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HOW HAS KAZAKHISATION BEEN REFLECTED INTO ASTANA'S URBAN SPACE?

ҚАЗАҚЫЛАНДЫРУ УДЕРІСІ АСТАНАНЫҢ КАЛАЛЫҚ КЕҢІСТІГІНДЕ КАЛАЙ БЕЙНЕЛЕҢГЕҢ?

КАК ПРОЦЕСС КАЗАХИЗАЦИИ ОТРАЖАЕТСЯ В ГОРОДСКОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ АСТАНЫ?

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Abstract

According to the official discourse of President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan is presented as a multiethnic state with national identity program that includes interest of all ethnic groups. However, in academic literature there is evidence that the state’s nationalism policy is directed at reviving, strengthening, and representing the socio-cultural and political values of ethnic Kazakhs. Academics argue that the state is undergoing a so-called Kazakhisation process. Opinions of scholars active in the academic discourse on the current situation on the national policy in Kazakhstan vary.

I argue that the state has an official multiethnic policy that recognizes the principles of multiculturalism, friendship of people, and tolerance. Also, the state realizes unique multiethnic policy by putting Kazakh culture and language as a core of general Kazakhstani identity, not excluding other groups. The contribution of this research to the general literature on nationalism in Kazakhstan is that it argues for the multiethnic dimension of the Kazakhisation process, which are reflected in the state’s discourse and policies, as well as in the urban space of Astana.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

Kazakhstan has the reputation of being a multiethnic and tolerant state. Since its independence President Nazarbayev has consistently highlighted ethnic diversity in his annual addresses. Kazakhstan, a former republic of the Soviet Union is one of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which has not experienced major ethnic tensions (Kevlihan and O’Beachain 2013). The state-building process and formation of a national identity in Kazakhstan, is based on the premise of the state as a multiethnic entity.

The state started reviving national identity by creating a national flag, national anthem, and by moving the capital city from Almaty to Astana. Also, the identity-building process was relegated to the control of the state. In addition to the common definition of nationalism as a sense of belonging to a group of people, nationalism also included a national identity expressed through cultural flags, anthems, traditions, ceremonies, and monuments (Smith 1991). Nationalism consists of two forms: civic and ethnic (Gellner 1983; Smith 1991; Kern 2014). There are states that have strong ethnic nationalism like Germany and there are states that adhere to civic nationalism, such as France (Brubaker 1992). However, there are cases of states which have a multiethnic policy such as Canada, Singapore, and Spain (Kymlicka 2004).

According to the official discourse of President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan is presented as a multiethnic state that has tolerant and friendly policies to ethnic minorities. However, in academic literature there is evidence that the state’s nationalism policy is directed at reviving, strengthening, and representing the socio-cultural and political values of ethnic Kazakhs. Academics argue that the state is undergoing a so-called Kazakhisation process. Opinions of scholars active in the academic discourse on the current situation on the national policy in
Kazakhstan vary. One group of scholars (Kudaibergenova 2015; Kevlihan and O’Beachain 2013) claim that state-building and identity formation is moving in multiethnic dimension. However, the other group of academics believe that nationalism has an ethnic character (Karim and Chebotarev 2002; Burkhanov 2017; Davenel 2012; Koch 2013; Bissenova 2017). These scholars study the ongoing developments of the growing process of Kazakhisation. Therefore, the puzzle is that there are two contrasting processes going on in the state according to academic discourse: development of multiculturalism and the Kazakhisation process.

This dissertation argues that the state has an official multiethnic policy that recognizes the principles of multiculturalism, friendship of people, and tolerance. Also, the state realizes unique multiethnic policy by putting Kazakh culture and language as a core of general Kazakhstani identity, not excluding other groups. The contribution of this research to the general literature on nationalism in Kazakhstan is that it argues for the multiethnic dimension of the Kazakhisation process. The literature on the Kazakhisation process in academic literature, regarding the topics of nationalism, city planning, and politics have been reviewed in the first chapter of this thesis. The second chapter covers the Annual Addresses to the Nation of Kazakhstan by President Nazarbayev, as well as the analysis of other state programs on national identity to highlight the multiethnic dimensions in the official discourse of the state. The analysis of urban space in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, concludes that Astana’s development is a reflection of the state policy on nationalism. Social advertisement on street billboards, monuments, sculptures, and street names reflect the state ideological policy clearly. These elements of Astana’s urban space have specific academic because the focus of this research is on the new capital city. Academic literature and official discourse of the state often refer to Astana to illuminate the process of Kazakhisation. The third chapter illustrates how Kazakhisation’s multiethnic dimension is reflected in the urban space of Kazakhstan’s capital city, Astana.
The thesis argues that the process of Kazakhisation has multiethnic dimensions, which are reflected in the state’s discourse and policies, as well as in the urban space of Astana. Research has revealed that Kazakhisation is initiated not only by state but also by its ethnic Kazakh citizens.

**Kazakhisation**

In order to fully understand the forthcoming research, it is necessary to define certain key terms. The focus of the research is the process of Kazakhisation. This term needs to be defined first. In the academic discourse the term is used to show ethnic nationalism, that is implemented by the state (Sarsembayev 1999; Karin and Chebotarev 2002). However, in this research the meaning of the term has been slightly modified.

Initially in the beginning of the 1990s the term “Kazakhification” represented “… the idea of creating ethnic Kazakhs in the economic, cultural, educational and political spheres of independent Kazakhstan” (Sarsembayev 1999). The term Kazakhification is similar to the term Russification. Russification was a policy implemented by Soviet administration in the 1930s that obliged every citizen of USSR to learn the Russian language, to know Russian history, and also the evolutionary and internationalist rhetoric was changed to Russian culture (Burkhanov and Sharipova (2015). Russification was a forced policy, which was painful and discriminatory for the non-Russian Soviet Republics. Kazakhisation evokes feelings that are similar to the process of Russification, at the least because they sound alike. Later in the literature the term kazakhisation is used. For example, Kulzhanova (2012, 14) uses the term Kazakhisation to describe the same process. She says that Kazakhisation is granting more power and attention to ethnic Kazakhs in politics, economics, and social life. Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 1) claim that Kazakhisation can be understood as an action of the state directed to the revival, strengthening, development and representation of cultural, ethno-demographic, polit-
ical and legal values of ethnic Kazakhs. They argue that the process is not officially recognized. However, Kazakhisation is realized through ideological and propagandistic means of reviving ethnic Kazakh’s culture, language, as well as adherence to the idea of multinationality, friendship, and tolerance. This is the reason that the government strongly promotes Kazakh leaders, historical heroes, and poets. The names of streets and cities were changed to Kazakh, the state symbols, monuments and holidays are associated with the mythology and culture of ethnic Kazakhs. Mun (2015, 6) for example, says that Kazakhization is strongly expressed through the use of educational space to promote the culture of the dominant, ethnic Kazakh group.

All these authors (Mun 2015; Karin and Chebotarev 2002; Burkhanov and Sharipova 2015; Sarsembayev 1999) argue that the process of Kazakhisation is unofficial. They claim that the process is driven by state (top-down) through state programs and policies, as well as unofficial means that are not officially recognized by the state. There are no official documents saying that the state is going through this process. As it was earlier mentioned the term is similar to Russification which has discriminative meaning. Therefore, probably the state will never use the term Kazakhisation to officially name the process. However, the term is widely used in academia to describe the process of the revival of Kazakh identity.

**Literature Review**

Returning to the theoretical part of the research on nationalism, there are different theories and definitions relating to nationalism and national identity. This section first discusses varying theories on different kinds of nationalism and national identity policies. First, ethnic and civic nationalism will be discussed. The topic of multiethnic nationalism will be discussed as it supports the main argument of this research. Following the previous section,
the discussion moves to the topic of nationalism in Kazakhstan reflected in Kazakhisation discourse.

As previously mentioned, national identity can be based on different forms of nationalism; nationalism based on ethnic identity such as the case in Germany, civic nationalism like France, and there are states in which state identity is based on multiculturalism. Gellner (1983) links the idea of nationalism to political ideology that expresses the sovereignty of the nation as a political body. The principle of nationalism is to give a nation the right of self-determination in a specific territory. This definition expresses civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is defined slightly differently. Though the definition of a nation includes the idea of ancestry, language, history, traditions, and culture not all states have these characteristics (Kern 2014). He differentiates between two interpretations of the idea of nationalism: ethnic and civic.

In accordance with Gellner (1983), Kevlihan and O’Beachain (2013) argue that dualism lies at the heart of every national identity. In other words, there is always tension between civic and ethnic elements of nationalism. Civic nationalism emphasizes the following uniting factors: territory, legal-political community, equality of the nations, common civic ideology, and culture. In contrast, ethnic nationalism stresses importance of community as a result of birth, relevance to biological or genealogical group, as well as shared ethnic language and religion. Kern (2014) argues that ethnic nationalism is believed to be aggressive and based on emotions. It is associated with revolution, war, and violence. Comparatively, civic nationalism embodies the idea of equality, unity, democracy, and liberalism. Commonly, it is a synthesis of many factors and two kinds of nationalism. Yack (1996) argues that civic nationalism is just a myth. Civic nationalism exaggerates the value of the community that it promotes. Communities that are based on civic nationalism are easy to break apart because they are not bound by a strong and principled commitment.
Unlike previous authors, Kymlicka (2004) and Calhoun (2004) are advocates of multicultural national identity. They consider states with complex ethnic composition like Canada, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh that have challenges in building a national identity. They believe that the state must care about minority groups within the state. Specifically, Kymlicka (2004) claims that the state should recognize minorities. He compares two forms of incorporating minorities: Western methods which prioritize justice, and post-Soviet (Eastern Europe) in which more of an emphasis is placed on security and integrity rather than justice. He says that post-Soviet countries with minorities, highlight this form of nationalism not because of lack of democratization or economic capacity, but because justice is made when the state recognizes other nations with states. Kymlicka (2004, 165) gives specific examples how a state should have multi-ethnic policy. He says “the idea here is to allow minorities to have some modest control over their own institutions, such as schools, media, and theaters, without creating any territorial base for territorial secessionism” (Kymlicka 2004, 165).

Different states have different identity policies based on their ethno-cultural compositions, history, and political situation. For federal multi-ethnic states it is favorable to have a nationalistic policy that takes into account minority groups to avoid conflicts and secession (Kymlicka 2004). For some ethnically homogeneous and unitary state like Germany having ethnic identity of one ethnicity as a core of national identity is suitable. However, there are ethnically heterogeneous, unitary and new states like Kazakhstan that need to build identity upon which there can be legitimacy in order to satisfy the needs of all ethnic groups.

Kevlihan and O’Beachain (2013) argue that Kazakhstan’s post-independence is a period of nationalizing state-building, pointing out that from independence in 1991, the state has favored ethnic Kazakhs in particular through the revival of language and historical figures. Even at this early date, the so called “Kazakhisation” process had begun. “Kazakhisa-
tion post-independence included changes to street names, the erection of new statues, the creation of a new flag and a new stirring anthem” (Kevlihan and O’Beachain 2013, 342). However, the authors do not reject the development of civic nationalism as well. Language policy is evidence of the development of civic nationalism. In 1995, the Russian language became an official language along with Kazakh. Earlier the Russian language was recognized a language of inter-ethnic communication. Kudaibergenova (2015) also argues Kazakhstan is developing civic nationalism in the state to satisfy the needs of its ethnic minorities. She says that one of the key factors of civic nationalism development is desire to achieve economic and social stability in a multi-ethnic society. Due to the fact that domestic stability and social consolidation cannot be achieved under conditions of ethnic disputes, President Nazarbayev has promoted the values of civic nationalism such as unity, democracy, and tolerance. On the other hand, Kazakhstan not only borders Russia but also has tight economic and political relations with its neighbor. So, the state adheres to an official policy of civic nationalism.

The literature (Kevlihan and O’Beachain 2013; Kudaibergenova 2015) that argues for the equal development of civic and ethnic nationalism in Kazakhstan usually refers to the speeches of the President and state programs of national identity. They reflect the official discourse that takes place in the media, in the speeches of the President, and other governmental officials. However, there is also literature that has different visions of nationalism in post independent Kazakhstan. In general, the literature on kazakhisation can be classified on two types. The first group focuses on state (top-down) as an initiator of the process (Karin and Chebotarev 2002; Burkhanov and Sharipova 2015; Sarsembayev 1999; Tussupova 2010). The second one focuses on Kazakhisation as a bottom-up process (Davenel 2012; Bissenova 2017). This research focuses on top-down approach to study the process of Kazakhisation. The main reason for concentrating on the top-down approach is that the bottom-up approach is outside the scope of study of a state approach. Also, the top-down approach to study is rel-
relevant to political science more rather than to anthropology. Arguing that the process is top-down it is necessary to highlight that there are different agiences of the state. The first agency is Presidential office that is responsible for strategic documents. Thesecond is municipal authorities responsible for communication with public and implementation of strategic documents.

To start with, academic scholars studying the process of Kazakhisation initiated by the state includes: Akiner (1990), Sarsembayev (1999), Karin and Chebotarev (2002), Tus-supova (2010), Burkhanov and Sharipova (2015), Mun (2015), Burkhanov (2017), who share a common opinion on definition of the process. The core idea of the process is that it is directed at strengthening the role of ethnic Kazakhs in economic, political, and social life. The instruments of Kazakhisation used by state are the education system, language policy, and socio-demographic policies. It is worth mentioning that the authors studying state policies on nationalism focus on state actions directed at reviving Kazakh identity, and ignore or simply do not take into account state’s multi-ethnic policy.

Sarsembayev (1999) calls the process Kazakification, but the definition is similar to what defines as Kazakhisation. It sounds similar to the term Russification, which implies forced politics coming from the state. Kazakification is an idea of creating dominance by ethnic Kazakhs in politics, economics, cultural and social life in independent Kazakhstan. He is the only academic who calls the process “the official nationalism of Kazakification” (Sarsembaeyv 1999, 329). He claims that the process is official but does not give reference to state policies or speeches announcing or naming “Kazakification” as a part of state policy. He acknowledges that it is a dual policy aimed both at satisfying approval of nationalist Kazakhs, and not disturbing multi-ethnic peace. He further describes how the state officially undergoes Kazakification through the education system, changing history textbooks, assigning ethnic Kazakhs to parliament, changing status of Kazakh language, moving the capital city, and re-
naming street names. He also touches upon the state trying to have a multi-ethnic policy, but he does this by doubting it. For example, he says that in 1994 Nazarbayev made a “shocking” announcement criticizing existing national identity policy and changing the constitution.

“Nothing of significance has occurred except changes in the New Constitution of 1995 regarding the removal of the phrase defining Kazakhstan as the form of a statehood of the self-determining Kazakh nation and the elevation of Russian to the status of an official language” (Sarsembayev 1999, 337)

Changing the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan and elevating the status of the Russian language to start multi-ethnic policy, shows the state’s intention to have multi-ethnic dimension within a nationalism policy. The phrase “nothing of significance” shows that the author rejects legal and official actions of state towards multi-ethnic policy, to accent attention of the reader to the process of Kazakisation.

Karin and Chebotarev (2002) name the process Kazakhisation, defining it as state policy directed at the revival, strengthening, development, representation, and domination of basic socio-cultural, ethno-demographic, economic, political and legal values as well as resources of the Kazakhs. Unlike Sarsembayev (1999) they say that the process is not recognized on the official level, though they claim that the process is state initiated. They make this claim because the state does not use the word “Kazakhisation” in official documents. As it was already mentioned the word is similar to “Russification” which reminds people of a negative and discriminatory policy, forced on ethnic Kazakhs by the Soviet administration. Therefore, the state does not use the word and it is only used in the works of scholars.

They claim that the state violates the Constitution of 1995 and human rights by ignoring the mindsets of the state’s minorities. Sarsembayev (1999) gives examples of the wide-scale state celebration of prominent Kazakh figures like Abay and Zhambyl that only strengthen the Kazakhisation process. This is true, there are such celebrations, however, the author do not mention that there are also official national holidays and celebrations like Nau-
ryz, May 1st The Day of Unity, and Christmas which reflect the multi-ethnic dimension of nationalism of the state policy.

Another example of the prioritization of the Kazakhisation process and the state’s diminishing efforts in multi-ethnic nationalism promotion is reflected in the works of Burkhanov and Sharipova (2015), Karin and Chebotarev (2002), Burkhanov (2017) and Sarsembayev (1999) about Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (hereafter APK - a consultative body to facilitate potential conflicts among different ethnic groups). They argue that the body “has not real authority of capabilities” (Karin and Chebotarev 2002, 2). First, they do not clarify the definition of the term “real authority”. If they are addressing the power of the body in state decision-making, then it is worth mentioning that from 2007 nine people have been elected to the lower level of the Parliament by Assembly of People of Kazakhstan. This means that the APK has power in decision-making and it is a part of the multi-ethnic policy initiated by state.

Scholars studying the process of Kazakhisation in the state ignore or do recognize serious state actions directed at multi-ethnic nationalism. Changes in the constitution made in 1995, the creation of a powerful APK, national holiday’s aimed at uniting all citizens of Kazakhstan are all examples that are ignored by academics. Moreover, Kazakhstan follows Kymlicka’s (2004) list of recommendations for a state to have a just multi-ethnic policy that includes granting minorities the right to control their institutions like schools, theaters, and media. The following research contends that the discourse of the President of Kazakhstan and the state is tolerant and attentive to developing multi-ethnic society. Statistics also illustrate state actions directed at establishing multi-ethnic nationalism. By 2011, 1,058,572 students (70, 6%) were studying the Kazakh language, 383749 (25, 7 %) Russian, 43093 (2, 9 %) Uzbek, 5256 (0, 35%) Uyghur and 1056 Tajik. In total throughout the state there were 7646
schools: 3828 Kazakh schools, 1573 Russian schools, 58 Uzbek schools, 14 Uyghur schools, 2 Tajik and 2164 mixed (Kazakh-Russian) schools (Altynbekova 2011). Moreover, there are 52 theaters in the state representing different ethnicities in Kazakhstan (Assembly.kz). Russian language along with the state language (Kazakh) is widely used and has a special status. According to a UNESCO report of all the 1292 press media published in the state, 218 of them are in Kazakh, 540 are in Russian, 407 are mixed (Kazakh-Russian), and 127 of them are printed in the language of other ethnicities (UNESCO official website). Research has proven that the state's actions on supporting multi-ethnic culture of the society reflect what is the official policies of the state.

Scholars (Sarsembaev 1999; Burkhanov 2017; Karin and Chebotarev 2002; Bissenova 2017; Lasczczkowski 2011) studying Kazakhisation refer to Astana’s status as the new capital city of Kazakhstan, to highlight its role as one of the instruments of building a national identity or nationalism policy. Particularly, they claim that Kazakhisation is clearly reflected in Astana’s urban space, in the names of streets and cities, buildings, and monuments. In fact, Astana’s urban space could be used as a reflection of state policy on national identity because it is a new capital that was built by the initiation of the President (Mkrtchyan 2017). Mkrtchyan (2017) argues that state policies directed at nationalism are reflected in the urban space of Astana.

The following research has also found that urban space as being affected by the Kazakhisation process. The study of Kazakhisation in the urban space of Astana can physically reflect state’s identity policy in buildings, monuments, names of streets, language and faces on street billboards. This refers to everything that becomes everyday routine, but has a message coming from the state. For example, not all buildings in the city are built by state initiation. Of course, there are private companies that erect shopping malls, restaurants, and parks.
Therefore, it is necessary to define what are state buildings and monuments erected by state, as well as state social ads on billboards. The focus on state constructed buildings, monuments, and state social ads on billboards, accentuate the top-down characteristic of the Kazakhisation process.

Billig (1995) argues that the notion of nationalism is believed to be something emotional and politically charged. What he calls hot nationalism has been the cause of many revolutions. However, he argues that this kind of hot nationalism is not as effective as banal nationalism in legitimizing the power of state in the eyes of citizens and the global institutions. He does not say that identity and nationalism are no longer important for states. He argues that symbols and state signs such as flags, anthems, money, sport teams, president’s speeches, news, monuments, and state buildings are embedded in the citizens consciousness, thus making them part of ordinary life. These everyday habits create identity.

Fauve (2015) discusses nationalistic elements during the process of city-making in Astana, and also mentions other cities like Washington D.C., Moscow, Ankara, and Berlin as capital cities that were established after regime change, with the purpose of changing the ideology of citizens. The theory of city planning and its role in politics is also applicable to Astana. Kazakhisation was also expressed through the construction and planning of cities.

Urban space is a manifestation of banal nationalism and expression of the state’s identity policy. Lasczczkowski (2011), Bissenova (2017) and Koch (2013) based their research on the ethnographic analysis of Astana, the capital city and Almaty, the former capital. Along with the urbanization of these cities, including the mass construction of buildings, the process of the ongoing transformation of these cities started too. With urbanization Almaty has received a healthy injection of Kazakh traditionalism. In contrast Astana is a city that was designed to express Kazakh ethnicity and ethnic nationalism (Bissenova 2017).
Bissenova (2017) argues that the capital city was moved to the geographic center of Kazakhstan to control the region which was mainly populated by Russians or Russian-speaking Kazakhs. The capital was moved to break with the past history of colonialism, the Soviet past, to encourage the emergence of a new group of elites, and to facilitate the development of a new type of citizenship. After the change, Astana became the primarily administrative and monumental center of Kazakhstan. Laszczkowski (2011) reports that the volume of investment in construction of the city accounted for approximately fifteen billion US dollars so far, and the population has increased three times over. Residential areas, shopping malls, administrative centers, museums, theaters, business centers, universities, and parks were built in the city. Astana’s cityscape succeeds in creating ideological effects in the mind of its inhabitants. Laszczkowski (2011) and Koch (2013) focus on the “Left Bank” of the city that is progressively developing. In general, the fact that Astana is flourishing as a capital shows economic prosperity and progress of the state in the eyes of its citizens. The symbolic meaning of the buildings in Astana is deeper. For example, Baiterek is a tree of life, of a new beginning. The holy bird Samruk (Kazakh folklore) is laying golden eggs on this tree. The egg is a symbol of the sun and happiness. This is a Kazakh vision of universe and life. There are many other examples of Kazakhisation expressed through city architecture including the pyramid-shaped Palace of Reconciliation, National Library, Khan Shatyr, and the names of streets and parks. Almost every state building in Astana has a symbolic meaning.

Research Question /Thesis

How has Kazakhisation been reflected in Astana urban space?

Kazakhisation is a two-dimensional process that is initiated both by citizens, specifically ethnic Kazakhs, and also by the government. This thesis focuses on the policy state-
ments of the government which contribute to the process of Kazakhisation, a process of that is argued to be unofficial in academic literature (Sarsembayev 1999; Karin and Chebotarev 2002; Bukrhanov 2017). There are no official announcements from the state regarding the existence of the Kazakhisation process. Therefore, this paper aims at exploring the process of Kazakhisation in the Annual Addresses to the Nation of Kazakhstan by President Nazarbayev and in the policies of the government in Astana’s urban space.

Methodology

Academic literature argues that the Kazakhstan is undergoing a process of Kazakhisation and that this process is initiated by state officials. It was illustrated in the literature review section, that academic literature studying Kazakhisation ignores the state’s actions directed at the promotion of a program of multi-ethnic nationalism. Contrary, in the official discourse of the state reflected in president’s speeches and programs on national identity, it is asserted that the state is developing a multi-ethnic nationalism and not constructing a special program favoring ethnic Kazakhs through Kazakhisation. In fact, the term Kazakhisation is not used by the state and is not an official policy. To understand why there is a clash between state and academia discourse, this research analyzes the president’s speeches and state programs on nationalism policy and national identity. Urban space of Astana has been chosen as a reflection of the state’s nationalism policy, therefore monuments, sculptures, city decoration elements, street names, and social advertisement were observed. Finally, interviews with state representative bodies such as the Akimat (city administration) are necessary to discuss the role of the state in city planning. This research has three methodological approaches: content analysis of the president’s speeches and programs, Astana’s urban space observation, and interviews with people engaged in planning of the city.
Analysis of the president’s speeches and programs

All twenty-one annual addresses of the president from 1997 until 2018 were analyzed. Particular attention was placed on the discourse of the president on nationalism or identity policy in Kazakhstan. Information is available online on the official website of the president in three languages (Kazakh, Russian, and English). The website also contains official programs and policies, some of which will also be covered. Programs and policies have been selected based on their relevancy to the formation of national identity. As the main argument of the thesis is that the Kazakhisation process has multiethnic dimensions, during the analysis of the president’s speeches promotion of the multiethnic character of nationalism policy has been considered. President Nazarbayev’s Annual Addresses to the Nation of Kazakhstan, APK’s strategic documents such as: The National Unity Doctrine and The Concept of Strengthening and Developing Kazakhstani identity and Unity are available online on the official website of the APK, and in three languages.

In 1997, during the first The President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Annual Addresses to the Nation of Kazakhstan (hereafter AAN) the president expressed his thoughts about this tradition.

“My fellow-citizens, every year I shall report back to you over the implemented and outstanding activities explaining the reasons. In each annual report I shall put new objectives for the next year in order to move further to our strategic goals” (AAN 1997)

This quote is used to illustrate that the president set new goals and objectives for the government. This shows that in his speeches there are objectives for state agencies to work on strategic goals. Therefore, the president’s speeches are chosen as a source of information for identity policy review. Moreover, APK was founded by the president and all the strategic documents are approved and signed by the president. Law of the republic of Kazakhstan «on the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan» from 1995 states that The Assembly of the People of
Kazakhstan) is an institution without the formation of a legal entity, formed by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which fosters the development and implementation of state policy in the sphere of public harmony and inter-ethnic unity. Therefore, strategic documents of APK are the source of state policy on national identity.

Observation of Astana’s urban space

To observe the implementation of state policy on national identity the urban space of Astana was chosen to be evaluated. The reason that Astana was chosen to be analyzed is that the new capital city was founded by President Nazarbayev as a part of the national identity-building process (Mkrtchyan 2017).

Applying Billig’s (1995) notion of banal nationalism, the following research analyzed the role of the urban space of the capital city in shaping national identity. To examine banal nationalism, the policies of the government on national-identity reflected in state symbols has been studied. Observations have been made on street billboards with social advertisement, monuments, sculptures, and streets names on both the left and right side of Astana, paying particular attention to eighteen streets located in the old and new centers.

Pictures were taken of social advertisements on billboards along these eighteen streets and then their content and images were analyzed. Social advertisements on billboards are the messages the state sends to people. They contain information on current policies and propaganda. Also, monuments, sculptures, decoration elements, and street names were covered for the research. These are the elements of urban space that illustrate historical figures, events, and ideas the state wants to highlight.

Before going to observational research on the streets of Astana, the analysis of institutional structure of city administration was completed. On the official website of the city ad-
ministration (Akimat) there is a full description of the institutional structure and their functions. Subdivisions of Mayor’s office includes 29 institutions such as Office for Youth Policy Issue, Astana Office of Architecture and Urban Planning, Astana Office of Internal Policy, Astana Office of Housing, and many others. Two of the subdivisions named Astana Office of Architecture and Urban Planning, and Astana Office of Language Development deal with street names, monuments, sculptures, and social advertisement in the streets of the capital. Normative and legal document of the Astana Office of Architecture and Urban Planning on advertisement from 19 December 2003 No.508 paragraph 17-1 and 17-2 states that all kinds of street advertisement in the urban space of Astana both social and commercial are approved by this institution. Paragraph 6 of this document states that content of advertisement must be in the state and Russian language, also depending on the preferences of advertiser in other languages. The paragraph of the document also states that the accuracy of the language is approved by onomastic commission of the Office of Language Development. Paragraph 24 of another state document of about architectural, city-planning, and construction activity in the Republic of Kazakhstan (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of July 16, 2001 No. 242) states that Office of the Architecture and Urban planning offers historical monuments, sculptures, and elements of city decoration for approval to Republic level. The document on the rules of naming streets is available online on the official website of the Office of Language Development. The document is a state law on the administrative-territorial unit that also has paragraphs on naming streets. Chapter 4, paragraph 13 states that street names are named or renamed taking into account the opinion of city residents and of the Mayor’s office. The mayor’s onomastic commission decision is later directed to Republic onomastic commission that makes the final decision. These normative and legal documents and state laws were analyzed to make sure that street names, monuments, sculptures, and social advertisement are monitored by Mayor’s office.
Even though the decision-making power of the state in city planning is written in the legal documents, there is doubt by Fauve (2004) who argues that some individuals not representing state may be involved in city planning too. In other words, he argues that initiation does not necessarily come from the state. This argument is difficult to reject, as it was discussed before, in the bottom-up theory of Kazakhisation. Legal documents and state laws show involvement of state in city-planning. However, it is possibly that certain city residents working in advertising agencies that work with the state body on designing and printing street social advertisements, can have involvement in the outcome of the city landscape. Interviews with state body representatives who work in city planning and workers of advertising agencies were conducted and reveal the level of Mayor’s involvement in setting social advertisements.

Conducting interviews was a necessary method to explore that state’s involvement in the Kazakhisation of urban space in Astana. The interviews had a semi-structured form with formulated questions that can diverge to deeply answer the questions and gather more data. In total six people were interviewed. These are the works of the Office of Language Development, private advertising agencies, and an independent expert from the APK. Snowball sampling and direct emailing where the methods used to find people from city language development body for interviews.

The snowballing effect was proven to be a more efficient method for finding. It was revealed that there is also department of language development in the airport that monitors all the announcements and signs, documentation and translation in the state sponsored Astana International Airport. Before putting any sign or public announcement in the airport the text must be approved by the language development department first. The department itself works closely with city language development body and approves all the documents with that department. Therefore, networking was necessary to find interviewees to ask questions about
state buildings, street names and social advertisement. For the research it was important to interview workers who have decision-making power or have experience in naming street names, approving state buildings in the city or designing social advertisement. The main criteria to be interviewed were experience and management position. Ethnicity was not a factor in the interview process. If ethnicity was included in the criteria list, then the results would have been biased.

Taking into account Fauve’s (2014) argument that individual people in the state are also actively involved in city planning, private advertising company workers who had experience of working on city administration orders were also interviewed. Social advertisements on street billboards are expected to be printed by private advertising agencies. Their designers and managers to evaluate the level of their contribution to the content and images on advertisement.
Chapter 2 Official Discourse

In 1991, Kazakhstan acquired its independence and started the process of nation-building. The collapse of the Soviet Union was mainly due to economic failure that affected all republics within the union. As a result, the initial period of independence was followed by economic stagnation, deficit, crisis, and complete failure of the production industry. Along with the economic failure that was reflected in people’s salary, lack of food and lower quality of life, the state experienced an absence of national identity. In other words, recently independent Kazakhstan had an economically unstable government which had to manage a multi-ethnic population. Specifically, this situation created challenges for a state to start identity-building. By 1989, the proportion of ethnic Kazakhs constituted roughly 40.1% of the population, Russian 37.4%, German 5.8%, Ukrainians 5.4%, Uzbeks 2%, Uyghur 1.1% and other minorities (UNHR, 2004). Having an ethnic and religious heterogeneous society during economic stagnation, the state started to implement a friendly multiethnic policy. For example, in the address “Strategy Kazakhstan-2050: new political course of the established state” President Nazarbayev highlighted that the state aims at establishing harmony and peace among disparate social, ethnic, and religious groups. He emphasized equality for all citizens of Kazakhstan including all ethnic groups, bilingualism, culture and traditions. Kazakhstan’s multi-cultural character of national identity policy in the official discourse has been actively promoted with establishment of APK in 1995, by the president. Furthermore, in the annual national speeches, president Nazarbayev kept stressing the multi-ethnic dimension of the national identity policy.

This chapter will analyze the official discourse on Kazakhstan’s development and modernization in all spheres, but mainly focusing on national ideology development. The first part of the chapter will focus on Nazarbayev’s annual addresses to the nation (AAN) by
focusing particularly on nationalism policies and messages. Information is available online on the official website of the president in three languages (Kazakh, Russian, and English). Due to the differences in translation, the speeches were analyzed in three languages. Arguing that Kazakhisation has a multiethnic dimension, during the analysis of the president’s speeches promotion of the multiethnic character of nationalism policy has been considered.

The second part covers APK’s strategic documents such as National Unity Doctrine and Concept of Strengthening and Developing Kazakhstani identity and their relevance to state programs like Mangilik El (Eternal Nation) and Rukhani Zhangyru (Spiritual Revival, in English).

Before analyzing official discourse of the state in social policies, it is necessary to define official discourse. Dijk (1995) argues that political discourse is identified by its actor or politician. In other words, official political discourse is a text or speech of a president, prime minister, or other members of government. This research includes: political speeches, media interviews of state government representatives, laws, and governmental policies as units of measurement to be analyzed. On the official website of the President, there have been uploaded almost all his addresses and speeches he made so far. His speeches are readily available in three languages. Moreover, his speeches and addresses are broadcasted on national television. In other words, his speeches are widely spread to the citizens of Kazakhstan. This tradition is shared from international experience of other presidents reporting the results of the year and future plans. The very first AAN of President Nazarbayev to people of Kazakhstan was in October 1997. In 1997, he announced that these addresses will become annual, thus becoming an annual tradition. These addresses are broadcast on television, and then published in national newspapers and on the official website of the President.
The main goal of the annual addresses was outlined in the 1997 AAN:

“This message has been elaborated within the framework of my Constitutional duty to address annually to the people of Kazakhstan concerning basic trends in domestic and foreign policy. Yet, as I've mentioned above, our state and the society at large need a more global vision and a strategy to be guided by as a coordinate system which would enable us to draw up our annual plans of actions. That is why these issues are given particular consideration in the Message. Subsequent annual Messages of the President to the people of Kazakhstan devoted to major trends in the domestic and foreign policy will contain evaluation of implementation of the long-term strategy” (AAN 1997)

There have been twenty-one addresses to date. The core of these addresses is dedicated to the economic activities of the state which is not directly relevant to the thesis. Therefore, to make these addresses useful for the research, only socio-political topics have been selected from the speeches. Also, to make it more organized, the addresses have been divided into three groups: formation of multiethnic character of nationalism in the discourse (beginning) 1997-2003, strengthening of multiethnic character of nationalism (2004-2009), and transition to the strengthening of Kazakh identity (2010-2018). The period of 1990s and the beginning of 2000s is characterized with formation of nationalism with multiethnic dimension in Kazakhstan. In the speeches the president highlighted interethnic peace and unity as a base for stability. Though, the status of Kazakh culture and language was special at any period in all his speeches. Later from 2004 to 2009, the discourse on the multi-cultural character of nationalism was only strengthened in the speeches of the President. However, from 2010 in the discourse of the president the special status of Kazakh identity expressed through culture and language became dominant. This is believed to be kazakhisation process in academic literature. However, this thesis argues that kazakhisation process has multi-ethnic dimension and this is reflected in the speeches of the president too.
Formation of Multi-Ethnic Character of Nationalism

To start with, the core or beginning of the tradition of annual addresses (1997-2003) is based on the idea of democratization, stabilization of the economy and politics, and building a peaceful multi-ethnic society. The annual addresses primarily reflected the program “Kazakhstan – 2030”, a policy that has already been widely discussed and promoted. The idea was that Kazakhstan was in a transition from its communist past to a democratic future. The president stressed the importance of stabilizing the economy first before moving forward with modernization. He believed that without a stable economy, any attempts of modernization in society was impossible. Each AAN repeats the importance of economic stability. However, because this research focuses more on social problems raised by the president and his vision of identity-building, the economic discourse has not been analyzed. In the 1997 AAN, the president clearly asks “Who are we - Kazakhstanis?” and says that the answer requires time and historical development. During the period between 1997 and 2003, the president kept repeating that the symbol of Kazakhstan is the Asian snow leopard. This tendency comes from the naming of East Asian economically powerful countries (Korea, Japan and Taiwan), as tigers. In other words, Kazakhstan had model of economic development that resembles East Asian countries experience.

Economic stability can be achieved only if the society is socially and politically stable. Therefore, Kazakhstan needed nationalistic politics that united its ethnically heterogeneous society. President Nazarbayev claimed that unlike other post-Soviet countries, Kazakhstan had not experienced direct confrontations and ethnic conflicts. Kazakhstan is a homeland for many nationalities, who accept Kazakhstan as their motherland. In AAN in the period between 1997 and 2003, the president stressed the importance of having a multi-cultural and peaceful society.
President Nazarbayev announced that the primary long term priority for Kazakhstan is national security and the second priority is domestic political stability and the consolidation of society.

“Our strategy for gaining this priority constituting the society includes the following components:

- guarantee developing our own uniform civic motivation based on equality of opportunities for all the citizens of our country;

- ensure eventual elimination of causes for ethnic differences and mind that all ethnic groups have equal rights” (AAN 1997)

He highlighted interethnic peace and unity of the society as a priority for state. Over the next three years (1999-2001) he dedicated more time on the discussion of Kazakhstani history, focusing on the suffering that they experienced during Dzhungar attack followed by Soviet repressions. Starting from 1997 to 2003, the President used word “we” in the meaning of “Kazakhstani people”. He also used Kazakhstani separately in the text.

“I'd like to put particular emphasis on tolerance and patience of the Kazakhstani, on their cordiality and affability. It is witnessed by all foreigners. I am only too grateful to my countrymen for enduring all the hardships and privations of the transition period with such understanding and patience and I deem these qualities to be a serious pledge of our success, of the consolidation of the society, of attracting foreign investments and involvement of the world community in settling our problems.” (AAN 1997)

In the ANN, President Nazarbayev says that Kazakhstani people have common history of resistance to communist regime and Dzhungar attacks. All nations suffered together repressions, hunger and injustice. He uses word “communist” oppressors rather than Soviet administration. Throughout the 1990s, Kazakhstan presented itself as multiethnic state which was a core of national identity policy. In this period, the Assembly of Kazakhstani people was created and Concept of Kazakhstani identity was also formed.

In 1999, on the fifth annual session of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan “National consensus – the core of Kazakhstan’s stability and development” the president repeated the discourse of the importance of keeping multi-national politics, but highlighted the special
and titular role of the Kazakh language and culture. He said that all ethnicities will have protected rights for their ethnic languages, but that the Kazakh language and culture will be dominant and everyone needs to speak Kazakh. He also added, saying that it is necessary to be understood by all people in the Kazakhstan. Unlike Russian, Uzbek, Tajik or German people, Kazakhs cannot rely on other state to form our ethnic identity. Therefore, first, it is important to develop a Kazakh identity and along with it identity, culture and language of other ethnicities within state. (Nyssanbayev and Kossichenko 2010). In other words, this is expression of multiculturalism that is based on one particular culture. On this session he also said that the total inclusion of Kazakh language and culture is not a forced and quick process.

Overall, it is worth noting that the general discourse in the speeches of this period was directed at promoting unity, friendship, and tolerance within a multi-cultural society.

**Strengthening Multi-Ethnic Character of Nationalism**

The next period (2003-2010) is a period of strengthening of the discourse of multi-ethnic character of national identity building process. To be more specific, until 2010 the discourse remained almost the same as in the previous period (1997-2003) in the AAN of the president. However, it is a beginning of a different period because in it is a start of the first program on formation of a national identity such as “Cultural Heritage”. Also, it is a new period because the president announced the economy is stabilized so that the state can start focusing more on socio-political issues. In 2003 focus was on the importance of villages (auyl) as an origin of Kazakh culture. Also, that year President Nazarbayev announced launch of “Cultural heritage” program that aimed at research of national culture, folklore and traditions. One might argue that this is a sign for giving more of a priority to Kazakh ethnic group. The reason is that auyls (villages) are mainly inhabited by ethnic Kazakhs. Another point is that “Cultural heritage program” refers to culture of ethnic Kazakhs (Bissenova 2017). However,
in the speech there is no explicit reference to it. The year 2003 is also memorable to the national identity policy of the state, because during the speech on APK’s 10th anniversary session the president said that Kazakhstan has unique model of multi-ethnic consensus program. President announced that inter-ethnic peace and multiculturalism is a result of painstaking work of the government. The general message was that Kazakhstan is on a right way towards achieving stability in economics and then to politics, keeping national unity.

In general, in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 AAN President Nazarbayev repeated that economy is stable enough to pay more attention on social problems like education and health. By 2006, 15 years of independence have past. At the same time, he said that during this process of economic stabilization people of Kazakhstan had changed a lot too. First of all, people acquired democratic values of freedom, tolerance to other groups and fairness. All these are base for national civic identity and multiculturalism. In the AAN, the president highlighted these civic values as a core for national identity. In his AANs from 2004 until 2009 he used the word “we” in the meaning of “Kazakhstani”, “government”, “people of Kazakhstan”.

From 2007 nine people could be elected to the lower level of the Parliament by Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, empowering APK with decision-making power. By 2008-2009 President Nazarbayev announced the special role of unique Kazakhstani institution – Assembly of People of Kazakhstan. The Assembly was granted more power in the Parliament, because it worked effectively.

“Over the 16 years of our independence, we have implemented our own model for securing public stability and inter-ethnic accord, molding the Kazakhstani identity and shared Kazakhstani patriotism. This is our Kazakhstani know-how, of which we are justly proud and which we must carefully guard. Within the Constitutional Reform context, the status and power of Kazakhstan’s People's Assembly have increased” (AAN 2008)

These years are called strengthening of multi-ethnic character of nationalism in Kazakhstan because the idea of Kazakhstani identity of multiculturalism started being solidified. In the beginning it was clear that Kazakhstani people share common history. But by 2009,
when the economy stabilized enough people of Kazakhstan started sharing civic identity that
brought them together to achievements. In the official discourse identity of Kazakhstani peo-
ple was made up of democratic values: freedom, tolerance, competitiveness, intelligence and
openness. From the image of snow leopard Kazakhstan turned to the idea of being Eurasian
state. These values become the base for Doctrine of national unity in 2009, which will be dis-
cussed later. During AAN in 2006 President Nazarbayev highlighted the role of Astana as
Eurasian city that facilitates international negotiation. The role of Eurasian Economic Union,
Eurasian National University, Eurasian forums became frequently highlighted in the dis-
course of the president. But overall, this period from 2003 and 2010 is characterized with
strengthening of multi-ethnic policy of the state reflected in the president’s speeches, state
programs and actions such as granting political power to APK.

Transition to Strengthening Kazakh Identity

From 2010 till 2018 Kazakh identity strengthening period had started. President an-
nounced new decade of modernization. The decade started with modernization in education:
“Balapan” program for children, Nazarbayev University, introduction of three language poli-
cy. In 2011 AAN the president says that on 20th anniversary of independence the amount of
Kazakh-speaking people has increased which is important for the country. In 2012 he an-
nounced the beginning of a new Kazakhstani patriotism. He started addressing issue of Ka-
zakh culture and language development as a core of identity for multi-ethnic state. Though,
the discourse about unity of multi-ethnic state is still valid. “This issue for me is not negotia-
ble. If anyone in our country is discriminated against then we should assume that all Kazakh-
stan citizens are discriminated against” (AAN 2012). However, transitional mood in the dis-
course is visible.

“Whoever attempts to “drive a wedge” into the interethnic harmony of the nation
should be prosecuted by Law. And here we Kazakhs bear a special responsibility. We must
understand that the epoch of single-ethnic states has gone. Kazakhstan is our land. It is a land that has belonged to our ancestors. The land that will belong to our descendants. We bear a direct responsibility for the peace and harmony of our land” (AAN 2012)

For the first time the word “we” or “our” in this case refers to ethnic Kazakhs, saying that this is the land of Kazakhs. I tend to believe that this period is transitional because the president started talking more about individual character of a nation that should be unique to resist globalization process that destroys cultures. In the new decade, Kazakhstan not only stopped adapting Western values, but started resisting it. The discourse that new technological development spoils children and a new generation became official. New technology undermines new generation’s spiritual upbringing, but it fosters development of economic potential. Kazakhstan is not a snow leopard anymore, it is not an Eurasian brother as well. From the president’s AANs of this period it seems that Kazakhstan has new vision of identity.

In the transitional period (2010-2018) the acceptance of Kazakh culture and language as a base for Kazakhstani identity has been announced. I believe that the shift in identity policies or transition was facilitated by Doctrine of National Unity from 2010. For the first time in the discourse he used “we” as “Kazakhs” saying that the guarantor of Kazakh unity, preservation of Kazakh culture and language. Russian language is still crucial, but the focus is on Kazakh as a national language and English as a language of progress.

The year 2014 is characterized with promotion of “Mangilk El” program which means eternal nation. It is too strong to claim that “nation” is understood as ethnic “Kazakhs” because in the text he says that it refers to all Kazakhstani people. However, in the program is announced right in the transitional for identity period. So, it is quite debatable. The “Mangilik El” program was announced for the first time in the AAN in 2012 in Kazakh language only (Ileuova 2014). As a result, the program was not a public discussion about it. Later, in the speech dedicated to the Independence Day celebration in 2013 December, the president came back to this idea and give order to the government to develop the program. Explicitly the
program was announced in 2014 AAN, giving order to President Apparatus and Assembly of Nation of Kazakhstan to participate in realizing the program that has seven specific criteria or development of patriotism.

“Eternal people” is the national idea of our nation-wide house, the dream of our ancestors… First, it is the Independence of Kazakhstan and Astana. Secondly, national unity, peace and harmony in our society. Third, this is a secular society and a high spirituality. Fourth, economic growth based on industrialization and innovation. Fifth, it is the Society of General Labor. Sixth, the commonality of history, culture and language. Seventh, this is national security and global participation of our country in solving global and regional problems” (AAN 2014)

The text of his addresses is available in three languages. The use of ‘we” as “Kazakhstani” or “Kazakhs” varies in different languages. In the Kazakh text it explicitly celebrates eternity of Kazakh ethnicity. In Russian text it is used as “Kazakhstani”. Even in the 2012 AAN, when the president mentioned Eternal Nation, he said it in Kazakh language, but in Russian it was not said.

“Қымбатты отандастар!
«Қазақстан 2050» жаңа стратегиялық бағыттың жүзеге асыруда бізге – қазақ халқына айрықша жауапкершілік жүктеледі… Сол шайқаста төгілген қан барша қазақ тамырға бар... Бұл бейбітшіліктің, тұрақтылық пен ғұлумендің ғасыры болады. Қазақстан халқы ұлы тарихтың нәсі атануға лайық. Сендер (жастар) тәуелсіз Қазақ елінің перзентеріпіңдер... Мәңгілік Ел болу жолындағы ұлы істериңіз жаңа дауірлере жол ашсын! (Kazakh language)

There is a great responsibility on Kazakhs in realization of the state program «Kazakhstan-2050» ... The blood spilled in this battle flows in all kazakhs... This century is a century of peace, stability and development. Kazakhstan people deserve to be called the Great. You are the children of independent Kazakh people. May our great achievements in the way of eternal life lead to new epochs!” (translated) (AAN 2012)

When he speaks in Kazakh language he uses both words “Kazakhstani people and Kazakh people”. “Kazakhstani people” is used more to refer to civic values like interethnic peace, harmony, stability and progress. However, when he refers to history, land, territory, ancestors, culture or spiritual values he uses “Kazakh people”. So, when he said eternal nation he was explicitly referring to ethnic Kazakhs. He says that in this land the blood of our
(Kazakh) ancestors was shed and the new generation (Kazakh) is a gift, this is going to be eternal nation. I would like to add Russian version of this part from address, but the president did not say it in Russian version. It just ends with the word gratitude to all Kazakhstani people.

Also, the translation technique should be taken into account first. “Kazakh people” and “Kazakh nation” sound differently in his speeches, but translated as having one meaning – Kazakhstani. In fact, “Kazakh people” (kazakhskii narod) refers to ethnic Kazakhs and “Kazakh nation” refers to a nation in general. May be as a translation mistake words are used in one meaning in Russian language. However, in case of 2012 AAN the president speaks only in Kazakh when he was saying about Eternal Nation.

However, in the 20th anniversary of the APK the president made a speech about the importance of Mangilik El (eternal nation) program for shaping Kazakhstani culture and identity to unite all ethnicities within state. The program will become a source of unity and integrity of common spiritual and moral values of all people. And finally it is a program aiming at strengthening the role of Kazakh language particularly as a state language and all other languages in the state. The result is educational system on three languages (Kazakh, Russian and English). This shows that even though the kazakhisation process takes place in the discourse of the president, it is difficult to reject the multi-ethnic dimension of the process too.

Another state program aimed at highlighting central and uniting role of Kazakh culture and language as a base for state identity is Rukhani Zhangyru (Spiritual Revival) program. The program itself is announced by the president as a continuation of modernization part of politics and economics which is the third stage is social modernization. The program is written in Kazakh language only. The program “Rukhani Zhangyru” is not translated in Russian officially in the website. The official logotype of the program includes the image of
eagle. This is the second program of the president, including “Mangilik El” program, which is published online at state newspaper “Egemen Kazakhstan” (Sovereign Kazakhstan) in Kazakh language only. The President says that the program aims at reviving culture and language of the nation. In the introduction the president says the state tries to be part of thirty developed states. These states mainly have western values. It is right to accept western progress but it is necessary to remember national identity. In the discussion the word “national” means “ethnic” (Kazakh). Translated in Russian language the president calls it Modernization of Social Consciousness. And its mission is to have educated, competitive and open-minded citizens of Kazakhstan who have strong national identity. And the program started with shifting from Cyrillic alphabet to Latin, three language education system, launching program of “100 new faces of Kazakhstan” that promotes talented citizens who glorify Kazakhstan, and the program called “Cultural Export” that aims at introducing to the world Kazakh culture through music, festivals and books. Even though Rukhani Zhnagyru program has more ethnicization character, the role of multiculturalism was not cancelled in the program. Along with strengthening the role and status of Kazakh language the role of Russian and English languages is retained through introducing mandatory school subjects in Russian language.

These two state programs Mangilik El (eternal nation) and Rukhani Zhangyru (spiritual revival) often used in AAN of the president lately (2010-2018). This period from 2010 to 2018 is characterized with accenting on identification, development and strengthening of Kazakh culture and language. The main argument in the discourse is that Kazakh culture and language serve as a core to the formation of all Kazakhstani identity. But in 1996 on APK’s session the president said the process will not forced and quick. And from 2010-2012 with Mangilik El program the process of granting special status to Kazakh culture and language
had started. It is worth noting that multi-cultural character of state identity policy still remains in the discourse. It is mainly reflected in APK’s documents and discourse.

**Strategic documents of the APK**

The Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan is a state body that takes part in writing state policies on nationalism and national identity. The APK was established by initiation of the President Nazarbayev who intentionally created this institution to regulate inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan. The strategic documents of the APK also play major role in the discourse of multi-ethnic dimension of kazakhisation process. There are two main strategic documents of the APK on the official website: Concept of Strengthening and Developing Kazakhstani Identity and Unity, and National Unity Doctrine.

The first Concept of Strengthening and Developing Kazakhstani Identity and Unity was written in 1996 by the APK from initiation of the president. The document starts with definition of the word “identity”, because it is a new idea for post-Soviet people. It says that the document focuses on the national identity. It states that modern Kazakhstani identity is based on three historical identities: Kazakh identity, identity imposed by Russian Empire and then USSR, and a democratic identity. The document claims that Kazakhstan is a secular state that gives freedom to all religious groups to freely practice their religion. The Concept of Strengthening and Developing Kazakhstani Identity and Unity is based on Constitution of Kazakhstan from 1995, which treats all peoples of Kazakhstan as equal, making them components of a Kazakhstani nation. The key values are democracy, freedom, tolerance, transparency and friendship. This model of national identity later served as a base for official discourse in the addresses of the president from 1997 until the transitional period. In 2015 the document was modified by Ministry of Culture and Sport, approved by the APK and signed
by the president. It says the base for the document is Mangilik El (eternal nation) program. In
the very beginning the definition for the Kazakhstani identity and unity is given.

“Kazakhstani identity is based on the fact that every citizen, regardless of ethnic
origin, connects his fate and future with Kazakhstan. A single past, a joint present and shared
responsibility for the future bind society together: "We have one Fatherland, one Homeland -
Independent Kazakhstan." (The Concept of Strengthening and Developing Kazakhstani Identi-
ty and Unity 1995)

The document highlights the efforts of the state in promoting multi-ethnic character of
nationalism policy in this definition. Further in the text, it is clearly said that Kazakh culture
and language are the core and integrating elements of Kazakhstani identity.

Another strategic document of the APK is the Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakh-
stan. For the first time the document was written in 2009 by the APK and approved by the
president. By that moment in the official discourse, the idea of Kazakhstaniis who strive for
interethnic and interfaith harmony, unity and friendship had been strengthened. The first
Doctrine was released to public in spring 2009. By November 2009, there were objections
against the Doctrine. Mukhtar Shakhanov, the founder of “Memlekettik Til” (state language)
movement and ten other members organized a press-conference to show their objection
against Kazakhstani identity that is promoted in the first Doctrine of National Unity. They
claimed that if the doctrine is not rejected then on December 17 they would start hunger
strike protest. They argued that the President Nazarbayev made a mistake by naming people
of Kazakhstan – Kazakhstani. They want a titular ethnicity – Kazaks - to be the dominant
group.

Petition was signed by more than 4000 was sent to the president with a message to
cancel the doctrine and release the new one which accepts Kazakhs as a titular nation. They
argued that the idea of “Kazakhstani people” is similar to the idea of “American people”. The
idea of that if Kazakhstan accepts the doctrine then ethnic Kazakhs will become a part of many other ethnicities in the country which is an end to a nation.

Discourse that is chosen for this research in the AAN of the president shows official side of the discourse. According to a definition of an official political discourse, any discourse by political actors is an official discourse. Therefore, Shakhanov’s addresses to the president and a petition signed by 4000 people is also official. The point is that the research focused on Nazarbaey’s speeches only throughout 22 years. However, there were discourses that were ignored in many literatures on Kazakhstani identity. Literature written in Kazakh or discourse in Kazakh language is not taken into account. Thus, with a pressure from ethnic Kazakh political activists the transitional model of identity formation has started. Exactly, the period when the president started changing the discourse, talking more about importance of Kazakh culture and language.

In 2010, there was written a new and modified Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan that takes into account objections of protesting group.

“The Republic of Kazakhstan is the only legal and historical heir to the centuries-old statehood of the **Kazakh people** and the natural continuation of its political and state structure. Kazakhstan takes all measures to protect its independence and strengthen its national statehood” (Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan 2010).

The transitional period towards Kazakh identity in the discourse of the president from 2010 might the result of this protest. In the text it is explicitly written that Kazakh language and Kazakh culture have a dominant status. This is the change that was made since the previous doctrine. On the basis of Kazakh culture and language there will be developed unity, tolerance and friendship with other ethnicities in the state. In 2014 the Doctrine was modified and there introduced minor changes. And one of them states that thanks to a Kazakh nation’s wisdom and hospitality, different ethnicities live together in a peace and harmony. Overall, the official discourse of the president on national identity policy has changed in 27 years as it
is observed in the analysis. In the mid of 1990s the president in his speeches and programs didn’t constantly highlight the role of Kazakh culture and language. Instead, he accents importance of inter-ethnic peace, friendship and tolerance. After 2010, he stresses dominant role of Kazakh culture and language as a core of national identity of Kazakhstani people.

Indeed, in the discourse of the president up until 2010 there were no direct and forced policies on learning Kazakh language by all citizens. Only from 2010 the role of Kazakh language and culture started to be highlighted by him. It might be concluded that this process has started as a result of pressure of ethnic Kazakhs. Clear example is Mukhtar Shakhanov’s movement against the first Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan. People in the government were workers of Soviet administration or at least they studied at Russian universities and schools. Most of state workers do not speak Kazakh language. If to consider from primordialist school of thought, they do not have emotional need of granting titular status to Kazakh language, because most of them are Russified. Movement of people from rural areas to the big cities and influence of oralmans also boosted the process. In other words, the process of kazakhisation was forced from bottom to up. Only then, the state started the last programs of reviving Kazakh culture and language. The state reacted to the demand of majority.

The head of the center for interethnic and interconfessional studies in Central Asia in the interview for this research said that this is the process of self-identification.

“The process is inevitable. Almost all post-Soviet new states are experiencing this process. Some of them split apart not knowing who they are like Ukraine. They were deciding whether they are Slavic or European. First time in the history, Kazakhs had complete independence and centralized state to build identity. Therefore, the pressure coming from people is influential and dangerous”

From my observations, multi-ethnic policy implemented via the APK and multilingual policy initiated by the president show multi-ethnic dimension of kazakhisation process. As it was planned and announced by the president in 1996 Kazakh culture and language
will serve as core and united cultures of other ethnicities. Kazakh language will be the state language, but the role of other is not going to be diminished. To make Kazakh culture and language the central one first it is necessary to identify what Kazakh identity is. I think that the state is trying to answer the question of what Kazakh identity is. In the beginning of 1990s the state was a snow leopard, then for some time it was Eurasian and now it rejects all these ideas and positions itself as an eagle. The image of berkut (eagle) is depicted on the logo of “Rukhani Zhangyru” program. The same image of an eagle presents on the national flag, which has two meanings. The first one is the representation of independence and freedom. The second meaning is the representation of Kazakh lifestyle. Currently, the logotype of Rukhani Zhangyru program is on the street billboards and on façade of buildings in Astana, showing that the program is currently implemented. And the president also frequently refers to the program in the official speeches on the APK sessions, highlighting its multi-ethnic dimension.

Just to remind a definition of kazakhisation - “…is the idea of creating ethnic Kazakhs in the economic, cultural, educational and political spheres of independent Kazakhstan” (Sarsembayev 1999). Karin and Chebotarev (2002, 1) claim that kazakhisation can be understood as an action of the state directed to the revival, strengthening, development and representation of cultural, ethno-demographic, political and legal values of ethnic Kazakhs. On the stage of reviewing literature on kazakhisation I was planning to show how it is reflected in urban space of Astana, but after making actual research I decided to redefine the term. This thesis offers modification of the term by adding information on state action directed at development of multi-ethnic character of identity policy. Kazakhisation is a process of defining, reviving and development of ethnic culture and language of ethnic Kazakhs as a base for Kazakhstani identity that integrates cultures of all ethnicities. This chapter has analyzed official discourse on national identity from the president and the APK. To find whether it is reflected
in the socio-political life of people, the next chapter provides evidences from urban space of the capital city Astana reflected in street names, monuments and social advertisement in the streets
Chapter 3 Urban Space of Astana

After analyzing state discourse and academic literature on what kazakhisation, this chapter aims at showing how it is reflected in urban space of Astana. This chapter discusses evidences of state national identity policies in urban space of Astana reflected in social advertisement on street billboards, monuments and street names. The introductory part of the chapter is a theoretical part, focusing on how urban space demonstrates national identity and its relevance to the argument of the thesis. The first part is a brief introduction to the history of the capital city. The second part is an analysis of social advertisement in the 18 streets of Astana. The third subsection is dedicated to monuments, sculptures and city decoration elements. Finally, the street names and renaming of streets as an ideological tool are analyzed.

The literature on the role of city planning and urban space on politics highlight the special role of capital cities in having ideological messages. Molnar (2013) and Koppen (2013) argue that there is a close connection between state politics and architecture. Molnar (2013) discusses post-war central Europe, arguing that the relationship between architecture and politics is mutually constitutive, as state heavily relies on architecture to realize their political interests. He uses examples of three cities of using architecture as a tool for propaganda (East Berlin), an instrument of social reform and reassertion of national identity (Budapest), and re-Europeanization (Berlin). For example, even decoration of buildings facades with tulips showed revival of Hungarian traditionalism – action taken by state. It is way a of expressing banal nationalism, placing symbols everywhere to promote one ideology. Applying Billig’s (1995) theory of banal nationalism, this research highlights the importance of social advertisement, street navigators and monuments in Astana’s urban space. These are the elements that are also viewed everyday and have strong symbolic meaning.
Street names, monuments, sculptures, elements of city decoration and speeches of the
president were chosen to show that kazakhisation is a top-down process. The speeches of the
President and his programs aiming national ideology represent the official policy coming
from the state. Astana’s urban space represented by monuments, sculptures, social advertise-
ment and street names show how the ideological politics actually executed by state. Only so-
cial advertisement on billboards, monuments and sculptures installed and approved by
Akimat were considered in this research, ignoring commercial or private advertisement. The
list of renamed streets is available only on the official website of Akimat. The content analy-
sis of state policies and its reflection in urban space does not show the role of state in ka-
zakhisation process. To make it more valid and show that the process is initiate by state offi-
cials interview with Akimat workers, advertising agencies and individual experts was done.

The thesis argues that kazakhisation process with multi-ethnic dimension is reflected
in the urban space of Astana. Particularly street social advertisement on billboards and street
names reflect multi-cultural dimension of state identity building process. In contrast monu-
ments, sculptures and city decoration elements express recent state programs on reviving Ka-
zakh culture.

**Background about Astana**

In 1997 Astana became a new capital of Kazakhstan. Previously, the capital city was
Almaty, the Soviet style and Soviet-planned, old city in the south-east of Kazakhstan. Astana
served as a clean space explicitly aimed at nation-building and identity construction. The
President explicitly says that Astana is not just a randomly selected city. The city was chosen
for 32 reasons (Mkrtchyan 2017). The first and main reason is location. Astana is located
right in the center of Kazakhstan, which serves as a sign for unification of all regions. Anoth-
er reason that the president highlights is that Astana by 1997 was inhabited mainly by Rus-
sian-speaking population (Laszczkowski 2011). So, in order to change the social and demographic situation in the region, the capital was relocated to Astana. This means that Astana initially had symbolic meaning to identity-construction. Also, the name itself translated from Kazakh means “capital”. In general, it is a project initiated by the President Nursultan for nation-building.

First, in May 1998 the city was renamed from Aqmola (mid-size factory town) to Astana (Laszczkowski 2011). Soon, state administration was relocated from Almaty to Astana, making unprecedented constructions efforts to build up administrative and monumental city on the left bank of the city. Sooner, in a decade the population of Astana was tripled and the volume of investments estimated fifteen billion dollars (Laszczkowski 2011).

The city is full of administrative buildings built by the state. People all over the country moved to Astana motivated by prospects of employment and better lives. Bissenova (2017) says that Astana attracted people from all regions, but majority were from southern part of the country, which is believed to become an injection of Kazakh traditionalism to Russified north. Not only this but, the construction of the city- architectural solution- implies explicit ideological message.

The focus of the research is to show the role of state in promoting and spreading ideology. Applying the theory of banal nationalism, the urban space of Astana was chosen as an object of analysis. Particularly, the social advertisement on billboards and monuments set up by state bodies, street names are chosen as an instrument of banal nationalism. The city is divided into left and right banks. Also, the city is known to be identified as an old center and a new center. To remain object in the research both old and a new city centers were captured. It is important to capture both old and, a new centers to show the difference in architecture
and ideological signs. The new center was built from scratches and reflects state ideology. In contrast, the old city was planned by Tsarist and then Soviet architects.

For ethnographic research in the old center there were chosen nine major streets (see Maps 1-3 below): Zhenis (Victory), Beibitshilik (Peace), Kenesary, Seifullin, Abai, Zheltoksan, Respublika, Imanov, Agybay Batyr. These streets are not chosen randomly. The first residence of the President, Ministry of Finance, Parliament and other first administrative buildings were built there. The residence of the president became a museum when the administrative center was moved to left bank. Zhenis, Abay, Seifullin and Zheltoksan streets are the location of buildings that date to the Tsarist period. On the left bank nine streets were chosen: Sarayshyk, Konaev, Dostyk, Syganak, Vodno-zelenyi bulvar, Kabanbay batyr, Mangilik El (Eternal Nation), Uly Dala (Great Steppe), Ryskulov. First five streets are the new center

Source: 2Gis.kz
where the main government buildings are located like President’s residence, Senate building, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, the park where both guests and residents of Astana spend time, shopping malls. The other four streets are located on the EXPO side, which was newly built in 2017. EXPO 2017 Astana was an international exhibition on a topic of “Future Energy” that attracted international as well as local visitors. The area is brand new and many people from regions came to see pavilions. Also, there are universities and schools, new apartments and a new shopping mall located. The area became lively and crowded. In the nearest future the area is supposed to be a financial center.

My research began from the right bank of the city. The old center is made up of Tsarist Russia and Soviet style housing. Some of these houses were reconstructed and became historic museums. And some were bought by private companies and turned into fancy shops or banks. The apartments in the old city are mostly Soviet style housing of economy class. They look very old and damaged. In fact, the façade of this type of soviet housing on Republica street was reconstructed before OSCE Summit in 2012. Particularly, the façade of buildings that look on street side were painted with brighter color and ornaments. The inner side of housings (the courtyard) remained the same. Houses are densely located. On the right bank there a lot of schools, universities, hospitals, cafes and shops. Bus stations are usually overcrowded with students, pupils and other people.

**Social advertisement**

Social advertisement on billboards, sculptures and street signs are part of urban space. They are also symbols of banal nationalism. Social advertisement on street billboards reflect state’s ideological message. The content of social advertisement in Astana varies: clean city, love for Astana, Constitution, sport winners, historic and cultural figures, anti-corruption
promotion, Expo, President’s programs like “Rukhani Zhangyru” (Spiritual revival). If the messages on billboards are analyzed from socio-political perspective then I classify them promoting active socio-civic and political position. Social advertisement expressing socio-civic values are in majority, especially on the right bank. Having interviewed people from Akimat and advertising agencies on the issue of social advertisement, and studying state documents on Akimat’s activity, I came to conclusion that all social and commercial billboards are approved by Akimat. In Akimat there is department of language development that checks the text. There are norms according to which advertisement must be written in two languages (Russian and Kazakh). The location of social advertisement is also chosen by Akimat or other state body like Procuracy. The text and design are not necessarily given by Akimat. A designer from polygraph center said that she was doing two projects for Akimat. During the first one they gave her all the requirement and images, she just needed to integrate all pictures. In the second case, she had to design some images. But later, this was corrected by Akimat and then printed. Other two managers of other polygraph centers which print social advertisement on billboards for state said that all final projects are approved by Akimat and only then are printed. They can offer some ideas but in the end it is up to Akimat to accept or not.

I have taken the photos of social advertisement on billboards only. They usually have logo of Astana city. These billboards with public service announcements, as so-called “social advertising”, expressing civic values of the state (Photo 1 below) call for being socially responsible residents of the city and state. The two images on the Photo 1 are the examples of a state-sponsored promotion of civic values: the one is for anti-corruption campaign and the other is for clean city. In the left-hand side of the Photo 1, the text is written in Russian only. It shows a chain being broken and says, “don’t go by, break the chain of corruption.” In other
Photo 1 Billboards with Public Service Announcements in Astana

Note: All photos are made by author.

words, a person involved in corruption becomes a part of a system and contributes to it. Below is a phone number to complain on corruption by calling to the Department of the Agency for Civil Service and Anti-Corruption Activities in Astana. This anti-corruption advertisement is popular both on the left and new centers. The right-hand side image of the Photo 1 illustrates two hands holding together a tree. The text is in both Kazakh and Russian. It says that the nature and people are united. In general, it calls people to protect environment.

Another type of civic social adds calling for fulfilling civic duties like serving the military, working, paying taxes, helping compatriots, supporting women, gender equality, and fighting against extremism. In the left-hand side of the Photo 2 below one can see a promotion of a state unemployment program. In two languages (Kazakh and Russian) it asks “are you looking for job?” and gives the link to a social program website to find a job. Again,
Photo 2 Street Banners in Astana’s Old City Center

the logo of Astana Akimat is there. There are illustrated 6 faces of people. It looks like the CV-profile of job-seeking people. Even though it is cartoon illustration of people (not photo), it is clear they are of different ethnicities, genders and age. The state needs to ensure that everyone is active and contributes to the development. On the right-hand side of Photo 2 presents a man in a military uniform holding rifle. In Kazakh and Russian language it says “The duty of each citizen is to protect the Republic of Kazakhstan”. Even the speech is strict and official, using the word “Republic of Kazakhstan”. In contrast other social advertisement (without military context) use the words “Kazakhstan”, “Motherland” or “Fatherland”. In other words, the text bears strong civic message. Images of faces on these billboards express the multiethnic dimension of identity policy. As a part of the president’s program Kazakhstan 2050 and all previous addresses, citizens of Kazakhstan should be healthy, athletic and socially active. Recently, in the streets of Astana there were installed city-bikes for active lifestyle. These bikes are located right next to bus stations. Right next to each bike-station there are social advertisements portraying sportmen of Kazakhstan. Among them all famous sport
teams like Barys, Astana football club, Ilya Ilyin and Ermakhan Ibragimov. There are also very young and less popular sportsmen depicted on these billboards. For example, the right-hand side of Photo 3 below depicts a basketball team of Astana city. While the left-hand side of Photo 3 features a young sportsman Evgenyi Afanasuyk who is a Champion of Kazakhstan in freestyle wrestling. Below of his photo there is his autobiography saying that he was struggling in finding himself and having found it in the sport. The text is written only in Russian. There is promotion of many other young and talented people in these

**Photo 3 Street Banner in the Astana’s New City Center**

![Street Banner in the Astana’s New City Center](image)

advertisements who are painters, sportsmen, dancers and singers. Some of them are in Russian, some in Kazakh.

All these listed billboards were installed in 2012 and 2013 as a part of Astana Akimat program. Akimat made a competition among citizens (individuals and companies) for the
best social advertisement on topic of: patriotic upbringing of young generation, state symbols, Astana is my heart, state holidays, healthy lifestyle, anti-fire campaign, the importance of paying taxes, the role of family in society development that mainly promote of civic values.

Apart from socio-civic values promoted through social advertisement in the streets of Astana, there are also advertisements with political content. These billboards were analyzed on textual content and visuals. Particularly, I was focusing on the message of identity and nationalism signs. After observing billboards both on the left and right banks on 18 streets, I classified these billboards on promoting civic and ethnic identity. The difference is that advertisements promoting civic nationalism or patriotism are written in two languages or Russian only. There are usually pictures of the President, flag, constitution, the shape of Kazakhstan’s borders or EXPO pavilions. The ethnic nationalism (talking about ethnic Kazakh identity) on billboards is expressed through elements and signs of Kazakh ethnic culture, folklore and history. One of the popular examples are Kazakh ornaments. These ornaments are on national flag showing the dominance of Kazakhs culture in Kazakhstan. Also, the presence of image of animals like eagles and horses points to Kazakh culture. For example, the image of eagles has two meanings. The first one expresses the freedom and independence of Kazakhstan. The second meaning is a representation of Kazakh lifestyle. In the past, nomads used eagles for hunting which is a tradition that is still practiced by some Kazakhs in the eastern region of the country. In other words, the image of eagle as a part of Kazakh culture is strong.

On the Photo 4 below, there is a group of people representing different professions. It says “together WE build law-based future”. The words “we” is highlighted in the sentence. “We” in this case seems to mean Kazakhstan since people of different ethnicities are pictured. It clearly represents civic nationalism and multiculturalism, because it implies legality, equality and freedom. Photo 5 below represents program “100
Photo 4 Street Banner in Astana’s New City Center

Photo 5 Street Banner “100 New Faces of Kazakhstan” in Astana’s New City Center
new faces” that promotes modernization of society. This new project is a part of Rukhani Zhangyru program. The project aims at popularizing active members of society who contribute to the development science, sport, culture and medicine in the state. This shows that Rukhani Zhangyru program is directed not only at reviving Kazakh culture and language, but also at modernization of society in general. The background of the image in this banner is blue - the color of Kazakhstan’s flag, and there is a flag of the state and the shape of Kazakhstan’s border. The text in this banner reads 100 new faces. Successful people - successful state” in both Kazakh and Russian “. The social advertisement on billboards dedicated to the project is very popular. Perhaps the reason is that it is a new project started this year and it needs to be promoted. There are images of different people on billboards in Astana, names of local university heads, painters, sportsmen and scientists. Representatives of different nationalities are presented on these billboards, expressing modernization of the state in different spheres. Again, this is a part of Rukhani Zhangyru program which argues to be directed at strengthening Kazakh identity. However, images of multi-cultural society are visible on these billboards I have discussed above.

The logo of the program Rukhani Zhangyru is almost on each social advertisement all over the state. The logotype of the program is composed of colorful eagle and the words “Rukhani Zhangyru”. The eagle is all bright and colorful representing both modernity and Kazakh culture. The idea of being snow leopard and being Eurasian is not relevant anymore. It is a modernization of Kazakhstani culture. In fact, Rukhani Zhangury program is presented having both messages for multicultural/civic identity building policy as well as promoting ethnic nationalism. Images and content on photos above are the example of state messages for multi-cultural dimension in identity building.
However, Photo 6 displays billboards, which are the examples of ethnic identity promotion. The text in both billboards is the same, but the background is different. It says in Kazakh “sincere engagement is development of motherland is a sign of a true patriotism”. The word “motherland” is key in the sentence. In the previously discussed advertisements the state was referred as “Republic of Kazakhstan” or “Kazakhstan”, but in Kazakh language it appears as “motherland”. The billboard captured on the left-hand side of the Photo 6 displays Kazakh ornaments on the background. On is the right-hand side of this Photo there is an image of a Kazakh boy wearing Kazakh traditional clothing and handling an eagle. Even the name of the program which was not officially translated in Russian implies revival of Kazakh culture and language, and the content of billboards dedicated to the program has the same meaning.
Overall, social advertisements displayed on billboards serve as an instrument of ideology promotion by state. In case of Astana, content of social advertisement observed on 18 streets mainly promote civic nationalism or multi-cultural dimension of state identity policy. Only exceptions are some social advertisements on Rukhani Zhangyru program that partially promote strengthening of Kazakh identity.

**Monuments, sculptures and city decoration elements**

There are other elements of banal nationalism in urban space in Astana like sculptures, monuments and city decoration. I chose them as symbols of banal nationalism because they represent state and the message it sends to people by memorizing historical figures and events that important for state. Monuments and sculptures that were observed on major streets are mainly dedicated to ethnically Kazakh heroes, batyrs, poets, khans and writers. On the other hand sculptures and elements of decoration of the city can be interpreted as symbols of multicultural dimension of nationalism policy of the state.

The dense concentration of sculptures and monuments are in old center (former residence of Nazarbayev in Astana) and new center (Vodno-zelenyi boulevard). During my observational research I have mentioned that the left bank of the city is decorated more with different kinds of sculptures and ornaments of Kazakh motifs on buildings and in the streets. In contrast, on the right bank there are less sculptures and decorations. There are more monuments for Kazakh khans, batyrs, heroes and poets, even the names of streets are named for their memory. In contrast, on the left bank the street names are for historic events, actions or cities, but this will be discussed later in details. The monuments for Kazakh heroes are mainly on the old center: Abay and Seifullin monuments, Zhanibek and Kerey khans (Photo 7 be-
low), Aiteke Bi, Kazybek Bi and Tole Bi (Photo 8 below), and the war hero Aliya Moldagulova (Photo 9).

**Photo 7 Monument to Kerey and Zhanibek Khans in the Old Center in Astana**

In the old center on the right bank, there is an area of President’s former residence on Abay street. In front of the building there is a monument for Kerey and Zhanibek Khans, as shown on the Photo 7 above. Zhanibek and Kerey Khans are the founders of Kazakh Khanate. It is symbolic to establish a monument for Kazakh Khanate founders in front of the president’s residence. The monument’s title appears only in Kazakh. This can serve as a message of a dominant status of Kazakhs in the history of modern Kazakhstan. Establishment of monument to Kazakh Khans in front of president’s residence shows that kazakhisation process takes place in the identity policy of the state.

In the old center of Astana, near the former residence of the president there are many other monuments for Kazakh historic figures. These monuments are dedicated to ethnic Kazakh judges (Photo 8 below), a war hero (Photo 9 below) and a poet (Photo 10 below). The Photo 8, for example, shows the monument dedicated to justice that is located in front of the district criminal court on the street Beybitshilik. The image of three Kazakh judges who
wrote first legal socio-political rules in Kazakh khanate. They are the symbols of Kazakh unity. At the time when Tauke Khan (1680-1718) was ruling the state there was a split in society. So, the law created by these judges is believed to unite Kazakhs. Another meaning of the

**Photo 8 Monument to Three Kazakh Judges**

monument is probably indication of Kazakhstani constitutional history (E-history).

**Photo 9 Monument to the Women Hero of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)**

**Photo 10 Monument to Abay, the Most Famous Kazakh Poet**
The monuments erected exclusively to ethnically Kazakh heroes, khans an poets indicate that the state highlights the special status of ethnic Kazakhs in the state. This is a reflection of kazakhisation process in the urban space of Astana. This is a message to citizens that the state stresses merits of ethnic Kazakhs for national identity.

Monuments for ethnic Kazakh heroes suggest that kazakhisation process is taking place in identity policy. But sculptures and city decoration elements in the city also show that kazakhisation process has multi-ethnic dimension. The city is decorated by elements of Kazakh culture, folklore and myth. Vodno-zelenyi Boulevard is a pedestrian street in the new city center. This boulevard is decorated with elements from Kazakh folklore (Photo 11 below) along the whole boulevard. The Photo 11 illustrates camel bearing shanyrak, which represents nomadic past of Kazakh people. Shanyrak is symbol of Kazakh culture too, but it can be interpreted as a symbol of inter-ethnic unity as well. The same image of shanyrak is on the emblem of the state. In the official website of the President there is description of the emblem is given. It says that Shanyrak is a main backbone of the yurt that allows to see a blue sky and the sun. In the culture of the Eurasian nomads it is a key element of family dwelling. On the emblem it symbolizes common home and common homeland of all citizens of Kazakhstan. The same sign of shanyrak is on the façade of the Astana Opera building, which is adjacent to the Boulevard. On the official website of the theater there it is said that the theater and its design is initiated by the president and all the building is decorated with Kazakh national motifs. In fact, shanyrak as a symbol is popular. On the Photo 12 below, that depicts an entrance to President’s former residence, which has its yard decorated with sculpture of shanyrak. On the background there is a national emblem which also has shanyrak on it. Above the emblem there is national flag. This picture or the view in general is very symbolic. Decorating the building with Kazakh motifs is a sign showing the dominance of a
titular nation in the government. In addition to government buildings, shanyrak as a symbol of unity is presented in the façade of mosques, theaters, shopping malls and sport centers. On the Photo 13 below, one can see a park on the territory of the central mosque in the new city center. This park is decorated with a yurt – houses in which Kazakhs (nomadic) used to live.

Photo 12 Shanyrak at the Former President’s Residence
If one were to walk beyond these 18 streets, shanyrak as an element of city decoration can be seen all over the new city center: Barys Arena, Nazarbayev University Hall, Astana Airport, Astana Opera. The head of the center for interethnic and interconfessional studies in Central Asia in the interview said that shanyrak is not just symbol of Kazakh culture:

“It is taken from nomadic cultures. In practical sense it is a mobile house of nomadic tribes living in the territory of modern Kazakhstan. But from philosophical point of view it is a symbol of unity, integrity and family. Yurta and shanyrak symbolizes the worldview or ideology of Kazakh people. Fragile yurta stands in the middle of the steppe and welcome everyone coming to it. It is not difficult to destroy it because it is not a building. It is fragile and its doors are always open to guests. Shanyrak that is on top of it symbolizes peace, family, friendship and unity. It is not just a symbol of Kazakh culture. It is a symbol of unity”

The head of the center for interethnic and interconfessional studies in Central Asia was trying to persuade that shanyrak as a city decoration element means inter-ethnic unity and multiculturalism. So, shanyrak as a city decoration element can be perceived manifestation of Kazakh culture. But, it is worth of noting that in the official website of the president in the description for shanyrak on national emblem it is said:

“The image of shanyrak on the State Emblem of the republic is a symbol of common home and common homeland of all people living in Kazakhstan. The stable development of Kazakhstan depends on welfare of each citizen just like the strength and stability of shanyrak depends on reliability of all its uyks” (Akorda 2018)
By decorating the city with shanyrak sign the state shows the multicultural character of nationalism promotion by state. This exactly reflects the president’s discourse on national identity that puts kazakh culture as a core and integrating element of Kazakhstani identity.

Another element of city decoration which is popular in Astana’s urban space is kobyz. Kobyz is a national musical instrument in Kazakh culture. The prototypes of the musical instrument are typical for many Turkic ethnicities like Kyrgyz and Turkmen people (Bekmoldinov 2016). There is also a sculpture of a person playing kobyz on Vodno-zelenyi Boulevard (Photo 14 below). One can also see the decoration element of the city on Konayev street in the shape of kobyz, right next to Astana Opera and on its building (Photo 14 below).

Photo 14 Kobyz Monuments in the New City Center of Astana and at the Astana Opera Theatre

Bekmoldinov (2016) argues that kobyz is a part of nomadic past of Kazakhs. On instruments like kobyz and dombyra Kazakh poets and singers mostly played songs about homeland. There are many other themes to sing about for sure. However, these instruments are associated with patriotic topics. He says that one of the great examples is national anthem. The hymn is accompanied with kobyz and dombyra notes. Therefore, kobyz as a city decora-
tion element installed by city administration might symbolize promotion of both ethnic and civic nationalism.

Another element of decoration of the city is Kazakh ornament. Ornaments are a type of ancient national folk art. Kazakh ornaments are all around the city. As the Photo 15 below shows, they are on the buildings, on street bins and benches, and even on the navigation-signs for streets. The city planning architecture department from Akimat is responsible for decoration of the city. These benches and bins on the boulevard, left bank streets and parks are installed by city administration. The white-colored ornaments on the green-gray building of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (Kazakhstan Rail Road) national company show their endorsement by the state.

Photo 15 Kazakh Ornament Decorations in the New City Center of Astana

Ornaments that are used on the national flag, are widely used as decoration element in the city. On the official website of the president the symbolic meaning of the ornament is given. It is said that the vertical band is the national ornamental pattern: “this Kazakh ornament is one of the forms of specific perception of world in strict accordance with aesthetic style of the people. Representing a harmony of various forms and lines. The national ornament along the flagstaff represents the art and cultural traditions of the people of Kazakh-
stan.” The interpretation that it represents the culture of the people of Kazakhstan is rather broad. It represents the Kazakh culture. Mukanov et al (2017) argue that ornaments turned into subjects of reflecting archetypical images of Turkic nomadic past of Kazakh people which is contentious process of ethnic self-identity or search for national idea. Even though the ornaments are announced to be national symbol, they mainly represent Kazakh culture. Therefore, ornaments in the urban space of Astana show dominance of Kazakh culture in national identity.

Street Renaming

Urban space is full of cultural, social and political messages hidden in social advertisement, architecture, city planning, and monuments. Street names also play important role in identity-formation. The city of Astana is expanding very quickly, and as new streets are added. But when old street names are renamed this creates discussions. In the period from 1991-2005, there were renamed 3 regions, 12 cities, 7 regions in Astana and 957 small villages throughout the country (Tussupbekova et al 2017). Last ten years active renaming of streets was initiated in Astana. The reason is that up until 1991 the city was planned and designed by Russian-speaking government officials. After 1991, due to socio-political reasons it became necessary give new names to old streets and. To conduct this research I chose 18 streets in Astana both in the old and new centers. These streets were chosen for reason. They represent the busiest streets on old and new centers. It is impossible to capture all streets in the city for observation and it is not the aim of the research. However, there is available information on Akimat’s official website that give the list of cities that were renamed or newly appointed.

Renaming and naming of streets is also indicator of banal nationalism. Names of streets are constantly used by people in everyday life. Moreover, they show who or what is
important for state. Behind the name there is ideological message. There are 163 out of 315 central streets symbolize culture or history of Kazakh people. Among them there are included revolutionists who were for Soviet administration, Kazakh signers, artists, composers, scientists and activists. On the one hand, they could be classified as related to kazakhstaniiness or civic identity. But the names of non-Kazakh scientists, writers and activists like Furmanov, Dzerzhinskyi and Michurin were renamed to other names and removed at all. Therefore, taking into account this factor it can be argued that ethnicity of the historic figure was more important than his/her contribution to the development of the state. Though, there are names of non-Kazakh historic figures like Potanin street, Kubrin street and Zatayevich street. These are non-Kazakh scientists, social activists and poets who contributed to the science, culture and history of Kazakhstan. Therefore their names still remain the streets of Astana. The number of streets with the name of foreign scientists or political activists of other ethnicity is limited currently.

A person whom I interviewed from Akimat works as a member of city onomastics commission. She says that they receive a lot of mails and emails requesting to rename the street. Usually, requests are to eliminate all Soviet and Tsarist related names on relevant to the history of Kazakhstan names. She also said that they receive letter with complain from city residents who argue that a name a person in Kazakh is humiliated. For example, Seifullin koshesi (in Kazakh) in Russian language sounds like ulica Seifullina. For Kazakh-speaking population the letter “a” in the end of the word shows the gender of a person. So, a male Kazakh poet becomes a female when it is pronounced in Russian. Also, there was a case when a Kyrgyz citizen visiting Astana wrote a letter to Akimat asking to correct the name of Kyrgyz poet the same how it sounds in Kyrgyz Language: Chingiz to Chyngyz. Almost the same would happen to Mangilik El street. She says it is a name, it should not be translated in Russian. People should accept the name in original language. This shows that in the state bodies
workers accept the names of state programs being announced only in Kazakh language as well as street names.

I asked her questions about the job, aim and structure of onomastic commission. She said that there are 12 people in the commission: scientists, political activists, government workers and professors. The Chairman of the Board is Deputy Mayor of the city. She works in Akimat in the department for languages development since 2006. During her career she participated in renaming of more than 50 streets and giving names to 20 new streets. As it was said commission accepts requests from people and the government to consider renaming or a new name. First, commission discusses different options and offers their solution. Then, the protocol of discussion is considered by Maslikhat to take into account opinion of people. Then, the case is uploaded to the official website of the Mayor (printed on newspaper in the past). And finally, after all these procedures offer is discussed by Republican Onomastics Commission.

Tussupbekova et al (2017) argue that in the 1960s Akmolinsk was one of the major socio-cultural and political centers of Kazakh SSR. Most importantly, there were laid railway to the city. After this industrial development street names became Vagonnaya (Carriage Street), Zavodskaya (Plant Street) or Vstrecha (Meeting Street). Previously, the major streets were named after communist ideas or heroes like Lenin Street, Karl Marx Street, Kommunisticheskaya Street or Pervomayskaya (Street of May 1)., after 1991 the ideological, political and social relevance of street names became old and irrelevant. In the research of Tussupbekova et al (2017) there were identified 16 different principles of naming streets in Astana: khans and poets, military heroes, geographical places, old capitals, politicians or political events, historical women, scientists, artists, historical places, writers, lakes and mountains. As it was already mentioned in the old center or right bank there are streets named for heroes, poets and khans. The central streets are named after important Kazakh figures contributing to
the socio-political development of Kazakhs in the far past and recently. For example, the
nearby streets on President’s ex-residence are Zheltoksan, Abay, Kenesary and Beybitshilik
(Peace). Zheltoksan translated in English means December. It is not just name of a month. In
December 1996 there was a protest in Kazakh ASSR against dismissal of Dinmukhameded
Konayev (the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan) who was substituted by
Kolbin (ethnic russian). Ethnic Kazakhs went on city square in Almaty and showed their ob-
jection. But, later it turned into massive riot of people which was harshly suppressed. The
peaceful demonstration turned into bloody event where approximately 200 people died and
100 were sentenced. In the history of independent Kazakhstan, this event currently interpret-
ed as a struggle for independence of Kazakhs (National Digital History). Therefore, the cen-
tral street (old center) is named for this historically important for ethnic Kazakhs event. Ke-
essary Khan is a stateman, military leader and leader of the national liberation of Kazakh
people against Russian Empire. He is the last Khan of Kazakh Khanate (National Digital His-
tory). There is also a huge monument to Kenessary Khan on embankment park. Till 1997 the
street has name of Karl Marx.

Abay Kunanbayev is a great Kazakh poet, composer and philosopher. Most im-
portantly, his contribution to Kazakh culture and poetry lies in his works that express nation-
alism and development of Kazakh folk culture. He also a founder of Kazakh written poetry
(National Digital History 2018). In other words, he is one of founders of Kazakh written po-
etry about motherland and patriotism. Previously, the street was named Lenin Street, but in
1997 the street was renamed. And currently, there is a massive monument of Abay (picture
24) on this street in front of State Management Academy.

Beybitshilik translated in English means peace. Till 1998 it was called in Russian
language Mira (Peace). In February 1998 it was officially renamed in Kazakh name –
Beybitshilik. I believe that “peace” means peace of citizens and ethnicities. It can also mean
peace after WWII. But there is a street called “Zhenis” in Kazakh, previously in Russian “Druzhba” which means victory.

In other words, the central and strategically important streets are named after important Kazakh figures who contributed to the development of Kazakhs as a nation. But, it is worth of saying that there are streets in old center that are dedicated to peace and unity of all ethnicities in Kazakhstan like Beybitshilik (Peace), Zhenis (Victory), Maskey (Moscow) and poets, heroes and historical figures of other ethnicities – Potanina, Shevchenko and Tarkhana.

On the left bank (new center) street names are dedicated to old capitals, historical events and ideas in Kazakh history: Syganak, Akmeshit, Turkistan, Sarayshyk, Sauran, Mangilik El, Konayev and Dostyk. First five streets are the old capitals of Kazakh Khanate. Previously, up until 2007 these streets had just a number of a main street #19, 33, 34, 12 and 78. In 2007, streets were renamed on ancient capitals of Kazakh Khanate. Konayev street until 200 was called Manas street. Later, in 2009 it was renamed to Tauelsizdik (Independence) and that year to Konayev Street. Dinmukhamed Konayev was deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR from 1992-1952, later he was First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party. Riots in 1986 were partially because Gorbachev dismissed Konayev from his position and assigned Kolbin who is ethnic Russian. So, the role of Konayev is important for Kazakh nation. The other central street Dostyk is translated as “friendship”. Up until 2007 the street has just a number 2. I think it is about friendship of citizens because May 1 is the day of Unity of Kazakhstani people. During Soviet period the holiday was celebrated with popular parades in major cities. This was demonstration of the working class that expressed the solidarity with revolution and inter-ethnic peace and communist society (National Digital History 2018). Nowadays, it symbolizes almost the same – friendship and unity of different ethnicities in Kazakhstan. I interpret, Dostyk Street (Friendship) as a reflection of this holiday or multi-ethnic policy.
In the official website of Astana City Administration (Akimat) information about street names is freely available. The list of renamed and new streets is put on one organized table with chronological order. There are four columns in the table: old name, new name, date of approval (date and code) by Akimat and the date of approval by Maslihat (state body). Also, the table is divided on central streets and streets in peripheral districts. As I have an opportunity of analyzing all street names and renaming in capital city, I decided to divide them on different types: Kazakh ethnicity culture related, civic Kazakhstaniness-related and neutral. Kazakh ethnicity related refers to names that are relevant to Kazakh culture, poets, history, music, folklore, myth, songs, tales, musical instruments, heroes, musicians. Kazakhstaniness is expressed through civic values like liberty, unity, constitution, independence, ethnic friendship, peace. Neutral names of streets are those which are dedicated to flora and fauna, rivers and lakes, mountains and just numbers. As timeline is important for the research, chronological order of renaming is taken into account.

In the table there are renamed street in the whole territory of Astana, including all peripheral districts. For this analysis central districts were chosen: Yessil, Almaty, Saryarka, Prigorodnyi, South-east district, Shubar, Industrial, Energetic, Telman. In total there were renamed 315 streets. Kazakh ethnicity related street names are in majority constituting 163, the next is neutral that equals to 129 and Kazakhstaniness related account for 23 only.

In fact, within 164 Kazakh ethnicity related names there are ethnic Kazakhs who actively participated in revolutions and served Soviet and Tsarist administration. Russian names were renamed, in contrast Kazakh Soviet activists’ names remained like Dzhangildin, Seifullin and Mendeshev streets. These are social and political activists who supported Soviet government and ideology (National Digital History).
In general, the boom of renaming streets coincides with relocation of Astana as capital in 1997. 33 street names were changed, as shown in Table 1 below. It is clear from changes presented in Table 1 that all Soviet-theme streets were renamed immediately: Revolution, October revolution 50th anniversary, Socialisticheskaya, Komsomolskaya, Lenin, Marx, Tselinnik. It is worth mentioning that these streets were major busy streets. Therefore, they received names of important Kazakh heroes, Khans and poets. It is not just a surprise. These streets were central streets. So, they had very political names. In 1997, they became politically important for independent Kazakhstan. So, they were renamed on names of Abay poet, Kenessary Khan, Zheltoksan, Saken Seifullin, Mukhtar Auezov and Republic avenue.

Table 1. Renamed Astana’s Streets Since 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Old name</th>
<th>New name</th>
<th>Akimat approval (code, date)</th>
<th>Maslikhat approval (code, date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Tkachenko st.</td>
<td>Manas st.</td>
<td>04.04.97</td>
<td>3-1-100c04.04.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dalnyi st</td>
<td>Tkachenko</td>
<td>25.06.97</td>
<td>3-1-478c10.09.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>October revolution 50th anniversary</td>
<td>Omarov st</td>
<td>25.06.97</td>
<td>3-1-478c10.09.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Kirov st</td>
<td>Zhambyl Zhabayev st.</td>
<td>25.06.97</td>
<td>3-1-478c10.09.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Zheleznodorozhnyi (Railway st)</td>
<td>Mussabayeva</td>
<td>25.06.97</td>
<td>3-1-478c10.09.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Student st</td>
<td>Abylay khan st</td>
<td>28.08.97</td>
<td>3-1-478c10.09.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Celinnik st</td>
<td>Republic avenue</td>
<td>28.08.97</td>
<td>3-1-478c10.09.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>K. Marx st</td>
<td>Kenessary Khan st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Revolution st</td>
<td>Saken Seifullin st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Street 1</td>
<td>Street 2</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>October st</td>
<td>Mukhtar Auezov st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Komsomolskaya</td>
<td>Zheltoksan st.</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Delegatskii st</td>
<td>Sary arka st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lenin st.</td>
<td>Abay avenue</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ordzhonikidze st</td>
<td>Otyrar st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Avdeev st</td>
<td>Shokan Ualikhanov st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Budennyi st</td>
<td>Korkyt st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Grekov st.</td>
<td>Taraz st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kuibyshev st</td>
<td>Bayanauyl st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Mikoyan st</td>
<td>Syrdariya st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Monin st</td>
<td>Akzhaiyk st.</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Soviet Constitution st</td>
<td>Constitution st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Smakotin st</td>
<td>Zhanibek Tar-khan st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Telman st</td>
<td>Sultanmakhmut Toraygyrov</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Shvernik st</td>
<td>Mukhamedzhan Tynshbayev</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Shmid st</td>
<td>Myrzhakyp Du-latov</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Sakko and Vancetti st</td>
<td>Alikhan Bokeikhanov st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Kalachev st</td>
<td>Potanin st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Vokzalnyi st</td>
<td>Birzhan Sal st</td>
<td>05.11.97</td>
<td>3-1-600c07.11.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is also necessary to point out that some Kazak ethnic related names like Abay were also renamed. But, they were renamed because they were located on small and not important streets. So, Abay street that was a small street became Kubrin street. But, Lenin street which is a long and wide street became Abay street. This kind of relocations of Kazakh ethnicity related happened very often in coming years. For example, Ryskulov to Bukharbay batyr in 2015, Tilendiyev to Kenzhi in 2015 and Orynbor to Mangilik El in 2016. The reason is that after 2007 and 2015 the left bank started to be build up. The boom of the left bank (new center) required new street names that are important for state and society. All administrative buildings, shopping malls, business centers and offices were relocated to the left bank along with important street names. Previously, Ryskulov street was a tiny and short street on the right bank (old center). But later, in 2015 one of the major streets on EXPO area was called Ryskulov. In 2016, the Orynbor street was renamed to Mangilik El. In Chapter 2, the importance of idea of Mangilik El program was discussed. This is policy initiated by the President intended at reviving culture, history and language.
Chapter 4 Conclusion

The aim of the thesis was to answer the question how kazakhization is reflected in urban space of Astana. To answer the question I reviewed literature on kazakhisation, analyzed speeches of the president and other state documents on ideology, observed social advertisement, street names, monuments and sculptures in Astana on 18 streets. In the two previous chapters there were made analysis of the data collected on the question of national ideology the state is promoting on urban space. In general, 21 President’s speeches, 2 state documents, 18 streets having 50 social advertisement on billboards, 25 monuments and sculptures, 315 street names and 6 interviews was involved in research process to answer the question.

The speeches of the president from 1997 until 2018, Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan in 2009, 2010, 2014, Mangilik El (eternal nation) and Rukhani Zhangyru (spiritual revival) were analyzed on content. It was concluded that basically AANs of the president focus on economic situation of the country and also they contain a lot of ideological messages. He constantly refers to the role of Assembly of the people of Kazakhstan, inter-ethnic peace, unity and multicultural base of Kazakhstani society. He keeps saying that to become prosperous and developed country it is necessary to have harmony within ethnically heterogeneous society. Having multi-ethnic society, the state must ensure peace within the country first. The Assembly of people of Kazakhstan was arranged to fulfill these goals. The Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan claims that the state is unitary, the power is centralized, but representatives of different ethnicities are protected by constitution and have rights to express and practice their culture. Though, it clearly says that Kazakh culture and language have the titular status. This was accepted after nationalist movement headed by Mukhtar Shakhanov and 4000 people who signed petition to the president, asking for a special status for Kazakh culture, language and ethnicity. Later after 2010 in the speeches of the president, the special
role of Kazakh culture and language as a base for ethno-cultural development started to be highlighted. In 2012, for the first time the president announced beginning of the program Mangilik El that was not translated in Russian. Later, another state program Rukhani Zhangyryu was announced in Kazakh only. Both of these programs aim at reviving culture and identity of Kazakhstan, taking into account that Kazakh culture and language as the core to the whole Kazakhstan identity.

Street social billboards, monuments and sculptures have been observed in 18 streets in Astana. These elements of an urban space are chosen as an example of banal nationalism (Billing 1995). These elements became a part of Astana resident’s everyday life, but they have strong political and social meaning. So, I took photos of 50 social advertisements and 25 monuments and elements of décor in 18 central streets in Astana. It has been concluded that there are social advertisement and monuments promoting both civic and ethnic values. There are more social advertisement having civic message: call for cleaner city, love for Astana, the role of the Constitution, sport, health, anti-corruption promotion and others. The text on these social advertisements is written both in Kazakh and Russian. There were advertisements that were written in Russian or Kazakh only. The latest billboards are written in three languages for the convenience of tourists visiting EXPO. If the social advertisement has faces on it, representatives of different ethnicities are included except for some rare cases related to Rukhani Zhangyryu program.

The names of streets also serve as an element of banal nationalism. After 1997, 315 streets were renamed in central districts in Astana. It was concluded that 163 of them are dedicated to ethnic Kazakhs heroes, myth, legends, songs, batyrs, khans, writers, activists. And other 129 of them have neutral meaning representing names flora and fauna, and just numbers. Kazahstaniness oriented street names constituted 23 that are named to inter-ethnic
peace, friendship, civic values like constitution, and important historic figures of other ethnic-
ities.

In his 2012 AAN President Nazarbayev declared in Kazakh only that Kazakh people
are responsible for interethic peace in the state because they are dominant group and it is
their land. This was not translated in Russian and English. This shows that kazakhisation pro-
cess defined by academic literature takes place in the identity policy of the state. However,
this thesis tried to show that the process has multi-ethnic dimension. The point is that the
term kazakhisation is defined not accurately by both sides: outsiders (western scholars) and
insiders (Kazakhstani people). The contribution of this research to the literature is that it rede-
finesthe term kazakhisation. Kazakhisation takes place in the politics of the state agencies
(Presidential office and Akimat) towards national identity. However, the state does not call it
Kazakhisation. The process defined by literature covered in this thesis (Sarsembayev, Karin
and Chabotarev, Mun) as kazakhisation does not take place in Kazakhstan or at least not
proven. I would redefine the term kazakhisation as a current policy of the government aimed
at defining, reviving and strengthening Kazakh identity as a core of Kazakhstani culture, in-
cluding in the process cultures of other ethnic groups. This is what President is saying in his
Annual Addresses to the Nation, programs and this is what Assembly of People of Kazakh-
stan discusses. But, the word kazakhisation is not used in the discourse of the president. This
is the reason why in the literature for kazakhisation it is claimed to be unofficial. It is official
(in the AAN of the President, in the state programs), but the state does not use this term to
define the process. The state representative in the interview said that it is better to use the
word acculturation. It better describes the process of reviving Kazakh culture and language as
a core of Kazakhstani identity. If scholars or people will use the term kazakhisation then it
sounds like a process that is imposed and forced on people. In the reviewed academic litera-
ture kazakhisation is argued to be top-down process. But after observations and interview
with people, I argue that kazakhisation has also started in the society. The evidence to this is a petition signed by 4,000 people to change the Doctrine of National Unity, or the offers of citizens to rename the streets.

In fact, the contribution of this thesis is in its attempt to modify the definition for kazakhisation process. The thesis provided many evidences of why the definition of kazakhisation should include note about multi-ethnic character. Urban space of a capital city of the state reflects actual policy of the state regarding national identity building. The research revealed that the state has multi-ethnic policy simultaneously identifying Kazakh identity. This is clearly reflected in the urban space of Astana in social advertisement, monuments, sculptures and street names. Though, Kazakisation is embracing a more ethnic tenor lately through the programs such as Rukhani Zhangyru and Mnagilik El, it retains the multicultural components that have been emphasized in the thesis.

Overall, nationalism and identity formation for a new state is a crucial question that stands along with economic and political stability. Kazakhstan as a relatively new country started nation-building process. The case is worth of studying because of ethnically heterogeneous society living in the state. The focus of study was so called kazakhisation process that is taking place currently in the society. After reviewing literature it was argued that it is a top-down process. And the research aimed at showing how kazakhisation is reflected in urban space of Astana: in monuments, street social advertisement, sculptures, city decoration and street names. Urban space is a representation of banal nationalism theory. Street names, social advertisement on billboards and monuments become elements of everyday life. However, the message behind them has ideological meaning. The analysis of the president’s speeches and programs related to nationalism have been done. And its justification or evidence was followed in urban space of Astana. The process is believed to be unofficial in the literature because the state does not define the process as kazakhisation.


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