data of independent variable. The rationale for using these two press releases is because they are issued based on meetings and joint sessions of civilian government and military that happened before the crisis end date or related to the crisis end, but there was a lag in issuing the press releases in these cases. The normal business of both agencies: civilian and military continued during the crisis and the press releases not included for independent purposes ranged from foreign tours, to meeting foreign dignitaries, and especially in the case of military, press releases related to military exercises or troops visits are not included for the analysis of the independent variable.

Table 4 Frequency and Dates of Press Releases Issued by MOFA and the ISPR

| Crisis | MOFA | Dates | ISPR | Dates |
|------------------------------|-------------|---|-------------|--------------------------|
| OBL Crisis 2011 | 6 | May 2, May 3, May 5, May 7, Two on May 13, and May 14 | 2 | May 5, May 9 |
| Salala Attack Crisis 2011 | 1 | One on December 9 | 2 | November 26, December 11 |
| Surgical Strike Crisis 2016 | 2 | September 22, September 29 | 3 | All on September 29 |
| Indian Airstrike Crisis 2019 | 2 | February 19, February 27 | 2 | February 26, February 27 |

The format of press releases also ranges from crisis to crisis and from one agency to the other. MOFA Pakistan sometimes also used the script of press briefing by the head of MOFA in 2016 as press releases and ISPR does not include the press briefings in the press releases. There are six press releases issued by MOFA Pakistan and two by the ISPR Pakistan for OBL crisis, one by MOFA Pakistan and two by ISPR Pakistan in Salala Attack Crisis crisis, two by MOFA Pakistan and three by ISPR Pakistan in 2016, and two press briefings by the prime minister of Pakistan and two by the director general of the ISPR Pakistan (that I transcribed) in 2019. The 2019 briefings are different in the sense from the civilian government perspective that the prime minister addressed the nation on Pakistan television regarding the crisis. The press briefings in 2016 also consisted other issues not related to the crisis so only those answers of the civilian representative were included in the data that talked about the crisis.

To analyze the coordination between the civilians and the military in each crisis from the press releases, two dimensions are analyzed: consistency within each agency's press releases, consistency across inter-agency press releases are explored. The rationale for consistency within each agency's press releases relies on the premise that if one agency remains consistent throughout the crisis it could be due to the lack of opposition from the other governmental agency that resulted in the coherent response. On the other hand, if one agency retracts from its original stance that could result from the opposition of the other agency. That is why consistency is important between the two agencies to avoid conflicting stances related to triggers or responses during an international crisis in order to keep the focus and anger of the public towards the crisis opponent. The fault lines that appear due to a broken stance can be detrimental for the rally phenomenon because the divided public will focus on defending the stance of either their affiliated political party or the military depending on different segments of the society.

The rationale for consistency across inter-agency press-releases is more explicit than the consistency within one agency's press releases, and the consistency between policy statements of civilian and military can reflect the coordination between agencies, or the lack of it more clearly. To be consistent, both agencies need to evaluate the crisis trigger in the same way and issue similar responses. The press releases targeting crises triggers and crises responses from MOFA and the ISPR contain the content that is compared to see whether both agencies evaluate the triggers and offer responses that are not in conflict with the other agency.

In a hybrid regime, two or more centers of power such as civilian political parties and the military establishment exercise influence on the decision making and each center also garners support from certain section of the public. The consistency in policy statements expressed in the press-releases during an international crisis not only shows that both centers of power have

similar foreign policy aspiration and the support of the segments of the public that contributes to their power sharing on the national political arena. On the other hand, inconsistency in the policy statements expressed through press-releases creates confusion among public about the official stances about the crisis responses and evaluation of triggers and the public cannot rally if they are undecided between choosing whether to support one agency's stance or the other. As argued by the elite polarization literature, in this scenario, public will rally behind the party or the military they are affiliated with. The divided public opinion is the antithesis of the rally around the flag phenomenon during an international crisis and the inconsistency regarding foreign policy statements between the civilians and the government is a necessary condition in its formation.

Methodology

The qualitative case study method is used to test the hypothesis about the effect of civilian and military coordination as a necessary condition for the rally around the flag phenomenon to happen in Pakistan during an international crisis. Levels and units of analyses of dependent and independent variables are discussed separately to account for the changes in both variables. For the dependent variable, change in anger directed either towards Pakistan's leadership or the crisis opponent is measured and if the change is bigger for the crisis opponent and the anger level is more than the 0.47 (the NY Times baseline anger value) for the crisis opponent, then that is considered a case for the happening of the rally phenomenon. First, the frequency of mentions is compared to see whether the issue became salient and whether Pakistan's leadership and crisis opponent were mentioned more during the crisis than during the pre-crisis period. If the frequency of both the leadership of Pakistan and the crisis opponent increases that indicates that the issue was salient not as salient if only one party to the crisis was mentioned more and not the other. Second, although the unit of analysis is editorials for the

dependent variable, the levels of analysis are different. First, the main level of analysis and the indicator of the rally phenomenon is the overall change in anger based on the added context to see the direction of anger and if the anger value is more for the crisis opponent then that is considered an indicator of the rally phenomenon. Lastly, the second indicator is the anger change based on the individual anger values from Dawn and The Nation newspapers to check whether the values are skewed by any one of the two newspapers. If that is the case, it would act as a moderator with the potential to undermine the effect of the independent variable.

For the independent variable, there are two levels of analysis and one unit of analysis except for the Indian Airstrike Crisis where the unavailability of the press releases was the reason to look for the same content of the civilian and the military leadership but through their national address and press briefing. The first is the intra-agency level of analysis in which the press releases issued by the same agency, either MOFA or ISPR, are analyzed for coordination. The second level of analysis is the comparison of MOFA and ISPR to analyze whether the response or the evaluations of triggers during the crisis were consistent marking the civilian-military coordination.

First, the crises are analyzed individually according to the level of analyses to see whether there was the rally phenomenon when the civilian-military response was coordinated. Second, those cases are identified where there was no rally despite the coordination of civilian-military response in finding whether inter-agency coordination is the necessary or necessary and sufficient condition for the rally. Lastly, two rival explanations of protracted conflict, and the ruling party relationship with the military, are discussed to see whether those are the necessary conditions rather than the civilian-military coordination during an international crisis.

Chapter 5. Results

This chapter contains the analysis of the dependent and independent variables across all four cases. Each crisis is divided into three parts, the analysis of the dependent variable, independent variable, and the findings. The analysis of the dependent variable, the public rally, covers the frequency of batteries and the change in anger values for Pakistan and the external opponents. The analysis of the independent variable, inter-agency coordination details the crisis triggers and responses that are used to measure consistency in two agencies' responses. The findings section of each crisis discusses the positive or negative relationship between the public rally and the inter-agency coordination. Lastly, all four cases are analyzed together to discuss the effect of inter-agency coordination in the instances of the public rally and its absence.

The Case of Osama Bin Laden Crisis

Analysis of Public Rally

The processing of batteries in Contextualizer shows that the frequency of batteries for both the Pakistan's civilian and military leadership and the US' leadership increased during the crisis period. Before the crisis, Pakistan's leadership was mentioned 57 times as compared to 81 times during the crisis while the US' leadership was mentioned 128 times before the crisis as compared to 172 times during the crisis period. This shows that, during the crisis, leadership becomes more salient than the non-crisis period. The increased frequency also increases the denominator in the calculation of mean anger values and reduces the chances of skewing the anger values. Table 5 shows that the first criteria for the rally phenomenon is having values bigger than 0.47, NY Times baseline value, and all anger values in the table are higher than the baseline value. The change in anger values in editorials as compared to before and during the crisis period are negative for both newspapers. The anger value dropped for the US more than it dropped for Pakistan which is an indicator that the rallying behind the leadership of Pakistan did

not happen in the OBL crisis because the second criteria for the rally phenomenon is having increased anger for the crisis opponent.

The analysis of individual newspapers also provides the nuances in the changes in anger during an international crisis. For example, Dawn, a liberal newspaper despite having higher values of anger for Pakistan before the crisis, have lower anger value for Pakistan and a slightly higher anger value for the US during the crisis. The Nation, however, has lower anger values for Pakistan as compared to Dawn, but the drop in values is more noticeable for the US during the crisis. This finding is supported by Porat et al. (2019) who argued that the ideology gap in viewing the out-group as a threat between liberals and conservatives decreases during the crisis. However, the slight increase in anger for the US in Dawn seems to be balanced off by the significant decrease in anger in The Nation. This and the overall negative change indicate that the rally phenomenon did not happen in this crisis.

Table 5 Before and during the Crisis Anger Values for Pakistan and The US in Osama Bin Laden Crisis, 2011

| Source and Type of Analysis | Anger Values | | | | | |
|---|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Pre-OBL Crisis | | OBL Crisis | | Change for Pakistan | Change for the USA |
| | <i>Pakistan</i> | <i>USA</i> | <i>Pakistan</i> | <i>USA</i> | | |
| <i>Both Newspapers with The Context</i> | 1.225 | 1.616 | 0.974 | 1.311 | - 0.2507 | - 0.305 |
| <i>Dawn with the Context</i> | 1.37 | 1.317 | 0.9995 | 1.344 | -0.3705 | 0.027 |
| <i>The Nation with the Context</i> | 1.03 | 1.758 | 0.9545 | 1.321 | - 0.0755 | -0.437 |

Analysis of Inter-Agency Coordination

The inter-agency coordination hypothesized in theory could explain why there was no rally in OBL crisis despite the unilateral action taken by the US to kill Osama bin Laden. MOFA Pakistan issued six press releases starting from May 2 to May 14 during OBL crisis that concern the Abbottabad Operation conducted by the US and two press releases by ISPR Pakistan on May 5 and May 9. In the analysis of coordination between MOFA and ISPR, first, the consistency within each agency's press releases is determined by looking at the evaluation of triggers and responses of each press release individually.

MOFA Pakistan May 2: In this press release on the death of Osama bin Ladin, the theme revolves around the resolve of Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, no complaints with the US in the way operation was conducted, and a sigh of relief in killing the head of Al-Qaeda because he was the enemy of Pakistan and goes on to say:

“Al-Qaeda had declared war on Pakistan. Scores of Al-Qaeda sponsored terrorist attacks resulted in deaths of thousands of innocent Pakistani men, women and children. Almost, 30,000 Pakistani civilians lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the last few years. More than 5,000 Pakistani security and armed forces officials have been martyred in Pakistan's campaign against Al-Qaeda, other terrorist organizations and affiliates” (Appendix A).

Similarly, it paints this operation as a mutual success without any concerns related to the sovereignty or unilateral action taken by the US. Talking about the coordination and the mutual success aspect of the operation it says: “Earlier today, President Obama telephoned President Zardari on the successful US operation which resulted in killing of Osama bin Ladin” (Appendix A). The press release on May 2 does not evaluate the Bin Laden raid as a trigger and there is no intention to respond.

MOFA Pakistan May 3: This is the first press release on the Abbottabad Operation that contains concerns either due to the military establishment or media backlash. It highlights four main themes:

- 1) Pakistani civilian and military leadership were not aware of the operation in these words: “However, the Government of Pakistan categorically denies the media reports suggesting that its leadership, civil as well as military, had any prior knowledge of the US operation against Osama bin Ladin carried out in the early hours of 2nd May 2011” (Appendix A).
- 2) No Pakistani airbase was used for the helicopters used in this operation to fly from. It says: “Reports about US helicopters taking off from Ghazi Airbase are absolutely false and incorrect” (Appendix A).
- 3) Pakistan’s defense was agile, and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was ready to respond. Press release mentions it in these words: “On receipt of information regarding the incident, PAF scrambled its jets within minutes” (Appendix A).
- 4) An expression of concern, for the first time, about how the operation was conducted without Pakistan’s knowledge by saying “Notwithstanding the above, the Government of Pakistan expresses its deep concerns and reservations on the manner in which the Government of the United States carried out this operation without prior information or authorization from the Government of Pakistan” (Appendix A).

The press release on May 3 is the first press release in which the Bin Laden raid is evaluated as a crisis trigger by showing reservations about the way the operation was conducted.

MOFA Pakistan May 7: The theme of May 7 is centered on the idea that there is a need of a joint response, and review of the national security according to the national interests of Pakistan only. “The Prime Minister emphasized during these consultations that the sole criteria for formulating our stance is safeguarding of Pakistan’s supreme national interests, by all means, by all state institutions, in accordance with the aspirations of the people of Pakistan, who above all value their dignity and honour” (Appendix A). This is the first press release that hints the need of a response based on the aspiration of Pakistan’s public and this press release was issued after the first press release by the ISPR.

MOFA Pakistan May 13: There were two press releases published on May 13th, both referencing the Prime Minister of Pakistan’s speech and the joint statement of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet and highlighted two themes: first, the condemnation of the US unilateral action taken on May 2, and second, the need for inter-agency cooperation (civilians and military) supported by the people of Pakistan. Following two quotations can summarize the crux of these two press releases regarding these themes: “Condemned the US unilateral action in Abbottabad in violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.” (Appendix A). 2: “It is imperative that all arms of the Government i.e. both Civil and Military with the full support of the Parliament and the people of Pakistan, work together to the best of their ability to safeguard Pakistan’s sovereignty, security and for promoting Pakistan’s national interests.” (Appendix A).

MOFA Pakistan May 14: This press release based on the resolution adopted by the joint session of the parliament repeated the condemnation of the US unilateral act and included a new theme related to the aftermath of any similar future action taken by the USA, “the Government will be constrained to consider taking necessary steps including withdrawal of transit facility allowed to NATO/ISAF forces” (Appendix A).

ISPR Pakistan May 5: Apart from admitting the shortcoming of Inter Services Intelligence Agency and its contribution against war on terror, there are two major themes in the press release issued by the ISPR Pakistan that contains the decisions from the corps commanders' conference. First theme is related to any such future incident conducted by the USA and it says: "COAS made it very clear that any similar action, violating the sovereignty of Pakistan, will warrant a review on the level of military / intelligence cooperation with the United States." (Appendix B). The second theme relates to the warning to India that they should not take it as a precedent to conduct strikes in Pakistan and it says: "The Forum, taking serious note of the assertions made by Indian military leadership about conducting similar operations, made it very clear that any misadventure of this kind will be responded to very strongly. There should be no doubt about it." (Appendix B). This press release shows the discrepancy between the first press release by the civilian government and the first release by the military. This press release evaluates the Bin Laden raid as a crisis trigger as compared to the civilian press release which had the impression of a mutual success.

ISPR Pakistan May 9: This press release focuses on the negative public opinion and asks the civilian government to decide a formal response on this situation and take the nation in confidence. The press release mentions it as follows: "Public dismay and despondency has also been aggravated due to insufficient formal response.", "Chief of Army Staff said that he has requested the honourable Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani to kindly consider convening of a joint session of the Parliament for briefing on security issues as related to Abbottabad incident." (Appendix B). This press release and the press release by the civilian government on May 7 are the turning points in the crisis response. Due to the public backlash due to a non-coherent response both civilians and the military moved towards the need of a response. Also,

this press release suggests that the military is shifting the focus of responsibility towards the civilian government by explicitly asking them to issue a response.

Findings

The comparison of inter-agency and intra-agency press releases shows that in OBL crisis there were both inconsistencies present in the responses. The civilian government started with lauding the US action to condemning it by first showing careful concern to any similar future actions to forming a joint resolution that in future logistic supply to NATO/ISAF will be cut off. Similarly, ISPR press releases also contain inconsistency in them if the two are compared. In the first one, the message is the review of relationship with the USA if any similar action is done and in the second press release the focus shifts from the US to the domestic politics and the request to the civilians to formulate a response. The stark contrast is also present between the agencies and the timing of ISPR press release shows that the military was doing more deliberation, and waited until May 5 to issue the first response, than the civilians and the response of the former came on the fourth day as compared to the same day of Abbottabad Operation of the latter. These inter-agency and intra-agency inconsistencies found in the press-releases indicate that there was lack of coordination between the two branches of the government based on their evaluation of the trigger and response.

The Case of The Salala Attack Crisis

Analysis of Public Rally

The Pakistani and the US leadership was mentioned 122 and 223 times before the Salala attack crisis and 223 and 494 times during the crisis, respectively. It shows that the salience of leadership increased during the crisis and the editorials mentioned the leadership almost twice as many times as before the crisis. The anger values obtained from running the analysis on the

sentences before and after the leadership are shown in Table 6. On the level of analysis of both newspapers, anger values are positive both for the Pakistani and US leadership, however, for the US leadership it is four times more than Pakistan's. The analysis of individual newspaper also shows that anger increased more for the US leadership than the leadership of Pakistan. In Dawn newspaper, the change in anger value for Pakistan's leadership is negative showing the decrease in anger and positive for the USA showing an increase in anger. In the Nation newspaper, the values increased for both Pakistan and the USA. The decrease of anger for Pakistan and increase for the USA again highlight the argument that liberals tend to behave like conservatives during international crisis (Porat et al. 2019). Both indicators of having an anger value of more than 0.47 and increase in anger directed at one crisis party than the other are met as anger change for the USA is four times more than Pakistan. The evidence leads to the conclusion that the rally phenomenon was observed during the Salala attack crisis.

Table 6 Before and during the Crisis Anger Values for Pakistan and The US in Salala Attack Crisis, 2011

| Source and Type of Analysis | Anger Values | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Pre-Salala Attack Crisis | | Salala Attack Crisis | | Change for Pakistan | Change for the USA |
| | Pakistan | USA | Pakistan | USA | | |
| <i>Both Newspapers with The Context</i> | 0.5427 | 1.138 | 0.6381 | 1.538 | 0.0954 | 0.4 |
| <i>Dawn with the Context</i> | 0.7904 | 1.206 | 0.6701 | 1.5 | -0.1203 | 0.294 |
| <i>The Nation with the Context</i> | 0.2366 | 1.105 | 0.6097 | 1.72 | 0.3731 | 0.615 |

Analysis of Inter-Agency Coordination

During the period of Salala Attack Crisis crisis, there was one press release by MOFA Pakistan and there were two press releases by ISPR Pakistan. The first press release was issued by the ISPR on November 26, the second by the MOFA on December 9, and the third on

December 11 by the ISPR. Before analyzing the press-releases, one thing that press releases do not mention is that the NATO/ISAF logistic supply line was suspended on the same day of the attack on its troops (Momand 2011).

MOFA Pakistan December 9, 2011: One press release found on the MOFA Pakistan website contains the meeting of US ambassador Munter and foreign minister Khar in which the need of having relationship based on mutual respect was discussed and FM Khar was quoted as follows: “The Foreign Minister stated that relations between the two countries must be based on mutual respect. She added that the recent incidents have led to a re-evaluation of our terms of engagement.” (Appendix A).

ISPR Pakistan November 26, 2011: This press release details the incident and states the protest of the chief of army staff of Pakistan and the demand for action against the perpetrators of this attack and it states: “COAS has strongly condemned NATO / ISAF’s blatant and unacceptable act resulting in loss of precious lives of Pakistani soldiers.”, “A strong protest has been launched with NATO / ISAF in which it has been demanded that strong and urgent action be taken those responsible for this aggression.” (Appendix B).

ISPR Pakistan December 11, 2011: This press release only contains information about the US vacating the Shamsi airbase in Pakistan and the last flight departing from it (Appendix B).

Findings

The MOFA and ISPR Pakistan press releases do not show any discrepancy in terms of consistency in intra-agency or inter-agency content. MOFA Pakistan only had one press release that highlights the same issue of having bilateral relationships with mutual respect. Two press

releases from the ISPR Pakistan also do not contradict the MOFA press release or each other. It is important to mention here that the action taken during the Salala Attack Crisis crisis had its roots in the resolution passed by the joint session of the parliament and it faced no opposition seven months later and both agencies of the government showed a coordinated response. The analysis of the variables in this crisis shows that the public rallied behind the decision to block NATO supply and there was coordination between the civilian government and the military. The only press release issued by the MOFA strengthens the same crisis response by reviewing the relationship with the US based on the same evaluation of the crisis trigger.

The Case of the Surgical Strike Crisis

Analysis of Public Rally

The frequency of the leadership of Pakistan and India in editorials is 47 and 318 before the crisis and 35 and 638 during the crisis, respectively. The decline in the frequency of Pakistan's leadership during the crisis could mean that the focus shifted towards India and in the same number of editorials collected before and after the crisis, the Indian leadership is mentioned twice as much during the crisis. The analysis of both newspapers together shows a slight increase in the change in anger as compared to Pakistan. Individual newspaper analysis provides further insight about the anger values. Both Dawn and the Nation's anger values increased for Pakistan and India. Interestingly, The Nation's change in anger values are more for Pakistan than India whilst the opposite is true for Dawn. However, there is a stark contrast in the magnitude of anger change in Dawn and The Nation. Dawn had lower values for both India and Pakistan before the crisis, but it reached almost the same level during the crisis. Even though the anger values during the crisis are bigger than 0.47 baseline value, the overall difference between the two is not substantive enough to generate a rally and more anger in The Nation for Pakistan as compared to reduced anger in Dawn could cancel out the rally effect.

Table 7 Before and during the Crisis Anger Values for Pakistan and India in Surgical Strike Crisis, 2016

| Source and Type of Analysis | Anger Values | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|--------|------------------------|-------|---------------------|------------------|
| | Pre-Surgical Strike Crisis | | Surgical Strike Crisis | | Change for Pakistan | Change for India |
| | Pakistan | India | Pakistan | India | | |
| <i>Both Newspapers with The Context</i> | 0.4043 | 0.8376 | 1.098 | 1.541 | 0.6937 | 0.7034 |
| <i>Dawn with the Context</i> | 0.3005 | 0.5505 | 1.136 | 1.602 | 0.8355 | 1.0515 |
| <i>The Nation with the Context</i> | 0.4839 | 0.9357 | 1.066 | 1.512 | 0.5821 | 0.5763 |

Analysis of Inter-Agency Coordination

During the Surgical Strike Crisis, there were two press releases issued by the MOFA Pakistan and three by the ISPR Pakistan. The main themes of each agency's press releases are discussed as under:

MOFA Pakistan September 22, 2016: There are two main themes in the press release related to Surgical Strike Crisis: the activities at the line of control after the terrorist attack on Indian military in Kashmir, and the premise that India is blaming Pakistan for these terrorist attacks without providing any evidence. The press release talks about these themes as follows:

In response to the journalist's question about military buildup on the Pakistan's side of Line of Control it says: "You referred to some exercises on Pakistan's side. Let me tell you that these are routine exercises." (Appendix A). In response to another question about the Pakistani involvement in the terrorist attack the press release says: "*We totally reject these unfounded, baseless and uninvestigated accusations leveled against Pakistan.*" (Appendix A).

MOFA Pakistan September 29, 2016: The theme related to Surgical Strike Crisis in this press release is the question about the Indian claim of the surgical strike in Pakistan. Answering this question, the press release states: "On your second question, I am aware that there have been

unprovoked violations on the LoC by the Indian security forces. Once we have more information on the issue, we will share it with you.” (Appendix A).

ISPR Pakistan September 19, 2016: The central theme of this press release focuses on the terrorist attack in Kashmir and India’s accusation of Pakistan for its involvement in the attack. The press release states the response of the COAS of Pakistan as follows: “Taking note of a hostile narrative being propagated by India COAS said that we are fully cognizant and closely watching the latest happenings in the region and their impact on the security of Pakistan.” (Appendix B).

ISPR Pakistan September 29, 2016: There were two press releases issued by ISPR on September 29, 2016. The themes of these two press releases target the civilian briefing about the preparedness of the army and the rejection of the surgical strike that was claimed by India. The press releases discuss these themes in the following words: First, civilian officials briefing and security preparedness in these words: “COAS General Raheel Sharif welcomed the parliamentarians to GHQ. DGMO briefed the committee on current security situation on borders, entire threat spectrum and operational preparedness of the Army. COAS had detailed discussion on various issues related to national security.” (Appendix B). Second, the theme related to surgical strike: “There has been no surgical strike by India, instead there had been cross LOC fire initiated and conducted by India which is existential phenomenon. As per rules of engagement same was strongly and befittingly responded by Pakistani troops.” (Appendix B).

Findings

The comparison of MOFA and ISPR Pakistan press releases during the Surgical Strike Crisis suggest that there were no inconsistencies in intra-agency and inter-agency press releases. The three themes - the evaluation of the triggers (verbal threats from India, security preparedness

of army in case of any trigger by India), rejection of Indian accusation for the responsibility of attack in Kashmir, and rejection of surgical strike and Line of Control violations - are substantiated by both MOFA and ISPR Pakistan press releases. The lack of inconsistencies in press releases in terms of evaluating crisis triggers and offering responses issued during Surgical Strike crisis suggest that both agencies were coordinated in their response towards India. However, the analysis of the dependent variable shows that there was no indication of the rally phenomenon.

The Case of The Indian Airstrike Crisis

Analysis of Public Rally

The frequency of Pakistan and India's leadership in the editorials more than doubled from 55 to 115 and from 343 to 785, respectively. This sharp increase in the number of times each country's leadership was mentioned in the editorials shows the salience of the crisis in the newspapers. In terms of anger values at both papers together level of analysis shows an increase of anger for both Pakistan and India. This increase in anger is more for India than for Pakistan. Same trend is also seen at the individual newspaper level and anger values for both countries increased with more increase in anger for India as compared to Pakistan. Like the previous crises, Dawn editorials showed lower increase than The Nation for Pakistan and higher increase for India. In this crisis, the anger values for both newspapers for Pakistan were below the 0.47 baseline before the crisis, however, these values more than doubled during the crisis. Both criteria of the rally are fulfilled by having anger values more than 0.47 during the crisis and the change in anger value is more for Indian than Pakistan. This evidence suggests that in the Indian Airstrike case, the public rallied behind the actions taken during the crisis.

Table 8 Before and during the Crisis Anger Values for Pakistan and India in Indian Airstrike Crisis, 2019

| Source and Type of Analysis | Mean Anger Values | | | | | |
|---|-----------------------------|--------|-------------------------|-------|---------------------|------------------|
| | Pre-Indian Airstrike Crisis | | Indian Airstrike Crisis | | Change for Pakistan | Change for India |
| | Pakistan | India | Pakistan | India | | |
| <i>Both Newspapers with The Context</i> | 0.3534 | 0.7997 | 0.87 | 1.65 | 0.5166 | 0.8503 |
| <i>Dawn with the Context</i> | 0.9725 | 0.7725 | 1.171 | 1.942 | 0.1985 | 1.1695 |
| <i>The Nation with the Context</i> | 0.3326 | 0.8291 | 0.921 | 1.514 | 0.5879 | 0.6849 |

Analysis of Inter-Agency Coordination

ISPR Pakistan did not issue any press release during this crisis and instead ISPR published the video briefing by the director general of ISPR. On the other hand, MOFA Pakistan issued one press release on March 1 and the prime minister Imran Khan addressed the nation twice on the national television. The themes of the transcriptions of the video briefings of both civilian and military branch of government and one press release are analyzed for consistency in the following paragraphs. The February 19th speech of the PM was broadcast before India conducted the airstrike in Pakistan and the February 27th speech was broadcast after Pakistan conducted the airstrikes. The February 26th press briefing by ISPR was after the Indian airstrike and February 27th was after the Pakistani airstrike.

PM of Pakistan February 19, 2019: This address to the nation has three major themes. In the first theme, the PM of Pakistan talks about the futility of Pakistan's involvement in supporting a terrorist operation in Indian Kashmir, specially, when the crown prince of Saudi Arabia was visiting for which Pakistan had planned for a long time to attract investments (SAMAA TV 2019a). The second theme consists of resolving issues with the dialogue and if India has any evidence of any Pakistani involvement in these attacks, it should be given to

Pakistan so that these people are punished according to the law (Appendix A). The third theme talks about the retaliation Pakistan would do in case India decides to attack unilaterally and he assures the Indian government that India should not have any doubt about retaliation from Pakistan (Appendix A).

PM of Pakistan February 27, 2019: This address of Pakistan's PM also contains three themes. First, he expresses solidarity to the victims of Pulwama attack in Kashmir and reiterates that it is not in Pakistan's interest to conduct terrorist activities anywhere in the world (Appendix A). Second, he refers to his earlier speech in which he warned India of retaliation and claims that our goal of strike conducted by Pakistan on February 27 was to show resolve and capability in a way to not cause any collateral damage (Appendix A). Third, he talks about the captured pilots and offers Indian government dialogue and talks about the perils of war if any miscalculation by India makes them start a war (Appendix A).

MOFA Pakistan March 1, 2019: This press release contains one theme which is related to the return of Indian prisoner of war pilot to India as a de-escalation measure (Appendix A).

ISPR Pakistan February 26, 2019: Three themes are prominent in this press briefing. First, the director general of ISPR refers to the speech of prime minister broadcast on February 19 about the incident in Kashmir and Pakistan's resolve and offer of investigation to India (ISPR Official 2019). Second, he offers international community and India to visit the place where the payload from the Indian aircraft fell and see whether it hit any terrorist camp or an open space, he says: "The spot is open for everybody and anybody, (all) ambassadors, (all) defense attaches, United Nations Military Observer Group in Pakistan, We will even say the (Indian) civilian population or army, they can come through the authorized entry in Pakistan." (Appendix B).

The third theme contains the threat that now Pakistan will respond to the provocation by India, and he stated: “Now it is time for India to wait for our response. The response will come at the point and time of our choosing where our civil military leadership decide and as a matter of fact has decided.” (Appendix B).

ISPR Pakistan February 27, 2019: This press briefing contains two main themes related to the crisis. First, DG ISPR talked about the purpose of the strike conducted by Pakistan was to show resolve and capability while avoiding any collateral damage (ISPR Official 2019b). Second, he talked about the perils of war and resolving the matters with dialogue by alluding to the PM of Pakistan’s speech in these words: “The state of Pakistan, the government of Pakistan, the armed forces of Pakistan, and the people of Pakistan, we have always conveyed a message of peace to India and the route to peace goes through dialogue. Both countries have the capability and capacity, but war is actually the failure of policy which India needs to understand.” (Appendix B).

Findings

The comparison of the statements expressed through the press briefings and the press release during this crisis show that the civilian and military were on the same page. First, they evaluated the crisis trigger in the same manner. The speech by the PM of Pakistan warned of retaliation when India threatened to conduct strikes in Pakistan. The ISPR spokesperson referred to the PM’s speech in his press briefings multiple times and gave the impression that the decision to take any action is a joint decision by the civilian and military leadership. ISPR press briefings also gave the impression that they are following the civilian governments’ directive in both taking military action against India or conducting peace talks. The press briefing by ISPR after the Indian Airstrike reiterated that as mentioned by the PM, now we will offer a response the

way India conducted the airstrike. Both press briefings after the Pakistani airstrike mention that the retaliation was done just to show resolve and they did not want war (Appendix A; Appendix B). The analysis of the evaluation of triggers, and response by both agencies and within each agency suggests that there are no inconsistencies in the messages sent by the two agencies during the Indian Airstrike Crisis and it can be said that the response was coordinated.

Comparison of Cases with and without The Rally Phenomenon and the Influence of Inter-Agency Coordination on the Former

The evidence from Dawn and The Nation editorials suggests that the rally phenomenon was observed in Salala Attack and Indian Airstrike cases out of all four cases. Both these cases also involve a coordinated response to the crisis triggers by civilian and military leadership of Pakistan. This correlation between the rally phenomenon and inter-agency coordination suggests, as hypothesized and if all other factors remain the same, that inter-agency coordination is a necessary condition for the rally around the flag effect during an international crisis in Pakistan. However, the surgical strike case also witnessed coordination between the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan, but the rally phenomenon was not observed in that crisis. This deviation from Salala Attack and Indian Airstrike cases in terms of having inter-agency coordination and not observing the rally phenomenon suggests the influence of other factors that could confound the rally phenomenon during an international crisis in Pakistan.

Table 9 Comparison of the dependent and the independent variable across four cases

| Crisis | Mean Anger Values | | | | | | Difference in Change | Coordination |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------|------------|--------|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| | Pakistan | | Opponent | | Change for Pakistan | Change for the Opponent | | |
| | Pre-Crisis | Crisis | Pre-Crisis | Crisis | | | | |
| OBL Crisis | 1.225 | 0.974 | 1.616 | 1.311 | -0.2507 | -0.305 | 21.70% | ✘ |
| Salala Attack Crisis | 0.5427 | 0.638 | 1.138 | 1.538 | 0.0954 | 0.4 | 319% | ✓ |
| Surgical Strike Crisis | 0.4043 | 1.098 | 0.8376 | 1.541 | 0.6937 | 0.7034 | 1.40% | ✓ |
| Indian Airstrike Crisis | 0.3534 | 0.87 | 0.7997 | 1.65 | 0.5166 | 0.8503 | 64.50% | ✓ |

One such factor could be the severity of the trigger by the crisis opponent and if it is not perceived as a significant enough threat then the leadership of a country decides not to take any action. The analyzed literature does not provide explanations for the rally phenomenon in those cases when a state takes no action and whether the public rallies behind the leadership in inaction situations. In the Indian Surgical Strike case, despite having the coordination between the civilian and military leadership, the evidence suggests that the rally effect was not observed. Further research can explore the factors that influence no rally in the instances of state inaction during an international crisis.

Another potential explanation comes from the relationship of the political parties with the military in Pakistan. There were three different political parties in power during the crises of this thesis. In the first two, OBL and Salala Attack crises, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was in power in the government. In 2016, during the Surgical Strike crisis, Pakistan Muslim League-N (PMLN) was in power and in 2019, it was Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (Pakistan Justice Movement, PTI). The relationship of military and the PPP and PMLN had a strained past that includes toppling of their governments by the military multiple times (Stanliand 2008, 353, 354; Shah 2014, 1012-1014). However, the PTI government came to power for the first time in 2018 and it

is considered an ally of the military against PMLN and the PPP and the PTI is also blamed to have rigged the elections with the help of Inter Services Intelligence (Shah 2019, 128, 129). This background would have made it easier for the leadership of Pakistan to rally the public in the Indian Airstrike crisis. This argument certainly needs further exploration but the analysis of the remaining three crises shows that there was also coordination in two, Salala Attack and Surgical Strike crisis, of the three crises. The more feasible explanation in this context comes from the structural conditions that the low level of domestic political institutions and the absence of democratic institutions for the crisis decision-making require the backing of military to make a legitimate decision in Pakistan (Stanliand 2008, 323). That is why the focus should be on the coordination between the civilian government and the military during the crisis and not on the nature of relationship a political party had with the military in the past. Lastly, public's military support also comes from the fact that the military used "civilian institutions" to legitimize their entering the politics by band wagoning political personalities (Fair 2011, 572). Political personalities and parties have helped toppling the civilian governments and the prominent parties of Pakistan that were also in power in 2011, 2016, and 2019 crises became mainstream with the help of military (Shah 2011, 71). On top of that, Pakistan's military role in supporting religious elements in Pakistan also garners support from those communities in times of crisis (Shah 2011, 71). In this context, the rally phenomenon becomes more complex because multiple groups strive for the rally for the backing of their respective support groups. The complex structure of Pakistan's society having a wide range of ideological, ethnic, linguistic, and provincial spectrum requires a unified response from the civilians and military to rally behind a single flag during an international crisis and push the other difference, for a short while, in the background.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis is to see which of the four international crises resulted in rallying around the flag phenomenon from the starting year of the first Pakistani civilian government that completed its tenured term. This involved four crises, two with India and two with the USA and had similar triggers to start the crisis with Pakistan. The responses of Pakistan differed across four crises and the first task was to find evidence for the crises that result in the rally phenomenon. Ideally, the surveys conducted before and after the crisis and the popularity ratings of leadership serve as an indicator of the rally phenomenon. In the absence of such surveys in the context of Pakistan, an indirect measure change in anger was used to find evidence of the rally phenomenon. The data came from the editorials of two daily English newspapers, Dawn and The Nation that are situated on the opposite side of ideology spectrum in Pakistan. Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count were used to measure anger values from the editorials. Contextualizer was used to measure anger values wherever the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan and the crisis opponent was mentioned in those editorials by first processing the editorials through Contextualizer and then analyzing those strings that were produced by searching the batteries of the two leadership. The results of the analysis showed that Salala Attack and Indian Airstrike were the two crises that resulted in the rally phenomenon.

The next step was to find the factors that contributed to the rally phenomenon in one crisis with India and one crisis with the USA. In the context of Pakistan's hybrid regime lacking democratic institutions that results in non-coherent responses from the civilian government and the military seemed to influence the rally phenomenon. Bureaucratic Politics Model and the effect of elite polarization on public opinion literature were used to generate the hypothesis that coordination between civilian government and the military in evaluating the opponent triggers

and offering responses is the necessary condition for the rally phenomenon. The analysis of press releases, and press briefing in Indian Airstrike crisis, provides the evidence that the crises when there was coordination between civilian government and the military also have rally phenomenon in those crises. However, Indian Surgical Strike also had a coordinated response, but the rally phenomenon was not witnessed in it. This could mean that the inter-agency coordination is a necessary condition but not the sufficient condition for the rally and further research can explore this in other cases to see whether that is the case.

Limitations of The Findings

There are, at least, two factors that limit the findings of the dependent variable, i.e., rally around the flag. First, an indirect measure, change in anger from the newspaper editorials, is used as an indicator of the rally. The literature supports the method used the findings could be more robust if they are corroborated by the public surveys or polls measuring the approval ratings of the government before, during, and right after the crisis. Second, in the measurement of context it is possible, uncommon though, that the authors of the editorials quoted battery entities expressing anger about the crisis opponent. In this case, the strings produced by Contextualizer will contain anger words with the battery entity and increase the anger value for that entity, but it could be a statement of anger directed at the crisis opponent which the author of an editorial quoted. One solution to this problem could be finding those strings produced by Contextualizer that contained both the country's leadership and the crisis opponent and then manually corroborating whether the anger is directed at the country's leadership or at the opponent.

The independent variable, the inter-agency coordination, has one limitation related to the small size of the data used for this variable. Only nineteen press releases are analyzed to assess the coordination between the civilian government and the military. To overcome the small

sample of the unit of analysis used for independent variable, the inclusion of other unit of analysis such as parliamentary debates and the statements of political leaders given to news reporters could provide more robust measure of inter-agency coordination. Second, the hypothesis generated in this thesis might have generalizability issue in its application to other contexts since it is based on the specific regime dynamics of Pakistan in which military is a strong actor in the crisis decision-making. In other contexts, the hybrid regime might have some other type of actors with differed reserved domain than national security that are not as salient to crisis decision-making, then the independent variable might not have the same explanatory power that it can have in militarized hybrid regimes.

Implications of The Findings of This Thesis

The aim of this thesis was to find factors that affect the rally around the flag phenomenon during an international crisis. The hypothesis about the inter-agency coordination as a necessary condition for a public rally in a hybrid regime is tested across four international crises of Pakistan. There is twofold contribution of this hypothesis to the literature. First, it has implications for the rally phenomenon as the dependent variable. The analyzed existing studies on rally around the flag phenomenon have not employed anger direction as a measure of rally and this measure could be useful for studying the rally phenomenon in those instances when public surveys are not available. This indirect measure of the rally effect through change in anger is a methodological contribution to the literature. Second, inter-agency coordination has not been studied as a necessary condition for the rally and further testing in different political contexts can provide insights about its generalizability beyond Pakistan.

The findings of this thesis also have policy implications that could relate to both international and domestic crises. For the policy makers of the opponents of hybrid regimes, the

indicator of inter-agency coordination should serve as an expression of resolve, and this understanding can help in crisis bargaining. For the policy makers of hybrid regimes, the findings of this thesis imply the need of institutions for crisis situations because their signaling of resolve can only be stronger when it is according to institutions and not on the whim of civilian or military leadership. Lastly, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for inter-agency coordination in policy communication in effectively implementing the policies. The dissemination of competing information by the relevant agencies, such as the health ministry and the local administration, can undermine the support for a policy because there could be proponents of the information sent by each agency. In domestic crises it could also be more salient due to an increased interest in policies that affect the life of public as compared to crisis decisions that might not directly affect public's life until there is the use of force.

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Appendix A Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Press Releases and Prime Minister's Address to the Nation

MOFA May 2, 2011

In an intelligence driven operation, Osama Bin Ladin was killed in the surroundings of Abbotabad in the early hours of this morning. This operation was conducted by the US forces in accordance with declared US policy that Osama bin Ladin will be eliminated in a direct action by the US forces, wherever found in the world.

Earlier today, President Obama telephoned President Zardari on the successful US operation which resulted in killing of Osama bin Ladin.

Osama bin Ladin's death illustrates the resolve of the international community including Pakistan to fight and eliminate terrorism. It constitutes a major setback to terrorist organizations around the world.

Al-Qaeda had declared war on Pakistan. Scores of Al-Qaeda sponsored terrorist attacks resulted in deaths of thousands of innocent Pakistani men, women and children. Almost, 30,000 Pakistani civilians lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the last few years. More than 5,000 Pakistani security and armed forces officials have been martyred in Pakistan's campaign against Al-Qaeda, other terrorist organizations and affiliates.

Pakistan has played a significant role in efforts to eliminate terrorism. We have had extremely effective intelligence sharing arrangements with several intelligence agencies including that of the US. We will continue to support international efforts against terrorism.

It is Pakistan's stated policy that it will not allow its soil to be used in terrorist attacks against any country. Pakistan's political leadership, parliament, state institutions and the whole nation are fully united in their resolve to eliminate terrorism.

"Death Of Osama Bin Ladin." 2011. <http://mofa.gov.pk/death-of-osama-bin-ladin/> (April 4, 2011).

MOFA May 3, 2011

The Government of Pakistan recognizes that the death of Osama bin Ladin is an important milestone in fight against terrorism and that the Government of Pakistan and its state institutions have been making serious efforts to bring him to justice.

However, the Government of Pakistan categorically denies the media reports suggesting that its leadership, civil as well as military, had any prior knowledge of the US operation against Osama bin Ladin carried out in the early hours of 2nd May 2011.

Abbottabad and the surrounding areas have been under sharp focus of intelligence agencies since 2003 resulting in highly technical operation by ISI which led to the arrest of high value Al Qaeda target in 2004. As far as the target compound is concerned, ISI had been sharing information with CIA and other friendly intelligence agencies since 2009. The intelligence flow

indicating some foreigners in the surroundings of Abbottabad, continued till mid April 2011. It is important to highlight that taking advantage of much superior technological assets, CIA exploited the intelligence leads given by us to identify and reach Osama bin Ladin, a fact also acknowledged by the US President and Secretary of State, in their statements. It is also important to mention that CIA and some other friendly intelligence agencies have benefitted a great deal from the intelligence provided by ISI. ISI's own achievements against Al Qaeda and in War on Terror are more than any other intelligence agency in the World.

Reports about US helicopters taking off from Ghazi Airbase are absolutely false and incorrect. Neither any base or facility inside Pakistan was used by the US Forces, nor did Pakistan Army provide any operational or logistic assistance to these operations conducted by the US Forces. US helicopters entered Pakistani airspace making use of blind spots in the radar coverage due to hilly terrain. US helicopters' undetected flight into Pakistan was also facilitated by the mountainous terrain, efficacious use of latest technology and 'nap of the earth' flying techniques. It may not be realistic to draw an analogy between this undefended civilian area and some military / security installations which have elaborate local defence arrangements.

On receipt of information regarding the incident, PAF scrambled its jets within minutes. This has been corroborated by the White House Advisor Mr John Brennan who while replying to a question said, "We didn't contact the Pakistanis until after all of our people, all of our aircraft were out of Pakistani airspace. At the time, the Pakistanis were reacting to an incident that they knew was taking place in Abbottabad. Therefore, they were scrambling some of their assets. Clearly, we were concerned that if the Pakistanis decided to scramble jets or whatever else, they didn't know who were on those jets. They had no idea about who might have been on there, whether it be US or somebody else. So, we were watching and making sure that our people and our aircraft were able to get out of Pakistani airspace. And thankfully, there was no engagement with Pakistani forces. This operation was designed to minimize the prospects, the chances of engagement with Pakistani forces. It was done very well, and thankfully no Pakistani forces were engaged and there were no other individuals who were killed aside from those on the compound."

There has been a lot of discussion about the nature of the targeted compound, particularly its high walls and its vicinity to the areas housing Pakistan Army elements. It needs to be appreciated that many houses occupied by the affectees of operations in FATA / KPK, have high boundary walls, in line with their culture of privacy and security. Houses with such layout and structural details are not a rarity.

Questions have also been asked about the whereabouts of the family members of Osama bin Ladin. They are all in safe hands and being looked after in accordance with law. Some of them needing medical care are under treatment in the best possible facilities. As per policy, they will be handed over to their countries of origin.

Notwithstanding the above, the Government of Pakistan expresses its deep concerns and reservations on the manner in which the Government of the United States carried out this operation without prior information or authorization from the Government of Pakistan.

This event of unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule. The Government of Pakistan further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the US. Such actions undermine cooperation and may also sometime constitute threat to international peace and security.

Pakistan, being mindful of its international obligations, has been extending full and proper cooperation on all counter terrorism efforts including exchange of information and intelligence. Pursuant to such cooperation, Pakistan had arrested several high profile terrorists.

The Government of Pakistan and its Armed Forces consider support of the people of Pakistan to be its mainstay and actual strength. Any actions contrary to their aspirations, therefore, run against the very basis on which the edifice of national defence and security is based. Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies have played a pivotal role in breaking the back of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Pakistan as well as around the World. Most of the successes achieved by the US and some other friendly countries have been the result of effective intelligence cooperation and extremely useful military support by Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan and its security forces have resolved to continue their fight against terrorism till people of Pakistan can live in peace and security.

“Death Of Osama Bin Ladin-Respect For Pakistan’s Established Policy Parameters On Counter Terrorism.” 2011. <http://mofa.gov.pk/death-of-osama-bin-ladin-respect-for-pakistan%E2%AC%80%AC-established-policy-parameters-on-counter-terrorism/>.

MOFA May 7, 2011

The Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani today held extensive consultations with the President, the Defence Minister, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Chief of the Army Staff on the situation arising from the Abbottabad operation resulting in the death of Osama Bin Laden. The situation was comprehensively reviewed in the perspective of Pakistan’s national security and foreign policy.

The Prime Minister will take the nation into confidence through the platform of the Parliament on Monday 9th May, 2011 and looks forward to a full debate on the matter on the floor of the House.

The Prime Minister emphasized during these consultations that the sole criteria for formulating our stance is safeguarding of Pakistan’s supreme national interests, by all means, by all state institutions, in accordance with the aspirations of the people of Pakistan, who above all value their dignity and honour.

“Abbottabad Operation: Press Release Issued By The PM House Today. – Ministry Of Foreign Affairs.” 2011. <http://mofa.gov.pk/abbottabad-operation-press-release-issued-by-the-pm-house-today/> (April 4, 2021).

MOFA May 13, 2011

Federal Ministers,

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Chiefs of the Defence Forces,
Federal Secretaries.

National Security is a sacred duty. This Committee is the highest forum to assess, review and take decisions on all National Security issues.

On 2nd May 2011, the US Forces carried out a covert operation in Abbottabad which resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden. This development has raised several serious questions which are being debated internationally and more specifically in the US and Pakistan.

Questions relating to our defence preparedness; capability of our intelligence agencies; our possible response to a repeat of such action as well as legal and moral issues pertaining to sovereignty and propriety, are not only being asked but are also a cause of anxiety and concern to the people of Pakistan.

I have in my Policy Statement to the National Assembly taken the Nation into confidence on the Government's position and addressed some of these issues. I have also called for a Joint Session of the Parliament in-camera whereby the representatives of the people could have an opportunity to get answers to the questions that they may have.

Besides the public discourse, it is certainly my intention that the DCC evaluates in a comprehensive manner the situation arising from the Abbottabad operation and take such decisions as are necessary to augment National Security.

Evidently, there are two aspects that must be considered in depth. One, is the implications for National Security and Two, implications for our Foreign Policy.

Well-considered, cohesive and an effective strategy must be worked out with an eye to the future.

I am of the view that we should learn from the past but after drawing the lessons must plan for the future.

We must collectively as a nation close our ranks, have confidence in our collective strength and do all that is necessary and good not only for Pakistan but for promoting regional stability, security and peace.

It is imperative that all arms of the Government i.e. both Civil and Military with the full support of the Parliament and the people of Pakistan, work together to the best of their ability to safeguard Pakistan's sovereignty, security and for promoting Pakistan's national interests.

I would now ask the Foreign Secretary to give us a briefing on the implications of this development in the Foreign Policy domain.

“Opening Remarks Of The Prime Minister At The Meeting Of The Defence Committee Of The Cabinet (DCC).” 2011. <http://mofa.gov.pk/opening-remarks-of-the-prime-minister-at-the-meeting-of-the-defence-committee-of-the-cabinet-dcc-12-may-2011/> (April 4, 2021).

MOFA May 13, 2011

The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) met under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani on 12 May 2011 at the Prime Minister's House.

Prime Minister in his opening remarks emphasized the importance of ensuring national security and protection of national interests by all state institutions, with the full support of the people.

The DCC comprehensively discussed the situation arising from the US Forces' covert operation of 2 May 2011 in the surroundings of Abbottabad and the killing of Osama bin Laden.

After in-depth discussions on national security and foreign policy aspects, the DCC underscored the following:

a. Safeguarding of Pakistan's sovereignty and national security is a sacred duty, which will be ensured at all costs.

b. Pakistan remains firmly committed to eliminating all forms and manifestations of terrorism and in this regard reiterated the importance of international cooperation.

c. Condemned the US unilateral action in Abbottabad in violation of Pakistan's sovereignty.

d. Has decided to institute an inter-agency process to clearly define the parameters of our cooperation with the US in counter-terrorism, in accordance with Pakistan's national interests and the aspirations of the people.

e. Pakistanis capable and shall respond appropriately to any challenge to national security, with the full support of the people.

f. Reiterated Pakistan's readiness to cooperate with the international community in promoting effective joint cooperation in countering terrorism. This cooperation will be predicated on Pakistan's security interest.

g. Emphasized the paramount importance of respect for Pakistan's sovereignty, the need for adopting a partnership approach that is based on mutual respect and mutual trust. Unilateralism is strongly rejected.

h. In the external domain, Pakistan will continue to take all appropriate steps to promote regional stability, peace and security, broaden and deepen its engagement with regional states as well as with major powers.

The DCC resolutely reaffirmed the determination of the Government to safeguard national honour and interests at all costs.

Islamabad

13 May 2011

“Press Statement Of The Defense Committee Of The Cabinet.” 2011.
<http://mofa.gov.pk/press-statement-of-the-defense-committee-of-the-cabinet-12-may-2011/>
 (April 4, 2021).

MOFA May 14, 2011

The Senate of Pakistan and the National Assembly, in a Joint Session held on 13-14 May 2011, considered the situation arising from the unilateral US forces action in Abbottabad on 2 May 2011.

After an in-depth discussion, including presentations made on the relevant issues by the Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence, Director General Military Operations and Deputy Chief of Air Staff Operations, the Joint Session of Parliament resolved as under:

Condemned the US unilateral action in Abbottabad, which constitutes a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty;

Strongly asserted that unilateral actions, such as those conducted by the US forces in Abbottabad, as well as the continued drone attacks on the territory of Pakistan, are not only unacceptable but also constitute violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and humanitarian norms and such drone attacks must be stopped forthwith, failing which the Government will be constrained to consider taking necessary steps including withdrawal of transit facility allowed to NATO/ISAF forces;

Determined that unilateral actions cannot advance the global cause of elimination of terrorism, and the people of Pakistan will no longer tolerate such actions and repeat of unilateral measures could have dire consequences for peace and security in the region and the world.

Reaffirmed the resolve of the people and Government of Pakistan to uphold Pakistan’s sovereignty and national security, which is a sacred duty, at all costs;

Affirmed the resolve of the people and state institutions of Pakistan to safeguard Pakistan’s national interests and strategic assets and, in this context, underscored that any action to the contrary will warrant a strong national response;

Expressed its deep distress on the campaign to malign Pakistan, launched by certain quarters in other countries without appreciating Pakistan’s determined efforts and immense sacrifices in combating terror and the fact that more than thirty thousand Pakistani innocent men, women and children and more than five thousand security and armed forces personnel had lost their lives, that is more than any other single country, in the fight against terror and the blowback emanating from actions of the NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan;

Called upon the Government to ensure that the principles of an independent foreign policy must be grounded in strict adherence to the principles of policy, as stated in Article 40 of the Constitution, the UN Charter, observance of international law and respect for the free will and aspirations of sovereign states and their peoples;

Further Called upon the Government to re-visit and review its terms of engagement with the United States, with a view to ensuring that Pakistan's national interests are fully respected and accommodated in pursuit of policies for countering terrorism and achieving reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan;

Affirmed the importance of international cooperation for eliminating international terrorism, which can only be carried forward on the basis of a true partnership approach, based on equality, mutual respect and mutual trust;

Affirmed Also full confidence in the defence forces of Pakistan in safeguarding Pakistan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and in overcoming any challenge to security, with the full support of the people and Government of Pakistan.

Reaffirmed the Resolution passed by the Joint Sitting of the Parliament on National Security held on 22 October 2008 and the detailed recommendations made by the Parliamentary Committee on National Security in April 2009.

Called upon the Government to appoint an independent Commission on the Abbottabad operation, fix responsibility and recommend necessary measures to ensure that such an incident does not recur. The composition/modalities of the Commission will be settled after consultations between the Leader of the House and the Leader of the Opposition.

“Resolution Adopted By The Joint Session Of Parliament.” 2011. <http://mofa.gov.pk/resolution-adopted-by-the-joint-session-of-parliament-on-14-may-2011/> (April 4, 2021).

MOFA December 9, 2011

Ambassador Cameron Munter of the United States of America, called on Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, today. The Ambassador discussed the current status of bilateral relations between Pakistan and the US.

The Foreign Minister stated that relations between the two countries must be based on mutual respect. She added that the recent incidents have led to a re-evaluation of our terms of engagement.

The US Ambassador assured the Foreign Minister of an early conclusion of the investigation into the tragic incident on November 26 and to work together with the Government of Pakistan to normalize the relationship at the earliest.

“US Ambassador Calls On Foreign Minister.” 2011. <http://mofa.gov.pk/us-ambassador-calls-on-foreign-minister-3/> (April 4, 2021).

MOFA September 22, 2016

Opening Remarks

Bismillah IrRehman NirRahim

Distinguished Friends, Ladies & Gentlemen! Assalaam Alaikum!

Since we last gathered on 8 September for the briefing, the situation of human rights violations has reached alarming levels and Indian occupying forces' atrocities have taken toll of over 18 innocent Kashmiris' lives and inflicted injuries to thousands, including continued use of pellet guns to cause injuries to the eyes. We condemn the continued killing of Kashmiris, including children, and call upon the UN Secretary General, UN Human Rights High Commissioner and International Community, particularly, the civil societies and those spearhead causes of human rights to condemn killing of innocent Kashmiris and take steps to stop Indian bloodshed in IOK.

The Prime Minister is in New York and addressed the 71st UNGA session yesterday. His address mainly focused on highlighting the plight of Kashmiris at the hands of Indian occupation forces. He underlined that a new generation of Kashmiris has risen indigenously and spontaneously against India's illegal occupation. He informed the UNGA that a dossier on Indian atrocities in IOK will be shared to UNSG. He reaffirmed Pakistan's steadfast and unflinching support to the Kashmiris' demand for self-determination. He demanded an independent inquiry into extra judicial killing and UN's Fact Finding Mission to investigate HR violations by India in IOK. He urged resolution of Kashmir dispute in accordance with the longstanding unimplemented UNSC Resolutions, which promise the people of Kashmir to exercise their right to self-determination under a UN supervised plebiscite.

Indian media attributed to the Nepal's Prime Minister a statement in which he made negative remarks about Pakistan's alleged involvement in terrorism. Let me share with you Nepali Spokesperson's Press Release, which reads:

“The attention of the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers Government of Nepal has been drawn to the reported misinterpretation of the interview of Rt. Hon. Prime Minister of Nepal Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' with the NewsX channel of India taken during his recent State Visit to India.

During the interview, the Prime Minister talked about the matters relating to the cooperation in security issues between Nepal and India and effective implementation of the policy already derived. The interviewer unnecessarily drew the reference to alleged third country support to terror networks. What the Prime Minister said in reply was only meant to refer to the support of the Government of Nepal in controlling Nepal-India cross-border criminal activities. He did not

intend to acknowledge the involvement of any third country whatsoever. The Government of Nepal dissociates itself from any wrong interpretation of the interview.

Nepal enjoys friendly and cordial relations with its neighbours based on goodwill, friendship and mutual understanding that have grown over the decades to the mutual satisfaction.

You may recall that after Dhaka Bakery attack also, it was Indian media, which quoted Bangladeshi Minister Prof Gowher Rizvi that he made remarks about Pakistan's involvement. Prof Rizvi personally refuted Indian media claim as 'utter nonsense.' The character of Indian media and the ethics followed by them is also visible in the hype it created after Uri's reported incident.

We saw a condemnable terrorist attack, last Friday, on a local Masjid in Mohmand Agency in which more than 35 people were killed and scores were injured. We pray for the victims, extend our heartfelt condolences and sympathize with the bereaved families.

We are proud of Mr. Haider Ali who won Bronze Medal at Paralympic Games in Rio this year, and shared the new world record of 6.44 meter jump. He had won silver medal in 2008 Summer Paralympics in Beijing which was the first ever Paralympics medal and created history.

Floor is now open for questions!

Question:

My question is with regard to the military movement/preparedness on Line of Control, especially when there are reports of Pakistan's airspace closing down in the Northern Areas. We also heard about India's military repositioning at Uri. Is there anything from Pakistani side that you could update us on the military build-up by Pakistan? (Shaima Khalil (BBC))

Answer:

You referred to some exercises on Pakistan's side. Let me tell you that these are routine exercises. With regard to the other part of your question, we have seen all those inflammatory

and irresponsible statements emanating from India coupled with hype created by Indian media. Pakistan is a peace loving country, and we pursue our Prime Minister's vision of peaceful neighborhood. Having said that, let me be clear that our armed forces and the entire nation of Pakistan remain ready to defend our country's sovereignty and territorial integrity at all costs.

(Sir just to be clear, what you are saying is that the airspace closure of yesterday was a routine exercise, and nothing to do with the possibility of an air strike – Shaima Khalil)

I have already mentioned that they were part of routine exercises, which we undertake regularly.

Question:

Sir, I have three questions:

(i) In a recent operation by security forces in Rajanpur which borders Balochistan and Punjab region in Pakistan, police have apprehended a number of terrorists with Indian-made weapons. Indian terror financing in Pakistan is also visible. Your comments please.

(ii) Our High Commissioner in India, Mr. Abdul Basit was summoned in New Delhi yesterday, and was handed over a demarche by Indian authorities. We have also seen reports wherein India has suggested that if Pakistan wants to investigate Uri attack, it is ready to share DNA results, and expects a response from Pakistan. Would Pakistan give a response?

(iii) We have seen that war clouds have shrouded South Asia, what diplomatic efforts have Pakistan made to avoid even the remote possibility of a war in South Asia. (Shaukat Paracha – Aaj TV)

Answer:

I have already replied to the third part of your question.

With regard to the first part of your question, we have been consistently highlighting India's role in subversive and terrorist activities in Pakistan. You may recall that few months back, our law enforcement agencies apprehended Indian intelligence agency, RAW's officer, Kulbhushan Yadav, who confessed Indian role in terrorist activities in Pakistan especially in Balochistan and Karachi. The recent statement by the Indian Prime Minister on the Independence Day of India was yet another proof of Indian involvement in perpetrating terrorism and terror financing in Pakistan. We have shared dossiers last year with the UN Secretary General as well as the US Government in this regard. We will keep the international community informed regarding fresh evidences, indicating Indian involvement in subversive and terrorist activities in Pakistan.

For your second question, I would like to refer you to Adviser Sartaj Aziz's recent statement on Uri attack. Minutes after the attack, the Indian authorities blamed Pakistan for the incident without even investigating the matter. It is either a strategy or a matter of habit on their part to blame Pakistan for any incident in India, especially in IOK.

We totally reject these unfounded, baseless and uninvestigated accusations leveled against Pakistan. First of all, Pakistan has nothing to gain from such incidents. Secondly, we must understand the backdrop and context of occurrence of such incidents. Look at the current situation in Indian Occupied Kashmir, where gross violation of human rights have been carried out by Indian occupation forces on innocent Kashmiris with impunity. This has attracted attention of the entire world community. I am not sure if you are aware of dozens of demonstrations, though peaceful, held in UK, across Europe, Canada and many other parts of the world by the civil society members, Kashmiri and Pakistani Diaspora and Member Parliaments, highlighting the grave human rights situation in IOK. The recent statements by UN Secretary General, OIC Secretary General, in particular, and UN Human Rights High Commissioner, condemning and expressing deep concern at the atrocities in Kashmir, are a testimony to this effect. India has been making desperate attempts to divert the world attention from the situation in IOK.

Also, I would like you to refer to certain incidents in the recent past like Samjhauta Express terrorist attack of 2007, when India was quick in blaming Pakistan for the incident, but had the tables turned on itself when in 2010, leader of their extremist and terrorist organization RSS, Swami Aseemanand, confessed that he was the mastermind behind the terrorist attack. He also publicly stated that Col Parohit, active service Army officer, who heads the terrorist organization, Abhinav Bharat, along with other army personnel were also with him. There are many other such terrorist incidents, which India blamed on others and later it turned out to be their own handiwork, like Chattisinghpura incident of March 2000, Maachil 2010 episode of extra-judicial killing of three young indigenous Kashmiris blamed as infiltrators, Makkah Masjid blast, Malegaon attack and so on. You have to keep all this in mind.

Question:

Has US approached Pakistan in Abdul Rahimi's investigation case, the man arrested for the recent terrorist attack in New York? (Qasim Noman – Wall Street Journal)

Answer:

Let me give you some facts first. The man who has been arrested is an Afghan origin US national. He has been living in the US since 1995. You are aware that hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees reside in Quetta, and everyday scores of them cross into their motherland. Even those Afghans who reside in other countries transit through Pakistan to reach Afghanistan. So, there is nothing unusual about it. It had been reported that his wife is a Pakistani. This information is incorrect. According to the preliminary information gathered, she is also an Afghan national, born in Kabul in 1991.

These matters are in the domain of Ministry of Interior.

Question:

I have two questions. First, India has decided to give Indian nationality to BLA Chief Brahmadagh Bugti. He will apply for the passport at the Indian High Commission in Geneva. Your comments. Second, Some US Congressmen like Bob Corner and State officials like Spokesperson, Richard Olson, etc remain critical of Pakistan and toe the Indian line. Has Pakistan firmly asked them to stop the rhetoric or give concrete proof that we are not indiscriminate? (Amjad Ali – PTV News)

Answer:

With regard to your first question, while we have seen the media reports in this regard, such developments add to the fact that India is deeply involved in stirring up situation in Balochistan through terror financing and perpetrating terrorism in Pakistan.

As for your second question, Pakistan's leadership has, time and again, reiterated our resolve not to allow anyone to use Pakistan's territory for planning or staging terrorist activities against any other country. Through successful operation Zarb-e-Azb, we have been able to clear FATA of all terrorist groups without discrimination. As part of National Action Plan, Pakistan has also carried out intelligence driven law enforcement operations indiscriminately against terrorist elements. There is widespread recognition and appreciation of the world, including the US, on Pakistan's successes as well as our sacrifices in the counter-terrorism efforts. Where there are numerous friends of Pakistan in the US ranks, there are some odd detractors as well.

Question:

In Indian city of Bajnour, four Muslims have been martyred by extremist Hindus. How do you see this increasing extremism in India against Muslims? (Khawaja Nayyar Iqbal – Kashmir Post)

Answer:

Rising incidents of intolerance particularly against Muslims in India has attracted the world with serious concerns expressed by number of countries. We have seen numerous reports on incidents of killing of innocent people for slaughtering cows and eating beef.

World has been watching that BJP led government has used anti-Muslim rhetoric to isolate Muslims not only politically but also socio-economically. A number of well known academicians, scholars, artists and civil society members have returned their awards to the Indian government due to state-sponsored phenomenon of intolerance and terrorizing of Muslims.

Question:

Could you tell us as to how many countries are supporting Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute? (We are aware of China and Turkey's support). Also, what is the net result of Pakistan's campaign to highlight the cause of Kashmir in the international community? (Kausar Lodhi – Prime News)

Answer:

The plight of Kashmiri people, who have lost over 100,000 precious lives in the course of their struggle to achieve the right of self-determination, is an open book for the world community to witness. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has expressed full support to the cause of Kashmir, and we are committed to highlight this issue at every regional and international forum and take up the issue of human rights violations and Indian occupation forces' atrocities in IOK in every bilateral interaction.

With regard to your question, a large number of countries have supported Pakistan on Kashmir. OIC alone is a conglomerate of 57 countries, which has supported Kashmiris' indigenous struggle in unequivocal terms. Pakistan leads the issue of Kashmir because we are party to the dispute and are committed to see a peaceful resolution of the issue under the ambit of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and wishes of the Kashmiri people.

I would also refer to Premier Li Keqiang's statement of yesterday, in which he has reassured Pakistan of China's full support on our stance on Kashmir, and has called on the international community to recognize the severity of the issue. Italian Defense Minister, on her recent visit to Pakistan, condemned atrocities in IOK. She stressed that her country would not tolerate such incidents of gross human rights violations, and would take steps to sensitize people around the world about the grave situation in IOK. PM's Special Envoys on Kashmir are making strident efforts to apprise the world community of India's massive and tragic atrocities in IOK. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has sensitized the world gathered at this year's UN General Assembly session about the plight of hapless Kashmiris and why the world cannot leave their calls of help unattended anymore.

This is an encouraging account of where we stand on raising the issue of Kashmir at the global level. Let me remind you that Kashmir is an international dispute and the only viable solution to this dispute can be through implementation of UN Security Council resolutions on this issue.

Question:

A prominent pro-India Kashmiri politician Tariq Hameed Karra has resigned from India's parliament and from his regional party to protest a government crackdown in the Indian occupied Kashmir that prevented people from offering Eid prayers for the first time in the region. Your comments. (Tariq Mehmood – Samaa TV)

Answer:

The action of Mr. Tariq Hameed Karra speaks for itself. He was one of the founding members of Peoples Democratic Party, the ruling party in IOK, and a member of the Indian Parliament from IOK. On September 15, 2016 he resigned from his Lok Sabha seat as well as from the Party in protest of the Indian atrocities in IOK, describing situation as “much worse than Nazi forces”. Besides, international community’s condemnation over the atrocities unleashed on defenceless Kashmiris, a number of politicians, academicians, journalists and human rights activists in India have also condemned Indian brutalities in IOK.

Question:

Adviser Sartaj Aziz had earlier said that Pakistan would hand over a dossier to UN Secretary General about India’s interference in Pakistan’s internal matters, evident from Kulbhashan Yadav’s apprehension by security forces earlier this year. Have we presented any such dossier during this year’s UNGA Session? (Fayyaz Raja – Channel 92)

Answer:

I have repeatedly replied to this question. These kinds of matters take their own time to be completed. Once the propitious time has arrived, and the investigation is ready to be shared, it will be done. But dossier or no dossier, this is public information that India has repeatedly been caught in terror financing, and instigating subversive activities in Pakistan. A recent example is Indian intelligence agency RAW’s officer, Kulbhushan Yadav’s public confession. It is only a matter of time when the evidence will be shared with the UN Secretary General.

Question:

My question relates to Mr. Fayyaz Raja’s question. What I have understood is that Pakistan is waiting for the right time to present Yadav’s case to the UN. On the other hand, we see that India blamed Pakistan for Uri attack without any proof, gave vitriolic statements against Pakistan in the wake of this attack, and we have even heard some media reports suggesting that India may not turn up at the upcoming SAARC Summit. Your comments please. (Asghar Ali Mubarik – Daily Mail, Islamabad)

Answer:

About participation in SAARC, what you are referring to are media reports, on which I would not comment. We have not received any official intimation in this regard. Pakistan is preparing for the Summit. With regard to the Uri attack, it is highly irresponsible on the part of India to accuse Pakistan without any proof, which has been happening now for quite some time as I mentioned earlier.

As for the dossier, it is not about waiting. We have already taken up the issue of Indian involvement in perpetrating terrorist activities and terror financing in Pakistan last year with the UN, where we submitted three dossiers to this effect. India has mere words but we have irrefutable proof of India's involvement in perpetrating terrorist activities in Pakistan.

Question:

Indian media has reported that Prime Minister Modi will not be attending the upcoming SAARC Summit. Has anything been conveyed officially to us in this regard, as to who will represent India at the SAARC Summit? (Essa Naqvi – Dunya TV)

Answer:

I am not aware of any official intimation in this regard.

Question

My question is about the stranded Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia, many of whom have returned through several flights. But their arrears have not been paid to them, so what about the sureties given to them in this regard?

My second question is that when Prime Minister met Saudi authorities in New York, a statement was issued that if there is any threat to the security of Saudi Arabia Pakistan will defend it. My question is that if there is a threat to our territorial integrity and sovereignty whether Saudi Arabia will defend us? (Anwar Abbas- Waqt News)

Answer:

First of all, I have responded to your first question number of times. Pakistani workers were facing financial difficulties in Saudi Arabia not because of the Saudi Government but due to the fact that some private companies are facing a financial crunch and are unable to pay remunerations to their employees. These workers are not only from Pakistan but from various other countries too. Saudi Arabia is providing employment to people from across the world; from Pakistan alone there are 2.8 million people employed in that country. Now as for the assurances, I have already mentioned that Saudi government came out to assist and extend their cooperation to those people who were facing problems. I am aware that they initially announced assistance of 100 million Riyal for these people, besides instructing those companies to provide medical facilities, food and financial assistance to their workers as long as their problems were not resolved. Saudi government also extended cooperation by not saying anything to those workers whose contracts had been expired. They also said that Saudi Government will give NOC to those who can find employment in other companies. Moreover, their Labor Ministry established desks in all those camps where these people were residing to help them file their claims and also prepare attorneys. So while you are talking about the assurances, this is their assurance. Now the attorneys will be pursuing their cases. The attorney could be their colleagues, own kith and kin, embassy of Pakistan or their friends. On top of that, all those who wanted to return to Pakistan are being facilitated by the Saudi government. They have borne the expenditures of their transportation to Pakistan.

Question:

In view of the current situation between India and Pakistan, what is the status of the visitors between the two countries especially at Khokhrapar, Wagah and Chakothi?

Secondly, what will be your advice to the Pakistani travelers to India in view of this current situation? (Zarghoon Shah -Geo TV)

Answer:

We have not issued any traveler advisory and I have also not seen any travel advisory, which has been issued by the Indian side. I don't have the statistics you are seeking.

With regard to the second question, you will have to ask Ministry of Interior for specific information. It is Ministry of Interior which monitors all the entry points to and from Pakistan, so you can check with them about the number of visitors crossing between the two countries. It also depends on the tendency to issue visas to nationals of each other's countries by the respective High Commissions.

Question:

Earlier this year Pakistan cooperated with India on Pathankot attack. We had sent a team to India for investigation. Is there any chance Pakistan will take part in the investigation of Uri attack, given the backdrop you talked about and the aggressive rhetoric exchanged between the two sides.

The other thing is about Indian media, I have heard from Indian media about the military buildup on their side of LoC. I am just wondering if you could tell us about the military buildup on this side of the LoC and on the possibility of a military exchange?

US government yesterday moved a Bill to call Pakistan a State sponsoring terrorism and President Obama has 90 days to submit the report. I would like your comment on that.

The other question is about the wife of Rahimi. You said that she is not a Pakistani but she is of an Afghan origin. But does she reside in Pakistan or is she in Pakistan now? (Shaima Khalil-BBC)

Answer:

As regard the last question I am not aware of it. If you wish to know, then please ask Ministry of Interior about it. We have millions of Afghan refugees who are here for a very long time and an equal number of people without any residence permit or refugee status.

You mentioned about the Bill in the US. I have responded about Pakistan's commitment to deal with the menace of terrorism. We do not discriminate between terrorists. The success of Zarb e Azab has been mentioned time and again and the acknowledgment which we have received from all across the world including the US. Secretary of State John Kerry, who called on Prime

Minister in New York, has appreciated our efforts. Japanese Prime Minister in his meeting with our Prime Minister acknowledged this too. And so did all those who met the Prime Minister. Senator John McCain was here with other Congressmen; they took turns to register their appreciation of Pakistan's success and commitment in eliminating terrorism especially from those areas which have never been under control even by the world's most powerful empires. So I think that I need not go into the details of that.

With regard to your first question, you have seen our spirit of cooperation. When the Indians approached us with the formal requests in the case of Mumbai attacks, we extended full cooperation despite the fact that it was India, which was lacking in terms of responding to Pakistan's requirements. In case of Pathankot attack we also sent our team over there. Thus, we have extended cooperation in the two instances. Regarding the currently reported incident, your question is speculative.

“Record Of The Press Briefing By Spokesperson On 22 September 2016.” 2016.

<http://mofa.gov.pk/record-of-the-press-briefing-by-spokesperson-on-22-september-2016/> (April 4, 2021).

MOFA September 29, 2016

Opening Remarks

Bismillah IrRehman NirRahim Assalaam Alaikum Friends!

It has been 83 days now and with each passing day Indian atrocities on defenceless Kashmiris are adding to the list of martyrs (over 110), victims with eye injuries (over 800) and other injuries (around 12,000). India has unleashed state terrorism, committing crimes against humanity with impunity, which the international community is watching. Hurriyat leaders remain in detention, and forced disappearances continuing.

Indian hatred against innocent Kashmiris and inability of more than 700,000 fully equipped Indian Occupation Forces to control Kashmiri youth, who are peacefully demanding their right to self-determination, has frustrated them so much that the Kashmiri students studying at Ganga Institute of Management and Technology Haryana are being persecuted by their counterparts and security guards in the campus at the behest of the Indian state. One student was so seriously injured that he is on the verge of incapacitation.

Pakistan remains committed to extending complete diplomatic, political and moral support to the Kashmiris' movement for self-determination.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's participation in the 71st UNGA Session was very productive. Not only did he effectively highlight and apprise the world community on the ongoing human rights violations in IoK by the Indian security forces, but he also met many world leaders on the sidelines to sensitize them on the Kashmiris' plight, and gathered political commitments from various world leaders on Kashmir issue.

Adviser to the Prime Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, also met various dignitaries and effectively raised the case of Kashmiris.

We welcome the first bilateral joint military exercises between Pakistan army and Russian Federation Ground Forces, currently being held in Pakistan from 24 September to 10 October 2016, which has been nick-named "Friendship 2016".

The arrival of four Iranian Naval Ships at the port of Karachi for a three-day visit is also warmly welcome. The Iranian Naval Officers will have professional interaction with their Pakistani counterparts.

Now the Floor is open for Questions

Question

We have seen that India had been trying to sabotage peace efforts in the region and Pakistan's offer for peace talks had been rejected time and again by India. How does Pakistan view India's hegemony in the region and pressurizing other regional countries for not taking part in the 19th SAARC Summit? (Fakhar-u-Rehman – Such TV)

Supplementary Question

India has refused to take part in the SAARC Conference which is a process for regional cooperation framework. What options Pakistan has left to take before the world to expose India? (Shahid Maitla – ARY News)

Answer

We have learnt about the India's unfortunate decision of not attending the Summit. India has a track record of impeding the SAARC process.

Indian intentions of creating hurdles is visible from the actions and statements at the political level during the last two months, coupled with coordinated media efforts.

India is desperate to divert the international community's attention from the atrocities and blatant human rights violations being committed by the Indian Occupation Forces in Indian Occupied Kashmir on defenseless Kashmiri Muslims. During the last eighty three days Indian Occupation Forces have martyred more than 100 innocent Kashmiris, including children, women and young men, caused injuries to the eyes of over 800 through use of Pellet guns, blinding many hundreds, either completely or partially, and injured more than 12000 people.

The Indian atrocities have attracted the world attention, which is manifested in the strong condemnations and calls by the international political and human rights organizations as also members of civil society from across the world for sending fact finding missions to the Indian Occupied Kashmir.

It may be pertinent to mention that the major thrust of SAARC activities is to uplift the socio-economic conditions of the people of South Asia, which has the highest concentration of the world's poor. India's negative attitude has had a direct bearing on the welfare and betterment in this region, which is highly regrettable.

Question

I have two questions. First, at the NAM Summit, Colombia wanted to move a resolution condemning North Korea but India blocked this move. This has exposed the infamous India-North Korea nuclear nexus. Your comments please.

Secondly, a short while ago the Indian DGMO in a statement said that India has conducted surgical strikes last night across the LoC. The statement further says that they have spoken to

Pakistan about it. Do you think that these surgical strikes are declaration of war from Indian side? Does Pakistan perceive it as an act of war by India? (Shaukat Paracha – Aaj TV)

Answer

With regard to your first question, we have seen these reports. We have also taken note of the report by the UN Security Council Committee, which oversees the implementation of sanctions on DPRK, regarding training of DPRK personnel in India. It is for India to explain the reason for its position during the NAM Summit in Venezuela. If you have excess, you may approach Indian concerned quarters directly for a reply.

On your second question, I am aware that there have been unprovoked violations on the LoC by the Indian security forces. Once we have more information on the issue, we will share it with you.

I have seen media reports, and noted two things, (a) that DG ISPR has given a statement on India's violation of LoC, and mentioned Shahadat of two army personnel; (b) that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has condemned unprovoked breach of the agreement on LoC by the Indian forces.

Question

According to media reports, India has befooled the entire world by declaring an accident blast in oil depot in Army Brigade Headquarters at the town of Uri near the LoC as terrorist attack. Disappointingly, massacre of Kashmiris has not been condemned by the so-called proponents of human rights while killing of the killers has made them express sorrow. Your comments. (Khawaja Nayaar Iqbal – Kashmir Post)

Answer

We cannot comment prior to independent investigation report of the Uri attack. If you recall, there was call for an independent inquiry into the Uri attack. I would ask you to see this reported incident in the context of two important backgrounds: (i) ongoing atrocities by Indian security forces in Indian occupied Kashmir and India's desperate attempt to divert world's attention from

the region; and (ii) India has demonstrated capability of staging terrorists attack on its soil and blaming it on others. We have seen time and again that India would blame another country for terrorist activity and somewhere down the line it would turn out to be the handiwork of its own security agencies. A glaring example of this is the Samjhauta Express terrorist attack in Feb 2007, the responsibility of which was later on admitted by leaders of India's own terrorist and extremist organizations namely; RSS and Abhinav Bharat. RSS Leader Swami Aseemanand's public confession in December 2010 exposed India. There are many more such incidents that Indian elements belonging to the two terrorist outfits mentioned in collaboration with Indian establishment and agencies carried out and blamed on others.

Question

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed that India has successfully isolated Pakistan and will intensify that effort so that it is completely isolated globally . Your comments. (Tariq Sial – Daily Times)

Answer

Pakistan cannot be isolated by mere statements of the Indian Prime Minister. Pakistan enjoys friendly and close relations with the comity of nations and Prime Minister of Pakistan's engagements on the sidelines of the 71st UNGA session in New York, China's massive investments, joint exercises with Russia, visit of Iranian Naval ships, signing of mega project agreements with Central Asian States, Russia, China and International Financial Institutions make Indian claim a laughing stock.

Question

India has done it in the past and wants to do it again in terms of choking Pakistan's water resources. Adviser Sartaj Aziz has stated that this is an act of aggression by India. How does Pakistan see this, as India has employed a systematic strategy to isolate Pakistan? (Essa Naqvi – Dunya TV)

Supplementary Question

Do you believe that India can build its dams in the next few months to restrict or affect water flow into Pakistan and violate the Indus Water Treaty?

Secondly, Kashmir has run out of food and medical facilities to cater to the injured Kashmiri civilians. Does Pakistan want to highlight this particular aspect of human rights violations in Kashmir to the world community? (Anwar Abbas – Waqat News)

Answer

As for your question on Indus Water Treaty, we have seen the media reports but have not received any formal communication on the matter.

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is not time barred and was never intended to be time or event specific. It is binding on both India and Pakistan and has no exit provision.

According to the sub-provisions (3) and (4) of the Article XII of the IWT, the Treaty cannot be altered or revoked unilaterally.

There is an Arbitration mechanism provided in IWT to resolve the disputes related to the implementation of the Treaty. This mechanism has been utilized by Indian and Pakistan to resolve many Indus water related disputes amicably. India cannot unilaterally revoke IWT as it would undermine India's international standing.

Pakistan is closely monitoring the situation and would respond accordingly.

As to your second question, given the grave situation with constant curfew, media blackout, Kashmiris have run out of food and medical facilities. Kashmiris are being injured and killed constantly. On top of that while more than 700,000 Indian security forces have already been deployed in the region, Indian authorities are sending more troops every day.

Pakistan will continue to raise the issue of Indian brutalities in IoK at the UN, OIC and all other international forums as also with the HR Organizations across the world. A series of activities organized by the Kashmiri Diaspora and Self-Determination Movement Organizations across

Europe, Nordic region and North America with the support of local Parliamentarians, Pakistani Diaspora and Civil Society Members. PM's Special Envoys are undertaking visits to various Capitals and sensitizing the elected representatives there as well as members of the civil society and our Diaspora. International Community is constantly apprised and pursued to play its role to immediately end the bloodshed in the IoK. India has unleashed a reign of terror in IoK. We are sure that the international community cannot ignore such a genocide of Kashmiris by Indian occupation forces and fulfill its responsibly to ensure the realization of the right to self determination of the Kashmiri people, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. Pakistan remains committed to the Kashmiri people's cause.

Question

There have been reports about surgical strikes in LoC. Could you give us a more specific description of the level of escalation in the area? Do you expect more clashes, or military buildup leading on to further escalation of the situation?

Has the SAARC Summit been cancelled or postponed?

On the recent clashes in LoC, do you see any chance of diplomatic solution to this problem?

To the question of Indus Water Treaty, you have said that Pakistan is closely monitoring the situation and that India cannot unilaterally revoke the treaty? How realistic is the Indian threat to restrict Pakistan's water, or is it just mere speculations on the part of India? (Shaima Khalil – BBC)

Answer

I would respond to your last question first. I have just replied to the questions on Indus Water Treaty, which has been very clear and self explanatory.

As far as diplomatic efforts are concerned Pakistan has always called for dialogue, particularly with regard to the issue of Kashmir, for achieving lasting peace and stability in the region. During the recent atrocities in IoK, Pakistan has sent two letters to Indian Government for an exclusive dialogue on Kashmir with the view to resolve the longstanding issue. India has not

been forthcoming in accepting Pakistan's offers for dialogue. India's conditional approach to dialogue is unacceptable.

Before the current phase, and you will agree with me, there have been many occasions in the past where both India and Pakistan came very close to having exchange of visits to decide on dialogue process but India would back-track at the last minute from these commitments on the pretext of one excuse or the other.

Regarding your question on SAARC Summit, India has a track record of impeding the SAARC process. Whenever Summit has been postponed, each time any of the participating member states declines to participate in the SAARC Summit, it is postponed after a due process. In the history of SAARC Summits most of the postponements have been caused by India's negative attitude towards the SAARC process. Since the past two months, India had made it very clear through its state-administered media that it would back out from the Summit.

As to your first question regarding LoC, ceasefire violation by India without provocation did take place. India has admitted it. Once we have more details about it, we will definitely share with you.

Question

India claims that it had shared evidence on Uri attack with Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi yesterday. There are also reports that the High Commissioner responded in no time declaring that the evidence was false. Was this evidence shared in Islamabad at the highest level? Your comments please. (Mateen Haider – Dawn News)

Answer

Here, I want to draw a distinction between evidence and information. What they have shared with us is just a piece of paper. In the previous incidents too, there has been exchange of papers. We are waiting for details to come. Once received, we will look into the details and will share them accordingly.

Question

India's External Affairs Minister claimed Kashmir is an integral part of India, while speaking at the UNGA Session. She denied human rights violations in IoK as baseless. Your comments.
(Amjad Ali – PTV)

Answer

The statement by the Indian External Affairs Minister referring to Indian Occupied Jammu & Kashmir as an integral part of India is the denial of the UN Security Council resolutions calling for free, fair and impartial plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of the Jammu and Kashmir. It was an arrogant, irresponsible and highly regrettable act to discredit the sanctity of the UN Security Council Resolutions at the very UN Forum. The UN members should take note of it and should admonish India.

The Indian government cannot absolve itself from the killings of more than 110,000 innocent Kashmiri people since its occupation of IoK. Discovery of Mass Graves of thousands of indigenous Kashmiris, whom India killed by falsely labeling them as infiltrators, calls for initiation of case against India for committing crimes against humanity.

We condemn the grave human rights violations being perpetrated by the Indian Occupation forces in the IoK. Pakistan's call for a free and impartial investigation through the Fact Finding Mission of the United Nations to ensure the accountability for brutalities in IoK has been joined by the calls by the UN Human Rights Commissioner, OIC, Members of OIC Contact Group on Kashmir and civil society from across the world.

Question

My question is about the growing nexus between India and Baloch separatist leaders. In an interview, Baloch separatist leader Dr. Allah Nazar asked New Delhi and the whole world to support them with cash and arms against Pakistan. He also said that they will continue sabotaging CPEC projects. What's your stance on this?

Secondly, there are reports that there has been an exchange of fire along Pak-Afghan border. Has Pakistan contacted Kabul in this regard? (Muddassar Hussain – Khyber TV)

Answer

As regard Pak-Afghan border, we have a mechanism in place and whenever anything of this sort happens, we discuss such incidents under that arrangement.

You also mentioned about India's nexus with 2-3 Baloch men. We have raised this issue many times on various occasions and have also submitted dossiers to the UNSG last year which containing evidence of Indian involvement in terrorism inside Pakistan, particularly the Indian involvement in stirring up the situation in Balochistan. I think now everything is crystal-clear after the arrest of Kulbushan Yadav, Indian intelligence agency, RAW's officer, and his public confession, Indian Prime Minister's Independence-Day statement, and the statements by 1-2 odd Baloch elements, who are enjoying perks and living abroad. They are paid for vilifying Pakistan, and they even applied for India's nationality. What else do you need to establish a clear connection between India and those elements which are disturbing peace in Pakistan and carrying out terrorist activities? To me it's very clear and it should also be very clear to you as well.

Question

We say that there was a violation of LoC last night and India says that they have carried out surgical strikes. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has termed it a blatant violation of peace on LoC. What really happened there? What was the real incident, can you please describe it?

Supplementary Question

My question is about our efforts to highlight the Kashmir issue with special reference to PM's Special Envoys, like writing letters to the world leaders. During the UN session, did we receive any response from the leaders and delegations of those countries?

Secondly, as regard the SAARC Summit when India declined to attend it, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan also followed suit and declined to attend the Summit. I want to ask that what was the status of these countries' participation before the Indian refusal, whether they had agreed to participate or not? (Majid Jarral – News One)

Answer

With regard to your question about SAARC, all member countries had actually agreed to participate. It is only once the countries principally agree on the venue and dates that the final dates of the Summit are fixed. So in this case, all member states agreed to hold this year's Summit in Pakistan.

Pertaining to the efforts of our Envoys on Kashmir, I have earlier mentioned about it in a very detailed manner that the process of sending the Envoys has started. Before the Envoy reaches the capital, his meetings have to be arranged with the parliamentarians, at other political levels and their interactions with the civil society. When the UNGA happened, the process had just started. Only one Envoy, MNA Mr. Awais Leghari was on visit to the specified country at that time. It is a continuous process. You can't expect solution or result overnight. These efforts are ongoing, and Kashmiris are paying the price for their demand of self-determination with their lives and blood. But one thing is constant, and that is our commitment to the cause of Kashmir, and raising the issue of Kashmiris' sufferings at the hands of Indian security forces at all forums.

Question

Since India has tried to sabotage SAARC process, has Pakistan any intention to hold any other conference with other countries of the region like Iran or China? (Asghar Ali Mubarak – Daily Mail Islamabad)

Answer

I have said this thing many times that Pakistan believes in regional peace and stability. Pakistan pursues the policy of peace with its neighbors. We do not believe in spending our resources and energy on the activities which are detrimental to the peace and development of the region unlike one country. Pakistan considers it has a very unique role to play in the connectivity of the entire region including South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. Pakistan would like to exploit this potential of regional connectivity more than using our energies towards undertaking activities just to teach lesson to one country. This is unlike that country, which is constantly engaged in vilification campaigns against Pakistan, and remains involved in undertaking all measures to sabotage peace-building efforts in the region.

Notwithstanding this, we already have a number of cooperative mechanisms in place. Just to refer a few, we are part of CAREC, ECO, SCO, ACD, etc. We will definitely undertake all such measures which will help in promoting development and cooperation in this region.

Question

My question pertains to the upcoming Afghanistan Conference in Brussels. There were earlier reports that Adviser Sartaj Aziz would represent Pakistan in the Conference. Would Adviser Aziz talk about the revival of QCG process in the meeting? Is there any plan for a bilateral meeting with Afghan leadership on the sidelines? (Naveed Akbar – Dunya Newspaper)

Supplementary Question

Afghanistan has been growing its bilateral ties with India at the cost of those with Pakistan. How do you see this, especially when Pakistan is hosting around three million Afghan refugees in his country? (Essa Naqvi – Daily Dunya)

Answer

With regard to Afghanistan Conference in Brussels, I do not have any details about who will represent Pakistan. If we have an invitation, we may attend the conference.

On QCG, we must understand that it is a process for facilitating peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan through negotiations. It is essentially an intra-Afghan issue. Pakistan is committed to lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan through peaceful dialogue, and has been part of various initiatives to fulfill this objective. QCG members Pakistan, US, China and Afghanistan have stated their interest in QCG process for peace in Afghanistan.

At this time I cannot say whether there will be a bilateral meeting with Afghanistan leadership, but such occasions are generally used to hold bilateral meetings on the sidelines.

To your supplementary question on Afghanistan, we do't comment on relations between the two sovereign states. However, our only concern is that no country should allow its territory to be

used against Pakistan in any way. Yes, the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan are reflective of our commitment to the Afghan people to help them and to see that they return with peace, dignity and honour. What you are talking about are sporadic statements from certain elements among Afghan political leadership. These statements do not in any way reflect the sentiments of Afghan people towards Pakistan and such statements serve those who do not want to see peace in Afghanistan.

“Record Of The Press Briefing By Spokesperson On 29 September 2016.” 2016.

<http://mofa.gov.pk/record-of-the-press-briefing-by-spokesperson-on-29-september-2016/> (April 4, 2021).

MOFA March 1, 2019

The captured Indian Air Force Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman has been returned to India today. He was arrested when his military jet MIG-21 crashed in Azad Jammu & Kashmir after being shot down by Pakistan Air Force for violating Pakistani airspace on February 27, 2019.

While in captivity, he was treated with dignity and in line with international law. Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Imran Khan announced his return as a goodwill gesture aimed at de-escalating rising tensions with India.

Islamabad

01 March 2019

“Return Of Indian POW, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.” 2019.

<http://mofa.gov.pk/return-of-indian-pow-wing-commander-abhinandan-varthaman/> (April 5, 2021).

Google Translation of the Transcription from Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Address to The Nation Aired on National TV, February 19, 2019

A few days ago there was an incident in Pulwama in Occupied Kashmir and I was on top
 But one of our most .It had to be done because Pakistan was blamed respond of it then
 Which we had been investment conference ,Was, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia importantvisit
 So I decided that what I really needed to do was learn how to do it .preparing for a long time
 So when the Crown Prince .Had to go over it visit From this conference and theirs rightattention
 is back, I am giving this answer to you and I am giving this answer to the Government of
 No one thought what is the benefit of ,No onevidence .First, you blamed Pakistan .India
 The Crown If Pakistan was holding such an important conference and so onvisit .Pakistan in it
 To Even a fool would do such a thing to his conferencesabotage .Were plan Prince's was so late

Why Pakistan? to Pakistan And even if it weren't for them visit What is the benefit do
 year war of terrorism in which -15 We have fought a Going to stability When Pakistan this stage
 Is stability. 70,000 Pakistanis have been killed. Terrorism is going down, peace is coming
 And I also want to ask the Government of .coming, why have we benefited from such a thing
 and every time there is some kind of tragedy in Kashmir India that if you are stuck in the past
 you have to hold Pakistan responsible instead of you Kashmir. No problem with
 I am telling Will keep This is Pakistan again and again whipping boy .Get started that dialogue
 We .Yes, there is new thinking new Pakistan, this is the new mindset you clearly that this is the
 I am of the view that no one should go out of our land and commit understand that our interest
 If Westability .commit terrorism in Pakistan terrorism and no one should come from outside and
 I'm doing, you want to do some kind then I go to the Government of India today offer ,you want
 If you .that any Pakistani was involved in it I am ready incident of investigation
 If so, give it to us. I guarantee involved? any Pakistani Is there any actionable intelligence have
 because we belong to will not take action we And .that we will take action you
 If anyone is .They will take action because they are hostile to Pakistan .Is someone pressure
 whenever we ,And other things using the land of Pakistan, this is our enmity, this is our interest
 to talk about It is possible India precondition Let's talk about leave India dialogue
 Terrorism of an entire . are ready to talk about terrorism I tell you, we . first terrorism
 Pakistan is .and we are ready because we want an end to terrorism in the region ,Yes region issue
 Seventy thousand Pakistanis have been .the country that has suffered the most from terrorism
 So we are .terrorism We have lost more than a hundred billion dollars to . killed in terrorism
 a new thinking must ,See .But I want to say two things to you in the end .ready to talk to you
 that this is the reason why the young radicals of I feel One introspection . India come to
 think Do you .There must be a reason .that went down the fear of death have reached Kashmir
 Will it succeed .Oppress, solve the problem through the military ,one dimensional operation? that
 whole inside Afghanistan, the after seventeen years , If today ?if it has not succeeded so far
 Not from the that the military solution world has recognized
 And ?Shouldn't be discussion? Is it over in India . problem the solve Will dialogue conversation
 Voices are Politicians.the other thing we are hearing in India is hearing voices in the media
 First of all, . Should strike,take revenge on Pakistan , teach a lesson should coming that Pakistan
 Allows to judge, jury, executioner? any one person or country what is the law of the world for
 and we understand that The second thing is your election year ?In which justice system is it ?be
 If you think you will . Pakistan is taught a lesson It will be found that if in the election boost
 Will retaliate Pakistan will not think of doing attack Pakistan in any way, Pakistan retaliate
 Where does it go without doing, without Pakistan will have no other choice retaliate do
 Starting a war is in the hands of .We all know that starting a war is easy .answering and then
 So I hope .God knows best where it will go . ending the war is not in the hands of man man but
 We will use common sense, wisdom and the problem that will be that better sense will prevail
 .And negotiations will solve it This too dialogue .as in Afghanistan ,solved in the end

SAMAA TV. 2019. "PM Imran Khan Address To Nation On Pulwama Incident | 19 February, 2019." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ZhPuFLnfqM> (April 5, 2021).

Google Translation of the Transcription from Prime Minister Imran Khan's Address to The Nation Aired on National TV, February 27, 2019

I wanted to .Becoming from tomorrow morning Since yesterdaysituation ! My Pakistanis
 Look, after Pulwama, we made a whole offer to India that .take you into confidence about this
 And I know His in Pulwamacasualties .Wish we were ready for that some kind of itinvestigation
 how people must have hurt their families because here ten years to seventy
 And how many hospitals I've been to in ten years where I've Have happened casualties thousand
 Those who have no arms, no legs, cannot walk, no seen peoplebomb blast victim
 What is Therefore, I know that one who has passed away and the other who hasinjured .eyes
 So we made a direct offer to India that any kind of ?happening to them and their families
 If any Pakistani is involved in this, then Pakistan is ready to cooperate with youinvestigation
 I do not want our land to be used We said this because it belongs to Pakistaninterest .you
 Nor should anyone from outside use Pakistani .anywhere in the world to carry out terrorism
 When we were ready, when we were ready to Not at all So there is someone in itdispute .land
 I was afraid that India would have to take any action and that is why I told them , cooperate fully
 Because To do that we will be compelled when you take action, our compulsion. Will berespond
 The country does not allow any country to operate within its own country and anyonesovereign
 And I .Be yourself executioner ,And jury,Judge .decide for itself that it has committed a crime
 was worried because there are elections in India, I thought some action would be taken because
 So I told India that we would have to retaliate. When the action was taken yesterday .of it
 And we didn't take action in .morning, we talked about the Army Chief, the Air Chief and me
 He and even .Happened in Pakistan the morning because we didn't know what to dodamage
 Had to take action from Pakistan and bigger until we find outirresponsible
 So we waited and today we took Did not happen casualty When none of us do casualties India
 Only let us tell India Don't be casualties No, no We already had a plancollateral damage .action
 That is, if you can come to our country, we can go to your country and take that in uscapability
 I crossed the retaliation Of Pakistan Two from IndiaMigs .was the goal This .action
 Now the . Done and I want to say today that the pilots are with us Themshoot down .border
 It is very .This is very important. I am now addressing India .problem is where we go from here
 As many wars as there have been .important that we use a little bit of intellect and wisdom here
 No one thought that the war they were Has happened in the world, in all the warsmiscalculation
 The First World War was to end in months. It took six years. In .starting would go anywhere
 And it was delay.Russia Hitler thought I would conquer World War II, there came a time when
 Did the US think that they would be stuck in .I Similarlywar on terror .destroyed there
 The Vietnam War, did the United States think the Vietnam War ?Afghanistan for 17 years
 My .Is that in warsmiscalculation That is why the history of the world tells us ?would go that far
 afford ?question to the Indian government is what weapons do you have and do we have
 If so, where will it escalate?Don't we have to figure out what to do next ?Can miscalculation
 That is why I invite .It will not be under my control nor under the control of Narendra Modi ?go
 Yes, that's right you again that while the companions are sitting, we have told you thattragedy
 we are ,want to fight terrorism We a Lord of the Ringsdialogue you can now become known as

We want to solve our -I will tell you again at that time better sense should prevail But .ready
Thanks .problems through dialogue

SAMAA TV. 2019. "PM Imran Khan Addressing Nation After PAF's Retaliatory Action Against IAF | SAMAA TV." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iTYLNODK5a0> (April 5, 2021).

Appendix B Inter Services Public Relations of Pakistan Press Releases and Media Briefings

ISPR May 5, 2011

One point agenda was the Abbottabad incident in which Osama Bin Laden was killed by US forces. The Forum discussed the incident and its implications and on military to military relations with the United States.

While admitting own shortcomings in developing intelligence on the presence of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, it was highlighted that the achievements of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), against Al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates in Pakistan, have no parallel. The Forum was informed that around 100 top level Al Qaeda leaders / operators were killed / arrested by ISI, with or without support of CIA. However, in the case of Osama Bin Laden, while the CIA developed intelligence based on initial information provided by ISI, it did not share further development of intelligence on the case with ISI, contrary to the existing practice between the two services. Nonetheless, an investigation has been ordered into the circumstances that led to this situation.

COAS made it very clear that any similar action, violating the sovereignty of Pakistan, will warrant a review on the level of military / intelligence cooperation with the United States.

The Corps Commanders were informed about the decision to reduce the strength of US military personnel in Pakistan to the minimum essential.

As regards the possibility of similar hostile action against our strategic assets, the Forum reaffirmed that, unlike an undefended civilian compound, our strategic assets are well protected and an elaborate defensive mechanism is in place.

The Forum, taking serious note of the assertions made by Indian military leadership about conducting similar operations, made it very clear that any misadventure of this kind will be responded to very strongly. There should be no doubt about it.

The Forum reiterated the resolve to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan and to fight the menace of terrorism, with the support and help of the people of Pakistan.

“No PR-108/2011-ISPR.” 2011. <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=1736> (April 4, 2021).

ISPR May 9, 2011

He discussed one point agenda of Abbottabad incident. He said that Abbottabad incident has been in sharp public focus. Incomplete information and lack of technical details have resulted in speculations and misreporting. Public dismay and despondency has also been aggravated due to insufficient formal response. It is believed that people of Pakistan need to be taken into confidence through their honourable elected representatives.

Chief of Army Staff said that he has requested the honourable Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani to kindly consider convening of a joint session of the Parliament for briefing on security issues as related to Abbottabad incident.

Chief of Army Staff said that he has also requested that strength of democracy must be put into effect to develop a consensus on important security issues including war on terror. Articulation of a national response through the Parliament, under the circumstances, is the most effective way to let the World know the historic achievements of Pakistan against Al Qaeda and its terror affiliates. This would not have been possible without the active support and invaluable sacrifices of people of Pakistan.

At the end, COAS held a very frank Question/Answer session with the participants.

“No PR-109/2011-ISPR.” 2011. <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=1737> (April 4, 2021).

ISPR November 26, 2011

On the night of 25/26 November NATO helicopters and fighter aircraft carried out unprovoked firing on two Pakistani Army border posts in Mahmand Agency as a result of which 24 troops embraced shahadat and 13 were injured. Pakistani troops effectively responded immediately in self defence to NATO / ISAF’s aggression with all available weapons.

COAS has strongly condemned NATO / ISAF’s blatant and unacceptable act resulting in loss of precious lives of Pakistani soldiers. While lauding the effective response by the soldiers of Pakistan Army in self defence, he directed that all necessary steps be under taken for an effective response to this irresponsible act.

A strong protest has been launched with NATO / ISAF in which it has been demanded that strong and urgent action be taken those responsible for this aggression.

“No PR-284/2011-ISPR.” 2011. <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=1917> (April 4, 2021).

ISPR December 11, 2011

Shamsi Base Vacated

Last flight carrying left over US Personnel and Equipment departed Shamsi Base today and the Base has been completely vacated. The control of the Base has been taken over by the Army.

Shamsi Base Vacated and control of the Base has been taken over by the Pakistan Army. (11-12-2011)- Photo ISPR

Last flight carrying left over US Personnel and Equipment departed Shamsi Base today and the Base has been completely vacated. (11-12-2011)- Photo ISPR

“No PR-295/2011-ISPR.” 2011. <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=1928> (April 4, 2021).

ISPR September 29, 2011

Members of Standing Committee on Defence Production headed by Mr Khawaja Sohail Mansoor visited GHQ today.

COAS General Raheel Sharif welcomed the parliamentarians to GHQ. DGMO briefed the committee on current security situation on borders, entire threat spectrum and operational preparedness of the Army. COAS had detailed discussion on various issues related to national security.

Khawaja Sohail Mansoor Chairman of the Standing Committee on Defence Production thanked COAS on behalf of all visiting members for the warm welcome and hospitality extended to them at GHQ. He said that entire nation is proud of its valiant armed forces and will always stand behind them during war and peace.

“No PR-320/2016-ISPR.” 2016. <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=3469> (April 4, 2021).

ISPR September 29, 2011

There has been no surgical strike by India, instead there had been cross LOC fire initiated and conducted by India which is existential phenomenon. As per rules of engagement same was strongly and befittingly responded by Pakistani troops.

The notion of surgical strike linked to alleged terrorists bases is an illusion being deliberately generated by Indian to create false effects. This quest by Indian establishment to create media hype by rebranding cross border fire as surgical strike is fabrication of truth. Pakistan has made it clear that if there is a surgical strike on Pakistani soil, same will be strongly responded.

“No PR-334/2016-ISPR.” 2016. <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=3483> (April 4, 2021).

ISPR September 29, 2011

Pakistani troops befittingly responded to Indian unprovoked firing on loc in Bhimber, hotspring, kel, and Lipa sectors. Exchange of fire which started at 0230 hrs after midnight continued till 0800 hrs.

2 Pakistani soldiers embraced shahadat

“No PR-336/2016-ISPR.” 2016. <https://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=3485> (April 4, 2021).

Google Translation of the ISPR Press Briefing Transcript February 26, 2011

The situation between India and Pakistan has been tense in the last few days, and this tension, as you know, started with what happened in Pulwama on February 14 and all the subsequent talks since the Prime Minister After that the Foreign Minister did it and then I also

talked to you in great detail .Political-military leadership unites with the nation Resolve
 Show What, the Prime Minister took the nation into confidence and then ours level But I told
 you in great detail at a press conference how to walk .It is an Urdu proverb that a wise enemy is
 better than a foolish friend .Now our misfortune is that our neighbor India also resorts to
 stupidity and lies even in enmity. The Prime Minister had said that if you attacked Pakistan we
 would not think of an answer. retaliate Will do Then when I talked to you I also said three things,
 I will come to those three things .First let me tell you what happened this morning and how
 things went after that, how India covered it on its media. claim Is doing that detail to
 you share After doing that, I told you what the Prime Minister said and what I
 said manifestation I will share with you how it is happening and how to do it .Please show the
 first slide .Ladies and Gentlemen, this is India claim Four pictures of their media in
 you display Am doing top left The picture is saying that time of strike twenty one minutes, three
 fifty terrorists eliminated That is, twenty-one minutes to enter the borders of Pakistan Azad
 Kashmir claim They are saying that we have killed 350 terrorists. Next, top right But if you look,
 it says that strike first Balakot 3 : 45 to 3 : 53 am -Bottom left But when they come, they
 write second strike Muzaffarabad 3:48 to 3:55 am-Bottom right Go to Third Strike Chakothi at
 3:58 to 4:04 am -These are theirs claim Above the media .The essence of Allah Almighty is great,
 we should not talk big. Let's stay for 21 minutes and show Pakistan air space I .The night the day
 this tension started war methodology In terms of war readiness, our air force was, so the whole air
 force can't stay in the air all the time .methodology There is a preparation for war safeguards As
 soon as the force varies according to the land' s his safeguards The Air Force and Navy
 own safeguards picks up .All of us on earth safeguards in place Are In place Were in place And
 above the Line of Control, Working Boundary and Line of Actual Contact we are eyeballs to
 eyeballs -You ground incursion Whenever they come to the top, they get the same answer as we
 did plan what happened .As tensions escalated after February , 14 the air forces on both
 sides combat air patrolling Which we do CAP MISSION They say They rotation I in air I
 want you to see before my press conference will last two days, the Pakistan Air Force plane that
 will get you the voices of those Locals also said that Pakistan Air Force is on alert and
 he patrolling Is doing And this combat air patrolling Which is one all the time combat
 patrolling Mission or two combat air patrolling The mission of this in air Live and rotation I
 this change Keep doing It was like that at night, the radar too observe We are getting information
 about how the Air Force is coming to them by crossing the border or crossing the LOC .The last
 one from February 14 to last night by both sides CAP mission They were fly They also used to go
 near the border within their area and that one precautionary scrambling She lives .They used to
 come close to the border but they did not come close enough to let us in .Ours at night combat air
 patrol mission was in the air -His first barley in the Sialkot-Lahore area visibility Came on the
 radar that they are approaching Lahore-Sialkot border So one of our time CAP team She
 was air Since that center position Was in Pakistan They approached and challenged them, they
 did not cross -He stayed on his side for about seven or eight nautical miles, but ours CAP air I
 was the one who went in front of him and challenged him .SOP According to when the first CAP
 Team She was there commit When done second CAP team Automatically in air Done .While
 they were facing the threat in Lahore-Sialkot sector Another formation they had was in the Okara

Bahawalpur sector by our radar pick What about the other ?standby team Was combat air patrol Of they went down south And challenged him .The third is our barleycombat air patrol Was that next inline in air Then our radar pick What's more, his team is from Karan Valley in Muzaffarabad sector approach Is doing and that was a heavy team -When our thirdCAP team Went to the area and challenged them then they had crossed the line of control -When challenged, it took four minutes to reach the Line of Control and when challenged, it returned .If sostrike Do any of our positions, which is a military position with the Line of Control fight Of the Air Force , of themengagement Is ,they did not do that -Because if it's on our frontattack If they do, the soldiers are ready, the air force is also ready .casualties Also uniform personnel Would have But this is not the purpose of India, the purpose of India is that the Modi government should be in Azad Kashmir.ceasefire violation Even if they do civilian population On deliberate target Do If theirstrike Someone from our army post strike Would have uniform soldiers Would have been martyred and their purpose would not have been fulfilled .Their goal was to target a place where civilians were killedcasualties Am identity They don't have soldiers and that's it claim We can do that terrorist camp We have attacked what they intended takeout What and what warmongering And for political gain, what had to be done for the election would have been beneficial for them .Now that our Air Force has challenged them, please show me the next slide .If you see this, the Line of Control will take youyellow And black I can see red I Indian Occupied Kashmir Is written The dot you can see from here is theirs from hereintrusion Happened 4 to 5 nautical miles came in their formation which was given by Pakistan Air Forcetimely And effectively By challenging repulse What they did was their ownpayload Had it jettison What are you doing distance From what it is angle Was exit Of what payload The four bombs they had at Jabba fell and they went back .Now whenjettison Did they do it ?visibility چ challenging aircraft It happens visibility Does not happen Thisground troops This is what works certain To do ,whether something has fallen or not.They went back under pressure from the Pakistan Airforce, they remained in the air Then we got our one on the ground line of communication It happens check What strike So no one but when they ownpayload If you drop it trajectory But the one that is Balakot inside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa out of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Fell there Now you have themclaims Have seen that 350 terrorists killed -And one that belongs to themhideoutThey destroyed it .I called you because I would take you all with meon ground Shows but unfortunately, weather I can't take you because of By the way ,If I by road If I take it away, it will be dark there .Which is local media, some channels have reached there .They have shown it on TV, I will show it to you now.not even a single brick in the debrisIf anyone out there infrastructure Had it been, there would have been its wreckage 350 .Thisclaim Doing that we terrorist Are killed . I say even if there were ten, their dead bodies, some their funerals, some theirsblood ,The spot is open for everybody and anybody -Allambassadors ,All defense attaches ,United Nations Military Observer Group in Pakistan ,We will even say the civilian population or army, they can come through the authorized entry in Pakistan. See it for yourself, go back and tell your prime minister, where is that impactLying has no legs .They firstsurgical strike Did you see that too ?The Prime Minister had said that weretaliante Will not think retaliate If you do, you will not attack .Intrusion Hui, his retaliation On three

points .Airforce The first thing that happens is that the Air Force is coming deny Well, our Air Force did just that .I said three things: you will never be able to surprise us, we have not been surprised, we are ready, we responded, we denied -I said that we will retain the escalation ladder, we have that initiative in our hand. I said that we will surprise you, wait for that surprise. I said that our response will be different, see it for yourself. The response will come and the response will come differently. We are a democracy. I said that two democracies, they do not fight. You have proved that you are not a democracy, you have chosen a path of war without knowing the consequences for the peace and stability in the region. We have fought for fifteen years to bring peace and stability in the region. If you look at this option that we focus towards you we are focusing towards you -There is also a joint session of Parliament tomorrow, after which the Prime Minister has convened a meeting of the National Command Authority.and I hope you understand what is national command authority, what does it constitute. We are a democracy, we have political consensus -Earlier, the Prime Minister had said that I authorize you to take them on -They were given a response to the plan they came up with deny has been .Now the Prime Minister said in today's meeting armed forces Also all elements of national power Also and Pakistan 207 million population Also Get ready for any eventuality The people are ready, you have seen the response of the political parties today, they are all one Now it is time for India to wait for our response. The response will come at the point and time of our choosing where our civil military leadership decide and as a matter of fact has decided. It is your turn now to wait and get ready for our surprise. Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen, if you have any questions

ISPR Official. 2019. "DG ISPR Press Conference - 26 February 2019." YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wppc--qD1L4> (April 5, 2021).

Google Translation of The ISPR Press Briefing Transcript February 27, 2011

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for coming to ISPR once again -Something on the Line of Control since this morning activity While it is going on , I thought we should talk to you about it .This morning the Pakistan Air Force airspace I live across the Line of Control Indian Occupied Kashmir I have six targets engage Done As has been the case for the last few days because India has overpowered us aggression What is the Line of Control ?violate Of and then the way after that claim Done that one Alleged terrorist hideout Is it destroy What else 350 terrorists were killed in it, on top of that I spoke to you yesterday .The Pakistan Armed Forces and the Pakistan Air Force had no choice but to respond .But how is the answer ?In the same way that India gave ?Or the way a responsible country does .When the Lord is with you capability And capacity Gives thanks for it element Comes .They are more than you use self-defense Is for With Pakistan Armed Forces capability Also ,capacity Also ,will Also ,resolve Also, with the people, there is everything .But since we are a responsible state, we want peace, so this morning when the Pakistan Air Force was about to take those targets, the first thing we did was decide We will not take any military target .The second we did decide What about our target ?engage There should be no loss of human life in the result of doing .Not just human life but anyone collateral damage Not even So when our Air Force stays within its borders, the targets we set select We had

six targets select Done Our pilots hit these targetslock What, and then this lock After doing so, we found them in an open space a short distance away strikes کیں- The point was, we have capability, will, resolve Yes, but we do not want to do anything that will make us irresponsible . You strikes We took all the targets in Bhimber Gali, KG Top and their supply depots in Narian area . accuracy From lock What and when we had the option to fire on them, we showed responsibility, to them safety distance And then we set that target engage What The point is, we can do anything but we can region of the peace Of cost Don't want to This retaliation in true sense No ,but to say that Pakistan has capability Yes, we can, but we want to be responsible . We escalation Don't want to We do not want to go to war . The Prime Minister also gave a message of peace, the people also gave a message of peace and we do not want to lead the region to war under any circumstances . We will share the video with you shortly . When the Pakistan Air Force took over the target, two Indian Air Force planes again entered Pakistan in violation of the Line of Control . The Pakistan Air Force was ready, they did it take on What , among themselves engagement As a result , the two Indian ships that were shoot down Happened Of one of them wreckage Fell on our side while the other wreckage Fell on his side . In addition, there is a report of the crash of an Indian ship which is a little inside but with us engagement Did not happen The two pilots who were on the ground with our forces captured them arrest I took and treated them according to how a civilized country treats them . One of them was injured CMH Moved . Inshallah, they will be taken care of while the others are with us . Some of them documents I want to show you . thank you . Besides, the Indian media was watching everyone saying that Pakistan is one F-16 They have also dropped . First of all, this is what Pakistan did in all this action F-16 Not used and there is no news that any Pakistani plane has crashed . Now let's talk about the way forward. The state of Pakistan, the government of Pakistan, the armed forces of Pakistan, and the people of Pakistan, we have always conveyed a message of peace to India and the route to peace goes through dialogue. Both countries have the capability and capacity, but war is actually the failure of policy which India needs to understand . War as the Prime Minister said it is easy to start ,no one knows where it ends ,so it is the same on our part today. having displayed our capability, will, and resolve we still do not want to escalate. We want to follow a path which leads to peace. The people of both the countries and the region at large, they have a right to live and live in peace . If you say we need to give our people education, health, employment, let's sit down and talk . War is not the answer . If no problem in the world is solved by war, then our offer, the offer of the government of Pakistan, India should consider it with a cold heart, where do we want to go . over here international community Pakistan also does not want to go to war between Pakistan and India, there is a message of peace from Pakistan . They should also come forward and see how the environment between India and Pakistan are a threat to peace and development not only between the two countries but in the region and beyond . Media, I said before, I'm still saying, like we did different response Given and given responsibly by Pakistani media peace journalism What is it . The action we took today self-defense what I . We have some kind of on it victory indicate Don't want to No one wins the war, no one loses, humanity loses . So I request the Pakistani media that objective reporting Continue reporting on the road to peace . If war was imposed on us then reporting at that time different Is . Today's reporting responsible Yes, today's reporting is

responsive and leads to peace .Pakistan as a state and Pakistan's forces as onecapable
force Despite having all the qualifications as Our message is for peace-

Thank you very much

ISPR Official. 2019b. "DG ISPR Press Conference - 27 February 2019." YouTube.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EkGeXOiGhBU> (April 5, 2021).