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NON-PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
AND REGIONAL AGENDA PROMOTION:
VARIATION IN REGIONAL REPRESENTATION

БҰҰ ҚАУПСІЗДІК КЕҢЕСІНДЕГІ ТҰРАҚТЫ ЕМЕС МҮШЕЛІК
ЖӘНЕ АЙМАҚТЫҚ КҮН ТӘРТІБІН ІЛГЕРІЛЕТУ:
АЙМАҚТЫҚ ӨКІЛДІКТЕГІ ВАРИАЦИЯ

НЕПОСТОЯННОЕ ЧЛЕНСТВО В СОВЕТЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ ООН
И ПРОДВИЖЕНИЕ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЙ ПОВЕСТКИ ДНЯ:
ВАРИАЦИЯ В РЕГИОНАЛЬНОМ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВЕ

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Contents

LIST OF TABLES	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: Country’s Intentions to Promote the Regional Agenda: Speculation or Reality?	1
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW: Are UNSC Non-Permanent Members Effective in Regional Agenda Promotion?	5
2.1 Arguments in Favor of Pure Dominance of Permanent UNSC Members	5
2.2 Arguments in Favor of Non-Permanent Members’ Ability to Influence the Agenda and Factors that Contribute to Their Influence	7
2.3 Gap in the Literature and My Research Questions	11
CHAPTER 3. THEORY: How is Regional Agenda Promotion Possible? Why Is It Important, and under What Conditions Does Regional Representation Matter?	13
3.1 Explaining the Mechanism of Non-Permanent Members’ Ability to Promote Their Regional Agenda	13
3.2 Why Regional Agenda Promotion Is So Important to Non-Permanent Members?	14
3.3 Different Dimensions of Regional Agenda Promotion	15
3.4 Characteristics of the Representative That Make Regional Representation Matter.....	17
3.4.1 Opportunity.....	17
3.4.2 Willingness	18
3.5 Alternative Explanations: Regional Characteristics beyond Representation That Might Really Matter.....	22
CHAPTER 4. DATA AND METHODS	25
4.1 Dependent Variables	26
4.2 Independent Variables.....	27
4.3 Control Variables	30
4.4 Methods.....	31

CHAPTER 5. RESULTS	32
5.1 The Effect of Representation on Raising International Attention on Security Problems of the Region	32
5.1.1 Representation versus Regional Characteristics.....	32
5.1.2 Representative’s Characteristics (Opportunity or Willingness)	34
5.2 The Effect of Representation on the Number of Peacekeepers Deployed Once the Peace Operation Is Established under the UNSC Mandate.....	36
5.2.1 Representation versus Regional Characteristics.....	36
5.2.2 Representative’s Characteristics (Opportunity or Willingness)	39
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION.....	43
APPENDIX.....	47
REFERENCES	48

LIST OF TABLES

		Page
Table 1.	Descriptive Statistics on Dependent Variables.....	27
Table 2.	Descriptive Statistics on Independent Variables.....	28
Table 3.	Results of Logit Regressions for Models, Measuring International Attention of Regional Security Issues under the UNSC.....	33
Table 4.	Robustness Check on International Attention of Regional Security Issues under the UNSC (Using Number of Regional Representatives).....	34
Table 5.	Results of Logit Regressions for Models, Measuring International Attention of Regional Security Issues under the UNSC Representative's Characteristics.....	35
Table 6.	Results of Random-Effects GLS Regression for Models, Measuring the Number of Peacekeepers Deployed for the Peace Operations.....	36
Table 7.	Robustness Check on the Number of Peacekeepers Deployed for the Peace Operations (Using Number of Regional Representatives).....	39
Table 8.	Results of Random-Effects GLS Regression for Models, Measuring the Number of Peacekeepers Deployed for the Peace Operations Representative's Characteristics.....	40
Table 9.	Descriptive Statistics on Control Variables.....	47
Table 10.	The Regional Categorization.....	47

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1. Substantive Effects of Regional Representation in the UNSC on the Number of Peacekeepers.....	37
Figure 2. Substantive Effects of Representative's Economic Power on the Number of Peacekeepers.....	41
Figure 3. Substantive Effects of Proximity on the Number of Peacekeepers.....	42

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GDP	Gross domestic product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPI	International Peace Institute
P5	Permanent Five
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
WB	World Bank

ABSTRACT

This research complements existing quantitative literature on the role of the non-permanents members in the UNSC. In particular, the research analyzes to what extent the UNSC non-permanent members successfully promote their regional agendas as regional representatives. Moreover, this analysis in its turn tries to reveal an important theoretical concern such as the ability of the less powerful states (non-permanent members) to have influence on the most powerful (the P5).

In the framework of this research the regional agenda promotion is considered as raising international attention on regional security issues and increasing the number of peacekeepers deployed to the established UN missions. Analysis of the effect of regional representation on both dimensions of regional agenda promotion is supplemented with analysis of a regional representative's individual characteristics. The latter constitutes factors of opportunity and willingness that encourage or discourage a non-permanent member to promote its region's agenda.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: Country's Intentions to Promote the Regional Agenda: Speculation or Reality?

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) plays an important role in promoting and advancing global security. Fifteen UNSC members come together to discuss the agenda that is set principally in advance and decide how to tackle relevant security issues. Ten of these members are non-permanent and are selected for a 2 year term. This relatively short period gives temporary members a chance to make efforts to deal with security threats around the world together with the permanent five. However, at the same time it is not a secret that states are by nature self-interested and they are interested in their own welfare first and foremost. Thus, in conjunction with dealing with security threats around the world as part of UNSC duty, it is more important for states to deal with security issues that are more likely to negatively affect them, i.e. coming from their respective geographical region. One way that states may work on this in the framework of the UNSC is promoting their regional agenda.

Country's intentions to promote the regional agenda during the UNSC non-permanent membership term are occasionally found in their bids for a non-permanent seat, official statements in media, etc. For example, the case of the non-permanent members selected for the latest 2017-2018 period demonstrate the relevance of these statements. Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Kairat Abdrakhmanov emphasized in his 2017 speech to Parliament that Kazakhstan intends to use its membership in the UNSC to promote its national strategic interests, among which there is a priority to strengthen stability and security for the country, as well as in the Central Asian region. Kazakhstan set a goal to represent Central Asia and is ready to defend regional problems within the framework of the Security Council (Orazgaliyeva 2017, Mar 14). Italy stated it would devote special attention to the countries of

the Mediterranean because of the proximity and historical ties with countries of the region (Italy and the UN 2017). Ethiopia as well set a goal to prioritize issues of African states, regional peace and stability (Beyene et al. 2017). Particularly these recent examples triggered my interest in examining this topic.

However, one can doubt that in reality non-permanent members can succeed in such efforts because of lack of influence on the UNSC course of work. In other words, the actual ability of non-permanent members to influence the UNSC's work determines whether non-permanent members promote their regional agendas in UNSC. In general scholars divide into two camps in their evaluation of the capabilities of non-permanent UNSC members to shape the work of the body. Some of them (e.g. O'Neill 1996; Caron 1993; Woods 1999) argue that the work of the UNSC is driven by the powerful states only, thus, elected members barely have an opportunity to influence the Council's agenda setting and its subsequent decisions on various security issues. Thus, non-permanent members are deprived of the opportunity to promote their own regional agenda. Other scholars (e.g. Langmore and Farrall 2016; Thorhallsson 2012; Mikulaschek 2017) argue that the less powerful can actually influence the body's agenda and voting.

This research aims to contribute to the existing debate and identify to what extent the UNSC non-permanent members successfully promote their regional agendas in the UNSC as regional representatives. What is the mechanism that makes the most powerful listen to the less powerful ones? What are conditions that contribute to more effective regional representation of temporary members? These are some main theoretical and empirical questions addressed in this study. These questions are important because they analyze the features of policy making at the highest diplomatic level which have substantial effect on international relations. Ultimately, it is essential to understand whether regional representation in the UNSC matters.

My approach in this research tries to complement the literature in at least three ways. Firstly, it introduces a more fragmented concept of a region. In accordance with the UN Charter, regional representation of the UNSC temporary members is based on equitable geographical representation where all continents are represented. Existing literature focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of regional representation on this continental level (Lai and Lefler 2009, 2017; Hurd 2008; Mansbridge 2003). Yet, it is apparent that sub-continental units, i.e. regions, within these grand units are so diverse, that it seems more appropriate to examine the regional representation at sub-continental level, which presents higher variation on representation and heterogeneity of interests.

Secondly, based on examining the empirical studies, this work goes beyond non-permanent membership per se to analyze the characteristics of a non-permanent member. It is essential to know who is a regional representative. In particular, I examine the effect of opportunity and willingness factors (that is a representative's economic power, political affinity with other states in a region, its proximity to threat) on regional agenda promotion.

Thirdly, the research implies two sets of empirical analysis in essence demonstrate two different dimensions of non-permanent member's promotional work in the UNSC. Two dependent variables with which regional agenda promotion is measured (attention on regional security issues and number of peacekeepers deployed under UN mission) capture representation's intangible and material effects. Findings on these both allow comparing a verbal and practical outcome of non-permanent membership.

The conducted empirical testing partially confirms the hypotheses proposed. In particular, when looking at international attention on regional security issues in general, regional representation does not matter. In this set of analysis other regional characteristics beyond representation (e.g. number of conflicts, region's total population and economic size)

tend to matter. Subsequently the effect of representative's characteristics is not significant as well. On the other hand, when it comes to such tangible outcomes as positive change in the number of personnel deployed to a mission country, representation seems to matter. Moreover, the results suggest that such factors of the representative's willingness to increase the number of peacekeepers as economic power and proximity to threat have some significant effect.

The following chapters discuss the arguments and findings in more detail. In particular, Chapter 2 is the literature review chapter, outlining the main trends in existing debates on the UNSC non-permanent membership. Chapter 3 is the theory chapter, where I provide arguments about why and how regional representation matters and works. Chapter 4 describes data and justifies methods which I use to test my hypotheses. In Chapter 5, I present my findings regarding to what extent the UNSC non-permanent members successfully promote their regional agendas in the UNSC as regional representatives. Finally, on the basis of findings and reasoning, Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks including implications of my findings, limitations of the study, and some suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW: Are UNSC Non-Permanent Members Effective in Regional Agenda Promotion?

There are different studies on the topic of effectiveness of the UNSC non-permanent membership in regional agenda promotion. This section of literature review identifies two broad groups of studies: one that emphasizes the power and influence of the permanent UNSC members and another that highlights the prospects of non-permanent members' influence. The gap that the literature helps to unveil is that much of the existing research only talks about whether non-permanent members have influence in UNSC, whereas a better way to move the literature forward is to provide a coherent theoretical framework to examine the conditions under which non-permanent members may influence the agenda within the UNSC. It is worth noting that even if literature provides examples of factors that contribute to more potential influence of non-permanent members, they are mostly qualitative, hence, restricted to case studies.

2.1 Arguments in Favor of Pure Dominance of Permanent UNSC Members

Proceeding to a detailed review, the first group of scholars has been arguing that the interactions taking place in international organizations simply reflect the power inequality, i.e. power-based (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994). Following this logic, the UNSC non-permanent members cannot themselves determine the policies they would prefer to bring under discussion and promote further simply because the most powerful states in the world are permanent member-states, power of which is reflected in their economic and military capacities. The dominance of the permanent five is also reflected in the comparatively large amount of staff that works for their missions. It is said that the overwhelming number of staff

enables big powers to influence the direction of work of non-permanent members' representatives that usually have small size delegations (Caron 1993; Woods 1999).

O'Neill (1996) also argues that temporary UNSC members cannot influence global affairs on their own. According to him, the permanent members concentrate all the power in own hands and by no means want to share it with temporary members. Therefore, very rarely non-permanent members get from the obtained seats something more than this prestigious position per se. Caron (1993) points out that it is permanent members that mostly offer the agenda and entirely determine it. According to him, it happens that the permanent members coordinate policies and agree beforehand on important decisions during the informal sessions without even inviting others to discuss the matters.

Pursuing only own interests, powerful permanent five regard non-permanent members' work function in the UNSC as simply voting in favor of their interests. Therefore, non-permanent members are important because of their votes.¹ When needed, powerful states buy the votes of others by side-payments (Moravcsik 1991, 1998). In particular, the empirical evidence shows significantly increased number in new World Bank projects for non-permanent members (Dreher et al 2009a), and more benefits from different IMF programs (Dreher et al 2009b). Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find that on average non-permanent UNSC members get 56% more aid than other countries, so they benefit from the increased aid flows coming from the biggest donors. Reynolds and Winters' (2016) recent data also reveal that the UNSC membership brings increased foreign aid afflux. So great powers merely buy the votes of the elected members and undermine their influence on the Council's course of work.

¹ This is due to egalitarian nature of the UNSC. Although the P5 possess the veto power, each member has an equal share in voting: one country = one vote. In order to adopt any resolution 9 out of 15 votes is needed.

It may seem unsurprising then that non-permanent members are not interested in substantially influencing the Council's course of work as long as their motivations to seek such seats are rooted in economic dividends they tend to receive. In addition, it is also argued that non-permanent membership increases the international standing of the state. The elected members' status grows with their growing international prestige and recognition (Hurd 2002, 2008; Malone 2000; O'Neill 1996; Russett, O'Neill, and Sutterlin 1996). Overall, satisfaction with a new international status of important state and financial profits, gained from the membership, mainly demonstrate the substantial ineffectiveness of the work of non-permanent members in the UNSC.

2.2 Arguments in Favor of Non-Permanent Members' Ability to Influence the Agenda and Factors that Contribute to Their Influence

Another group of scholars argue that less powerful states have an actual voice in the international organizations and can shape the agenda. However, non-permanent members' actual influence and success in interactions come from different factors that contribute to this. In general literature examines qualitative factors on this matter, for example, Langmore and Farrall (2016) generally assume that the effectiveness of the elected member's work depends on how the state adapts to the circumstances, and makes best of the special UNSC proceedings. Thorhallsson (2012) adds to the discussion saying that small states can get support from the UNSC on various issues, given that they will be well-prepared to the discussions at the meetings. The author emphasizes that diplomatic and leadership skills are essential for being influential. According to him, mostly it also depends on the nature of the issue; the less controversial it is, the more chances the small country will succeed at negotiations. Although Thorhallsson (2012) argues that non-permanent members have to have political incentives when serving on the UNSC, he does not elaborate on what incentives may motivate them first and foremost, e.g. proximate threats.

Scholars have found that during the presidency tenure², the state's ability to shape the work of the UNSC is the strongest (Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Tsakonas 2006; Mikulaschek 2017). The presidency in the UNSC gives a good opportunity to shape the monthly agenda and promote interests more effectively in the course of the president's personal and its state's national preferences. However, as the nature of the UNSC meetings is of great significance, even being president does not completely guarantee opportunity to intervene into program of meetings and agenda (Blavoukos, Bourantonis, and Tsakonas 2006).

The literature also examines how well non-permanent members represent their respective regions and whether they are interested enough in regional agendas promotion. However, it should be noticed that the majority of literature studies effects of the representation not on regional but on state level, thus, examining positive or negative consequences for a representative only (Malone 2000; Hurd 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Bashir and Lim 2013).

In its turn, the literature on the effects of regional representation examines the question primarily on a continental level. That is regions are grouped as continental units: e.g. Asia, Africa, etc. Therefore, one potential limitation of the literature is that it misses the regional diversity of sub-continental units: e.g. Central Asia, East Africa, etc. Non-surprisingly scholars find that in fact countries often do not represent the common regional interest (Hurd 2008; Mansbridge 2003) as the national priorities within the geographic groupings can be very different. Lai and Lefler (2009) observe that the representative state in the UNSC does not necessarily have a common voting position with countries from the same

² During the two-year term each state takes presidency over the UNSC for a period of one month. The UNSC president's primary duty is opening and leading the Security Council meetings and signing official reports of the Council. Presidency rotates from state to state in alphabetical order.

region. Therefore, they argue that non-permanent members do not represent their geographic regions.

On the other hand, the UNSC elected members have good opportunity to work on behalf of their region's interests. Langmore and Thakur (2016) argue that non-permanent members improve the work of the UNSC because they have better knowledge of the region, from which they come from, or deeper concern on this or that agenda having more detailed information on local peculiarities in comparison with other regions' representative states. The more important advantage is that using knowledge of local situation, the state can lead the meetings in times of regional crisis (Langmore and Farrall 2016).

Some scholars (Hofmann, Mendes, and Campbell 2016) conclude that ideational discrepancies among the states of the same region encourage the UNSC non-permanent member, elected from this region, to prioritize the active promotion of the discussion of regional issues under the Council's framework. Such behavior especially concerns rising powers. Hofmann et al. (2016) argue that because of ideational discrepancies operating within regional organizations the rising power faces constraints from other regional powers in attempts to resolve the controversial regional issues in own favor. Therefore, rising powers have an interest to operate in global organizations instead of regional; so, for instance, the state uses the UNSC non-permanent membership position to circumvent direct confrontation with its regional rivals. Historical accounts suggest that Latin American region did not support Brazil in its bids (Arraes 2006, cited in Malamud 2011), so through the UNSC membership Brazil strived to overcome Argentinian resistance and legitimize its interventionist policies in Haiti (Malamud 2011; Hirst 2007) so as also to enhance its regional leadership. In addition, during their terms of temporal UNSC membership, Brazil and Chile were interested in influencing the Council's decision to launch missions in Haiti with a view

to enhancing “inter-state diplomatic and military coordination” in the region (Malamud 2011).

On the other hand, if there is ideational affinity among the regional group of states, the rising power would prefer to direct most of its resources to regional organizations rather than global as it does not need project its regional leadership through the representation in the authorities of global organizations (Hofmann et al. 2016). However, the authors also emphasize that rising powers, coming from the regions with ideational affinity, will still use the UNSC membership as an opportunity to consolidate the regional organizations and express the region’s concerns.

Recent studies (Graham 2015; Hofmann et al. 2016; Matshiqi 2012) provide even more evidence that non-permanent members have a voice in the UNSC and are able to promote own national and regional interests, challenging the enduring conventional view that only permanent five determine the policies. Some UNSC non-permanent membership missions are perceived as a strong advocacy for their region’s issues, and most commonly scholars provide South Africa’s example, which often tried to emphasize the problems of the African continent. Graham (2015) and Matshiqi (2012) see South Africa’s motivations as having been rooted in reassurance of its regional power recognition.

Of course it is questionable whether advocacy translates into something more – really changing the situation. Pouliot’s (2011) analysis reveals that global organizations can help the state to announce globally its position, but unfortunately, the attempt to attract the global community’s closer attention to regional issues may remain as a mere attempt. Nevertheless, new research shows that the African states were able to influence the agenda and general work of the UNSC between 1988 and 2014 by making the UNSC deploy more peacekeepers and increase peacekeeping budget for different regions (Mikulaschek 2017); yet, it is not

clear what factors explain the variation in African states' bargaining success when there are no highly salient diplomatic years (it is argued that non-permanent members promote own interests when the permanent five need their votes most, i.e. in rare highly salient global issues). Also it would be interesting to see if Mikulaschek's (2017) empirical findings on African states' ability to influence could be generalizable, so as to ensure the external validity of his conclusions.

2.3 Gap in the Literature and My Research Questions

The main trends in literature on the regional representation in the UNSC have been identified. So far, the current state of literature lacks a comprehensive study of the effects of states' non-permanent membership in the UNSC on their respective regions. Moreover, large-N quantitative studies are rare. The attempts to examine such question are mostly limited to some case studies and the analysis of factors, contributing to more effective representation, are mostly of qualitative nature.

My research question is the following: to what extent do the UNSC non-permanent members successfully promote their regional agendas in the UNSC as regional representatives?

It is important to study whether the membership positively affects regional agendas promotion, because through examining whether representation matters for a region, it may shed more light on such theoretical concern as the ability of the less powerful states (non-permanent members) to have influence on the most powerful (the P5).

Besides, this research aims to contribute to existing literature by analyzing quantitative factors that characterize the actual ability and motivations of a non-permanent member to promote regional agenda.

Moreover, by looking at the UNSC public debates and material outcomes of those discussions, the research aims to distinguish different dimensions of regional agenda promotion that a representative may pursue.

CHAPTER 3. THEORY: How is Regional Agenda Promotion Possible?

Why Is It Important, and under What Conditions Does Regional Representation Matter?

3.1 Explaining the Mechanism of Non-Permanent Members' Ability to Promote Their Regional Agenda

The power of the UNSC permanent members is hard to underestimate and undermine. Having a veto power they can decisively put down any attempts of non-permanent members in pushing forward their initiatives, e.g. promotion of regional security agenda, if the latter act against their interests.

Nevertheless, taking into account this conditional clause, non-permanent members are able to promote the valuable for them issues. One explanation is that non-permanent members' votes may be vital to some permanent members as they may need a certain number of supporters on their side. The importance of their votes gives temporary members a bargaining power by which they can make some permanent members support a representative in its agenda promotion promising a desired vote in exchange.

One more additional explanation of how non-permanent members may make the P5 listen to them lies in the fact the permanent members strive to reach unanimity in voting. Unanimity makes it easier for the P5 to ensure compliance of the UNSC decisions and minimize the cost of carrying out resolutions adopted (Mikulaschek 2017). In sake of unanimity, the P5 may allow sometimes non-permanent members to promote their own regional agenda.

3.2 Why Regional Agenda Promotion Is So Important to Non-Permanent Members?

If permanent members are ready to share their power and are interested in allowing agenda issues that they would otherwise be less interested in, then what exactly makes it important for non-permanent members to promote their own regional agenda? Assuming that states are by nature self-interested, it is understandable that states will be more concerned with their own security than with security of remote states. State's considerations about own security does not imply ensuring the stable environment within own territory only as states need to ensure the absence of threat to its welfare that may come from its surrounding area, e.g. its region.

It is more likely that states will be affected more by the threats that may come from the surrounding area than from any other parts of the world due to the fact that territorial proximity implies a direct danger. That is why the state elected as a non-permanent member coming from the region A would be more interested to promote the security concerns of the region A than of the regions B or C, geographically remote to its area. In the absence of the representative from the region A, other representatives are unlikely to pay the proper attention to region A's security issues because their interests would be limited. For instance, during its 2004-2005 UNSC membership, Algeria always emphasized that the international community should not be "passive and indifferent" to Darfur crisis in Sudan (both states belong to North African region). It also pointed that being an African state it is more than others responsible to effectively deal with the threat (S/PV.5015).

The impediment for non-permanent members to make permanent members get interested in addressing their region's security issues and, thus, to influence the UNSC work lies in the membership structure of the UNSC. The election procedure is based on the idea of

equitable geographical representation, where the UNSC seats are equally distributed among four main continental groups: five seats for the states of Africa and Asia; one seat for Eastern European states; two seats for Latin American states; two seats for the states of Western Europe and other states. However, although all continents are represented, a limited representation problem does not allow the sub-continental groups, i.e. regions (such as North Africa, South-East Asia, etc.), to be represented equally and constantly.

In total the interests of some regions in international peace and security issues cannot be effectively considered unless they have a representative holding a seat in the UNSC, the seat that gives a state and its respective region a chance to influence the course of high politics in own favor. Therefore, winning the region's seat presents an opportunity to promote the regional security agenda.

3.3 Different Dimensions of Regional Agenda Promotion

Promoting the regional security agenda may be implemented in various ways. In the framework of this paper promotion of the regional security agenda comes in two general forms.

First, if non-permanent members want to promote regional agenda they should be concerned with raising international attention of regional security issues under the UNSC. Besides possible informal sessions, it would be more important for temporary members that the UNSC included the issue of non-permanent member's interest into the Council's agenda. Agenda includes all topics that the UNSC finds essential and relevant. It is formulated in advance and basically reflects the value the Council attaches to the issue (UN 2017). Agenda topics are then discussed in the UNSC public debates, the political significance of which is extremely high. If representative succeeds in diplomatic efforts to include the regional issue

on agenda along with other issues, this means the issue will receive comprehensive international consideration.

Second, non-permanent members are concerned with the practical outcome of their diplomatic efforts to ensure peace and stability because inclusion of some issues on agenda may increase international attention but this does not guarantee that security concerns will go beyond mere discussions. In this regard it is important to consider how non-permanent membership affects the decision-making over one of the core mandates of the UNSC – UN peacekeeping missions.³ Possessing a temporary seat in the UNSC, the representative has more chance to directly influence the SC decisions on peacekeeping missions.

Generally United Nations peacekeeping operations are conducted to prevent or eliminate threats to peace and security through joint coercive actions. One would expect that as temporary members are interested in improving the level of regional security, they are likely to pursue enlarging the scope of UN peacekeeping missions in their respective region. Particularly, in order to minimize the regional threats, non-permanent members put efforts to ensure that more peacekeepers will be deployed once the peace operation is established under the SC mandate⁴. For a non-permanent member a larger number of peacekeepers would mean more confidence in regional security situation. Empirical evidence referring to the case of

³ Another core mandate of the UNSC is imposition of international sanctions. One may argue that the UNSC regional representative during its tenure may also appeal to the Council to take up such an enforcement measure in order to eliminate regional security threats that could be removed but are rejected by authorities of state, the policies of which threaten regional stability (for example, genocide practices). Sanctions could make the target states responsible for actions condemned by the regional representative and the international community. However, whether the non-permanent membership in the UNSC leads to a higher chance of sanctions imposition is not considered in this work.

The reason why my test is looking at the number of peacekeepers is because considering peacekeeping is a harder case. It is known that the UN peacekeepers are a scarce resource and the organization would prefer to provide a scarce resource at the lowest possible level (Bayer et al. 2015). In comparison with sanctions as an option, it is a much costlier effort for the UN in terms of the additional human and financial resources because any additional peacekeeper implies increase in total salary, equipment, support services, etc. For more details on the cost of peacekeeping, see <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>

⁴ It is worth mentioning that this work does not consider the relationship between the scope of a peacekeeping mission and the success of it. See more information on why representatives need to increase UN peacekeeping mission's scope in Mikulaschek (2017); on what UN peacekeeping does on <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>

African states only, demonstrates that regional representatives made quite successful efforts to increase budget of missions and the number of personnel (Mikulaschek 2017).

Based on these explanations, I propose the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The non-permanent membership in the UNSC increases attention to security problems of the region from which the elected state comes from.

Hypothesis 2: The non-permanent membership in the UNSC positively affects the number of peacekeepers will be deployed once the peace operation is established under the SC mandate.

3.4 Characteristics of the Representative that Make Regional Representation

Matter

The hypotheses put forward above imply that non-permanent membership is expected to positively affect the security welfare of the region represented. However, the degree of successful representation may vary depending on who exactly represents the region. Different states have different interests and environmental constraints in achieving their goals. Therefore, the extent to which the regional effects will be more evident is conditional at least on two following things: opportunity and willingness. Under these conditions the representation in the UNSC might be more effective to the countries of the region and the other way round.

3.4.1 Opportunity

The representative has to be able to promote regional interests. Opportunity, as conceptualized by Most and Starr (1989, 23), is “...the possibilities that are available to any entity within any environment, representing the total set of environmental constraints and possibilities”. As it was said above, winning the non-permanent seat is already an opportunity

for a state to promote regional agenda. However, the representative state has to possess certain characteristics that would allow it to have stronger bargaining power so as to convince the UNSC members in the need to address and how to manage the regional issues at the global level politics. One of such factors is economic power of the representative, in particular how wealthy it is. Wealthy states might have stronger voice in the organization since their economic power contributes to their influence in the world arena.

Because it would be hardly possible for the permanent members to insist on the desired outcomes of voting procedure without support from non-permanent members, the P5 insure the guaranteed support by offering them a bribe. However, in comparison with economically weaker states, wealthy states seem to be less inclined to accept side-payments from the permanent five in order to vote in their favor. At least because economically powerful states are already financially sufficient, the permanent members will be forced to buy their votes at even bigger price. As this option is too costly for the P5, permanent members will have to let non-permanent members promote regional issues in exchange for their support in other issues, vital for permanent five.

Hypothesis 3a: The more economically wealthy the non-permanent member, the more likely it is to be effective in raising regional security problems at the UNSC.

Hypothesis 3b: The more economically wealthy the non-permanent member, the more likely it is to be effective in increasing the number of peacekeepers deployed as part of the UN peace operation.

3.4.2 Willingness

The representative has to be willing to promote regional interests. Willingness, conceptualized by Most and Starr (1989, 34), is "...related to a decision maker's calculations

of advantage and disadvantage, of cost and benefit, that decision makers consider on both conscious and unconscious levels". Not all non-permanent members may be very interested in promotion of regional agenda; some may be willing the representation to affect the welfare of the region more than others. Several factors that influence how willing non-permanent members are to promote regional agendas can be identified.

Proximity to threat. The non-permanent member will be more interested in improving the regional security of the state that it directly borders, and will be less inclined to care about distant states from the region. The reason is that state will be more likely to be affected by the threat that may come from a neighboring country.

For example, a state anticipates that military conflicts across the border can result in negative spillover effects (Hoeffler 2010). While any conflict has a negative impact in general on the entire region, it affects neighboring countries first and most (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008).

If a bordering state is experiencing conflict, the risk of being involved in own state conflict gets high (Gleditsch 2002, 2007; Kathman 2010). Moreover, even when the conflict is over, the other states have to be cautious as the post-conflict diffusion consequence is still high (Bara 2017).

Internal and external conflict and post-conflict situations always imply the risk of generating refugee flows and destabilizing the national and regional economies (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Even if a civil war is solely the result of internal processes, national investors may fear that the war will spread to neighbors. As a result, investors often resort to withdrawing their investments from both the country in which the war is fought and from neighboring states (Murdoch and Sandler 2004).

Preventing new conflicts and resolving disagreements in the bordering countries of the region will contribute to strengthening the security and economy of the representative himself, therefore the UNSC non-permanent member will be more willing to promote regional interests.

Hypothesis 4: The more proximate the non-permanent member is to the threat, the more likely it is to be effective in increasing the number of peacekeepers deployed as part of the UN peace operation.⁵

Political affinity with the region. Political affinity is conceptualized as “the similarity of national interests” in international politics (Bertrand, Betschinger and Settles 2016). The closeness and convergence of positions and approaches on all fundamental issues of regional and global politics, therefore, helps form common political agenda in the region in accordance with the interests of states. Pursuing the logic of common political agenda, the state, taking any position, must simultaneously assess both its national positions as well as their balanced relationship with a variety of other states’ standpoints.

Close policies of the countries from a particular region ensure regional issues are viewed as issues for the collective. Implementation of collective initiatives of the region means positive changes for each state the region.

Hypothesis 5a: The closer policy with other states from the region the non-permanent member has, the more likely it is to be effective in raising regional security problems at the UNSC.

⁵ The causal relationship between proximity of the UNSC non-permanent member and attention to security problems of the region is not observed because of coding difficulties. Issues from different countries of the region may come under consideration of the UNSC simultaneously, which makes it hardly possible to establish proper common measure of proximity.

Hypothesis 5b: The closer policy with other states from the region the non-permanent member has, the more likely it is to be effective in increasing the number of peacekeepers deployed as part of the UN peace operation.

Economic power. The indicator of a representative's wealth was regarded as an opportunity factor above assuming that richer states would be less inclined to pursue side-payments but have more bargaining power. However, at the same time economic power can be perceived as a willingness factor. In such a case, the effect of the economic power as willingness will be reverse to economic power as opportunity. In particular, the justification for this is that economically weaker states are going to ask for more help from the UNSC because they are more vulnerable to negative externalities. Economically weak states are unlikely to have enough resources to deal with regional threats and effectively prevent spillover effects of conflicts. In their turn, strong countries would be more confident to handle the threats themselves; that implies that, for instance, they have abundant of at least enough resources to secure their own territories well, or be financially able to accept the flow of refugees, or afford sending own contingents to the hot spots.

Hypothesis 6a: The less economically wealthy the non-permanent member, the more likely it is to be effective in raising regional security problems at the UNSC.

Hypothesis 6b: The less economically wealthy the non-permanent member, the more likely it is to be effective in increasing the number of peacekeepers deployed as part of the UN peace operation.

3.5 Alternative Explanations: Regional Characteristics beyond Representation That Might Really Matter

There might be some other regional characteristics beyond non-permanent representation that matter.

These regional characteristics include (but are not limited to) a total number of states in a given region, its population, economic size, and conflicts within a given region.

Number of states and population. If there are many countries in the region, their impact on international processes is more significant. That is, if an outbreak of tension arises in one country, per saltum a large number of countries can be affected, so the need for closer attention is justified. In the same way, the security problems in the region with a large population size obviously deserve more attention and protective measures because of greater potential negative consequences.

Hypothesis 7a: The greater the number of states in the region, the more attention to its security problems.

Hypothesis 7b: The greater the number of states in the region, the more peacekeepers will be deployed as part of a peace operation established under the SC mandate.

Hypothesis 8a: The greater the population of the region, the more attention to its security problems.

Hypothesis 8b: The greater the population of the region, the more peacekeepers will be deployed as part of a peace operation established under the SC mandate.

Economic size. Economic size of the region defines its vulnerability to potential conflicts. There are different empirical studies that have found some evidence that economic

development of a region impacts the degree of its socio-political destabilization (Weede 1981; Nafgizer and Auvinen 2002; MacCulloch 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Miljkovic and Rimal 2008). These studies reveal that less economically developed states are more prone to conflicts. As a result, conflicts in those regions become a focus of the UNSC consideration. Meanwhile, the UNSC barely addresses security issues of economically developed regions at least because the examples of highly developed regions (Northern America, Northern Europe, and Western Europe) demonstrate low or even no conflict intensity.

Hypothesis 9a: The lower the economic size of the region, the more attention to its security problems.

When it comes to the link between the economic size of the region and the number of peacekeepers, the situation should be different because I consider the states where missions are established. Therefore, the above listed stable and highly developed regions are excluded. From a range of the regions left (developing or least developing regions) the UNSC is more likely to send more peacekeepers to richer regions because the latter are more tied to the world economic web and are more likely to send ripples to other countries.

Hypothesis 9b: The higher the economic size of the region, the more peacekeepers will be deployed as part of a peace operation established under the SC mandate.

Conflicts. Conflicts define a high degree of salience of security issues. In comparison with, for instance, militarized disputes, they result in serious tangible damages and losses that require international reaction and response. Conflicts pose a danger to international peace and security. They are usually accompanied by a risk of violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms, threats to the lives and health of civilians, they create prerequisites for violating the international legal principles (in particular, prohibiting the use of chemical or other types of dangerous weapons). In addition, the use of armed forces in a conflict on a

certain territory carries a threat to the surrounding territories (countries, regions). Therefore, since these problems are prioritized for resolution under the UN Charter, the Security Council is directly responsible for the situation in a conflicting region because dealing with international conflicts throughout the world is its primary task. As a region may experience several conflicts simultaneously, this multiplies the importance of addressing its security issues at the UNSC level.

Hypothesis 10a: The more conflictive is the region, the more attention to its security problems.

Hypothesis 10b: The more conflictive is the region, the more peacekeepers will be deployed as part of a peace operation established under the SC mandate.

CHAPTER 4. DATA AND METHODS

The research involves two sets of empirical analysis. The first one implies testing the effect of regional representation on raising regional issues at the UNSC and the second one implies testing the effect of regional representation on the number of peacekeepers deployed to the given region. As the first set of analysis covers all regions, the unit of analysis is a region-year. As the second set of analysis covers only those regions where the UN conducts peace missions, the unit of analysis is restricted to a mission-year.

The concept of a region in the research is operationalized at a sub-continental level. That means that complex grand regions are split in several regions, e.g. Asia is divided into Central Asia, Southern Asia, South-Eastern Asia, Eastern Asia, and Western Asia. Regions and countries that belong to them are classified in accordance with the UN Statistics Division data, generally referred to as M49 standard (United Nations 2018a). I chose this classification for the sake of statistical convenience because it is also used by International Peace Institute (IPI) in their Peacekeeping Database, which I need for the second set of empirical analysis. My dataset includes 17 regions in total because I slightly modified M49 standard to suit my research task. In particular, Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia are regarded as one region with Australia and New Zealand because the first three comprise very small islands. I excluded Eastern European and West African regions from the study because they have always been represented on the UNSC.

I constructed a panel dataset because, first of all, the research supposes studying the effect of non-permanent membership on regional agenda promotion, comparing times when the region is represented and not, also taking into account that non-permanent membership lasts strictly 2 years. Moreover, the values of the majority of variables change over time.

The overall temporal dimension of the research covers a 1991-2017 time period, which provides a sufficient number of observations for a statistical analysis. This time period is limited by the availability of data on the dependent variables.

4.1 Dependent Variables

The first dependent variable is international attention on a region's security issues. To measure this variable, I did a content analysis of official formal meetings records of the UNSC (United Nations 2018b).⁶

The UN official website contains the records of the official UNSC meetings starting from 1994 to present. I examined whether regional issues were included on the official UNSC agenda during two years of the representing country's membership comparing this to times when there was no representative from the particular region. The variable attention is dichotomous. It is coded 1 if regional issues were raised and 0 if they were not.

The second dependent variable is a total number of peacekeepers deployed to a given region once the peace operation was established under the SC mandate. The total number of peacekeepers is an aggregation of the UN mission troops, police and observers. Comparing times when there was and was not a representative from a particular region, the research aims to find out whether the elected states during their term service made SC increase the number of peace-keepers under peacekeeping operations, thus, improving the security situation in the region. Data on peace operations from 1991 to 2017 is obtained from the new IPI Peacekeeping Database (International Peace Institute 2018), which in its turn is based on the archival UN records.

⁶ The course of the UNSC work implies both formal and informal meetings. During these meetings parties engage in interactions where state representatives may direct negotiation process in a favorable trend. Informal meetings are not recorded, therefore, it is impossible to evaluate how successful representatives were in working on behalf of their regions. Nevertheless, the formal meetings and final official decisions on various matters are generally preceded by nonpublic discussions and tend to reflect the products of the latter.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on Dependent Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Attention	408	0.5172	0.500	0	1
Peacekeepers	214	7484.416	13434.77	12.75	153529

4.2 Independent Variables

The main independent variable is the non-permanent membership in the UNSC. It is coded as a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if a region is represented and 0 if it is not. The data source is the list of all countries that have been elected as members of the Security Council at least once since 1946. The list is available on the UN official website (United Nations 2018c).

As the study is aimed to examine the conditions that might make the representation of the region in the UNSC more effective, that is that the regional agenda will be more likely to be promoted, independent variables also include factors that might influence how willing and how capable non-permanent members are in promoting regional agendas.

Economic power of a representative is a continuous variable measured by its GDP as an indicator of the representative's health of economy. The data on GDP of all non-permanent members is available from the World Bank Open Data: World Development Indicators, which is reported at 2010 constant US dollars (World Bank 2018). I use the logarithm of GDP to Logged GDP so as to make it more normal and decrease the scale.

Political affinity is measured by calculating the similarity of representative and other regional states' votes in the UNGA. The data is taken from the United Nations General Assembly Voting Data by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017). First, I generated political affinity variable for each dyad (a representative – other country in a region) at a given year by

creating an opposite value for their absolute distance variable, which is “the distance between country 1 and country 2 posterior mean ideal point estimates.” Then I calculated the mean value of all dyads in a region at a given year, which reflects foreign policy similarity between a representative and all other countries in a region.

Proximity is coded as a dichotomous variable taking 1 if a representative is contiguous to a mission-country and 0 if not. Data from the Correlates of War Contiguity data set is used (Stinnett et al. 2002). This variable is used only to test a representative’s characteristics effect on the number of peacekeepers. In most observations there is one UN mission per region. In cases when there are several UN peace missions in a given region at a particular year, proximity is coded 1 if a representative is contiguous to at least one mission-country.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Independent Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Representation	457	0.431	0.496	0	1
Number of Representatives	457	0.490	0.607	0	2
GDP	188	650	1240	0.82	6000
Logged GDP	188	25.681	1.912	20.525	29.423
Affinity	173	-0.448	0.374	-1.562	-0.068
Proximity	102	0.637	0.483	0	1
Number of States	459	9.499	4.155	2	18
Population	437	341	455	28	1800
Logged Population	437	18.996	1.109	17.148	21.311
Total GDP	441	2700	4000	75	18700
Logged Total GDP	441	27.677	1.471	25.041	30.569
Conflicts	289	0.650	1.013	0	5

Note: Variables GDP and Total GDP are given in billions of U.S. dollars; variable Population is given in millions.

I also run robustness tests with another measure of independent variable – number of regional representatives. In some cases a region is simultaneously represented by more than one state. In this regard, assuming that a group of representatives has a similar interest in improving security situation in the region, representatives can create coalitions that will help them more effectively translate their interests into actions. The data is taken from the list of all countries that have been elected as members of the Security Council at least once since 1946 (United Nations 2018c).

The following set of independent variables is aimed to test the effect of other regional characteristics beyond representation that might matter.

Number of states is a discrete variable and represents a total number of states in a given region. Data on the number of states in a region is taken from the UN Statistics Division M49 Standard (United Nations 2018a).

Population of a region is also a discrete variable and represents a total population of a given region. Population data is obtained from the World Bank Open Data: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018).

Economic size of a region is a continuous variable. I took individual state GDP values from the World Bank Open Data: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018) and summed GDP of all states in a region. So as to make it more normal and decrease the scale I use logarithm of total regional GDP to Logged Total GDP.

Conflicts variable represents an average number of conflicts in a region. This variable includes civil and interstate wars because both types of war represent salient security issues that pose a threat to international peace and security. The data on conflicts is obtained from the Inter and Intra state wars Correlates of War dataset (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).

4.3 Control Variables

As I conduct two sets of analysis (based on my dependent variables), I distinguish the control variables used. The following set of control variables is used in both sets of analysis.

The first control variable is political stability of a representative because more politically stable states might fear external threats less. Data is extracted from the WB Worldwide Governance Indicators, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism dataset (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010).

Another control variable is representative's national material capabilities. This variable is another dimension of representative's power different from its economic strength. The data is taken from the Correlates of War project for the Composite Index of National Capabilities v5.0 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).

Foreign policy difference is a control variable obtained from the United Nations General Assembly Voting Data by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017). Original data captures the absolute distance of a pair of countries "posterior mean ideal point estimates". I calculated the mean value of all dyads in a region at a given year, which reflects foreign policy difference between a representative and all other countries in a region.

The following set of control variables is relevant only to the part that considers the number of the UN peacekeepers.

The first control variable is the number of missions which helps estimate properly other variables' effect on number of peacekeepers. The region can be characterized by one mission per country or several at the same time as a few different missions can be established at one state. The data is taken from the IPI Peacekeeping Data on missions (International Peace Institute 2018).

Lastly, another control variable is the number of contributors. Missions are formed if countries voluntarily contribute own personnel, which then constitute mission's number of peacekeepers. The number of contributors varies across missions and time, which affects the total number of peacekeepers. The data is obtained from the IPI Peacekeeping Data on contributors (International Peace Institute 2018).

4.4 Methods

Because I conduct two sets of empirical analysis with different types of dependent variables, one of which is dichotomous and the other one is continuous, there is a need to use different regression models as well. Particularly, for a dependent variable attention, I use logistic regression models. For a dependent variable peacekeepers I use Random-effects GLS regression. Because the dataset is panel, all the regressions are conducted with lagged independent variables. In both sets of panel regression analysis I employ year fixed effects because years may have different characteristics that may be spuriously related. As each year is individualistic, I try to account for the influence of time-series trends.

CHAPTER 5. RESULTS

The following section demonstrates and discusses the results of statistical analysis, firstly, for hypotheses with the first dependent variable – raising international attention of regional security issues under the UNSC, and, secondly, for hypotheses with the second depending variable – the number of peacekeepers deployed for the peace operations established under the UNSC mandate.

The results of both types of hypotheses are organized in such a consecutive manner so as to demonstrate the overall effect of representation versus regional characteristics. The results of both types of hypotheses then proceed to demonstrate whether representative's characteristics (opportunity or willingness factors) matter.

5.1 The Effect of Representation on Raising International Attention on Security

Problems of the Region

5.1.1 Representation versus Regional Characteristics

The Table 3 below demonstrates the statistical findings for Dependent variable 1 - raising international attention of regional security issues under the UNSC, distinguishing results of representation's effect (Hypothesis 1) and regional characteristics' effect (Hypotheses 7a, 8a, 9a, 10a).

As both models predict (with and without year fixed effects) having a regional representative at the UNSC does not matter when it comes to raising regional issues. The coefficients of representation are negative, which is opposite to predicted hypothesis, and statistically insignificant.

On the contrary, all of the region's characteristics are consistent with expected results with different level of statistical significance. The most significant one is the coefficient of number of states in the region ($p < 0.01$) which takes a positive sign as predicted (7a). Total region's population is of border statistical significance ($p < 0.1$) and positive as hypothesized (8a). Negative and significant ($p < 0.05$) GDP variable indicates the plausibility of a prediction (9a) that economically weak regions need and receive more attention than economically strong ones. Coefficient for Conflicts is positive and significant at 5% level, which supports Hypothesis 10a.

Table 3 Results of Logit Regressions for Models, Measuring International Attention of Regional Security Issues under the UNSC

Dependent variable: attention	Model (1)	Model (2) (year fixed effects)
Representation	-0.10 (0.60)	-0.17 (0.61)
Number of States	0.30 (0.10)***	0.31 (0.11)***
Logged Population	0.74 (0.44)*	0.79 (0.48)*
Logged Total GDP	-0.92 (0.42)**	-0.97 (0.45)**
Conflicts	8.29 (3.62)**	8.18 (3.57)**
Constant	8.28 (7.26)	9.68 (7.52)
Pseudo R-squared	0.37	0.39
N	255	255
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$		

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.

The Table 4 below presents results of the robustness tests with another measure of independent variable – number of regional representatives. In general, the results are pretty much the same as in previous table with a minor exception of Population coefficient, which is

now slightly more significant in year fixed effect model ($p < 0.05$). Whether a region is simultaneously represented by more than one state does not matter.

Table 4 Robustness Check on International Attention of Regional Security Issues under the UNSC (Using number of regional representatives)

Dependent variable: attention	Model (3)	Model (4) (year fixed effects)
Number of Representatives	-0.387 (0.558)	-0.478 (0.589)
Number of States	0.308*** (0.096)	0.329*** (0.106)
Logged Population	0.788* (0.438)	0.849* (0.481)
Logged Total GDP	-0.906** (0.430)	-0.960** (0.465)
Conflicts	8.538** (3.600)	8.448** (3.546)
Constant	6.944 (6.789)	8.232 (7.126)
Pseudo R-squared	0.373	0.398
N	255	255
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$		

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.

Overall, Table 3 and Table 4 findings suggest that it is region's characteristics that matter, while neither representation of the region in the UNSC nor the number of states representing it makes a positive and considerable difference in raising regional issues.

5.1.2 Representative's Characteristics (Opportunity or Willingness)

Table 5 below summarizes the results from analysis of representative's characteristics that come from hypotheses 3a, 5a, 6a. Models (5) and (6) show the effect of economic wealth and representative's affinity with the region without and with year fixed effects, respectively. Models (7) and (8) add control variables in testing.

Table 5 Results of Logit Regressions for Models, Measuring International Attention of Regional Security Issues under the UNSC Representative's Characteristics

Dependent variable: attention	Model (5)	Model (6) (year fixed effects)	Model (7)	Model (8) (year fixed effects)
Logged GDP	-0.316 (0.218)	-0.438 (0.273)	-0.586 (0.403)	-0.689* (0.411)
Affinity	-0.918 (1.096)	-1.397 (1.285)	-2.437 (3.320)	-2.401 (3.477)
Capabilities			31.61 (30.80)	42.35 (29.20)
Political Stability			-3.012 (3.163)	-3.138 (3.941)
Foreign Policy Difference			-0.447 (3.033)	-0.375 (3.076)
Constant	7.925 (5.295)	12.42** (6.329)	16.69 (11.19)	18.93* (11.50)
Pseudo R-squared	0.06	0.13	0.15	0.21
N	158	158	97	97
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$				

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.

The results do not support the predictions concerning affinity in any models. The coefficient is negative, which contradicts hypothesis 5a but statistically insignificant at the same time.

The GDP coefficient gains some statistical significance ($p < 0.1$) when in a model with controls and year fixed effects (Model 8 predicts 21% of total variance, which is higher than other 3 models given). The negative sign contradicts hypothesis 3a, which proposes that economically powerful states would have more bargaining power in the UNSC debates, but supports hypothesis 6a, which means that economically weak states call for more need and, thus, attention on regional security issues. Nevertheless, such an effect is quite marginal.

5.2 The Effect of Representation on the Number of Peacekeepers Deployed Once the Peace Operation Is Established under the SC Mandate

5.2.1 Representation versus Regional Characteristics

This section runs analysis on the second depending variable – the number of peacekeepers deployed for the peace operations established under the UNSC mandate.

Table 6 Results of Random-effects GLS Regression for Models, Measuring the Number of Peacekeepers Deployed for the Peace Operations

Dependent variable: peacekeepers	Model (9)	Model (10) (year fixed effects)
Representation	2,591** (1,147)	2,500* (1,397)
Number of States	442.5*** (151.7)	429.2*** (164.1)
Logged Population	-1,119 (947.2)	-1,307* (774.7)
Logged Total GDP	428.1 (765.8)	557.6 (827.1)
Conflicts	-4,092 (6,930)	-2,234 (5,802)
Constant	9,407 (13,890)	9,262 (15,655)
R-squared	0.13	0.24
N	139	139
N of groups	10	10

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.


The effects of representation (Hypothesis 2) and region's characteristics (Hypotheses 7b, 8b, 9b, 10b) on the scope of the UN peace missions (Dependent variable 2) are presented in Table 6 above.

Two columns in Table 6 show that representation coefficient is positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.05$ in Model 9, and $p < 0.1$ in Model 10 with year fixed effects) as

predicted by the statistical model. When the region is represented at the UNSC, on average we expect 2,500 more peacekeepers to be sent to ongoing missions – this basically supports Hypothesis 2 and, thus, indicates that non-permanent members are more successful in promoting regional agenda from a practical side.

Figure 1 below graphically depicts how having a non-permanent member on the UNSC affects the number of peacekeepers.

Figure 1. Substantive Effects of Regional Representation in the UNSC on the Number of Peacekeepers



However, at the same time, the effect of the region's characteristics cannot be neglected either. As for number of states, this variable takes positive and strongly significant coefficient ($p < 0.01$).

Interestingly that population coefficient is negative and significant at 10% level, which is contrary to Hypothesis 8b. One potential explanation is that this is due to population outliers. Some regions which are characterized by a high population number can actually have one or two heavily populated countries, however, the scope of the UN mission is not expected to be directed by the population size of these outliers.

Positive value of regional GDP is consistent with the direction of Hypothesis 9b but it is not statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot be confident enough to argue that richer regions get more peacekeepers.

Negative values of Conflicts variable are contrary to Hypothesis 10b; however, it is worth mentioning that these values are statistically insignificant. The likely explanation for such unpredicted effects lies in the nature of missions themselves. That is these variables might better capture the very establishment of UN peace missions, and might not matter once the operation is already established, which is considered in the framework of this paper.

The Table 7 below presents results of the robustness tests with another measure of independent variable – number of regional representatives, as in testing of raising regional issues in the first section of results.

Representation still holds a statistically significant and positive value ($p < 0.01$). Number of states coefficient is positive and significant at 1% level. Other variables that stand for regional characteristics also have odd coefficients as in Table 4. In addition to the potential explanation of such coefficients mentioned above, it can be added that variable Conflicts might affect direction of region's characteristics the most. Coefficients of Conflicts variable are characterized by big standard errors. Probably looking at the total number of civil and interstate wars is not the best measure of how conflictive the region is because one single

conflict may be more threatening or disastrous than several others taken together, requiring much more peacekeepers.

Table 7 Robustness Check on the Number of Peacekeepers Deployed for the Peace Operations (Using Number of Regional Representatives)

Dependent variable: peacekeepers	Model (11)	Model (12) (year fixed effects)
Number of Representatives	2,404** (1,028)	2,404* (1,253)
Number of States	440.2*** (146.5)	425.2*** (159.3)
Logged Population	-1,109 (914.0)	-1,324* (743.7)
Logged Total GDP	453.4 (740.7)	581.7 (791.9)
Conflicts	-3,991 (6,685)	-1,998 (5585)
Constant	8,579 (13,606)	9,005 (15,565)
R-squared	0.13	0.24
N	139	139
N of groups	10	10

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.

5.2.2 Representative's Characteristics (Opportunity or Willingness)

The results from analysis of effect of representative's characteristics are summarized in Table 8 below. The Table 8 and Figures 3 and 4 show evidence that whether the scope of the UN peace operation will be increased or not depends on who exactly represents a region. In particular, the effect of representative's economic power and proximity to threat on the number of peacekeepers is observed.

As Hypothesis 6b predicts, less economically powerful states would want to ensure more peacekeepers are deployed for UN missions, which is demonstrated by negative

coefficient in Models 13-16. In Models 15 and 16, when controls are included, GDP value is statistically significant at 5% level.


Table 8 Results of Random-Effects GLS Regression for Models, Measuring the Number of Peacekeepers Deployed for the Peace Operations Representative's Characteristics

Dependent variable: peacekeepers	Model (13)	Model (14) (year fixed effects)	Model (15)	Model (16) (year fixed effects)
Logged GDP	-1,001 (1,464)	-973.8 (1,591)	-1,620** (787.5)	-1,839** (864.1)
Affinity	-9,549*** (2,866)	-8,124** (3,248)	-4,777 (5,071)	-4,458 (6,180)
Proximity	587.5 (4,273)	-1,556 (4,704)	2,489 (2,132)	3,110* (1,764)
Number of missions			-2,436* (1,311)	-1,679 (1,881)
Number of contributors			207.2*** (50.51)	201.8*** (66.26)
Political Stability			-1,754* (966.3)	-486.5 (1,054)
Foreign Policy Difference			4,576 (4,896)	2,641 (11,483)
Constant	29,210 (34,773)	24,524 (38,763)	35,880* (19,803)	35,757 (25,032)
R-squared	0.08	0.28	0.61	0.75
N	80	80	55	55
N of groups	7	7	7	7

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.

Figure 2. Substantive Effects of Representative's Economic Power on the Number of Peacekeepers




Some marginal effect is observed when it comes to Proximity in Model 16. This model suggests that on average 3,110 more peacekeepers are deployed to missions that are geographically proximate to the UNSC non-permanent representative.

It is very interesting that although affinity value is not significant, it has a constant negative value and even significant negative value in models without controls. This is opposite to theoretical predictions of Hypothesis 5b. If affinity shows some significance in future tests of such type, this could be explained by proposing that representatives that are not politically affine with their regional counterparts cannot overcome regional resistance and try to transfer those issues to IOs level where they currently have some leverage power as in case

of the UNSC non-permanent membership. However, we cannot be sure about this unless results much more confidently demonstrate so.

Figure 3. Substantive Effects of Proximity on the Number of Peacekeepers



CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

The empirical results are partially consistent with theoretical expectations. In particular, it is found that a regional representative in the role of the UNSC non-permanent member does not seem to have an effect on raising international attention on regional security issues. What explains this international attention more are regional characteristics such as number of states in a region, total regional population and regional economic size, and conflicts in a region. However, when it comes to the number of peacekeepers deployed to the established UN missions the situation changes. The effect of regional representation is positive and statistically significant which gives a way to the argument that regional representation matters. Therefore, non-permanent members may not increase attention, which is only on the level of the UNSC open debates, but they may tend to improve the ongoing security situation in the region that might otherwise more likely to affect their own countries.

Another important finding is that as long as non-permanent members succeed in increasing the number of peacekeepers, this happens on a conditional basis. In particular, the mission is more likely to be enlarged in terms of peacekeepers if current regional representative is going to be affected by negative consequences of regional conflicts more severely; that is a non-permanent member is contiguous to the mission-state or it is not economically powerful to handle the situation.

The main theoretical implication is that non-permanent members do have some influence on the permanent members of the UNSC. Otherwise, as the permanent members are always there, the number of peacekeepers would not change even when there is a regional representative because the interests of the permanent members are more or less constant over time, taking into account that non-permanent membership lasts 2 years only. Therefore, this

suggests that the P5 shares power with non-permanent members by allowing them to influence the scope of the UN missions most likely in exchange for their support in issues that interest the P5 more.

The limitation of the paper is that it is quite hard to reveal the true causal mechanism when interpreting the results on the first set of hypotheses concerning raising attention on regional security issues. On the one hand, non-permanent members themselves may not be interested in regional agenda promotion in such a way. In particular, they may doubt the efficacy of their diplomatic efforts because even if they succeed in attracting international attention on regional problems, the real issue solving may remain on the level of mere discussions. Therefore, non-permanent members might make vigorous and determined attempt towards practical realization of regional agenda promotion, for instance, increasing the scope of peacekeeping operations so as to guarantee more the security in their region. That is why we see that the results on the latter are more statistically significant in comparison with non-permanent members' raising attention on regional security issues. On the other hand, there is another potential theoretical explanation that permanent members block the efforts of non-permanent members on their attempts to include desired issues on the UNSC agenda. In this case this gives scholarly work (e.g. O'Neill 1996; Caron 1993; Woods 1999) more confidence in arguing that the work of the UNSC is driven by the powerful states only and elected members barely have an opportunity to influence the Council's course of work. Nevertheless, this works requires additional qualitative research to help understand the phenomenon better. In this regard, I would suggest in-depth interviews with the delegations of non-permanent representative states.

There are some additional suggestions on the further work on this research. Although I have used fixed effects models to capture unobserved effects, there is still a possibility that

other factors not accounted for in the model, may be responsible and influence both issue raising and peacekeeping numbers.

One suggestion is to include the variable salient years. By salient years are meant years when the UNSC experiences most heated debates on the world's top priority issues. In this situation the P5 can hardly reach a unanimous decision. Each permanent member needs the support of its coalition the most, and persuades other members as well. As the votes become more precious, the bargaining power of non-permanent members increases. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) argue that when salient issues occur, for instance, Suez or Kosovo issues, the total bilateral aid provision to the UNSC non-permanent members from the side of the US goes up substantially. Alternatively non-permanent members may succeed in regional agenda promotion. I did not consider this variable because I found no primary data source on salient years. The timeframe of Kuziemko and Werker (2006) data on salient years does not coincide with one of the current research. Therefore, other source of reliable data will be needed in further work.

Another suggestion on the further work is to look at the ties between non-permanent and permanent members. Closeness with the P5 may imply that temporary members are more likely to gain the P5 support in their endeavors. However, one may face difficulties in operationalization of this variable. I tried to look at the average distance between foreign policies of a non-permanent member with each permanent member, using data by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), but interpretation of the derived values would hardly reflect the real level of closeness with the P5 since permanent members often have polar positions. Therefore, another measure is required.

Both suggested variables fall into the opportunity category in the framework of this research because they open up possibilities available to the non-permanent members in

regional agenda promotion. At the same time, the research may be further enhanced by inclusion of some willingness variables other than proximity, economic size, and political affinity because there might be something that these willingness variables do not capture.

As it was mentioned in the theory part, I omitted the analysis of sanctions as an alternative dependent variable because considering peacekeepers was evaluated as a harder case. Nevertheless, examining the effect of regional representation on sanctions might be interesting and important since it is one of the frequently used UNSC's enforcement instruments.

All things considered, one more important aspect to mention is a policy implication of this research. It is suggested that the UNSC should be reformed in a way that would enable all the geographical regions to be represented. Currently 17 geographical regions considered in this research are not represented equally and constantly. But when occasionally they are represented, we see changes at least in the scope of peacekeeping operations.

From the 1960s all the attempts to reform the structure of the UNSC have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, every year many countries raise the question of reforming the UNSC (Boutros-Ghali 1992; UN Press Release GA/10371 2005; Watt 2017, Sept 4). The ways they suggest to make the UNSC more representative commonly refer to including several more permanent members or enlarging temporary seats. In this regard, although the likelihood of the UNSC reform is low, I think it is essential to not merely expand the current number of seats but consider a fair way of enlargement. To make all voices equally heard, that is let all regions be represented, it is proposed to transform representation from continental to a regional sub-level.

APPENDIX

Table 9. Descriptive Statistics on Control Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Capabilities	158	0.009	0.015	0.00005	0.081
Political Stability	135	0.048	0.903	-2.603	1.760
Foreign Policy Difference	171	0.337	0.264	0.046	1.216
Number of missions	214	2.164	1.620	1	7
Number of contributors	214	54.525	54.354	5	629.818

Table 10. The Regional Categorization

#	Region
1	Eastern Africa
2	Middle Africa
3	Northern Africa
4	Southern Africa
5	Eastern Asia
6	South Asia
7	Central Asia
8	South-eastern Asia
9	Western Asia
10	Northern Europe
11	Southern Europe
12	Western Europe
13	Caribbean
14	Central America
15	South America
16	Northern America
17	Oceania

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